RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII

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KG Erwin -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 4:51:02 AM)
I put in a call for a medic. Hope he arrives soon. [;)]

Devil Doc -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 7:35:38 AM)
GENERAL THOUGHTS I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces. At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations. 2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong. THE MARINE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC 1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing. No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause. Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II. 2. Marine units in combat during World War II absorbed casualty levels that, by the book, should have made them combat ineffective. You don't have to take my word, find the casualty statistics for yourself. On Iwo Jima, there were approx. 48,000 casualties on 8 square miles of ground during the 30-some days of combat. No other battlefield anywhere in World War II reached that level of concentrated violence, not even on the eastern front. 3. The Vth Amphibious Corps had a ONE HOUR respite before the Japanese opened up on the from Suribachi, from the defensive forts on the left flank and from the prepared defenses on Motoyama #1. I wouldn't call that an 'easy landing', but maybe you were there? The first platoon to make it across the narrow strip to the west coast of the island had 5 men left in it. 13 battalion commanders were killed or wounded on Iwo. 4. There were no great sweeping drives in the Pacific campaigns the Marine Corps fought in. The Japanese did not surrender, so the Marines had to destroy every shread of resistance before an island was secured. And in many campaigns, they fought shoulder to shoulder with Soldiers. The only time the Japanese surrendered in significant numbers was on Okinawa, and that didn't occur until after our forces broke through the Shuri Line. Okinawa was a blood bath. No campaign in World War Ii even came close, except on the eastern front. 5. No other military force in the 20th century was able to maintain a uniformly high standard during expansion as the US Marine Corps. The German army defeated itseef through its haphazard growth. The Waffen SS ceased to be a elite organization because it grew too large, too fast with no sustainment base. The Germans did not grasp the logisitical realities of fighting a mechanized army. They never had one anyway, only armored and mechanized units embedded in an essentially 19th Century army. The Marine Corps's expansion (and for that matter, the US Army's) was controlled, logical, and most importantly SUSTAINABLE. The American armed forces did not expand beyond our industrial capacity due to centralized planning. The most damning evidence against supposed German military superiority was their drive to have as many little armies as possible, instead of one powerful & combined military force.

Devil Doc -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 7:38:24 AM)
I'm here for you buddy, only if you're lookin' for a corpsman!

Dragoon 45 -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 9:31:15 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: Original: KG Erwin To Iron Duke: A further part of my argument is based on the Marines' opponents, arguably the toughest we faced during WWII. The casualty ratio alone doesn't tell the story, because in many of the island assaults, the Japanese fought literally to the last man. Every amphib invasion was another D-Day, and we were never defeated. While technologically, the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, they never surrendered en mass, and in contrast to our German opponents, only defended more fanatically and constructed even more formidable defenses as the war went on. KG, I think none of the Amphib operations the Marines ever launched were tougher than what the Allies faced on D-Day, I really don't. You can argue the one that was tough - Tarawa - nearly ended in disaster. If memory serves, at Iwo and Okinawa, the Marines got ashore without a shot being fired. The week long bombardments meant beach defences weren't the issue, it was what you did when you got ashore that mattered. At that point, firepower meant the Japs were finished, it was just a question of time and attrition. I'd argue that after months or years of fighting in the atolls, your average Marine would have suffered badly at the hands of the Wehrmacht because they would never have fought an enemy so tactically adept, or well equipped. They simply weren't trained for it. I've no doubt they would have adapted eventually, but only for the same cost in casualties most other american units did. As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear. Regards, IronDuke Iron Duke. You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings. Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific. What advantages and disadvantages did the German Infantry Squad have over the Allied Infantry Squad? We have all danced around the subject but have not actually stated them. 1. The most important advantage the German Infantry Squad had was the deployment at squad level of the MG-34/42. The firepower represented by the use of a squad MG was not matched by Allied formations. 2. The K-98 was a bolt-action rifle which did not have the firepower of the M-1. 3. By June 1944, most German Squad Leaders were veteran combat experienced leaders. The German practice was to take combat experienced troops and send them to either NCO or Officer schools for promotion. 4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units. 5. The Germans probably had more realistic training. Although Live Fire Training in and of itself is not the end all and do all of training. Much was made about the extensive use of Live Fire Training by the Soviets prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They suffered losses through training accidents that would be unacceptable to Western Armies. But I think we can safely say the Soviets never equalled the Western Armies in the level of training. The type of training is not near as important as how the training is conducted. 6. The German Infantry never enjoyed the logistical support that the Allies had. 7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans. 8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were. I am sure there are others that we could add to this list and we can debate all of these based on a number of factors. I will return to my previous statements concerning Leadership. All the different factors mentioned in all the posts in this thread boil down to one thing: Leadership. Without effective leadership the best troops perform poorly and the worst troops perform above all expectations with it.

KG Erwin -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 3:43:42 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Devil Doc I'm here for you buddy, only if you're lookin' for a corpsman! Thanks for your response, Devil Doc. I knew you'd offer some good commentary. [&o] You, too, Dragoon45. I had a few choice comments to add, but decided to bite my tongue this time. [;)]

SemperAugustus -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 4:32:15 PM)
What about the Soviet forces from 1943 and onwards? Once they got rolling they did quite well against the German forces, not to mention the Japanese in Manchuria.

KG Erwin -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 5:08:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: SemperAugustus What about the Soviet forces from 1943 and onwards? Once they got rolling they did quite well against the German forces, not to mention the Japanese in Manchuria. Very true, and I'm surprised the Russians haven't been mentioned before. There have been some great studies released in the last ten years on the preparedness of the Red Army in 1941, such as David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus". The Russians had some major leadership issues in 1941-42, and some major organizational deficiencies, but by 1943-44 these were partially remedied. They learned well, and by 1945 could "do the blitz" with the best of them. However, their troop training was not on a par with the other allies, and they never did get that sorted out, even until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991.

EricGuitarJames -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 8:55:25 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Devil Doc GENERAL THOUGHTS I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces. At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations. 2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong. Re. 1) Well the deep armoured thrusts into France weren't sustained and we could debate the Ardennes into eternity - I disagree fundamentally on whether only the American army could have won there. However, I don't want to hijack this excellent thread so maybe another time. (-; Re. 2) I think if we look at Hurtgen Forest, Salerno, Kasserine Pass it is easily possible to make a case for the superiority of the German soldier, 'man to man'. The 'Bulge is a strange case since it would depend on which sector of the front and what period of the battle you wish to cite. The panic that went through the American army in the first few days of the German offensive somewhat colours the view of the individual soldier. Certainly no-one in the higher command echelons emerges with much credit, Hodges 'bugged out' and Bradley came close to a nervous breakdown! Please don't misunderstand me here, I'm not trying to say that the average GI was a poor soldier, I'm attempting to backup my point about the difficulty of proving he was the best.

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 10:01:54 PM)
I have to admit I am deeply ignorant about the US Army in the WWII era, but it occurs to me that the Americans had something in western Europe that none of the other combatants had and that was the principle of mass. By that I don't mean mass in the same sense that the Soviet armies knew it but in the psychological boost it must have given American planners. More than just the production capability of the US, but also the knowledge that there were able bodied men who could fill the gaps if an assualt turned particularly disasterous. Without trying to sound like im compairing Bradley or Devers with Zhukov or Konev, they could afford to take bigger gambles, could absorb heavier losses than either the British or the Germans. Hitlers Ardennes offensive was ill judged and poorly supported, but more importantly it squandered veteran soldiers and armoured units his forces desperately needed. The argument put forward that the American advances although bloodier than the British advance minimised the overall losses in the campaign by reducing it does not take into account IMHO the implications of heavy casualties on the moral of a nation weary of war. Monty's advance on Antwerp is a case in point. It infuriated the Americans who understandably wanted the port opened to shorten their supply lines but had the British army charged in, cleared the port but in doing so sustained heavy casualties the advance could well have stalled. I believe Monty's only mistake was that he didn't have enough Scottish regiments up front, nothing like the sound of the pipes to put a man off his lunch. [:D]

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 10:22:19 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear. Are you generalising here or refering specifically to the battles that took place in the Pacific? In your opinion did the japanese conduct their offensive operations in south east asia, particularly burma in a tactically inept fashion? Do you consider it to be the case that the Japanese army only managed to advance against the British as a direct result of having caught the British off balance and constantly on the back foot, but as soon as the British managed to secure an entrenched position closer to their lines of supply they did not have the skill to break through? I have read very little on the subject but that is the overall impression that i get.

ShermanM4 -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/28/2005 11:14:54 PM)
This has been an awsome thread! The only thing I have to offer is my two cents on the Sherman. Subsequently, I have nothing new to offer that has not already been I said. I believe the M4 Sherman was an excellent tank. Yes it did lack in comparison to armor thickness and armament size, but its reliability, numbers, and flexible design was one of the greatest assets the allies had. I read somewhere that the breachblock on the Sherman had 11 parts while the breachblock on the Panther had 56 parts. What about tank crews? Despite the technical aspects of the vehicles, does anybody know a comparrison of how well trained American, British, Common Wealth, and Polish Crews were too German Crews. It seems like it would have been difficult for the Germans to continue to train effective crews as the war went on. thanks, ShermanM4

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 12:34:53 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Devil Doc GENERAL THOUGHTS I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces.. The Germans performed very poorly with regards to logistics. It was a significant contributory factor to defeat in the east and in the mediterranean. However, they lacked the resources to have a good "tail". Particularly since operational doctrine called for fast mobile forces, who inevitably sucked up a large percentage of the available vehicles. I don't dispute this. My concern is with relative combat efficiency. Who were the more effective killers? (to be rather unpleasantly blunt about it). quote: At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. I disagree. The most stunning thrusts of the war were made by Army Group Centre during 1941. At the end of these thrusts, they fought pocket battles capturing hundreds of thousands of men. The deep armoured thrust of Patton in 1944 is small beer by comparison. He encircled very little, met little meaningful opposition (although was bloodied on occasion) and for all the Allied logistical might, ran out of gas just short of Lorraine. The Allies essentially stopped in early September having captured most of France with little violence required. When they stopped, the front congealed in front of them, and the difficulties began in Holland, Lorraine, Hurtgen and so on. I don't think pulling off victory in the Ardennes was all that spectacular when you look at the constraints the Germans were operating under. Once the weather cleared, they were attempting to fight a breakthrough battle in which any movement drew air attack. They were attempting a breakthrough battle in appalling weather conditions, using super heavy tanks on small or non-existant roads, poorly supplied with only limited fuel. The Ardennes was a non starter from the very beginning, particularly once Montgomery had moved British troops to cover the Meuse. Just look at the map, look at the distances to Antwerp, look at the OOBs and then the logistical situation, and the only conclusion was that any army faced with the advantages the Allies had would have got on top of the situation sooner or later. quote: You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations. No, but they still made a decent fist of it, driving hundreds of miles to Moscow etc. Also, logistics was an Allied speciality, the poor German tail only makes their relative combat efficiency more impressive, not less. quote: 2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong. Dupuy's approach was to take a series of engagements, look at combatant numbers and combat postures, then study casualties. His conclusion was the the German forces packed more of a punch. This isn't to suggest the Allied fighting man was any less courageous, just that he didn't kill as many men at that tactical level as the Germans killed. Regarding Omaha, there is some evidence to suggest there was some inertia on the beaches as the going got tough. The fact that Cota had to work so hard to get things moving suggests things weren't going well. At some places on Omaha there was a high probability you would be hit climbing off the landing craft, in other places, entire waves got ashore relatively easily. Progres inland was difficult though. Even on the relatively easy Utah, progress inland was slow, something Montgomery and the British were panned for when they failed to drive the ten miles to Caen on the opening day. Although the airborne units performed well, I think the beach units had problems. quote: THE MARINE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC 1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing. No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause. Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II. This is heading off Kg Erwin's original brief, by concentrating on a few elite formations that the Americans produced. I don't think it's fair to compare such formations against Wehrmacht formations, unless you're going to compare them to mid-war SS, or Fallschirmjaeger or some of the better Panzer divisions. You also don't need to prove to me that the Marines knew how to fight. However, you're being too sweeping in your praise of the Corp. quote: 1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing. With respect, this is contradictory. A learning curve implies you started somewhere lower than you were and learned along the way. To learn something means you didn't know it initially. Tarawa was a bloody lesson, one the Marine Corp learned from, but to suggest they always knew what they were doing doesn't stand up because if they had, there would have been no learning curve. quote: No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause. There are two things here. Firstly, the two engagements you mention come from the early part of the war when everyone lost against the Japanese. From November 1943, when the Marines took Tarawa, you'd be hard pressed to find anybody who lost against them. Allied firepower was simply to great, Japanese logistical issues simply too overwhelming. Again, this isn't to underplay the achievements of the Marines, no matter how much combat power you have, someone has to take the ground, but I think sweeping statements about the Marines doing this or that have to be placed in context. Secondly, Wake was no more hopeless than Iwo or Okinawa was for the Japanese. Their strategy from 1943 onwards was merely to sell their lives as dearly as possible and hope the casualties caused the Americans to lose stomach for the fight. This is in itself, an admission of defeat, a full two years before the end. quote: Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II. I think you have to quantify exactly what you mean by beach assault. My limited understanding of the Pacific war was that after Tarawa, the Japanese learned to avoid contesting the Beach landings because of American ship and air borne firepower. As such, a landing like Normandy was a rarity because the Japs dug in inland and waited for the Americans to come to them. Iwo had unique geographical properties that make it a slight exception, but we can discuss that later. By November 1943 (the date Tarawa was taken if memory serves), the Allies in Europe had landed in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy (the landings at Salerno being very contested). The Germans had sea borne elements in Crete in 41, and in mid 44 the Allies launched the Mother of all amphibious assaults against mainland France, the Dragoon landings in Southern France and another amphibious landing at Anzio. Therefore, exactly who was writing the book on amphibious assault is surely open to debate? If memory serves, The 1st US Infantry landed in North Africa, landed in Sicily, and landed in Normandy. Don't they have a right to be called America's premier amphibious force? Again, let me stress, this isn't to do the Marine Corp down, I'm merely asking we put their achievements in context, and avoid mythologising them. KG Erwin has pointed out too much of that has happened to German forces. quote: 2. Marine units in combat during World War II absorbed casualty levels that, by the book, should have made them combat ineffective. You don't have to take my word, find the casualty statistics for yourself. On Iwo Jima, there were approx. 48,000 casualties on 8 square miles of ground during the 30-some days of combat. No other battlefield anywhere in World War II reached that level of concentrated violence, not even on the eastern front. It would take some effort to research and dispute this. However, I don't think it would stand up. 8 by 8 miles would on the face of it encompass a good deal of central Berlin or Stalingrad. The 48000 figure isn't strictly relateable to the point about Marine units, because 22500 (give or take a few) of these 48000 were Japanese. Casualties on Iwo were heavy, some criticism has suggested way too heavy, but I think it's wrong to suggest the Marines were the only ones capable of this. German Divisions routinely disappeared from the order of battle, or fought for weeks on end until all that was left was a small Kampfgruppe, or battalions of 30-40 men. The casualty statistics on Iwo would not have been out of place on the Eastern front at any time or on the western front for the Germans as well at times. There are numerous examples. The 352nd Division infamous for Omaha beach was folded into other units after a few weeks in Normandy had reduced it to just a couple of hundred effectives. quote: 3. The Vth Amphibious Corps had a ONE HOUR respite before the Japanese opened up on the from Suribachi, from the defensive forts on the left flank and from the prepared defenses on Motoyama #1. I wouldn't call that an 'easy landing', but maybe you were there? The first platoon to make it across the narrow strip to the west coast of the island had 5 men left in it. 13 battalion commanders were killed or wounded on Iwo. At Omaha, many men died before they got off the Landing craft. They measured their respite in miliseconds. Casualties were heavy on some of the other beaches as well, as beach strongpoints had to be taken one by one. The US suffered 26000 casualties in a month at Iwo Jima, and 2000 in a morning on Omaha. The US Marines did not have a monopoly on heroic beach assaults. quote: 4. There were no great sweeping drives in the Pacific campaigns the Marine Corps fought in. The Japanese did not surrender, so the Marines had to destroy every shread of resistance before an island was secured. And in many campaigns, they fought shoulder to shoulder with Soldiers. The only time the Japanese surrendered in significant numbers was on Okinawa, and that didn't occur until after our forces broke through the Shuri Line. Okinawa was a blood bath. No campaign in World War Ii even came close, except on the eastern front. I have no problem with your description of the Marine's progress, but your description of Okinawa is way off. Both the Okinawa campaign and the Normandy campaign lasted close to three months. Japanese military losses were around 70000 according to Van Der Vat. American casualties around 40000. German losses in Normandy amounted to 210000 (including over 100000 captured I suspect). Allied casualties were also appalling, dwarfing the 40 000 killed and wounded on Okinawa. You are right to point to the Eastern front as usually worse, but the western front had it's moments in Normandy and on the Cassino line as well. quote: 5. No other military force in the 20th century was able to maintain a uniformly high standard during expansion as the US Marine Corps. The German army defeated itseef through its haphazard growth. The Waffen SS ceased to be a elite organization because it grew too large, too fast with no sustainment base. The Germans did not grasp the logisitical realities of fighting a mechanized army. They never had one anyway, only armored and mechanized units embedded in an essentially 19th Century army. Yes, but someone here mentioned there were six marine divisions. The Waffen SS 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 10th and 12th had good battle records untill the end. The Wehrmacht expanded by scraping the manpower barrel, the Marines didn't so claiming this as some sort of plus point is unfair. I'm sure the Germans could have maintained the quality of the Wehrmacht if they had just expanded another five divisions, choosing and training only those who passed the right tests. They formed a few hundred as this sort of manpower was required to plug the gaps. German formations lost quality because they needed quanitity, the Marine Corp didn't. quote: The Marine Corps's expansion (and for that matter, the US Army's) was controlled, logical, and most importantly SUSTAINABLE. The American armed forces did not expand beyond our industrial capacity due to centralized planning. The most damning evidence against supposed German military superiority was their drive to have as many little armies as possible, instead of one powerful & combined military force. The US Army's growth was difficult, painful, and only sustainable because they deliberately restricted the number of formations they created to 89. With a smaller population base, the Germans created five times that number of major formations. They had no choice because of the numerical odds they were facing. I'm also not sure what your last sentence is driving at. The Germans created many divisions, these divisions were combined to form Corps, and these Corps combined to form Armies and then Army Groups. Unless you are driving at the different types of units. This has nothing to do with arguments about military superiority and everything to do with the lunacy that ran the Nazi state. Volksgrenadier formations were essentially Infantry Divisions with old men and few heavy weapons. I don't see them as part of the problem. There was a huge wastage of manpower in the Luftwaffe field divisions that were unformaly poor in combat, and these men would have been better served being transferred to the Army and used to fill out existing formations, but again, the central issue is about relative combat efficiency. If the Germans made many mistakes, we should be thankful as it helped reduce that. Regards, IronDuke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:10:15 AM)
quote: Original: Dragoon 45 Iron Duke. You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings. Is it Lewis's book? It's a good study. Ultimately, though, many of the problems the Americans faed were of their own making. They re-organised the assault divisions in the days leading up to the assault creating assault teams which lost the attacking units all sense of cohesion. Each Man was no longer fighting next to the man he trained with or was buddies with. This mulitplied the confusion as man after man went down, and people got lost. In addition, One of the DUKW battalions was sunk en route, although this was not due to any major error on their part. For an hour, there was some inertia on the beach, even in relatively quiet areas (Omaha was by no means uniformly nasty). There seemed to be some genuine shock amongst the green 29th as it hit them. quote: Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific. This isn't correct. The problem with basic statistics is that they are meaningless without context. Something you seem to allude to yourself when (correctly IMHO) suggesting it is difficult to compare the Germans and Japanese. The thing about defences packed into three acres, is that they are an easy target. The one advantage the Marines had was that whenever they went into battle in the Pacific the battle area had been sealed off and defined. The Japs never received reinforcements, there was never any chance of unexpected units taking Marine units in flank, counter attacks were clumsy and usually good news, because it brought the Japs out of their holes and into the open to be killed. Only at Okinawa (if memory serves, but take with a grain of salt) were relatively serious concentrations of artillery used by the Japanese. The Japs rarely had tanks, and when they did, they were tin cans. The Americans sealed off the battlefield, then applied overwhelming firepower, then overwhelming force. What made amphibious landings in North West Europe and Italy so much more difficult was that you couldn't guarantee to achieve this overwhelming force, and couldn't cut off the battlefield, because behind the beach lay not a few miles of atoll, but a thousand miles of Europe, rail lines and roads etc. Some attempt was made in Normandy to temporarily isolate the battlefield by dropping Airborne units into the Cotentin peninsula, but that proved costly as well. At Salerno and Anzio, things were very hairy more than once. The success of landings were usually in doubt. As for defences, the defences on the Cassino line were nightmarish. Mountaeous terrain, with pill boxes, dug in tanks, reverse slope mortars etc. What about Normandy? Collins lost a man per yard driving on St Lo, as he pushed through the Bocage. The bocage was a defender's dream, and as hard to fight through as anything the Japs produced. Remember, when the Japs opened fire, they were fixed, and could be destroyed with firepower, either tanks, artillery or aircraft. You would usually have 14 inch guns on hand as well, as effective and terrifying an infantry support weapon as was ever invented. It is simply not true that German defences were easier than Japanese. They were simply different, and usually defended by a better equipped, tactically adept opponent, who would have artillery support and occasionally superior armour in support. quote: What advantages and disadvantages did the German Infantry Squad have over the Allied Infantry Squad? We have all danced around the subject but have not actually stated them. 1. The most important advantage the German Infantry Squad had was the deployment at squad level of the MG-34/42. The firepower represented by the use of a squad MG was not matched by Allied formations. Agreed in terms of equipment. quote: 2. The K-98 was a bolt-action rifle which did not have the firepower of the M-1. Agreed. quote: 3. By June 1944, most German Squad Leaders were veteran combat experienced leaders. The German practice was to take combat experienced troops and send them to either NCO or Officer schools for promotion. I think this was probably most people's practice. Give the survivors of the attack the dead Sergeant or Corporal's stripes. I also don't agree that most German NCOs were necessarilly combat experienced. Many of the units in Normandy were rated as fit to defend fixed positions, but not fit for offensive action. Yes, they would have had some combat experienced NCOs, but by no means enough to make a huge difference. The better formations would have had better concentrations, but the issue here revolves around German practice. Divisions were often run into the ground before being withdrawn for rebuilding. Therefore, whilst they may have had a good smattering of combat experienced NCOs, large numbers of the personnel would not have had any combat experience at all. quote: 4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units. Agreed, although this was less the case in 1944, and even less the case (ironically enough) in those formations that performed esxceptionally well (Liebstandarte, Hitlerjugend, Panzer Lehr). quote: 5. The Germans probably had more realistic training. Although Live Fire Training in and of itself is not the end all and do all of training. Much was made about the extensive use of Live Fire Training by the Soviets prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They suffered losses through training accidents that would be unacceptable to Western Armies. But I think we can safely say the Soviets never equalled the Western Armies in the level of training. The type of training is not near as important as how the training is conducted. Agreed. The Germans accepted and expected a 1% casualty rate during training. quote: 6. The German Infantry never enjoyed the logistical support that the Allies had. Agreed, although they made up for some of this. The german supply requirement per man was less than his GI equivalent and, interestingly enough, the element of ammunition within that supply requirement was higher. They expected to receive fewer rations man for man, but more ammunition. quote: 7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans. One of their strengths, a good point. quote: 8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were. Yes, but there are some interesting comments from people like Collins suggesting one of the differences between the US and Britain in Normandy was that the US were prepared to accept higher casualties to get the mission accomplished. Some of the casualty rates in the bocage bear that out. Regards, IronDuke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:35:03 AM)
quote: Yes I have read Mosier and I do agree with some of his points. I do not believe the British performance was better in the later stages of the War than the Americans. The British took almost as many prisoners as the French, Americans and Belgians combined between 1 July 1918 and the end of the war. The British Army was smaller than the French army. It was a string of victories for the last hundred days, not least the breaching of the Hindenburg line in October. Many American Scholars (at least until the arrival of Professor Mosier - whose discipline is English if memory serves) have been scathing about Pershing. He essentially cost lives by refusing all help, believing that the lessons the French and British had learned in four years were a recipe for trench warfare. What he failed to realise was that those tactics (short and brutal bite and hold operations) were the only way forward from trench warfare as the British proved in the closing months. The AEF sustained 250000 casualties, and when they first went into action were not fully trained. There were problems in staff officer training, and both the Germans and the Americans themselves felt some American troops had only very basic rifle skills. quote: The British to the best of my knowledge never used infiltration tactics in conducting large scale attacks in World War I. If the British and French troops had so much better experience than the Americans had at this stage in the War how do you explain casaulity rates. The American casaulities generally matched the Germans when committed to action. Generally, the Germans were defending in a defenders paradise, so I would have expected this. It was not always the case, though. The Germans suffered around 500 000 to 600 000 casualties on the Somme. Total allied losses are generally agreed to be around 625 000. The Somme was a graveyard for the german Army as much as it was for the British and French. Which battles re American casualties versus German casualties are you referring to, and what are your sources? quote: In every case except Cambrai British and French Forces suffered much more casualities than the Germans did. Also Pershing would not let the French or British control the AEF for one important reason: He didn't trust them. The British wanted to break down the Americans and use them for replacements for their units and the French wanted them to use to reinforce their units. Nether case was politically reasonable. Yes, but the downside of not allowing some American units to gain experience under British and French command was that they went into action having to painfully learn the lessons the British and French had already learned. This led to some basic errors, and cost lives. quote: Prior to the commitment of the Americans there was a very grave danger of the Allies losing the War. Imperial Russia, Italy, Romania, and Serbia were all defeated by the Central Powers. By late 1917 the Germans were only fighting a one front war. And no I am not maintaining that the Americans were super soldiers either. You cite one instance of a German After Action Report about American performance, I can cite others were the Germans could not explain why they lost a position to them, with many references to the excellent troops used. Also please remember the French had a large hand in training the AEF prior to its commitment to battle. I'd be interested to see these reports you cite. I actually quoted two German reports, and the source I used also quoted American Officers from the AEF making the same sort of comments IIRC. Pershing never accepted he was wrong, but I don't believe he handled the AEF at all well. Regards, IronDuke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:38:32 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames Re. 1) Well the deep armoured thrusts into France weren't sustained and we could debate the Ardennes into eternity - I disagree fundamentally on whether only the American army could have won there. However, I don't want to hijack this excellent thread so maybe another time. (-; Re. 2) I think if we look at Hurtgen Forest, Salerno, Kasserine Pass it is easily possible to make a case for the superiority of the German soldier, 'man to man'. The 'Bulge is a strange case since it would depend on which sector of the front and what period of the battle you wish to cite. The panic that went through the American army in the first few days of the German offensive somewhat colours the view of the individual soldier. Certainly no-one in the higher command echelons emerges with much credit, Hodges 'bugged out' and Bradley came close to a nervous breakdown! Please don't misunderstand me here, I'm not trying to say that the average GI was a poor soldier, I'm attempting to backup my point about the difficulty of proving he was the best. Good points. It's little recognised but I think more Americans fought under British command during the Bulge than fought under American command. The Ardennes is a strange battle in many ways, for every moment of good American performance, you can find something more questionable. I seem to remember we debated Patton's legendary drive on Bastogne with the good Von Rom for a while. It doesn't stand up to too close scrutiny. Regards, IronDuke

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:45:15 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV Are you generalising here or refering specifically to the battles that took place in the Pacific? In your opinion did the japanese conduct their offensive operations in south east asia, particularly burma in a tactically inept fashion? Do you consider it to be the case that the Japanese army only managed to advance against the British as a direct result of having caught the British off balance and constantly on the back foot, but as soon as the British managed to secure an entrenched position closer to their lines of supply they did not have the skill to break through? I have read very little on the subject but that is the overall impression that i get. To some extent, yes. I think early Japanese successes were often a result of real aggression rather than Operational genius. They also came up against one of Britian's finest in Burma. Elsewhere, the islands made the fighting quite fragmentary so it's difficult to comment on Japanese strategy and operational skill. This is also not my chief area of interest, so I too would appreciate anyone with more knowledge commenting on this aspect. Regards, Ironduke

Dragoon 45 -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 9:02:46 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: Original: Dragoon 45 Iron Duke. You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings. (quote) Is it Lewis's book? It's a good study. Ultimately, though, many of the problems the Americans faed were of their own making. They re-organised the assault divisions in the days leading up to the assault creating assault teams which lost the attacking units all sense of cohesion. Each Man was no longer fighting next to the man he trained with or was buddies with. This mulitplied the confusion as man after man went down, and people got lost. In addition, One of the DUKW battalions was sunk en route, although this was not due to any major error on their part. For an hour, there was some inertia on the beach, even in relatively quiet areas (Omaha was by no means uniformly nasty). There seemed to be some genuine shock amongst the green 29th as it hit them. Yes it is the Lewis book I refer to. He makes great pains about the lack of coordinated Naval Bambardment prior to the invasion. He maintains that the Americans had a much superior doctrine for amphibious operations in the Pacific than in Europe. quote: Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific. (quote) This isn't correct. The problem with basic statistics is that they are meaningless without context. Something you seem to allude to yourself when (correctly IMHO) suggesting it is difficult to compare the Germans and Japanese. The thing about defences packed into three acres, is that they are an easy target. The one advantage the Marines had was that whenever they went into battle in the Pacific the battle area had been sealed off and defined. The Japs never received reinforcements, there was never any chance of unexpected units taking Marine units in flank, counter attacks were clumsy and usually good news, because it brought the Japs out of their holes and into the open to be killed. Only at Okinawa (if memory serves, but take with a grain of salt) were relatively serious concentrations of artillery used by the Japanese. The Japs rarely had tanks, and when they did, they were tin cans. The Americans sealed off the battlefield, then applied overwhelming firepower, then overwhelming force. Yes the Japanese defenses were packed into a smaller area. Yes they were easier targets to hit. But they were not easy target to destroy. By the later stages of the war in the Pacific standard Naval Gunfire doctrine was for at least three days of bombardment; the first day to strip the camo from the positions so they could be accurately targeted, then days two and three the bombardardment would be fired to try to destroy these positions. All throughout this process breaks in the gunfire would occur to allow airstrikes to occur and also to allow the smoke and dust to settle to assess the effects of the fire. The Japanese dug in deep and there are many verified instances of Japanese positions surviving direct hits from 14-16" shells with no damage. The one major advantage naval gunfire provided to the attacker was the disruption of communications of the Japanese. Also the craters from the shellfire provided some shelter for the assault troops. (Quote) What made amphibious landings in North West Europe and Italy so much more difficult was that you couldn't guarantee to achieve this overwhelming force, and couldn't cut off the battlefield, because behind the beach lay not a few miles of atoll, but a thousand miles of Europe, rail lines and roads etc. Some attempt was made in Normandy to temporarily isolate the battlefield by dropping Airborne units into the Cotentin peninsula, but that proved costly as well. At Salerno and Anzio, things were very hairy more than once. The success of landings were usually in doubt. (Quote) As for defences, the defences on the Cassino line were nightmarish. Mountaeous terrain, with pill boxes, dug in tanks, reverse slope mortars etc. What about Normandy? Collins lost a man per yard driving on St Lo, as he pushed through the Bocage. The bocage was a defender's dream, and as hard to fight through as anything the Japs produced. Remember, when the Japs opened fire, they were fixed, and could be destroyed with firepower, either tanks, artillery or aircraft. You would usually have 14 inch guns on hand as well, as effective and terrifying an infantry support weapon as was ever invented. It is simply not true that German defences were easier than Japanese. They were simply different, and usually defended by a better equipped, tactically adept opponent, who would have artillery support and occasionally superior armour in support. Regards, IronDuke If the allies had been willing to wait overwhelming combat power would have been possible at any point of the French coast. The bottleneck was not in assault troops but in landing craft. Anzio is not a good example of an amphibious operation in that the landings were unopposed but the timidity of the Commander ruined the gains from the unopposed landing. The Allies could have captured Rome in Jan 1944 had a more aggressive commander been in command at Anzio. Salerno was the third amphibious landing made in the ETO, i.e. NA, Sicily then Salerno. The North Africa landings were a farce, literally anything that could go wrong did. Sicily was better but still there were problems, i.e. cargo ships not combat loaded, trigger happy gunners on the Allied shipping etc. Salerno had again its unique problems, heavy losses of the 82d ABN due to Allied AA gunners, etc. In the Normandy landings I would argue that the Allies were very successful in isolating the area to German reinforcements. The 1st SS Pzr Div took almost two months to get all its equipment and men to the combat zone due to the very effective interdiction of the rail and road net by allied air power. There are other examples of this as well. Naval Gunfire provided invaluable support for at least a month after the initial landings. Both 14" and 15" guns were available. You mention the defenses set up at Cassino and in the bocage country as an examples of the conditions that the Allied Infantry faced. Let's look at the Cassino defenses first. Combat in mountainous areas present unique challenges to both the attacker and defender. The attacker is almost always attacking uphill under continous observation. Due to the severity of the grades involved armor support is limited. The Armor cannot accompany the infantry in the assault. Smoke screens are rarely effective due to the generally very windy conditions in the mountains. Resupply and evacuation of wounded are major operations due to the nature of the terrain also. The presence of caves and over rock formations provide the defender with hardened positions for little or no effort. Clearly almost all the advantages lie with the defender in a campaign in mountainous terrain. Only in a couple of instances were forces in the Pacific to run into conditions that approximated those the allies faced in Italy, i.e. Okinawa and Peilielu. The Bocage country is probably the closest that Europe could come to with terrain similiar to what the forces in the Pacific faced. Limited observation, limited fields of fire, the hedgerows themselves provided obstacles to both movement and observation, indirect fires were not as effective as in open country, and most importantly armor could not operate effectively at first in this terrain. Once again the attacker is confronted with terrain which provides the defenders with almost all the advantages. But what kind of defenses did the Germans set up vs what type of defenses did the japanese use. The Germans would generally dig fighting positions in the hedgerows with interlocking fields of fire. Anti-armor assets would be deployed to cover armor avenues of approach. limited fire support available would be given preplanned targets on likely avenues of approach also. The Japanese on the other hand would did in deeply. MG positions would have overhead cover made up of alternating layers of logs, coral, and sand. These positions could and did on a number of occasions survive direct hits from heavy caliber shell fire. The Japanese set up interlocking fields of fire in all directions due partly to the problem of not knowing exactly which direction the assault would come from. This had the effect of having some positions that could only engage the attacker after he had advanced past it. Although I was unable to find Dupuys original tables, I found an example in a book by Martin Van Crevald, "Fighting Power". In the Table that Crevald attributes to Dupuy in the book only five of the engagements involve normal German Infantry Divisions. To me the work is very suspect due to the prevelance of PzGdr and Pzr Divisions in the engagements cited. I notice also that no engagement are used where Volksgrenadier Divisions are involved. BTW, this has been quite enjoyable!

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 12:38:50 PM)
I don't think you can call the M4 an excelllent tank. it was by all means a reliable gun platform that proved to be efficient in design whilst more easily upgraded than most other conteprary armoured units. I believe I am right in stating that more Tigers were lost to mechanical failure, predominantly of the gearbox, than to enemy action. IMHO the early M4 designs head to head with the Panther or late mark 4's bear direct comparison in terms of armour and armament to the mark 2 and 3 head to head against the tanks of the French armies in 1940. It was the tactical use of the weapon which made the difference. Operation Goodwood being a demonstration of the inferiority of the tank and the manner of its use. I agree, however, that the firefly and easy 8 were far more robust and effective designs. Does anybody have any idea how successfull the US tank killers were? I thought the German experience of the concept had proved that the best tank killer is another tank.

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:31:43 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: Original: Dragoon 45 quote: 4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units. Agreed, although this was less the case in 1944, and even less the case (ironically enough) in those formations that performed esxceptionally well (Liebstandarte, Hitlerjugend, Panzer Lehr). Its interesting to note that towards the very end Upper Echelon paranoia had become so extreme that soldiers from the same regions in the same companies were split up because it was believed that men from the same area were less likely to stop a camarade deserting. Also one of the most determined defenders was SS Nordland, due in the main to the fact that their countries were lost to them and now their ideological structure was about to collapse. Factor in their hatred for the Bolsheviks and you get some extremely stubbord defenders. In fact the units which coped best against the soviet onslaught across the Oder were the SS units attached to the 9th Army (XI SS Pz and V SS Mountain if memory serves) I'll work out how to use this quote system if it drives me insane![sm=00000018.gif]

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:41:33 PM)
8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were. The degree of horror that the german high command expressed at the level of losses that the Waffen SS were willing to sustain in their fanatacism lends weight to that argument. Apparently even Hitler was concerned. The argument kind of falls down though unless you are refering to the western allies exclusively. Marshall Zhukov in particular had no regard for his soldiers if the Stavka was breathing down his neck.

Dragoon 45 -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 1:54:16 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV I don't think you can call the M4 an excelllent tank. it was by all means a reliable gun platform that proved to be efficient in design whilst more easily upgraded than most other conteprary armoured units. I believe I am right in stating that more Tigers were lost to mechanical failure, predominantly of the gearbox, than to enemy action. IMHO the early M4 designs head to head with the Panther or late mark 4's bear direct comparison in terms of armour and armament to the mark 2 and 3 head to head against the tanks of the French armies in 1940. It was the tactical use of the weapon which made the difference. Operation Goodwood being a demonstration of the inferiority of the tank and the manner of its use. I agree, however, that the firefly and easy 8 were far more robust and effective designs. Does anybody have any idea how successfull the US tank killers were? I thought the German experience of the concept had proved that the best tank killer is another tank. M-4 had its weaknesses and strengths. Strengths: reliability, ease of repair, mobility, excellent gun for what it was designed for, ease of production, and other minor points. Weaknesses: armor, lack of effective anti-tank gun (I will return to this later), prone to catch fire, high profile, and other less important ones. The main points of contention about the Sherman has always centered around a) its gun, b) its armor, and c) its affinity to catch fire when hit. Lets address each in turn. Its Gun: The Sherman was not designed to engage other tanks in combat. It was designed as an infantry support tank. U.S. Army doctrine was for the Tank Destroyers to engage enemy tanks and they were equipped with high velocity guns to do this with. The 75mm M-3 Gun fired a high explosive shell with more payload than either the 76mm or 90mm rounds. Admittedly part of the reason behind not upgunning the Sherman earlier in the War was due to excessive barrel wear in the high velocity 76mm. Also another more important reason as mentioned earlier the Army did not want to give Sherman crews a more powerful gun to discourage them from engaging enemy armor which once again was the job of the Tank Destroyers. As far as its ability to be upgunned, you just have to look as the Israeli's for your answer. They had Isherman's in service armed with a deriative of the Panther's 75mm L60 gun (french built), 90mm and even a 105mm gun very similiar to M-68 105mm in the M-60 series tanks. Its Armor: Yes the Sherman was weakly armored when engaging other tanks. But the Sherman carried the same frontal armor protection as the T-34 series, although not quite as well sloped. Much use in theater was made of applique armor and other makeshift types of armor. The United States had the capability to uparmor the Sherman, the Jumbo is a prime example. I would also remind everyone that sometimes sloped armor is a hinderance when a tank is shooting at a tank at a lower elevation. Armor toughness depends on thickness and most importantly what angle the shot strikes the armor at. The majority of the time sloped armor gives an advantage but sometimes it doesn't. Again a conscious decision was made to limit the armor protection. Its Afinity to catch fire when hit: The M-4 and M-4A1 were powered by a radial aircraft engine. The M-4A2 was powered by GMC twin diesel engines. The M-4A3 was powered by a Ford V-8 tank engine (gas powered). The M-4A4 was powered by a multibank Chrysler engine (gas powered made up of 5 automobile engines on a common crank shaft). The U.S. Army decided on using the M-4A3 as its main type of Sherman. The vast majority of M-4A2's were shipped to Russia and also equipped the USMC tank battalions until late in the war. The biggest reason that the U.S. Army didn't want to use a diesel powered tank was logistical reasons, don't complicate fuel supply more that absolutely necessary. Diesel fuel has proven time and time again it is more effective fuel for tanks. It has a much higher point of combustion than gasoline, and most importantly does not tend to explode when hit. Yes it will burn but does so poorly. If you disagree trying lighting diesel with a match, it is almost impossible to do. Also a diesel engine provides much more torque and power for the fuel used than does gasoline. I don't have any Soviet sources to use, but Marine sources mention time and time again their M-4A2's being hit and not burning. The few times an M4A2 did catch on fire the fire was a lot easier to put out than would have been a gasoline fire. Also I believe Iron Duke mentioned something about the stowage of loose ammunition on the turret floor could have also been a problem as far as catching fire in the gas powered Shermans. I can't confirm this. Much has been written about the Panther and Tiger series over the years. Were they good tanks? Yes when they worked. But the two versions of the Tigers and the Panthers were very maintaince intensive tanks and were never as reliable as western tanks. Either version of the Tiger had an operational readiness rate of less than 40% in most cases due to various reasons (combat damage, mechanical breakdowns, fatigue, etc.). Although the Panther was notorious early in its life for catching fire, this problem was generally rectified by the later models, but its weak suspension and transmission were never improved to the point most people believed. As pointed out earlier, the vast majority of Tigers and Panthers destroyed were destroyed by their crews to prevent their capture. Probably less than 40% of those destroyed by their crews were damaged by mines,aircraft, AT guns, tanks, or tank destroyers. The lack of reliable heavy tanks hindered the German war effort considerably. The Panther weighted in at 47 tons, the Tiger I at 57 tons, and the Tiger II at 67 tons. The Sherman weighted in at less than 40 tons in most cases. Now imagine what improvements in armor, speed, or firepower could have been accomplished if the Sherman had the extra weight to play with. All tank design is a balance of speed, armor, and firepower. When you put the emphasis of one aspect of tank design you lose capability in another area. Heavy armor equals less speed and more weight. Heavy firepower equals again either less speed or less armor. High speed equals less armor or less firepower. I would also remind everyone that there were few bridges left in Europe by 1944 that could support the weight of a Panther let alone either of the Tigers without extensive and time-consuming engineer effort to strengthen the bridges. And I might add there was an extreme shortage of trained engineers in the German Army by the fall of 1944. Also because of the complicated design of both the Panther's and both types of Tiger's they were far from easy to produce. For the cost of one Tiger I the Germans could have produced 4 MK-IV-J tanks or 5 STuG-III's. As designed, the Sherman was an excellent tank. Its reliability, mobility, and firepower used in the role it was designed for, made it an excellent tank. Yes it suffered in head to head duels with heavier German armor, but once again it was never designed for this role. Much has been written about the upgunned Shermans with the 76mm as an attempt to give a heavier anti-tank capability to the Sherman, but what most people lose sight of is that the upgunned Sherman was a much less capable infantry support tank. The 76mm gun tended to obscure the target when fired due to its enormous muzzle blast. The HE shell of the 76mm was much smaller in terms of payload consequently with less effects on the target. Also only the Churchill Tank was modified for more special purposes than was the Sherman.

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 2:01:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: Devil Doc GENERAL THOUGHTS I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces.. The Germans performed very poorly with regards to logistics. It was a significant contributory factor to defeat in the east and in the mediterranean. However, they lacked the resources to have a good "tail". Particularly since operational doctrine called for fast mobile forces, who inevitably sucked up a large percentage of the available vehicles. I don't dispute this. My concern is with relative combat efficiency. Who were the more effective killers? (to be rather unpleasantly blunt about it). Regards, IronDuke German resupply in the North African theatre was always going to be perilous as long as a) the Italian fleet didn't have enough fuel to mount any kind of sustained operations b) the Royal Navy's Eastern Mediteranean Fleet was strong enough to contend the battle After Taranto and the battle of Mattapan the Afrika Corps was really left out on a limb, only the loss of several capital ships to Italian special forces and the Luftwaffe's effective anti-shipping sorties troubled the RN. ( My grandad served in the eastern med and the look of hate and fear when anyone mention the stuka was pretty intense fifty years after the event). I would suggest that Admiral Cunningham was the biggest reason for the germans failure to properly resupply North Africa, but I am a RN Fanboy.

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 2:12:09 PM)
Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles. I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

KGV -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 4:01:47 PM)
I've just spotted a book on the same subject of this thread on Amazon. Its called Frontsoldaten: the German soldier in WWII, has anyone read it?

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 5:48:20 PM)
quote: Original: Dragoon 45 If the allies had been willing to wait overwhelming combat power would have been possible at any point of the French coast. The bottleneck was not in assault troops but in landing craft. Anzio is not a good example of an amphibious operation in that the landings were unopposed but the timidity of the Commander ruined the gains from the unopposed landing. The Allies could have captured Rome in Jan 1944 had a more aggressive commander been in command at Anzio. Salerno was the third amphibious landing made in the ETO, i.e. NA, Sicily then Salerno. The North Africa landings were a farce, literally anything that could go wrong did. Sicily was better but still there were problems, i.e. cargo ships not combat loaded, trigger happy gunners on the Allied shipping etc. Salerno had again its unique problems, heavy losses of the 82d ABN due to Allied AA gunners, etc. In the Normandy landings I would argue that the Allies were very successful in isolating the area to German reinforcements. The 1st SS Pzr Div took almost two months to get all its equipment and men to the combat zone due to the very effective interdiction of the rail and road net by allied air power. There are other examples of this as well. Naval Gunfire provided invaluable support for at least a month after the initial landings. Both 14" and 15" guns were available. The bottleneck in landing craft was caused by a requirement to think on a scale never before envisaged. Overwhelmoing combat power was possible anywhere, this is true, but the real key to Normandy was two fold. Firstly, it was gaining the bridgehead. Secondly, it was winning the battle of the build up. The Allies could have obliterated everything (including the grass) for five miles behind any single one of the beaches and walked ashore, but they would subsequently have been thrown back into the sea because their lodgement area was not large enough. It was a balance. Attack across a front wide enough to gain a sizeable foothold and spread the defender's response, and do it with the landing craft at hand. Any further delays to obtain Pacific like concentrations of combat power for the pre-assault bombardment would have reduced the available campaigning season once ashore, and meant defeat. In the Pacific, the Allies could bomb and shell Iwo Jima non stop for a week because the Japs were going nowhere. A week long artillery and air bombardment of the Normandy coast would have allowed the Germans to bring up reserves to the threatened area and defeat the subsequent attack. After a week, the Allies would have waded ashore to find 21st Panzer concentrated, 12th SS and Panzer Lehr in the battle area, 1st SS en route. This was the real advantage the Marines had. Surprise wasn't a requirement, so overwhelming combat power was an asset. You're right to suggest many German units had problems reaching the front across a damaged rail network, and with linited fuel stocks, but 1st SS Panzer was one of many units en route, and it's forward units entered combat at the end of June. On D-Day, the Germans had 122 Tanks in Normandy. By the end of June, that figure had risen to a total of 1124 Tanks committed. The largest reinforcement most Japanese Garrisons received was a radio message of support from the High Command carrying the best wishes of the Emperor. A week long bombardment of Normandy would have seen 650 Tanks waiting rather than 122. 45 would have been Tigers. That is why I argue that whilst the book on Island hopping was written in the Pacific, the book on Amphubious warfare was really written in the European theatre of Operations, in much tougher operational conditions. quote: You mention the defenses set up at Cassino and in the bocage country as an examples of the conditions that the Allied Infantry faced. Let's look at the Cassino defenses first. Combat in mountainous areas present unique challenges to both the attacker and defender. The attacker is almost always attacking uphill under continous observation. Due to the severity of the grades involved armor support is limited. The Armor cannot accompany the infantry in the assault. Smoke screens are rarely effective due to the generally very windy conditions in the mountains. Resupply and evacuation of wounded are major operations due to the nature of the terrain also. The presence of caves and over rock formations provide the defender with hardened positions for little or no effort. Clearly almost all the advantages lie with the defender in a campaign in mountainous terrain. Only in a couple of instances were forces in the Pacific to run into conditions that approximated those the allies faced in Italy, i.e. Okinawa and Peilielu. Good points, but I mentioned Cassino et al to counter the assertion you made that: quote: Original: Dragoon 45 The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific. So, combat conditions were no tougher in the Pacific. quote: The Bocage country is probably the closest that Europe could come to with terrain similiar to what the forces in the Pacific faced. Limited observation, limited fields of fire, the hedgerows themselves provided obstacles to both movement and observation, indirect fires were not as effective as in open country, and most importantly armor could not operate effectively at first in this terrain. Once again the attacker is confronted with terrain which provides the defenders with almost all the advantages. But what kind of defenses did the Germans set up vs what type of defenses did the japanese use. The Germans would generally dig fighting positions in the hedgerows with interlocking fields of fire. Anti-armor assets would be deployed to cover armor avenues of approach. limited fire support available would be given preplanned targets on likely avenues of approach also. The Japanese on the other hand would did in deeply. MG positions would have overhead cover made up of alternating layers of logs, coral, and sand. These positions could and did on a number of occasions survive direct hits from heavy caliber shell fire. The Japanese set up interlocking fields of fire in all directions due partly to the problem of not knowing exactly which direction the assault would come from. This had the effect of having some positions that could only engage the attacker after he had advanced past it. Yes, but the Germans were better tactically, had better fire support, plenty of machine guns of unparalleled ferocity, and the ability to disappear. I would suspect most Japanese died where they took up initial positions. The Germans could fight until the position was flanked or in danger of being overrun and withdraw to set up another ambush in the next field. They had space within which they could deploy, and the casualty rates confirm they made a good job of it. Again, I don't want to play down the Marine's efforts, merely point out that they don't stand out in the annals of Allied combat history for quite the reasons people seem to want to suggest. Yes, most Japanese refused to surrender and had to be killed, but I've also seen plenty to suggest that even if they had wanted to surrender, the number of POWs taken would not have increased by very much. It was a dirty war, a very brutal war, but the tactics and discplines required were very different and Pacific theatre Marines would have had to learn to fight all over again if deployed to Europe. quote: Although I was unable to find Dupuys original tables, I found an example in a book by Martin Van Crevald, "Fighting Power". In the Table that Crevald attributes to Dupuy in the book only five of the engagements involve normal German Infantry Divisions. To me the work is very suspect due to the prevelance of PzGdr and Pzr Divisions in the engagements cited. I notice also that no engagement are used where Volksgrenadier Divisions are involved. Yes, but my understanding was that even the five engagements involving normal infantry divisions gave an edge (albeit slightly smaller) to the Germans, so however we look at it, it doesn't look good for Allied combat efficiency. Also, the combat model devised by Dupuy and the latest version built upon it have been tested in many other engagements since Dupuy's original selection and produced similar results. Also, the Germans must have put close to 50 Panzer and Panzergrenadier formations into service (Maybe 26 Panzer, 7 SS Panzer, another 15 Heer and SS Pzgr formations). If these were uniformly better, it suggests the Germans were able to produce above average formations more easily than the Alies could. There were only six US Marine, 3 US Airborne etc. You could add in another half dozen elite fighting formations from the Luftwaffe in the shape of FJ and HG Panzer Division. Finally, German units come out better whether attacking or defending (which invalidates some of the criticisms levelled at the combat model that it favoured the defender) and even came out better in the Ardennes, a battle they eventually comprehensively lost. At this point, (December 1944) Germany had suffered millions of combat casualties and was scraping the manpower barrel. That their combat effectiveness scores are still higher than Alied formations on the whole at this time suggests something fundamental is at work here. Since the Germans weren't supermen (whatever the Nazis thought), then I have to ascribe it to training, weaponry, tactics, small unit leadership and the intangibles of attitude and morale. Regards, IronDuke quote: BTW, this has been quite enjoyable! Yes it has. Many thanks for putting up such a stiff fight. I'm having to work very hard here to hold my own (I hope). Regards, IronDuke

EricGuitarJames -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 5:48:33 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles. I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled I see you've got the 'quote' system to work[:)] I think we can see the Sherman in a similar light to the Pz4, which also started as a predominantly 'infantry support tank'. One can see equivalence in terms of performance and 'upgrade-ability' throughout their lengthy service histories. The doctrinal problem comes with the US 'tank-killer' concept, although they were equipped with powerful AT guns they were not well armoured meaning that unless they were able to 'kill' with the first shot they were extremely vulnerable.

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 5:52:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV quote: ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote: ORIGINAL: Devil Doc GENERAL THOUGHTS I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces.. The Germans performed very poorly with regards to logistics. It was a significant contributory factor to defeat in the east and in the mediterranean. However, they lacked the resources to have a good "tail". Particularly since operational doctrine called for fast mobile forces, who inevitably sucked up a large percentage of the available vehicles. I don't dispute this. My concern is with relative combat efficiency. Who were the more effective killers? (to be rather unpleasantly blunt about it). Regards, IronDuke German resupply in the North African theatre was always going to be perilous as long as a) the Italian fleet didn't have enough fuel to mount any kind of sustained operations b) the Royal Navy's Eastern Mediteranean Fleet was strong enough to contend the battle After Taranto and the battle of Mattapan the Afrika Corps was really left out on a limb, only the loss of several capital ships to Italian special forces and the Luftwaffe's effective anti-shipping sorties troubled the RN. ( My grandad served in the eastern med and the look of hate and fear when anyone mention the stuka was pretty intense fifty years after the event). I would suggest that Admiral Cunningham was the biggest reason for the germans failure to properly resupply North Africa, but I am a RN Fanboy. Cunningham was a first class Sailor, and one of the best produced by any Navy in World War II. However, I think this is only part of the reason. Even when they had good months and could resupply north Africa adequately, Rommel never received what he needed because he didn't possess the trucks necessary to shuttle it from the few North African ports usable to the front line. Much of his stock remained sitting in Tripoli, Benghazi or Tobruk harbour waiting for transport. Much of his fuel was used by the trucks transporting fuel and ammo and food to him. Ultimately, like all AXIS forces, he lacked the logistical infrastructure to supply his troops. The battle for the meditarranean was not really the decisive factor. Regards, IronDuke

EricGuitarJames -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 5:58:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV German resupply in the North African theatre was always going to be perilous as long as a) the Italian fleet didn't have enough fuel to mount any kind of sustained operations b) the Royal Navy's Eastern Mediteranean Fleet was strong enough to contend the battle After Taranto and the battle of Mattapan the Afrika Corps was really left out on a limb, only the loss of several capital ships to Italian special forces and the Luftwaffe's effective anti-shipping sorties troubled the RN. ( My grandad served in the eastern med and the look of hate and fear when anyone mention the stuka was pretty intense fifty years after the event). I would suggest that Admiral Cunningham was the biggest reason for the germans failure to properly resupply North Africa, but I am a RN Fanboy. The biggest problem for the Germans in North Africa was the length of their supply lines from their main ports. By the time they broke into Egypt in June 1942 about 90% of the fuel and water that was reaching North Africa was consumed bringing it up to the front line. If one looks at the Tunisian campaign, Kesselring and Von Arnim were able to maintain offensive operations right up to the last few weeks. This is not to denigrate Cunningham and the RN's efforts in the Med, by neutralising the Italian fleet they certainly helped ensure the survival of Malta as a British base. n.b. HMS Warspite is probably my 'favourite' RN battleship, her service record is quite amazing, right back to Jutland where her survival under fire from the High Seas Fleet was quite stunning.

EricGuitarJames -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 6:04:31 PM)
See this is what happens when you get two 'like-minded' individuals posting on the same subject at the same time! Oh well, fools seldom differ[;)][:D]

IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (1/29/2005 6:10:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: KGV 8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were. The degree of horror that the german high command expressed at the level of losses that the Waffen SS were willing to sustain in their fanatacism lends weight to that argument. Apparently even Hitler was concerned. The argument kind of falls down though unless you are refering to the western allies exclusively. Marshall Zhukov in particular had no regard for his soldiers if the Stavka was breathing down his neck. I think concerns over Waffen SS casualties were mainly in Poland and France in 39/40. they seemed to take more casualties than regular units in achieving their objectives. By Russia, all units were being regularly decimated so it wasn't the same. They seemed to be capable of absorbing more, and inflicting more, so casualty levels were always high, but not considered unduly so for what was being achieved. regards, IronDuke

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