RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (Full Version)

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JJKettunen -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/2/2005 4:32:06 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

I hate to rely on stats, as they differ depending on the source, but Dupuy did the same thing, so I have a basis for comparison. The Wikipedia gave a figure of 8607 US dead compared to 17,236 German in the Battle of the Bulge. That's more than 2:1 in the Americans' favor. Another source, totalling all casualties, gave 82400 US/British vs 100, 000 German. This is for the German offensive/Allied counteroffensive phase.

These are raw figures, but what do they prove? It is a selective choice of numbers, just as Dupuy chose to do, so overall, the results are inconclusive. My point? Dupuy chose to be selective in his pre-conceived theory, so he chose the stats to prove his point. There was no objective POV at all, as the book he published these figures in, "A Genius for War", postulated that the Germans institutionalized military excellence through the creation of their General Staff. Now, this may have been true during the eras of victory in both world wars, but it ultimately failed them. The basic premise falls apart, as all the factors that play into combat effectiveness, such as training, morale, weapons effectiveness, logistical support, etc. are ignored. He falls into the trap of judging warfare as an academic exercise, devoid of human factors. His study is way too narrow, and this is where I have a problem with it.


What primary sources were used for the above numbers? One should use Allied records for the Allied casualties, and German records for the German casualties. It's the basic methdology many writers have not realized, but have used Allied estimates for German casualties. A couple of examples:

The staff of Patton's 3rd Army estimated that from 1 August 1944 to 29 January 1945 units from the 3rd Army had killed 96,500 enemy soldiers and wounded a further 269,000 (Patton, War As I Knew It). Actually, German casualties on the entire Western Front from 1 August 1944 - 31 January 1945 included 50,507 killed in action and 168,129 wounded (Wermacht Verlustwesen, file BA-MA RW 6/v.599). Clearly the estimates of the 3rd Army were compeletelly inaccurate.

Omar Bradley's intelligence officer estimated the Germans had suffered 250,000 casualties during the month-long battle in the Ardennes (Bradley, A Soldier's Story). Of these 36,000 were prisoners. Hence about 214,000 German soldiers were estimated to have been killed or wounded, which is almost five times too high.

As for the Dupuy's selective use of numbers, yes, he was selective, German records for the German casualties, and Allied records for the Allied casualties, just like any respectable historian would do, and to get as accurate results as possible. I don't know why you insist that his theory was pre-conceived, since you are not even familiar with it (only with its conclusions).

Regarding "A Genius for War", Dupuy tries to give more or less subjective answers why Germans, in his mathematical model, and to his suprise, were constantly more combat efficient than the Allied in average. He stated that the answer was in the traditions of the German General Staff.

Personally I don't understand why some people have hard time to understand that the military formations of a losing side
may have had higher combat efficiency overall than their ultimate victors. Wars are not sport events, there are a huge amount of factors outside single engagements, which affect the outcome of wars. Outcome of a war, or a battle for that matter, is not a direct measurement of skill, this many seem fail to understand.

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin
To Iron Duke & Keke, we can argue these points into perpetuity, but I cannot offer statistics to back up my original assertion, other than production figures, casualty stats, budget expenditures, etc. By every measure of these stats, the Americans kicked the Germans' butts. In real terms, it doesn't matter. We outproduced and outfought our enemies in WWII, and in every war since then. I would include Vietnam, but that isn't the focus of our discussion. I will say, though, that it is a fact that the American miltary in the present day is the best in the world. The roots of this superiority lay in the lessons of WWII, not, as some have stated, in Vietnam. The value of training and providing the troops with the best weapons and communications equipment we could give them were national defense policy in the 1940s. We are not a militaristic society, and the structure of our democracy, until recent years, doesn't advocate maintaining military forces for the purpose of offensive operations. We succeeded in creating these forces from scratch in Korea and Vietnam, and now have another in being. This is another part of my basic argument. No other nation in the world has been able to produce such a high-quality offensive force at a moment's notice. We saw it in action in 1991, and in 2003.

My point--my main point--is that we established the capability to form high-quality modern forces like this, in a very short time, more than 60 years ago.


As was expected, some people are just pissed off because Dupuy's model doesn't demonstrate that the Americans were better in all areas of warfare during WWII. That's why, instead of valid criticism, all we hear is patriotic humbug. I bet that if QJM was used in appropriate Vietnam engagements, it would show that most of the American units had higher combat efficiency than their Vietnamese counterparts? Did the Americans win the war?



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/2/2005 10:23:34 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

I hate to rely on stats, as they differ depending on the source, but Dupuy did the same thing, so I have a basis for comparison. The Wikipedia gave a figure of 8607 US dead compared to 17,236 German in the Battle of the Bulge. That's more than 2:1 in the Americans' favor. Another source, totalling all casualties, gave 82400 US/British vs 100, 000 German. This is for the German offensive/Allied counteroffensive phase.


I can only echo Keke's point about numbers. Both Keegan and Hastings (very good historians) have produced wildly innaccurate figures about German casualties in Normandy during World War II. They were putting the numbers in the half a million bracket. These figures are quoted everywhere from Montgomery's memoirs onwards. Zetterling showed (from OKH records) that the figure was around 210000. I think Allied historians have inflated German casualties in many instances because they have assumed when a division is all but wiped out that all 15000 souls (or whatever) were killed or wounded, when in fact a large chunk of these men would have been in the supporting arms and would have escaped. It was merely the rifle element that was wiped out that might number 9 or 10 battalions of 700 each etc.

In the first week of the Bulge, the US suffered around 25000 casualties to the German 20000. Within a week Allied forces opposing the Germans were three times tronger than when the battle started. Dupuy makes an assertion (that I confess I have not been able to check yet) that the German advance of 2 Panzer during the Ardennes offensive was quicker than Patton's spearheads during the first week of Cobra. You will know as well as I the differing conditions of these two advances. Ultimately, raw casualty figures mean nothing, because we know nothing of the context in which they occured.

Dupuy's figures were weighted to take account of the shape and dynamics of the battlefield. It is what makes them so compelling. He takes these figures and says what forces did both sides employ, what weapons did they use, what defensive posture were they in, what artillery and air support did they have? He published figures which showed on occasion American forces outfought German forces. He was not selective.

quote:

These are raw figures, but what do they prove? It is a selective choice of numbers, just as Dupuy chose to do, so overall, the results are inconclusive. My point? Dupuy chose to be selective in his pre-conceived theory, so he chose the stats to prove his point. There was no objective POV at all, as the book he published these figures in, "A Genius for War", postulated that the Germans institutionalized military excellence through the creation of their General Staff. Now, this may have been true during the eras of victory in both world wars, but it ultimately failed them.


He did the analysis, and the theory grew out of the analysis. Many engagements have been analysed, no one has been able to dispute his central point. Even the Bulge battles seem to have favoured the germans. I've mentioned this before, but the pre-conceptions about the American fighting man seem to belong to those who argue he was more combat effective, because they rubbish the only scientific model out there without good reason, because they seem unable to accept that the American fighting man was not the best.

The German General Staff failed for numerous reasons, but they are not really what combat effectiveness is about. Overwhelming odds and poor strategy essentially finished the Germans, together with a resurgent and overwhelming Soviet Military on one side, and the overwhelming firepower of the Western Allies on the other side.

quote:

The basic premise falls apart, as all the factors that play into combat effectiveness, such as training, morale, weapons effectiveness, logistical support, etc. are ignored. He falls into the trap of judging warfare as an academic exercise, devoid of human factors. His study is way too narrow, and this is where I have a problem with it.


Combat efficiency is not about this at all. Combat efficiency is about who kills most efficiently. The items you cite above such as training and morale etc, are the factors that go to make combat efficiency. It is what historians look to for an explanation when they have established who kills more efficiently. You could, for example, prove American weapons and logistics are better, but they would only be more combat efficient if you found they inflicted casualties more efficiently than their opponents.

The factors you mention above all come afterwards. Professor Van Creveld used many of these factors in his work on why the German Military were more efficient than the US Military during World War II. However, they came not as evidence that Germans were more combat efficient, but as the explanation of why they were more combat efficient. Combat efficiency is essentially established through Dupuy's work analysing raw data, and a good deal of circumstantial evidence.

quote:

To Iron Duke & Keke, we can argue these points into perpetuity, but I cannot offer statistics to back up my original assertion, other than production figures, casualty stats, budget expenditures, etc. By every measure of these stats, the Americans kicked the Germans' butts.


Production figures and budget expenditures merely prove who was the strongest. They prove the Americans were a heavyweight and the Germans a middleweight, but they do not prove who was the better pugilist. Dupuy's figures show the Germans were better boxers pound for pound. If you have a bigger population and a better and bigger economy, barring an equaliser like nukes, you're going to win. That is not what combat efficiency is about though. The Russians outproduced and outfought the Germans in the east far more than the US ever did in the west, but I have seen no studies indicating the Russians were more combat efficient than the Germans.

quote:

In real terms, it doesn't matter. We outproduced and outfought our enemies in WWII, and in every war since then.


Outproducing them is a function of size. Your essentially saying that if America was the size of France she wouldn't be all that powerful at all. This is fair enough. In real terms. it doesn't matter, you are right, but then this thread assumes that it does matter, to be fair, because that was the assertion that sparked the debate.

quote:

I would include Vietnam, but that isn't the focus of our discussion.


Vietnam is best left alone for all sorts of reasons. It is a complicated conflict and not one the world is ready to be entirely objective about.

quote:

I will say, though, that it is a fact that the American miltary in the present day is the best in the world. The roots of this superiority lay in the lessons of WWII, not, as some have stated, in Vietnam. The value of training and providing the troops with the best weapons and communications equipment we could give them were national defense policy in the 1940s. We are not a militaristic society, and the structure of our democracy, until recent years, doesn't advocate maintaining military forces for the purpose of offensive operations. We succeeded in creating these forces from scratch in Korea and Vietnam, and now have another in being. This is another part of my basic argument. No other nation in the world has been able to produce such a high-quality offensive force at a moment's notice. We saw it in action in 1991, and in 2003.


The American Military was not suddenly created in 1991 or 2003. It was always there, it just required someone to use it. The American Military of WWII was created through a massive and quick expansion (as was the AEF in WWI) and neither was nearly so successful. A large chunk of that was down to having an exellent opponent each time. I'd argue present American domination did grow out of Vietnam because America came to believe that she had lost there, and that she had lost because she fought with one hand behind her back (I'm not concerned with whether the US were right, merely that that was the lesson drawn). After Reagan, her thinking has essentially meant she has ensured that she has never fought without overwhelming advantages. In a way, her current strategy is 150 years old. US Strategy was essentially set by Grant when he overcame the south by simple and relentless application of the military power of the north. American strategy ever since has spent and produced big, deployed big and fought big. That is not combat efficiency, though.

quote:

My point--my main point--is that we established the capability to form high-quality modern forces like this, in a very short time, more than 60 years ago.


I'd argue you did this 20 years ago under Reagan. The American combat performance in WWI and WWII and Korea (leaving Vietname aside) do not support this conclusion. Germany increased her military strength more successfully in the period before 1945, and I don't see much evidence one way or the other during Korea and Vietnam.

Regards,
IronDuke



Maliki -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/3/2005 7:16:39 PM)

Reading through this i think it's unfair to compare how forces performed and the casualties they recieved and inflicted,and how their opponents fared,as compared to other theaters.The ETO was as different from the CIB as the PTO was to the latter.Saying X was better than Y because they performed better,or worse than Z under a given set of circmustances.The USMC,being assault troops,could no more have sustained a large inland campaign against mechanized forces then the Germans,Russians,whomever could have had continued success against heavily defended amphibious objectives.

Wouldn't a better way of looking at things be to see what the units were trained to do and how they performed in carrying out their assigned roles?The USMC could have attempted D-Day,they could have even succeeded given their performance in other operations.They could not have carried out,without losing operational effiecency,the prolonged combat that ensued afterwards.

Also Naval and air bombardment of shoreline objectives was highly over-rated.Someone here said that the marines didn't have it that bad because they enjoyed a material advantage in firepower and pre-assault bombardment.This overlooks the fact that at the same time the US was refining its techniques of amphibious assault that the enemy,Japanese,were also refining their ways of withstanding it.The first wave at Iwo Jima was let ashore without heavy resistance because the Japanese commander wanted the beach head to become crowded before letting lose his firepower on it,thus giving away its posistions and leading to its eventual destruction,thereby maximizing the casualties when he played his ace.The war in the pacific and the battle for the islands there were not won because of superior firepower,and naval and air bombardment,but by very grinding and bloody squad based actions.The Japanese had to be expelled bloodily for every foot of ground they gave up.It was alot like WWI in a way because it was a battle of yards once the fight on the ground was joined.There was no room for manuever just slogging ahead until that strongpoint was secured and then on to the next one and the one after that.



Maliki -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/3/2005 7:21:39 PM)

Oh yea.The largest amphibous operation of the war was not D-day.It was Okinawa.Just FYI.Though that was a joint army-marine operation.Though the US army did carry out the most amphibious operations of the war,including in the pacific.They also had a "navy" larger than any other force in the world.Strange..huh?



MikeBrough -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/3/2005 9:55:42 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Maliki

Oh yea.The largest amphibous operation of the war was not D-day.It was Okinawa.Just FYI.Though that was a joint army-marine operation.Though the US army did carry out the most amphibious operations of the war,including in the pacific.They also had a "navy" larger than any other force in the world.Strange..huh?


Surely not? What criteria are you using? The biggest Pacific War amphibious invasion but not bigger than D-Day.

Men landed on first day of each campaign: D-Day: 150,000 Okinawa: 60,000
Ships involved: D-Day: 2,807 plus 1,991 minor landing craft. Okinawa: don't know but less than 4,798, surely?


Source: http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsAmphibious2.htm



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/4/2005 2:33:09 AM)

I was conscious that we had focused heavily on Dupuy and his system which I do not feel has been seriously challenged. However, I do think there are other authorities and other reasons why the American Infantry struggled in World War II that go beyond Dupuy's methology. I was going to go through Dupuy and try and summarise his method for the thread more closely at some point as well, but firstly, I wanted to post a few comments on the American Army of World War II to illustrate why I think Dupuy found what he did.

firstly, and something close to the heart of the basic supposition of this thread that the US were consistently able to produce high quality forces, was the way the Army was initially increased in size.

Between 1940 and 1945, the US Army increased in size 25 fold. Now, it has been pointed out by some studies that this made the Army rich in experience of many things. Communications and logistics etc were all progressed within the US Army significantly because of this influx of outside expertise into the Military. However, the downside was that although well trained, the peace time Army had never trained its men in the duties or skills required of being an Officer or NCO. As the Army expanded many of these experiencd men moved elsewhere in the Armed services for easy promotion, and what this meant was that when they went into combat, most American units lacked not only combat experience, but also Officers and NCOs who had experience or thorough training of being an Officer or NCO. One solution to the greenness was to transfer men from the regular divisions to the newly raised formations, but this took men who had trained and lived together for years out of their parent units and thrust them into battle with strangers. Not a recipe for success.

Indeed, the entire American replacement system has been criticised for creating replacement depots which exacerbated the problem, by centralising replacements and assigning them out as required. This meant men frequently went into battle with strangers.

The second problem was the quality of the recruits. Many talented men were allowed to get out of service in the infantry, and most men with above average intelligence were usually assigned to the Air Corp, the technical branches or elsewhere. This meant that in addition to being green, and in addition to having few experienced NCOs or Junior Officers, most American units also contained an average quality of recruit that was not what it should have been. I can't find a reference to it, but I seem to remember a study from 1944 that found the average American infantrymen to have a lower IQ and shorter stature than his Air Corp equivalent.

Without experience, and with only inexperienced men to train and lead them at NCO and Junior Officer level, and an additional lack of experienced instructors during basic training meant units performed badly as a result. Patton famously said "The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; the American infantry needs all that it can get." Marshall in 1941, and Patton in 1944 were famously complaining about the standard of junior officers.

The net result was that American arms compensated with firepower. Lots of artillery, massive air support and liberally sprinkled armour and TD units were all designed to compensate for the generally poor quality infantry. Take the breakout battles in Normandy where heavy bombers were used en masse to kill everything in front of the American units, as an example.

This was not a uniquely American problem. The British Army had problems of its own in terms of performance although for different reasons, and by the war's end the Germans were suffering as well, as the quality of recruit dropped and the Waffen SS expanded taking a disproportionate share of the better replacements. They found extra firepower was also required to try and compensate. They introduced the MP43/44, the worlds first Assault rifle to try and make up for it, in much the same way the Soviets mass produced and issued their submachine guns.

Even the Marines, who seem close to several hearts here, did not excape the war without criticism. The Marines have been criticised (a tag that has never left them) for preferring stand up fights and frontal assaults. One example I saw quoted was Pelieu Island where casualties ran to 56%. Marine landings often saw the men shake out into linear skirmish lines before heading inland. Take away the trees, and these tactics were familiar on the Somme. In the Pacific, you see the same use of concentrated firepower to compensate as you do in Europe.

All in all, the evidence against the American Army being particularly combat effective in World War II is pretty steep. Dupuy's work merely provides some statistical evidence. This isn't about questioning American bravery, which I'm sure stands comparison, but about their combat effectiveness, which is something else altogether.

Regards,
IronDuke



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (2/20/2005 7:08:08 PM)

I mentioned earlier in this thread that I'd post a description of Dupuy's method to allow people to make a judgement of their own on his value.

This is a very basic description, but the basic combat model used was devised not just By Dupuy but by some other Retired US Officers selected to represented the full range of activity. There was a Marine, an infantryman, armour specialist etc.

The first step is to quantify the weapons for qualities like rate of fire, range, lethality, accuracy, reliability, mobility, radius of action etc. Also included are the number of potential targets per strike (or target density). Further modifications are made for armoured vehicles for fire control and ammunition supply.

What you then had was a range of values for weapons called the Theoretical lethality indices (TLI). This was how good the weapons were (essentially) in proving ground conditions. The next thing to do was convert them to how effective they would be on the battlefield.

This was two steps.

Firstly, TLIs were converted to Operational Lethality indices by adding in the effects of dispersion. Essentially, an MG 42 pumped out enough bullets every minute to kill a thousands people, but it never did, because troops were dispersed. It is the history of dispersion (sometimes known theoretically as "The Empty Battlefield") which explains this. An MG 42 is far more accurate, reliable, long ranged and deadly than a musket, but casualty rates on battlefields have grown less over time, not greater despite better weapons. Dispersion is the key to this.

The second step was to take the OLIs and modify them by calculating the effects of variables. In addition to the weapons effects mentioned above, effects were identified and calculated for Terrain (6 different effects), weather (5) season (3), air superiority (4) posture (2) Mobility (2) vulnerability (5) tac air (6) and a further 18 covering a range of things including the effects of surprise, disruption, leadership etc. Some could not easily be quantified (such as combat effectiveness) and were perhaps best calculated after the analysis, as a factor that might explain a certain result.

Esssnetially, at the end, you had a complex formula in which you fed in troop strengths, the weapons used (modified by all the factors above) and got a combat power strength. This was compared to the enemy combat power strength to get a value.

So, if US Combat power was higher that German combat power, the US had an advantage and were expected to win. Remember, these values are not modified for terrain etc at this stage, because those modifications were made before the combat power value was reached.

So, Dupuy now had a theoretical result. The next thing was to quantify what the actual result was, and see if the theoretical matched the actual. The actual result was worked out using three factors. How close to achieving their actual objectives the two sides came. How effective they were at holding or taking ground, and how many casualties they inflicted.

The last step was to compare the theoretical with the actual result in another formula. To be fair, the values for many of the variables required a lot of thought, opinion and tweaking. However, when the final set of variable values were set and applied, it was found the model correctly predicted the outcome in over 90% of the 60 engagements from the Italian campaign. It was later validated against a further 21 battles from NW Europe and Russia with similiar results.

A US Army model called ATLAS in use in the seventies managed only 68%.

The issue about combat efectiveness came up when explaining some of the results.

EG: In engagement A, the combat power comparison suggests it should have been a big US win, but it actually turned out to be a narow US win etc. What was found, was that if you assumed (and calculated in) that German combat power was 120 - 130% of the Allied combat effectiveness, the model fit much better, and the narrow US win was explainable.

They essentially found that wherever a big Allied win was predicted, they won. Wherever the combat powers were equal, or narrowly in the Allied favour, the Germans won. Some of it they put down to a more effective utilisation of manpower in combat (essentially a smaller Geman "tail" and more people fighting) but it didn't account for it all.

As Dupuy himself states:

quote:

We didn't like one of the two conclusions this adjustment forced upon us - that 100 Germans were roughly the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or British - but we could not ignore the fact that our numbers demonstrated that this was so.


The Combat model was further validated by reference to the Arab Israeli wars of 1973, which found the Israelis more combat effective (not something I've seen seriously questioned, although the conclusion came from the same model).

Looking at values from WWI, Dupuy found a similiar sort of picture, which led him to conclude that Combat efficiency is slow to change for various reasons. The problems that American force of arms had in Korea and Vietnam back that conclusion up.

Finally, please remember, this doesn't question the bravery of the men concerned, just suggests (as commonsense dictates) that although two men may be equally brave, one may be a more effective soldier for a whole host of reasons unrelated to courage. Others have built on Dupuy's work to identify what those factors may have been.

Regards,
IronDuke



Nemesis -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/7/2005 2:18:17 PM)

What an interesting thread this has been :). But I must say that when talking about the individual soldiers, I'm partial to Finnish soldiers ;). Of course they lacked the equipment, air-support and sheer firepower that US Army and Red Army (for example) enjoyed, but as soldiers, I think they were top-notch. Hell, they faced second-largest artillery-barrage in the entire war together with massive Red Army attack... And in the end of they day, they were undefeated.

Related to this:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.


Finns did that as well. The SOP consisted of primary defensive-line backed up by secondary defensive-lines. If the primary line of defence was lost, counterattack to re-take it was expected. Command expected that after the battle the primary line of defence was intact and in friendly hands.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/13/2005 3:45:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemesis

What an interesting thread this has been :). But I must say that when talking about the individual soldiers, I'm partial to Finnish soldiers ;). Of course they lacked the equipment, air-support and sheer firepower that US Army and Red Army (for example) enjoyed, but as soldiers, I think they were top-notch. Hell, they faced second-largest artillery-barrage in the entire war together with massive Red Army attack... And in the end of they day, they were undefeated.

Related to this:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.


Finns did that as well. The SOP consisted of primary defensive-line backed up by secondary defensive-lines. If the primary line of defence was lost, counterattack to re-take it was expected. Command expected that after the battle the primary line of defence was intact and in friendly hands.


The business of tactics and small unit doctrine is interesting. However, I think it is essentially a result, not a cause, of better combat performance. Good soldiers with inferior tactics will beat bad soldiers with superior tactics. The point about the counterattack is an important one. To motivate troops who have just been ejected (presumably with some loss) to immediately counterattack requires first class infantry. If German tactics were better, it is because they had the troops to carry them out.

I think the essential cause of Wehrmacht ground superiority rests on a few points.

1. A bigger share of better material actually going into the Infantry. Statistics illustrate almost half of American ground troops came from the lowest categories of recruit identified before training.

2. Better training, organisation and a much better replacement system. German units were recruited from geographic areas (much like the British regimental system) and their replacements were trained in battalions linked to those units. Training was frequently done towards the end by men from the Parent division who had a vested interest in ensuring the men arrived at the front in some sort of state to fight effectively. Links were encouraged at all levels between the replacement units and the combat units and the results showed.

The American depot system essentially meant most recruits knew the unit they were in only at the very end, and were lucky to get much field training, instead relying on experienced Camrades to help them along.

3. Better small unit Leadership, and a doctrine better suited to modern war. At every level the Germans emphasised not how to do something, but what to do. Subordinates were not told how to do something, but were told what the objective was, and any additional mission paramaters, but were then left to get the job done as they saw fit within those mission and objective parameters.

American Field manuals tended to explain in greater detail how individual tasks could and should be accomplished. I think the result was that Germans approached a mission with a clean slate, looking at what would work best in the terrain and circumstances. Americans were more likely to play it by the book, and I think that can leave you predictable, and unwilling to gamble, seize opportunities as they arrive and be really aggressive.


The net result was that American operational doctrine stagnated, I think. Any desire to manouevre was lost amidst a drive to make up for the relative German superiority with the use of lavish amounts of firepower. In return, this provoked something of a vicious circle. The idea that lavish firepower is at hand to do the job will not encourage troops to get out of their holes and act aggressively. Manouevre becomes something you do to find the enemy, before fixing him and annihilating him with firepower. However, the old maxim that you need infantry to pull the other guy out of his hole is true, and the net effect of the above was that when Allied units (not just American) went over the top, they struggled to deal with the more tactically adept Wehrmacht.

Once again, none of this questions their bravery, merely their combat efficiency, which is something else entirely.

Regards,
IronDuke



Yamato hugger -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/13/2005 6:59:21 PM)

Part of the reason the allies vs German troops over-all favored the allies was the doctrine. Allied formations were trained together, then as they experienced combat, they had replacements funneled into them and the experienced troops trained the replacements (more to it that than, but this is in essence what happened).

German units on the other hand were typically bled white, then pulled out of the line and filled up with replacements, effectively creating a whole new unit. Which of course explains the SS's performance in the Ardennes.

With some noteable exceptions Jap forces that encoutered allied forces from '42 onwards ceased to exist and therefore only had their prior experiences to fall back on, and those experiences couldnt prepare them for what they were about to face.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/14/2005 12:26:30 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Yamato hugger

Part of the reason the allies vs German troops over-all favored the allies was the doctrine. Allied formations were trained together, then as they experienced combat, they had replacements funneled into them and the experienced troops trained the replacements (more to it that than, but this is in essence what happened).


Yamato,
I don't agree. German formations also trained together. They had the extra advantage, also gotten by the British Regimental system, that they were all drawn from the same geographical area. They maintained this through their replacement system. Replacements trained with others destined for the same division, and the process of Camradeship was started as early as possible. An American replacement had no idea which unit he was destined for until he arrived at the front. Many American Regiments suffered 100% casualties within three months of entering combat. The replacement system kept them at full strength, but clearly there was only so much Veterans could teach or be willing to risk to teach to new recruits as the casualty figures suggest. The bonds within American units were not as strong, as men often went into battle with newly arrived strangers. This leads into your second point...

quote:

German units on the other hand were typically bled white, then pulled out of the line and filled up with replacements, effectively creating a whole new unit. Which of course explains the SS's performance in the Ardennes.


Yes, but this has one advantage. These understrength units were usually made up of Veterans, who had a deep sense of loyalty to each other as they had survived and fought for so long. This meant they punched above their weight, and there were few weak links. The large number of units the Germans produced (which they did instead of giving units large numbers of replacements) also meant German units were pulled out of the front line frequently, and in some cases got more leave than their American counterparts. The Americans only fielded 89 Divisions during the war for all Theatres, and as a result, there was never a surplus of units to ensure regular rotation. With so many Divisions, the Germans could give more leave.

Also, the process of rebuilding was done around a solid cadre of Battle hardened NCOs and Officers who had survived and whilst field training was underway, they could impart this experience in less lethal conditions than could be found at the front. The American replacement system was widely criticised by American Officers during the war, and was a major factor in German superiority.

It is possible, more replacements could have kept the Units in bigger better condition for longer, but the Germans woulf still have used the same replacement system which was far better than the one employed by the Americans.

quote:

With some noteable exceptions Jap forces that encoutered allied forces from '42 onwards ceased to exist and therefore only had their prior experiences to fall back on, and those experiences couldnt prepare them for what they were about to face.


The Japs are a different proposition altogether. I think conditions there, particularly Allied firepower and tactics and Japanese attitude to death, make the subject more difficult. However, this lack of experience you mention did not prevent the Japanese giving Allied troops hellish battles on Iwo, Pelieu and Okinawa.

Regards,
IronDuke



Yamato hugger -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/14/2005 5:22:10 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Yamato,
I don't agree. German formations also trained together. They had the extra advantage, also gotten by the British Regimental system, that they were all drawn from the same geographical area. They maintained this through their replacement system. Replacements trained with others destined for the same division, and the process of Camradeship was started as early as possible. An American replacement had no idea which unit he was destined for until he arrived at the front. Many American Regiments suffered 100% casualties within three months of entering combat. The replacement system kept them at full strength, but clearly there was only so much Veterans could teach or be willing to risk to teach to new recruits as the casualty figures suggest. The bonds within American units were not as strong, as men often went into battle with newly arrived strangers. This leads into your second point...


100% correct. German units even after recieving their replacements trained together and the replacements were generally from the same geographical area as well. This isnt always an advantage. The armor units on Luzon for example was comprised mainly of people drawn from the same area in Minnesota. The area was totally stunned when they got the news that they had lost their husbands / fathers. As a result recruitments from this area was lower than in other areas of the country (not counting draftees of course). It was learned early on to mix the locations that people come from. The seven (or was it five?) brothers that went down on that cruiser same deal (the Sullivans I believe?). No longer were brothers in the same unit for the same reason. And my fathers division, the 96th, sustained 125% casulties between Leyte and Okinawa.

quote:

Yes, but this has one advantage. . .
. . .Also, the process of rebuilding was done around a solid cadre of Battle hardened NCOs and Officers who had survived and whilst field training was underway, they could impart this experience in less lethal conditions than could be found at the front. The American replacement system was widely criticised by American Officers during the war, and was a major factor in German superiority.


Not really an advantage. During Vietnam the same basic replacement system was in place as WWII. And yes, everyone avoided the "cherry" for the first 4-6 weeks, because if they were going to get hit, it was most likely that was when they were going to get it. They had battle-hardened NCOs to instruct them, and they had their other replacement buddies to cover them. No different in WWII. But as you say while the Germans had battle hardened NCOs and officers, their US counterpart had MORE of them. Its a matter of opinion if on the job training is a good way to train a replacement (replacement, not recruit). Keep in mind that not all replacements in the US scheme were right out of the cornfields. Some had transfered for some reason, some had been wounded and then sent back to the line (usually but not always to the units they came from), ect. And the US unit typically stayed in the line.

quote:


It is possible, more replacements could have kept the Units in bigger better condition for longer, but the Germans woulf still have used the same replacement system which was far better than the one employed by the Americans.


On this point we disagree, but thats fair.

quote:


The Japs are a different proposition altogether. I think conditions there, particularly Allied firepower and tactics and Japanese attitude to death, make the subject more difficult. However, this lack of experience you mention did not prevent the Japanese giving Allied troops hellish battles on Iwo, Pelieu and Okinawa.


I think the differences in these battles was the officers there were begining to learn our tactics. I dont think the man behind the rifle was any different or better.



coregames -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/14/2005 7:15:03 AM)

From what I've seen in the WWII games I've played, the hardest part in getting the U.S. role right is balancing economic "building power" and quality of units (movement, combat factors, etc...), against the necessity for their primary involvement in two theatres of conflict. I've sometimes wondered if, in World in Flames, the U.S. was over-represented, because their income explodes after a certain point, and their units overall are probably the best in the game. From what I am reading in this thread, perhaps ADG got it just about right.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/15/2005 12:40:07 AM)

quote:

=100% correct. German units even after recieving their replacements trained together and the replacements were generally from the same geographical area as well. This isnt always an advantage. The armor units on Luzon for example was comprised mainly of people drawn from the same area in Minnesota. The area was totally stunned when they got the news that they had lost their husbands / fathers. As a result recruitments from this area was lower than in other areas of the country (not counting draftees of course). It was learned early on to mix the locations that people come from. The seven (or was it five?) brothers that went down on that cruiser same deal (the Sullivans I believe?). No longer were brothers in the same unit for the same reason. And my fathers division, the 96th, sustained 125% casulties between Leyte and Okinawa.


It's not always an advantage to the local communities, but it is always an advantage to the Soldiers in the Field. Despite some horrendous casualty counts in WWI and WWII, the British Regimental system survives. It also depends on the size of the area you recruit from as to whether large scale casualties wipe out communities. Also, just about every German between the ages of 11 and 65 was levered into a uniform by the war's end, so a reluctance to volunteer was not necessarily an issue.

quote:

Yes, but this has one advantage. . .
. . .Also, the process of rebuilding was done around a solid cadre of Battle hardened NCOs and Officers who had survived and whilst field training was underway, they could impart this experience in less lethal conditions than could be found at the front. The American replacement system was widely criticised by American Officers during the war, and was a major factor in German superiority.


quote:

Not really an advantage. During Vietnam the same basic replacement system was in place as WWII. And yes, everyone avoided the "cherry" for the first 4-6 weeks, because if they were going to get hit, it was most likely that was when they were going to get it.


Agreed.

quote:

They had battle-hardened NCOs to instruct them, and they had their other replacement buddies to cover them.


But only eventually. Battle hardened NCOs are not suicidal, just battle hardened. The German system allowed NCOs a time to become familiar with their men before they were in serious danger. It allowed the basic lessons required to be imparted and ingrained straight away before the first rounds were heard in anger. It gave some of the responsibility for training the recruits to the men who would come to depend on the recruits, the NCOs and Junior Officers concerned. It also gave the recruits and parent division some chance of Camradeship to exist from day one.

That the American system didn't work can be inferred from the criticism American Officers gave it. I seem to reem,ber at least one US division whose Commander instituted his own training programme with the recruits out of the front line, not something that would have been required had the system worked.

quote:

No different in WWII. But as you say while the Germans had battle hardened NCOs and officers, their US counterpart had MORE of them..


I don't think this is important. The cadre the Germans provided had the chance to work with their men in safety, and entered combat on a better footing as a result. Some American units were losing 100% of strength in just a few months. Either they were losing a lot of battle hardened men as well, or the recruits were coming out and getting hit very quickly.

quote:

Its a matter of opinion if on the job training is a good way to train a replacement (replacement, not recruit). Keep in mind that not all replacements in the US scheme were right out of the cornfields. Some had transfered for some reason, some had been wounded and then sent back to the line (usually but not always to the units they came from), ect. And the US unit typically stayed in the line


On the job training can complete but not do the bulk of a recruit's training. The battlefield is too unforgiving to train replacements on the job. Also, you depend on those men the minute they arrive. You depend on them before they have had a chance to be taught by veterans. I think this lay at the heart of US performace. You don't fight well with men you don't yet know and don't yet trust. I think Dupuy's figures demonstrate this.

Regarding...

quote:

And the US unit typically stayed in the line


Indeed it did, to its detriment. The US replacement system kept the 89 divisions they fielded at full strength (at least until the end when there was a shortage in the last few months of trained riflemen). However, this did mean that there were fewer units to rotate units in and out of the front line with. When it was clear that units had got to the point where they needed a rest to continue to function, they ended up in a quiet part of the front. The consequences of this were felt for several days at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive.

quote:

I think the differences in these battles was the officers there were begining to learn our tactics. I dont think the man behind the rifle was any different or better.


I don't think the Japs were any better. However, they essentially forced the Americans into a slow grinding firepower-fest. I don't think it would have been wise (were it ever conceived) to really switch units between the theatres, because any unit that had spent years digging the Japanese out of caves etc would have been taken apart by the more tactically astute Germans.

Regards,
IronDuke



Golf33 -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/15/2005 3:00:31 AM)

Interesting discussion. I have a slightly different take on the training of replacements: you don't need to withdraw a unit from battle to train together with its new replacements, but you do need to ensure the replacements themselves are properly trained before being committed to a unit on the front line.

Initially the AIF used a similar system to the US Army - replacements conducted their basic training in Australia, were sent to a theatre Reinforcement Depot, then forwarded to their units which might already be in combat. Although the overall effectiveness of the Australian units remained high (casualties during the initial attack on Tobruk were very light), 60% of the casualties that did occur were among reinforcements. This is obviously detrimental to overall combat performance and if not corrected leads to the sort of problems experienced by the US Army in Europe.

To correct the problem the AIF in the Middle East reorganised the in-theatre handling and training of reinforcements. To correct the lack of fitness of arriving reinforcements they instituted a fairly savage physical conditioning program that weeded out soldiers incapable of withstanding the rigours of combat (these were relegated to non-combat duties). The surviving reinforcements were then assessed for their level of training (in many cases they hadn't even been taught to shoot) and put through a training program that corrected their lack of basic military skills.

The organisation of the depot training course was essential to its success. Chester Wilmot described it like this:
quote:

The Depot is organised into a number of what we might call shadow units - that is, each one is a training unit for a unit in the field. Thus every infantry Battalion has its training company; every Brigade its own training Battalion; every field regiment its own training battery and so on. There is not just one big pool of reinforcements from which the forward units draw will-nilly the reinforcements they need. Every unit is made responsible for the training of its own reinforcements, and so a Battalion commander knows that it pays him to send his best officers and sergeants to the training dommander. If he doesn't send good men back as instructors, he will get badly trained reinforcements....The AIF Reinforcement Depot is no refuge for base wallahs who cannot hold down jobs with the fighting formations. In its determination to get the best men with the most recent experience, the Reinforcement Depot is continually changing its staff of instructor officers and sergeants. Instructors stay an average of six months. They come straight from forward units and they bring with them the latest experience.... just in case they have lost touch with basic textbook principles, nearly all instructors go through refresher courses themselves before they start work at the training units. Then they instruct for six months and by that time their initial advantage of having just come from the forward areas has worn off and they are replaced.


Units were thus kept at high strength by a steady stream of reinforcements while in the front lines. These reinforcements had been trained by the best of the unit's combat-experienced officers and NCOs and were already instilled with a unit identity and knowledge of the basic operating procedures of the unit, so they fitted in from the start. Units did not receive badly-trained or unfit replacements, and there was not the degree of separation between a newly-arrived reinforcement and his unit that could occur in the American system. It also prevented a unit committing combat support or even service support personnel to combat roles, which could happen in German units as their infantry components were bled white before the unit was withdrawn and rebuilt. This last is a particularly serious mistake for long-term combat effectiveness, since combat support and service support personnel take longer to train than infantrymen and their skill underpins the entire military effort at all levels.

Regards
33



Yamato hugger -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/15/2005 8:47:59 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

It's not always an advantage to the local communities, but it is always an advantage to the Soldiers in the Field.


Well this I can say for a fact isnt true. I was in regular army units that people were from all over the country and I have been in reserve units where everyone was from the same area, and really, no difference in effiency or morale.

quote:

The German system allowed NCOs a time to become familiar with their men before they were in serious danger.


Granted

quote:

It allowed the basic lessons required to be imparted and ingrained straight away before the first rounds were heard in anger.


US training provides the recruit to learn these things before he becomes a replacement. Now granted a replacement will not come into a unit knowing the history of what has been going on in the unit specifically, however, the tactics, basic terrain the unit operates in, ect is all a part of their training before they join a replacement battalion. It is the NCO's job in the unit to instruct them on more detailed things.

quote:

It gave some of the responsibility for training the recruits to the men who would come to depend on the recruits, the NCOs and Junior Officers concerned. It also gave the recruits and parent division some chance of Camradeship to exist from day one.


As with any other situation when people are involved, some are better than others at it. As for the comaradeship that is a tradeoff really. The time a unit takes to pull off the line, take replacements and train vs sticking a few in the line here and there to learn under fire.

If you have the time to spare, it might be better to pull off and do it that way, but as the Bulge attests, men under fire for the first time are unpredictable (not only refering the the "green" German units here, but the "green" US units as well). Niether sides "rookie" units were terribly effective (I worked with a guy that was in the 106th Division. He said the first German he ever saw was the one with his company commander telling them they had just surrendered).

quote:

That the American system didn't work can be inferred from the criticism American Officers gave it. I seem to reem,ber at least one US division whose Commander instituted his own training programme with the recruits out of the front line, not something that would have been required had the system worked.


Well the US system has been effectively unchanged for over 60 years now. If it was that bad, Im sure they would have done something.

quote:

No different in WWII. But as you say while the Germans had battle hardened NCOs and officers, their US counterpart had MORE of them..
quote:


I don't think this is important. The cadre the Germans provided had the chance to work with their men in safety, and entered combat on a better footing as a result. Some American units were losing 100% of strength in just a few months. Either they were losing a lot of battle hardened men as well, or the recruits were coming out and getting hit very quickly.


I on the other had think this is significant. More 1 on 1 training. More attention to detail. The loss ratios were no different really to any other nations forces after the same number of days in contact, there again US units were "in contact" longer than those typically of other nations.

quote:

Indeed it did, to its detriment. The US replacement system kept the 89 divisions they fielded at full strength (at least until the end when there was a shortage in the last few months of trained riflemen). However, this did mean that there were fewer units to rotate units in and out of the front line with. When it was clear that units had got to the point where they needed a rest to continue to function, they ended up in a quiet part of the front. The consequences of this were felt for several days at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive.


Well you also have to realize that the US organization (triangular) has its own built in rotation system. Typically only 2 of any given units 3 elements is actually on the line at any given time, the 3rd is in reserve typically.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/16/2005 1:37:30 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Interesting discussion. I have a slightly different take on the training of replacements: you don't need to withdraw a unit from battle to train together with its new replacements, but you do need to ensure the replacements themselves are properly trained before being committed to a unit on the front line.

Initially the AIF used a similar system to the US Army - replacements conducted their basic training in Australia, were sent to a theatre Reinforcement Depot, then forwarded to their units which might already be in combat. Although the overall effectiveness of the Australian units remained high (casualties during the initial attack on Tobruk were very light), 60% of the casualties that did occur were among reinforcements. This is obviously detrimental to overall combat performance and if not corrected leads to the sort of problems experienced by the US Army in Europe.

To correct the problem the AIF in the Middle East reorganised the in-theatre handling and training of reinforcements. To correct the lack of fitness of arriving reinforcements they instituted a fairly savage physical conditioning program that weeded out soldiers incapable of withstanding the rigours of combat (these were relegated to non-combat duties). The surviving reinforcements were then assessed for their level of training (in many cases they hadn't even been taught to shoot) and put through a training program that corrected their lack of basic military skills.

The organisation of the depot training course was essential to its success. Chester Wilmot described it like this:
quote:

The Depot is organised into a number of what we might call shadow units - that is, each one is a training unit for a unit in the field. Thus every infantry Battalion has its training company; every Brigade its own training Battalion; every field regiment its own training battery and so on. There is not just one big pool of reinforcements from which the forward units draw will-nilly the reinforcements they need. Every unit is made responsible for the training of its own reinforcements, and so a Battalion commander knows that it pays him to send his best officers and sergeants to the training dommander. If he doesn't send good men back as instructors, he will get badly trained reinforcements....The AIF Reinforcement Depot is no refuge for base wallahs who cannot hold down jobs with the fighting formations. In its determination to get the best men with the most recent experience, the Reinforcement Depot is continually changing its staff of instructor officers and sergeants. Instructors stay an average of six months. They come straight from forward units and they bring with them the latest experience.... just in case they have lost touch with basic textbook principles, nearly all instructors go through refresher courses themselves before they start work at the training units. Then they instruct for six months and by that time their initial advantage of having just come from the forward areas has worn off and they are replaced.


Units were thus kept at high strength by a steady stream of reinforcements while in the front lines. These reinforcements had been trained by the best of the unit's combat-experienced officers and NCOs and were already instilled with a unit identity and knowledge of the basic operating procedures of the unit, so they fitted in from the start. Units did not receive badly-trained or unfit replacements, and there was not the degree of separation between a newly-arrived reinforcement and his unit that could occur in the American system. It also prevented a unit committing combat support or even service support personnel to combat roles, which could happen in German units as their infantry components were bled white before the unit was withdrawn and rebuilt. This last is a particularly serious mistake for long-term combat effectiveness, since combat support and service support personnel take longer to train than infantrymen and their skill underpins the entire military effort at all levels.

Regards
33


Fascinating stuff, thanks for the post. It echoes the German experience. They gave each Division a Field training battalion, and one of the companies would link to each of the Divisions three regiments for even stronger ties. They too would release combat hardened personnel to train the recruits, on the belief that the best men to train anyone was the man who would rely on the trainee in combat. They had a personal interst in getting the training right.

Regards,
IronDuke



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/16/2005 2:00:06 AM)

quote:

Well this I can say for a fact isnt true. I was in regular army units that people were from all over the country and I have been in reserve units where everyone was from the same area, and really, no difference in effiency or morale.


Yamato,
I don't doubt what you are saying, but the Germans essentially just ensured that Prussians served together, that Wurtemburgers served together etc, recognising that a farm boy from Omaha in the middle of an infantry unit predominantly recruited from the Bronx might have problems integrating.

quote:

US training provides the recruit to learn these things before he becomes a replacement. Now granted a replacement will not come into a unit knowing the history of what has been going on in the unit specifically, however, the tactics, basic terrain the unit operates in, ect is all a part of their training before they join a replacement battalion. It is the NCO's job in the unit to instruct them on more detailed things.


German training did much the same thing, except it allowed the NCO to time to instruct the recruit in the more detailed things in a friendly environment. In the American situation, the recruit could be killed at any time before the instruction was finished because of combat, perhaps taking others with him.

quote:

As with any other situation when people are involved, some are better than others at it. As for the comaradeship that is a tradeoff really. The time a unit takes to pull off the line, take replacements and train vs sticking a few in the line here and there to learn under fire.


But the Germans had the best of both worlds. Field replacements joined field replacement battalions and were trained behind the lines. They joined under fire, in a better position to watch the veterans and survive. The Veterans also had more confidence in their abilities as a result and unit cohesion was better.

quote:

Well the US system has been effectively unchanged for over 60 years now. If it was that bad, Im sure they would have done something.


I'd argue evidence it wasn't repaired could be found in Korea and Vietnam. I don't know enough about the post Reagan reform Army to give an educated opinion about how it stands currently.

quote:

I on the other had think this is significant. More 1 on 1 training. More attention to detail. The loss ratios were no different really to any other nations forces after the same number of days in contact, there again US units were "in contact" longer than those typically of other nations.


I don't think 1-1 really matters in combat. I don't think a veteran NCO trying to survive under machine gun fire is best placed to teach a rookie the error of his ways. At least, not without getting themselves killed.

quote:

Well you also have to realize that the US organization (triangular) has its own built in rotation system. Typically only 2 of any given units 3 elements is actually on the line at any given time, the 3rd is in reserve typically.


Most (if not all) European armies went into battle in WWII with a triangular system. If memory serves, the Americans changed before the war because they were dissatisfied with the four regiment system they had been using. The German Divisions had three Regiments of three battalions (until manpower shortages forced them to reduce them) and the British had three brigades of three battalions each. Also, this doesn't really take units away from the front. It's main purpose was to provide flexibility on the attack and defence.

The final evidence I would present concerns Battle shock (or combat fatigue or whatever name you want to use for it).

American pyschiatric casualties in the second world war were massive. At one point, Marshall ordered an investigation because the US Army was discharging more men with Combat fatigue than it was inducting for basic training. Over 900 000 men or 9% of the US Army were treated at some stage. In NW Europe, American combat fatigure rates were ten times higher than those of the Germans facing them (Germans who knew the war was lost, were hopelessly outgunned, and for whom the future was bleak).

Post war research indicated that US psychiatric casualties fell into two basic groupings.

Men who fell apart after a few days of first engaging in combat. Men who suffered after five months plus in the line.

The basic failure of the American system can be seen here.

Replacements broke in large numbers after just a few days of seeing combat because they were under prepared, in units of strangers, and felt no bonds or Camradeship with those around them. In these circumstances, Combat was too traumatic, and the support available too little.

Men broke after several months because the Americans fielded too few Divisions. This meant that after five months in the line, men still had no immediate prospect of being rotated out of the front line for a complete break, and the hopelessness of it all got to them.

The German system provided people better prepared, who broke far less often. The German tendancy to build lots of new divisions rather than reinforce old ones gave them ample opportunities to pull divisions out of the line for a rest, because they were so many new formations being pumped out.

These things were major contributory factors to German Combat superiority, and the reason they took so long to subdue, even after overwhelming defeats (like the twin blows of Normandy and Bagration).

Regards,
IronDuke



Yamato hugger -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/16/2005 10:08:20 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

recognising that a farm boy from Omaha in the middle of an infantry unit predominantly recruited from the Bronx might have problems integrating.


Probably true, however US units WERENT recruited from 1 area predominately, so this statement is invalid. Certainly it applies to the Germans and probably other nations as well.

quote:


German training did much the same thing, except it allowed the NCO to time to instruct the recruit in the more detailed things in a friendly environment. In the American situation, the recruit could be killed at any time before the instruction was finished because of combat, perhaps taking others with him.


Operative words there are COULD BE. Sure its possible. It is equally possible the German replacement could be killed by airstrikes / partisans on his way to the front. The US army learned a lot from the German WWII army. The M-60 machine gun is a carbon copy of the German MG42 (with some improvements). The M-16 was derived at from the MP-44. Look at the current US Army helmets. As you say, the US Army converted from the square formation to the triangular during the war or just before (not all units converted before the end of the war even). The US interstate hiway system is copied from the autobahn system in place in Germany when Einsenhower saw it and brought it back here. I can assure you that the US Army looked at the German replacement system and rejected it for a reason.

quote:


I don't think 1-1 really matters in combat. I don't think a veteran NCO trying to survive under machine gun fire is best placed to teach a rookie the error of his ways. At least, not without getting themselves killed.


Ive been there. Trust me, it matters.

quote:


The final evidence I would present concerns Battle shock (or combat fatigue or whatever name you want to use for it).


No amount of non-combat training can prepare a person for being pounded night and day by artillery. To prepare a person to watch his friends and comrades get blown to pieces before their eyes. Germans, British, French, ect had seen it first hand in WWI, while only a relitive handful of US troops had experienced it. Euros had experienced it first hand for 3 years before the US was even involved in the conflict. Even the civilians had more "combat experience" than US troops initially. That the US forces suffered from a greater proportion of "combat fatigue" isnt a surprise, and that US doctors would be more lieniant with it is equally not a surprise. That isnt a failure of the replacement system, thats a failure (if you want to call it that) of the culture the troops came from.

quote:


Men broke after several months because the Americans fielded too few Divisions. This meant that after five months in the line, men still had no immediate prospect of being rotated out of the front line for a complete break, and the hopelessness of it all got to them.


This is perhaps the 1 flaw in the US system during WWII/Korea. Was repaired during Vietnam. 13 month tour of duty.

quote:


These things were major contributory factors to German Combat superiority, and the reason they took so long to subdue, even after overwhelming defeats (like the twin blows of Normandy and Bagration).


If the Germans held an edge at all was it had superior small unit leaders. US company commanders / platoon leaders depended heavily on support. Chiefly artillery / direct air support. Where as the Germans fell short was their lack of support. And even without air support the Germans were halted in the Ardennes in a week by a numerically inferior force without the benefit of prepared positions. The German units they were fighting had been pulled off the line, recieved replacements and trained before the battle. Our units were tossed in where they were needed with no training for the area they were to fight in. And US doctrine doesnt put a lot of effort into the defense, and yet they were halted. [;)]

And the reason they took so long to subdue, wasnt because they were better. It was because the suppiles were being trucked in from Cherboug



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/17/2005 1:27:42 AM)



quote:

Probably true, however US units WERENT recruited from 1 area predominately, so this statement is invalid. Certainly it applies to the Germans and probably other nations as well.


I used the Farm boy example to illustrate what the Germans were doing. I wasn't suggesting the Americans did this. My apologies if I was confusing. However, the equivalent example might have been ensuring all southerners were together or all Californians. They recognised that the feeling of belonging began by being surrounded with characters you recognised and had common experiences with. They recognised you created friends and Camrades first, and the combat unit followed.


quote:

Operative words there are COULD BE. Sure its possible. It is equally possible the German replacement could be killed by airstrikes / partisans on his way to the front.


Yes, but it was statistically far less likely than him turning up at the front, where the beneifts would be felt of the superior replacement system that had produced him.

quote:

The US army learned a lot from the German WWII army. The M-60 machine gun is a carbon copy of the German MG42 (with some improvements). The M-16 was derived at from the MP-44. Look at the current US Army helmets. As you say, the US Army converted from the square formation to the triangular during the war or just before (not all units converted before the end of the war even). The US interstate hiway system is copied from the autobahn system in place in Germany when Einsenhower saw it and brought it back here. I can assure you that the US Army looked at the German replacement system and rejected it for a reason.


They rejected it because their policy was to keep units at full fighting strength. You couldn't do this using the German system. Do you have a source that describes the US Army's study of the German system and subsequent rejection?

I found some more interesting material concerning the American system. The Army reported on the system itself in
The Personnel replacement system written by the Department of the Army. I found the matieral in Van Creveld;s Fighting Power.

It reported that some men complained of being "herded like sheep" or handled "like so many sticks of wood". It reported the men most of all wanted to be "identified with a unit" but after arriving in theatre often spent several weeks more in various depots. As I mentioned earlier, the 79th Infantry Division under General Wyche set up a system all of their own for the induction of recruits. It involved the regiments getting replacements assigned and detaching veterans from the front lines to give them pep and orientation talks before combat. It was a copy of the German system, except adopted at a divisional level by a unit who felt the current system let them down. It was copied by several other units and (most tellingly)the 79th finished the war being explicitly commended by Eisenhower as "A good combat unit". This was not common praise.

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No amount of non-combat training can prepare a person for being pounded night and day by artillery. To prepare a person to watch his friends and comrades get blown to pieces before their eyes.


whether the person is German or American.

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Germans, British, French, ect had seen it first hand in WWI, while only a relitive handful of US troops had experienced it.


I don't think this is relevant. The Generation that went to war in world war 1 would have been in their late thirties and older in World War II. No nation began the war using these men except in senior NCO or Officer positions.

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Euros had experienced it first hand for 3 years before the US was even involved in the conflict.


Large sections of the British Army hadn't, as they spent the war training in England for D-Day. Also, American psychiatric problems were worse in France '44 (after a couple of years experience in Sicily and Italy) than they were in the early days.

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Even the civilians had more "combat experience" than US troops initially. That the US forces suffered from a greater proportion of "combat fatigue" isnt a surprise, and that US doctors would be more lieniant with it is equally not a surprise. That isnt a failure of the replacement system, thats a failure (if you want to call it that) of the culture the troops came from.


Preliminary screening in the US Army rejected for service over 1.5 million men who were considered prone to "battle shock" following a Psychiatric examination. Training is supposed to remove the problems of the culture. By the logic you're using here, the Modern US Army should be even in worse state. It's the generation of television, McDonalds, computer games etc. It is possible you are right to say American Doctors were more lenient, but that's not really the point. The point is that they suffered far, far more than the Germans. One of the key groups of affected were those in combat for more than five months. The Germans had many like this who did not suffer, so clearly experience and exposure to combat was not a key factor.

It was lack of leave and for the other key group (the replacements) an inadequate preparation for the battlefield.

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If the Germans held an edge at all was it had superior small unit leaders. US company commanders / platoon leaders depended heavily on support. Chiefly artillery / direct air support. Where as the Germans fell short was their lack of support.


Agreed. Their doctrine relied on initiative and was very mission orientated. They allowed the local commander to decide how to complete the mission given the situation in front of him. I think their NCOs and junior Officers were second to none, chiefly because of training and doctrine.

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And even without air support the Germans were halted in the Ardennes in a week by a numerically inferior force without the benefit of prepared positions.


This is a slightly jaundiced look at the Ardennes offensive. The German advantage in the Ardennes was about 2.5:1. This was less than the Allied superiority in Normandy, where the Germans held for over 2 months. The advantage began reducing immediately and was overturned quite quickly.

The terrain was hopeless for an armoured assault, and the attack was essentially halted by lack of fuel and lack of bridges.

It has been noted that whilst they were advancing, they did so faster than the Americans did during the Cobra breakout, despite the fact it was the winter, they had fuel problems and unsuitable tanks, and more opposition than Patton faced.

Patton's counteroffensive had a torrid time for several days battleing through three relatively poor German formations to reach Bastogne and it took another two weeks to clear the Bastogne area of German forces.

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The German units they were fighting had been pulled off the line, recieved replacements and trained before the battle. Our units were tossed in where they were needed with no training for the area they were to fight in. And US doctrine doesnt put a lot of effort into the defense, and yet they were halted. [;)]


The two key units in the north, the Liebstandarte and HitlerJugend had been decimated in the Normandy Campaign about ten weeks before. It was rather impressive that they were spearheading the offensive at all. 10 weeks is not a lot of time to re-equip, reorganise, regroup and induct replacements en masse into a Panzer Corp. I think you are giving the Germans too little credit for what they achieved.

Yes, they were halted, but Peiper's spearhead destroyed their own tanks when a lack of bridges and fuel left them in a cul de sac.

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And the reason they took so long to subdue, wasnt because they were better. It was because the suppiles were being trucked in from Cherboug


No, it took so long because they were more combat efficient even at this late stage. The German supply system was trying to shift meagre supplies down hopelessly clogged roads under constant and massive air interdiction. At places like Bastogne they must have been moving off the roads into the countryside because the road net was blocked by the American Garrison.

As I've said earlier, Dupuy's figures are pretty damning. If they can be seriously challenged, then I'd be happy to reconsider, but whether you use his figures or simply work out who inflicted the most casualties per soldier, the Germans come out on top.

Regards,
IronDuke



Yamato hugger -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/17/2005 8:02:07 AM)

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Do you have a source that describes the US Army's study of the German system and subsequent rejection?


You mean other than the numerious things they DID copy aside from the replacement system?

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It reported that some men complained of being "herded like sheep" or handled "like so many sticks of wood". It reported the men most of all wanted to be "identified with a unit" but after arriving in theatre often spent several weeks more in various depots. As I mentioned earlier, the 79th Infantry Division under General Wyche set up a system all of their own for the induction of recruits. It involved the regiments getting replacements assigned and detaching veterans from the front lines to give them pep and orientation talks before combat. It was a copy of the German system, except adopted at a divisional level by a unit who felt the current system let them down. It was copied by several other units and (most tellingly)the 79th finished the war being explicitly commended by Eisenhower as "A good combat unit". This was not common praise.


Yes and I am sure the German replacement was served milk and cookies and wasnt hearded around like sheep. The difference here is US troops have roughly the same rights as a US civilian does. The right to complain. This wasnt allowed in the German army. Further, since 1933 Germans were blasted with the propaganda that they were the "super race" and I am sure that played in to their lack of complaints and lack of "battle fatigue". How many US ground troops (not counting air crew) became prisioners of war vs the Germans? How many Germans became US prisioners? I suspect a number of the German "battle fatigue" cases ended up surrendering rather than to report to a field hospital as opposed to US troops which would make counting their numbers accurately difficult if not impossible. Then there is also the problem with the Germans having destroyed a lot of records before the surrender. We will never have accurate information of the German situation.

quote:

Germans, British, French, ect had seen it first hand in WWI, while only a relitive handful of US troops had experienced it.

quote:


I don't think this is relevant. The Generation that went to war in world war 1 would have been in their late thirties and older in World War II. No nation began the war using these men except in senior NCO or Officer positions.


Euros had experienced it first hand for 3 years before the US was even involved in the conflict.



Of course it is relevant. Virtually everyone in Europe was touched by WWI. Deadths in the family, stories of "the war", first hand knowledge of it. Where as in America, a very small percentage of the population participated, and only slightly more could find France on a map. Civilians were a target from the outset of WWII, and they knew they would be before the war. British and German civilians had gas masks in their homes between the wars. US civilians didnt know what a gas mask looked like (most still dont). So consequently, the European replacement effectively had actual combat experience before they were even drafted/enlisted.

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Also, American psychiatric problems were worse in France '44 (after a couple of years experience in Sicily and Italy) than they were in the early days.


As I said before, this problem was reconized and corrected with the "tour of duty" incorperated during Vietnam.

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Preliminary screening in the US Army rejected for service over 1.5 million men who were considered prone to "battle shock" following a Psychiatric examination.


The 1.5 million were rejected for a number of reasons including those that were prone to "battle shock", not exclusively for that reason.

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Training is supposed to remove the problems of the culture. By the logic you're using here, the Modern US Army should be even in worse state.


I believe if the modern army had to endure what US ground forces in WWII had to endure, it would be worse. But today, instead of having some of the worse equipment on the battlefield (specifally AFVs) we have some of the best. Todays troops arent on the line for 4 - 5 - 6 months without a break. All lessons learned. If you get the mistaken impression that I think the US system used in WWII was the best thing in the world since sliced bread, you are mistaken. But it beat the alternitive. The German army lacked support troops most of all. Why was this? That is a simple question to answer really. They lacked support because they had too many units. Replacements dont go into support units nearly as much as they go into the combart arms, therefore in order to train these new replacements in the German system, the whole division had to be withdrawn, INCLUDING the support elements. And that reason, and probably that reason alone is why the US system was better than the German system. We didnt compromise on the support to the ground trooper, whereas the Germans did. And ultimately, that led to their downfall. And on the rare occasion when a unit was pulled off the line, the support units by and large were corps or army assets and could be easily reassigned.

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And even without air support the Germans were halted in the Ardennes in a week by a numerically inferior force without the benefit of prepared positions.


quote:


This is a slightly jaundiced look at the Ardennes offensive. The German advantage in the Ardennes was about 2.5:1. This was less than the Allied superiority in Normandy, where the Germans held for over 2 months. The advantage began reducing immediately and was overturned quite quickly.


The Germans had time to prepare for almost 4 years for D Day. Entrenched. Pre-registered artillery positions. Ammo stockpiled. Fall back positions were already set up as well. US troops in the Ardennes had about 4 minutes to prepare. The initial contact in the Ardennes hit the 7th Armored, 9th Armored, 28th Infantry and 106th Infantry. And of these, the 9th Armor and the 106th Infantry had never been in combat before. You cant compaire the 2 battles.

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The terrain was hopeless for an armoured assault


As opposed to the "tank country" of the bocage?

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It has been noted that whilst they were advancing, they did so faster than the Americans did during the Cobra breakout, despite the fact it was the winter, they had fuel problems and unsuitable tanks, and more opposition than Patton faced.


The 28th division in the Ardennes for example. Some companies were so far apart, they couldnt even see each other. The German AFVs were superior to US vehicles in all catagories.

quote:


Patton's counteroffensive had a torrid time for several days battleing through three relatively poor German formations to reach Bastogne and it took another two weeks to clear the Bastogne area of German forces.

The two key units in the north, the Liebstandarte and HitlerJugend had been decimated in the Normandy Campaign about ten weeks before. It was rather impressive that they were spearheading the offensive at all. 10 weeks is not a lot of time to re-equip, reorganise, regroup and induct replacements en masse into a Panzer Corp. I think you are giving the Germans too little credit for what they achieved.


Not bad when you consider they had planned to launch their own offensive very soon in an entirely different direction. Drove 90 some miles in 48 hours and went into the attack without rest. I think you are belittling the effort put in to stopping them. The 1st and 12th SS had been off the line since August (4 months).

quote:


No, it took so long because they were more combat efficient even at this late stage. The German supply system was trying to shift meagre supplies down hopelessly clogged roads under constant and massive air interdiction. At places like Bastogne they must have been moving off the roads into the countryside because the road net was blocked by the American Garrison.


Ever see the mini-series "Band of Brothers"? At Bastogne most of the 101st's men had less than 6 rounds. The Germans were so effient and attacked so rigerously that they couldnt break through a line held by men with less than a half dozen bullets apiece with no air support. It was their superior support system, artillery on call, ect that held the line. Elsewhere there were squads that were delaying German battalions, and in a lot of cases, holding them. The same reason the Germans couldnt move supplies is the same reason (ironically) that the allies couldnt move theirs. The allied airforces had destroyed virtually every train on the western front. And the closer to Germany we got the longer our supply lines got. And the shorter the Germans got I might add.

quote:


As I've said earlier, Dupuy's figures are pretty damning. If they can be seriously challenged, then I'd be happy to reconsider, but whether you use his figures or simply work out who inflicted the most casualties per soldier, the Germans come out on top.


I suspect these figures arent broken down by who fought who. That the Germans caused more casulties per man shouldnt be a surprise. They killed 25 million Russians. I would be VERY surprised if their kill ratio vs US troops was better than 1 : 1.



Jane Doe -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/17/2005 9:42:40 PM)

quote:

I suspect these figures arent broken down by who fought who. That the Germans caused more casulties per man shouldnt be a surprise. They killed 25 million Russians. I would be VERY surprised if their kill ratio vs US troops was better than 1 : 1.


Actually, they killed between 10-12 millions russian soldiers, not 25... to the defense of the russians, battling in mega encirclements must be quite tough on morale and plenty other factors.
Yes, their kill ratio against US troops and british troops ALSO was superior to 1:1



IronDuke_slith -> RE: The Combat Efficiency of American Forces in WWII (3/22/2005 1:11:48 AM)



quote:

You mean other than the numerious things they DID copy aside from the replacement system?


No, just a source that shows the examination and the conclusions drawn. My understanding was that the German system was rejected as innefficient. The American system was far more centralised and administered. The soldiers would have preferred a system on the German model, but the service forces preferred things as they were because it was more efficient administratively.

quote:

Yes and I am sure the German replacement was served milk and cookies and wasnt hearded around like sheep. The difference here is US troops have roughly the same rights as a US civilian does. The right to complain. This wasnt allowed in the German army.


Do you have a source for this? My understanding was that the right to complainwas present in the German Army. The basic rules dated back to the 19th century but were updated in 1936, suggesting complaints were amn issue and something they wanted to administer properly. By contrast the Ameriocan system was not one likely to produce results very quickly, as it was centralised like everything else.

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Further, since 1933 Germans were blasted with the propaganda that they were the "super race" and I am sure that played in to their lack of complaints and lack of "battle fatigue".


I've not seen any evidence in the literature proving this.

quote:


How many US ground troops (not counting air crew) became prisioners of war vs the Germans? How many Germans became US prisioners? I suspect a number of the German "battle fatigue" cases ended up surrendering rather than to report to a field hospital as opposed to US troops which would make counting their numbers accurately difficult if not impossible. Then there is also the problem with the Germans having destroyed a lot of records before the surrender. We will never have accurate information of the German situation.


Everything I've quoted from the German side comes from records that did survive. It should be noted that the German record remained low whether they were on the offensive of the defensive. Both early and late in the war, their numbers wre low. Battle fatigue often takes hold away from the front line, so surrender would not have been an option. Even if it was, its impact on the record would surely not have been to the tune of ten fold in certain theatres.



quote:

Of course it is relevant. Virtually everyone in Europe was touched by WWI. Deadths in the family, stories of "the war", first hand knowledge of it. Where as in America, a very small percentage of the population participated, and only slightly more could find France on a map. Civilians were a target from the outset of WWII, and they knew they would be before the war. British and German civilians had gas masks in their homes between the wars. US civilians didnt know what a gas mask looked like (most still dont). So consequently, the European replacement effectively had actual combat experience before they were even drafted/enlisted.


We must disagree here. I do not believe the threat or experience of bombing, or stories passed on by Granddad about the trenches count as actual combat experience. Certainly it wouldn't have been a help when faced with machine gun fire or shelling. The generation that fought the war would have been in the support services or in the Home guard in the forties or perhaps serving as Officers or sometimes NCOs. the average European replacement had no idea what it was going to be like. We are more experienced having watched wars on television.

quote:

The 1.5 million were rejected for a number of reasons including those that were prone to "battle shock", not exclusively for that reason.


Do you have a source for this. My reading suggests "preliminary screening had already removed 1,686,000 men suspected of emotional or mental disorders."

quote:

But it beat the alternitive. The German army lacked support troops most of all. Why was this? That is a simple question to answer really. They lacked support because they had too many units. Replacements dont go into support units nearly as much as they go into the combart arms, therefore in order to train these new replacements in the German system, the whole division had to be withdrawn, INCLUDING the support elements. And that reason, and probably that reason alone is why the US system was better than the German system. We didnt compromise on the support to the ground trooper, whereas the Germans did. And ultimately, that led to their downfall. And on the rare occasion when a unit was pulled off the line, the support units by and large were corps or army assets and could be easily reassigned.


I think you're way off here. The question of divisional slice has been looked at in some detail. It should be noted that the average number of support troops in the German Army was at it's lowest in 1941/42 when the Germans were at their peak. It increased after this time towards the end of the war, not decreased. The Germans were simply more efficient. The percentage of the German Army in combat units remained between 53-55% throughout the war. For the Americans it dropped to 40% by the end of the war. Some of this was due to the fact the Americans were essentially an expeditionary force, and more service troops were required, but the Army itself had this to say on the subject,

quote:

On 30 June 1944, during the most critical days of the Normandy operation, the number of enlisted men in the US qualified for overseas duty but assigned to Zone of interior jobs exceeded the number of enlisted infantrymen in the European and Mediterranean theatres.

Many combat soldiers in the theatres were physically inferior to men scheduled to remain at home. This situation was not one of which the AGF approved, but it was difficult for the War Department to correct in 1944. Since the early days of mobilisation, many prime physical specimens had been trained as technicians in Zone of the interior assignments.


This was written by the K Greenfield in "the Organisation of Ground Combat Troops" in 1947.

America created an innefficient supply train, in which most of the best men served. At a time when the Army was fighting hard, most American Soldiers never heard a shot fired in Anger.

One last point to note. I understand the daily supply delivery to an American Infantry Company was much higher than it was to its German equivalent. The German Company (within it's more meagre allocation) had three times as much ammunition allocated, though. Make of that what you will.

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The Germans had time to prepare for almost 4 years for D Day.


But only really started defending the hundreds and hundreds of miles of coast in Jan 1944 when Rommel really got to work.

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Entrenched. Pre-registered artillery positions. Ammo stockpiled.


Much of this artillery was attacked by Naval gun fire or Paratroopers before the beaches were hit.

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Fall back positions were already set up as well.


These positions didn't really prove to be the issue. The advance reached several miles inland before the front congealed with the arrival of German reinforcements. These reinforcements lined up where the Allies had reached, they didn't fill pre-dug positions.

quote:

US troops in the Ardennes had about 4 minutes to prepare. The initial contact in the Ardennes hit the 7th Armored, 9th Armored, 28th Infantry and 106th Infantry. And of these, the 9th Armor and the 106th Infantry had never been in combat before. You cant compaire the 2 battles.


Many of the German formations hit on D-day were garrison formations, classed as fit only for static defence. The class units only arrived later (luckily).

quote:

As opposed to the "tank country" of the bocage?


The Terrain was (you are correct) poor in Normandy, as poor as it was in the Ardennes, but the Germans moved through their terrain at a better pace.

quote:

Not bad when you consider they had planned to launch their own offensive very soon in an entirely different direction. Drove 90 some miles in 48 hours and went into the attack without rest. I think you are belittling the effort put in to stopping them. The 1st and 12th SS had been off the line since August (4 months).


Patton's intelligence chief had suggested something was likely in the ardennes and drawn up plans for the about face, it wasn't planned and executed in forty eight hours, merely executed in 48 hours, the plans were already there.

The comment about the 1st and 12th SS Panzer is simply wrong. They were released by CINC West for re-equipping in late September, and began regrouping and re-equipping in Mid october. They had perhaps two months to regroup, retrain, re-equip and prepare, not four months.

quote:

Ever see the mini-series "Band of Brothers"? At Bastogne most of the 101st's men had less than 6 rounds. The Germans were so effient and attacked so rigerously that they couldnt break through a line held by men with less than a half dozen bullets apiece with no air support.


Bastogne was (if memory serves) a supply dump for VIII Corps, so supply wasn't generally an issue (I thought they were only completely surrounded for a few days as well. Things may have been more difficult for some of the Para's weapons as they were specialist weapons and an Army supply dump might not have carried rounds for them.

I don't think the German efforts to break in were as savage as folk memory holds. Average casualties for German troos betwen 21-26 in the Bastogne sector was around 1% per day or 271 men. American casualties (despite being on the defnesive) were 341 men per day.

quote:

It was their superior support system, artillery on call, ect that held the line. Elsewhere there were squads that were delaying German battalions, and in a lot of cases, holding them. The same reason the Germans couldnt move supplies is the same reason (ironically) that the allies couldnt move theirs. The allied airforces had destroyed virtually every train on the western front. And the closer to Germany we got the longer our supply lines got. And the shorter the Germans got I might add.


But the Germans had few trucks to shift the supplies, no fuel to power the trucks, few good roads, and no roads that weren't clogged with Germans or subject to Air interdiction. I'd need examples to consider the issue of squads holding battalions etc.

quote:

I suspect these figures arent broken down by who fought who. That the Germans caused more casulties per man shouldnt be a surprise. They killed 25 million Russians. I would be VERY surprised if their kill ratio vs US troops was better than 1 : 1.


This is incorrect. The figures are very high when the Russians are factored in.

An analysis of 50 engagements between US and German forces found the average differential was 1 (US) to 1.55 (Ger). In other words, the Germans inflicted half as many casualties again as the Americans did per 100 combat troops. This figure was relatively constant whether the Germans were on the attack or defence.

Using Dupuy's other method (QJMA), he calculated German combat effectiveness to be in the order of 20-30% higher than American Combat effectiveness.

The difference between the two results (25% more effective using QJMA, 50% more combat effective using casualty stats) has been assigned to a couple of factors. The most convincing I've seen has been the projected superiority of certain German weapons (Panther, MG 42) etc.

However you analyse it statistically, the Germans were more combat efficient.

Regards,
IronDuke



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