RE: Oi and Kitikami (Full Version)

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Tanaka -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/14/2005 11:28:32 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson


quote:

ORIGINAL: Tanaka


quote:

ORIGINAL: doktorblood

Considering the fact that these are the only 2 ships in IJN that have radar until you can accelerate some radar equipped Yagumo class destroyers out of the shipyards, I think they are too important to risk in surface actions.


Which is exactly what the Japanese did historically.... [:D]



Are we saying here that K&O were in effect the "Aegis" Cruisers of the IJN ???

I've certainly never read that anywhere - but would be interested in a source !

If the Japanese did withhold these 2 ships because they were so effective at air warning - why were they never used with Kido Butai. I think most posters believe that K&O will improve air warning over a CV task force in which they are deployed [ I haven't tested this so I can't say for sure ]. And if so then - they probably would be the "Aegis" cruisers of the IJN "IN THE GAME" ... though again I find it hard to believe this represents there true historical capability.




Im saying the Japanese never used these ships in a surface action...




String -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/14/2005 11:35:13 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I know you did, but not having that reference handy, i'd appeciate it if you could show specific examples of LL equpped cruisers exploding and sinking or being crippled. "injuries" i found too vague because as has already been pointed out, all armaments and ammunition pose dangers if set off.



from http://www.combinedfleet.com/suzuya_t.htm

25 October 1944: The Battle off Samar:
The SUZUYA engages Task Group 77. 4. 3's "Jeep" carriers, but is attacked by ten Grumman TBM "Avenger" torpedo-bombers. A near-miss by a bomb causes the loss of her port propeller and her speed falls off to 20 knots. At 0830, Vice Admiral Shiraishi transfers his flag to the SUZUYA from the KUMANO that was damaged heavily in earlier attacks.

At 0904, the SUZUYA, YAMATO, NAGATO and the KONGO are attacked by 12 Grumman TBM "Avenger" bombers and eight fighters launched from Rear Admiral Stump's carriers. Around 0950, the SUZUYA is suddenly enveloped in smoke and flames. It is possible that bomb splinters and flames from successive near misses on her port side amidships area ignite the warhead of the torpedo in No. 1 tube and start a fire.

At 0954, all ships return to their prescribed stations around the YAMATO, then on bearing 225, head towards Leyte. At 1100, reserve torpedoes aboard SUZUYA start to explode. The fire and blasts damage the starboard engine room and boiler rooms Nos. 7 and 8 flood. The cruiser becomes unnavigable. At 1130, Vice Admiral Shiraishi again transfers his flag, this time to the TONE while the OKINAMI stands guard.

At noon, the SUZUYA's remaining torpedoes and ammunition explode. At 1300, Abandon Ship is ordered and fifteen minutes later the SUZUYA turns on her starboard side. At 1322, she sinks at 11-48N, 126-26E. About 450 crewmen are lost, but Captain Teraoka and 415 other crewmen are rescued by the destroyer OKINAMI. The Americans also pick up six of the SUZUYA's crewmen as PoWs. Later, Captain Teraoka becomes the CO of the old armored cruiser YAKUMO.

20 December 1944:
Removed from the Navy List.




Nikademus -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/14/2005 11:39:55 PM)

Appreciate it String.

However, as i said, I dont see examples such as this late air attack as a justification that retaining a torpedo armament was a bad design move. Many an air attack touched off ammo fires and explosions so I hardly see it as fair to judge by this criteria.

Now if Japanese ships were being crippled and sunk frequently by oxygen fires/explosions in a multitude of surface engagements...




Tiornu -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 12:28:09 AM)

"i'd appeciate it if you could show specific examples of LL equpped cruisers exploding and sinking or being crippled."
Just off the top of my head, I believe tha following were all brutalized by their own torpedoes: Furutaka, Aoba (twice, I think), Chokai, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami.

"as has already been pointed out, all armaments and ammunition pose dangers if set off."
This was mentioned facetiously, and it hardly makes a serious point. No one would suggest building a heavy cruiser without guns, but there were plenty of them that did fine without torpedoes. Furthermore, gun ammunition can be protected by heavy armor, while torpedoes are out there on their own.

"However, as i said, I dont see examples such as this late air attack as a justification that retaining a torpedo armament was a bad design move."
Urk..retaining a system that accomplishes nothing but the destruction of your own units--that's a good design move?




spence -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 12:41:04 AM)

Neither Oi nor Kitikami ever accompanied the Kido Butai. In fact I don't think either ever did much through out the war. As for their fearsome torpedo armament I believe all of it was eventually removed during "upgrades" to their true calling of barge carriers or some such.




Mike Scholl -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 6:56:59 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither Oi nor Kitikami ever accompanied the Kido Butai. In fact I don't think either ever did much through out the war. As for their fearsome torpedo armament I believe all of it was eventually removed during "upgrades" to their true calling of barge carriers or some such.




Believe they were re-built twice. Once as barge carriers, and then again to carry Kaitens.
What is certain is that they never did anything useful during the war. I have to agree with wilkerson that it seems very odd that they are given such apparently usefull radar capabilities in the game. If they had radar, it was certainly a primitive surface search set for use during the "decisive battle" in long range targeting for their torpedo salvos. If the sets were actually as good as some players want them to be, then the Japanese High Command would certainly be guilty of incompatency (if not stupidity) for not using them in the Solomans area where the lack of Japanese radar allowed the Allies to gain the upper hand in surface actions.

But I would agree with the fellow who suggested that they should have 5x4 TT per side in order to be more useful in game surface actions. But as useful adjuncts to Kido Butai, forget it.




Yamato hugger -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 8:18:12 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

Urk..retaining a system that accomplishes nothing but the destruction of your own units--that's a good design move?


Some BBs in the WWI era had fixed torp tubes in their hulls. The defenses leading to Oslo had LAND mounted torp tubes. If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs? We have missles, why have torps? Beacuse they work maybe?

The Japs prior to the war had a healthy respect for the torpedo (perhaps that was the major cause of their victory over the Russians? I dont know, I am speculating), in any event, the early battles around Guadalcanal more than justified putting them on any ship that could carry them. As to their later war lack of performance, part of the reason was that the US commanders developed an appreciation of Jap torps and took action accordingly (meaning the tactics we used didnt give the Japs a chance to use their torps the way they would have wanted to).




ChezDaJez -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 11:52:31 AM)

quote:

If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs? We have missles, why have torps? Beacuse they work maybe?


I believe they are talking about exposed weapons systems, not those contained within the hull. And I think the argument is also: Does the benefit outweigh the risk of these exposed weapons?

As far as subs carrying them today, they are still the primary ASW weapon and have a secondary mission of ASUW. ASW aircraft like the P-3C and the Nimrod all carry torps for ASW.

As I understood it, the Japanese liked to launch multiple torps in large salvos just before opening fire (assuming they had surprise) with guns. The primary goal was to create confusion within the enemy's TF, hopefully by getting hits. They would then capitalize on the confusion with gunfire. But once most Allied ships began employing radar, Japanese forces lost the tactical element of surprise. That coupled with the knowledge the Allies had gained about the LL reduced its effectiveness in battle. Japanese search radars were greatly inferior to US radars in detection ranges, power and reliability so even with their radar, they couldn't regain the element of surprise.

As far as the O and K steaming with KB, I don't see the point. Their torpedoes would certainly be superfluous in an Air TF. They would be much better off removing them and turning the ships into CLAAs if they were going to stay with KB. Just my opinion anyways.

Chez




Armorer -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:13:35 PM)

I may be mistaken, but I don't believe Tiornu was advocating deleting torpedoes from the Japanese cruisers' armament. I think he's saying that the LL was more dangerous to the ships which carried it than its effectiveness ( vis the Type 90, I believe ) warranted. In other words, the Type 90 would have been just as effective in the circumstances which prevailed in the Solomons as the LL's were. I've come to hold the opinion that the Japanese superiority in the battles in the Solomons was due at least as much to superiority in training and doctrine ( and luck ) as it was to superior torpedoes. I'd be interested if anyone could tell me which, if any, of the Allied ships sunk by LL's would NOT have been sunk by Type 90's. Certainly ( in my opinion, anyway ), the physical constraints of the Solomons area generally negated the advantage the LL's extreme long range, didn't it?

Regards,
Randy




Tiornu -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:18:24 PM)

"If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs?"
No one has said torpedoes accomplish nothing. We're talking about Long Lances on heavy cruisers "late" in the war.
The submerged torpedoes of old battleships were recognized as useless, which is why they were removed after WWI. The Nelsons were the last battleships completed with submerged tubes. Rodney actually claimed a torpedo hit against Bismarck, the only BBvBB claim; however, though she fired off all twelve of her torpedoes, she was not officially credited with a hit.
The Germans actually design "H" with a full set of submerged tubes. What were they thinking?
If torpedoes on a battleship were pointless, what about the carrier Bearn? Now, that's just weird.




TIMJOT -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:39:44 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Armorer

I I'd be interested if anyone could tell me which, if any, of the Allied ships sunk by LL's would NOT have been sunk by Type 90's. Certainly ( in my opinion, anyway ), the physical constraints of the Solomons area generally negated the advantage the LL's extreme long range, didn't it?

Regards,
Randy


Well I tend to think the type 93's speed and wakeless runs may have had something to do with its effectiveness too. Its hard to say how many USN ships may have avoided a slower, more visable, less powerful torpedo




AmiralLaurent -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:42:23 PM)


I think the debate is not "are torpedoes useful ?" but "are torpedoes useful on cruisers ?" or "are they useful enough to take the risk of their explosion?"

As for Oi and Kitakami, they were useless in RL, as the excepted big BB battle in the center of the Pacific they were designed for never took place. And in RL they were useful for training Japanese sailors than on the frontline.

In the game, I wonder if someone has a proof that their radar is useful for KB. Japanese radars were never to US or British standards anyway.




tsimmonds -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:53:25 PM)

quote:

In the game, I wonder if someone has a proof that their radar is useful for KB. Japanese radars were never to US or British standards anyway


These Brits were not detected until they opened fire, so I guess surface search ain't their forte.

OTOH, they did soak up a lot of fire!

-----------------------------------------------------------
Day Time Surface Combat at 16,26

Japanese Ships
CV Akagi
CV Kaga
CVL Ryujo, Shell hits 1
CVL Zuiho, Shell hits 4, on fire
CS Mizuho, Shell hits 1
CS Nisshin, Shell hits 1, on fire
CL Kitakami, Shell hits 29, and is sunk
CL Oi, Shell hits 16, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk

DD Akatsuki, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Hibiki, Shell hits 2
DD Kisaragi, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Yayoi, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Kikuzuki, Shell hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
DD Nagatsuki, Shell hits 4, on fire
DD Sawakaze, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Okikaze

Allied Ships
BB Prince of Wales, Shell hits 4
BC Repulse, Shell hits 4
CA Exeter, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
CL Birmingham, Shell hits 1
CL Newcastle
DD Van Nes, Shell hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
DD Kortenaer, Shell hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
DD Van Ghent, Shell hits 1
DD Tenedos, Shell hits 2
DD Thanet, Shell hits 1
DD Thracian, Shell hits 2, on fire





Nikademus -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:56:45 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

Just off the top of my head, I believe tha following were all brutalized by their own torpedoes: Furutaka, Aoba (twice, I think), Chokai, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami.



Does 'brutalized' mean they were sunk or crippled exclusively the presence of these weapons? Suzuya i've commented on. Mikuma was 'brutilized' quite thorougly all over by air attack of which the presence or absence of LL's would have made little difference.

quote:


This was mentioned facetiously, and it hardly makes a serious point. No one would suggest building a heavy cruiser without guns, but there were plenty of them that did fine without torpedoes. Furthermore, gun ammunition can be protected by heavy armor, while torpedoes are out there on their own.


I never said that a CA without the torps couldn't do fine. I've said that the LL's aboard the CA's gave them a greater flexability and made them a more potential threat. Gun ammo can be protected though in an early or mid generation CA thats not saying much. Ammo explosions (not full mag explosions) could still occur.

quote:


Urk..retaining a system that accomplishes nothing but the destruction of your own units--that's a good design move?


Well in the first place I dont agree that the LL acomplished or could acomplish nothing and neither you nor I can say whether or not the presence of these weapons systems wouldn't have made a signifigant contribution had the more traditional type battle both sides expected to fight had occured. Even in the closer ranged night battles that occured, the Type 93's qualities would still be evident vs. the older models.

As for late-war. Yes an argument can be made that they'd have better been off removed since the opportunity to use them in the manner expected was all but nill. Had Japan the shipyard capacity the US did, maybe they could have arranged it.




cassius44 -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 5:57:31 PM)

Somewhat irrelevant to the game, but the Jan 2003 issue of Journal of Military History has an interesting article on British tactical doctrine preparations for the Great War. According to this historian, the big threat to the RN main battle line was perceived as the German torpedoes from their main battle line, and RN tactics revolved around changing course after 6 minutes to avoid the oncoming salvo. Belief was that torpedoes were both more effective (underwater blast damage) and more accurate - a two-dimensional problem vs. the three dimensional problem of naval gunfire. To counter this, the RN planned to shorten the range to 8,000 yards for accurate gunfire, and then maneuver the battle line in divisions to avoid the German response.

Only when the war came, everyone started shooting at long range - which no one had planned for - which not only lead to horrible accuracy, but then also demonstrated the unrealized effect of shells plunging from on high. (A problem still not fixed for the Hood!)

Guess it just proves that very few plans turn out as expected - especially for weapons systems!

*Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916," The Journal of Military History 67 (January 2003): 85-137.*





Nikademus -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 6:11:17 PM)

Given what almost happend to the UK at Jutland there's a point to such fears, though i'm not sure if the UK was aware at the time when they forumated their doctrine. I've read it in both Cambell and Masse that on several occasions German torpedoes under ran UK BB's and in Revenge's case was hit by a dud torpedo. Had the German torpeodes operated correctly it might have added to the UK material losses. At the very least it would have led to substantial damage to a couple more BB's.

Regardless...Jellicoe greatly feared the potential threat posed by German torpedoes. To go even more OT....i think he got a bum rap for choosing to turn away vs pursue Scheer. Better safe than sorry IMO.





Tiornu -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 6:22:08 PM)

"Does 'brutalized' mean they were sunk or crippled exclusively the presence of these weapons?"
No, none of these ships spontaneously combusted.

"Mikuma was 'brutilized' quite thorougly all over by air attack of which the presence or absence of LL's would have made little difference."
Tell that to Mogami.

"I've said that the LL's aboard the CA's gave them a greater flexability and made them a more potential threat."
Certainly--but to whom?

"neither you nor I can say whether or not the presence of these weapons systems wouldn't have made a signifigant contribution had the more traditional type battle both sides expected to fight had occured."
Agreed, but that's another topic.

"Even in the closer ranged night battles that occured, the Type 93's qualities would still be evident vs. the older models."
And I'm still waiting for you to point out when that was the case.




Tiornu -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 6:26:55 PM)

"Somewhat irrelevant to the game, but the Jan 2003 issue of Journal of Military History has an interesting article on British tactical doctrine preparations for the Great War."
Unfortunately, Sumida has gone off the deep end. His fundamental thesis in "A Matter of Timing" is entirely without foundation and flawed in the areas where it actually does interact with available documentation. If you get past the cloak of Sumida's considerable scholarship, what we're left with is a good old conspiracy theory in which the lack of supporting evidence is claimed as support for the theory.




Nikademus -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 6:57:00 PM)

quote:


No, none of these ships spontaneously combusted.


My point.

quote:


Tell that to Mogami


Are you saying Mikuma would have survived had she not had LL's?


quote:


[And I'm still waiting for you to point out when that was the case.


If you dont believe that having a better torpedo is advantagous, then there's little point.




PeteG662 -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 7:28:24 PM)

I have seen no evidence in the game where K&O radars do anything for any purpose.




jwilkerson -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 8:16:07 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Tallyman662

I have seen no evidence in the game where K&O radars do anything for any purpose.



I hope you're right. I did look in the database. K&O have device #139 Type 13 radar, which shows as a surface radar not normally available until 4401. So presumably these radars do whatever type 13 radars do. But, this would seem to rule them out from assisting as air search radar platforms for KB in the early war. If these radars do anything, the ships would be better placed with a Surface Action Group.

( 1st edit - went and checked database some more - several BB, CA, CL and CV have type 13 radars available in later war upgrades - so it is likely that they do SOMETHING - I still haven't found a source indicating the K&O actually had radars pre-war - Conway and Jentschura are the two I've checked ).

( 2nd edit - here is a link which discusses Japanese ship borne radar ! IJN Radar Link )

( 3rd edit - the above link indicates type 13 was air search radar with ability to detect air groups out to 100km and singles out to 50km - if true - this would indicate that these radars SHOULD have the ability to be used as air warning ships for KB - oh well - not the answer I wanted to find - but data is data. Now of course the game seems to have implemented these as surface search radars - so in the game as delievered it appears we cannot get any advantage in using these two K&O as air warning vessels. That is until someone updates the database. )





PeteG662 -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 10:22:49 PM)

I would be glad to hear if anyone finds that the radar really does work on these ships in the game and what the effect is.....it has been shown you cannot trust the little messages saying the enemy SCTF was detected by radar or lookouts as they seem to be "pat" messages generated for display purposes.




jwilkerson -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 11:29:43 PM)

Well - I just ran some tests.

This is a standard test scenario I cooked up a while back to test carrier tactics ... it pits one KB near death star with 4 CV and 2 CVL in 1 task force ( 312 carrier planes ) versus 4 USN task forces containing 1 CV each [ note the USN task forces have the slowest one leading and the other three set to follow - so almost all the time, even when reacting, they wind up in the same hex - this seems to be the best way of getting the largest possible strikes for the USN in 1942 given the "CV Coordination Penalty" the USN suffer ]. The IJN TF has 25 ships, the USN TFs have 15 each. The USN has 294 carrier planes. The test is based off the Scenario 13 start and the hypothetical carrier battle happens about halfway between Kwajalein and Johnson Is. so that no bases have any effect.

So I ran 2 groups of tests ... 6 tests in each group ... first group the IJN TF had both Kitikami and Oi ... in the second group of tests, the IJN TF had neither of these ships. I was looking for any difference in CAP over the IJN TF.

The average CAP over the IJN TF with K&O was 37.0 the average CAP over the IJN TF without K&O was 39.3 ... so at least in this group of tests K&O presence did not improve the CAP over the IJN TF. The variation in results averages at 2.6 hence the difference in the results is "within the margin of error" so it is not significant that in this group of tests K&O not present seemed to have improved the CAP.

So, it looks like the type 13 radar on K&O doesn't help KB.

But does anyone know what the numbers on the radar devices mean ? There seem to be 3 that might be meaningful.

Range,
Effect,
Penetration

I'm guessing range is the range in kilometers and I'm guessing the effect is the percent chance of detecting something, as these numbers run from about 45 up to about 70 ... but I'm clueless as to what the "penetration" number would be ... some radars have a 500 here ( including the type 13 radar in question ) others have 0 ... at first I thought the ones with 500 here might be the air search radars, but alas there doesn't seem to be any coorelation between which radars have the 500 and which don't along air search versus surface search lines. So any insite on these parameters would be appreciated !

But as it stands now - I can't detect any effect of the Type 13 on K&O in carrier battles.





rtrapasso -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/15/2005 11:34:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Well - I just ran some tests.

This is a standard test scenario I cooked up a while back to test carrier tactics ... it pits one KB near death star with 4 CV and 2 CVL in 1 task force ( 312 carrier planes ) versus 4 USN task forces containing 1 CV each [ note the USN task forces have the slowest one leading and the other three set to follow - so almost all the time, even when reacting, they wind up in the same hex - this seems to be the best way of getting the largest possible strikes for the USN in 1942 given the "CV Coordination Penalty" the USN suffer ]. The IJN TF has 25 ships, the USN TFs have 15 each. The USN has 294 carrier planes. The test is based off the Scenario 13 start and the hypothetical carrier battle happens about halfway between Kwajalein and Johnson Is. so that no bases have any effect.

So I ran 2 groups of tests ... 6 tests in each group ... first group the IJN TF had both Kitikami and Oi ... in the second group of tests, the IJN TF had neither of these ships. I was looking for any difference in CAP over the IJN TF.

The average CAP over the IJN TF with K&O was 37.0 the average CAP over the IJN TF without K&O was 39.3 ... so at least in this group of tests K&O presence did not improve the CAP over the IJN TF. The variation in results averages at 2.6 hence the difference in the results is "within the margin of error" so it is not significant that in this group of tests K&O not present seemed to have improved the CAP.

So, it looks like the type 13 radar on K&O doesn't help KB.

But does anyone know what the numbers on the radar devices mean ? There seem to be 3 that might be meaningful.

Range,
Effect,
Penetration

I'm guessing range is the range in kilometers and I'm guessing the effect is the percent chance of detecting something, as these numbers run from about 45 up to about 70 ... but I'm clueless as to what the "penetration" number would be ... some radars have a 500 here ( including the type 13 radar in question ) others have 0 ... at first I thought the ones with 500 here might be the air search radars, but alas there doesn't seem to be any coorelation between which radars have the 500 and which don't along air search versus surface search lines. So any insite on these parameters would be appreciated !

But as it stands now - I can't detect any effect of the Type 13 on K&O in carrier battles.





Thank you jwilkerson!! Maybe this argument can be finally put to rest.

Just out of curiousity, when in game time did battle take place? 1942? 1945?




jwilkerson -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/16/2005 12:22:22 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

Thank you jwilkerson!! Maybe this argument can be finally put to rest.

Just out of curiousity, when in game time did battle take place? 1942? 1945?


These tests are based on Scenario 13 ... it takes a while to drive all the boats to the starting gate [ when I execute a series of saves to enable repeatability ] ... so it is late May 1942.

Note that this test may not be definitive. I'd say it is pretty much so as far as affecting CAP over KB ... but could the presence of the Type 13 radar have other effects - I don't know. Finding out what the "penetration = 500" means ... and running some tests for effects on surface action would both be next steps down the the road of investigating the Type 13 radar.





rtrapasso -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/16/2005 12:40:56 AM)

There was another thread some months back discussing what the numbers from the editor meant for radar. I disremember right now what the conclusions were. [8|]
If i remember i'll try to look for it this weekend...




sadja -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/16/2005 2:37:26 AM)

From the combinedfleet web site show the type 13 is an air search radar spotting groups of planes at 100km, single at 50km(54/27miles)




Marc -> RE: Oi and Kitakami (4/16/2005 3:07:06 AM)

Some remarks. Source for all comments is this

1. The Kitakami and Oi shouldn't have radar at the beginning of the war.
Only Kitakami received No.13 radar but as late as 1944/45 during conversion to a kaiten carrier.
Attached is a page from the book showing some details about the radar types stating that No.13 radar was developed in 1943/1944.

2. During the Battle of the Java Sea 27 Feb - 1Mar 1942 Haguro fired twenty Torpedos and the Nachi sixteen. One hit the Kortenaer, one sank De Ruyter (Haguro) and one sank the Java (Nachi). These three hits were the only hits of 153 type 93 torpedoes fired by the Japanese forces.

3. During the Battle of Cape Esperance the Furutaka was hit at the port torpedo mount. The torpedos ignited and started heavy fires, which attracted the gunfire of the U.S. ships. No word of explosions or further damage.
Aoba was not hit at the torpedo mounts.

4. Aoba was hit on 3 April 1943 by skip-bombing B17. Two Type 93 torpedos exploded starting fires in No.2 engine room and blowing a 3-m hole in the aft part of the starboard bulge, which flooded. The fire was extinguished by about 1520. She had to be beached to prevent sinking.

5. The Suzuya sustained a near miss from a bomb on the 25 Oct 1944. It ignited the torpedos in the starboard tubes. Torpedos exploded and the fire couldn't be extinguished. Finally the ship became unmaneuverable und the explosion of the HA-gun mounts amunition set the whole ship ablaze.

6. Mogami was also hit at the torpedo mounts but damage wasn't lethal.


[image]local://upfiles/1062/7D1A5E750EEE41399EDD80A3FF9D32A5.jpg[/image]




Marc -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/16/2005 3:13:28 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

At Samar, I believe both Chokai and Suzuya were done in by their own torpedo weaponry. Suzuya did not even suffer any direct hit, but a bomb frgament touched off a reaction in the torpedoes.
There are several other CA that were severely damaged by their Long Lances during the war.


Chokai was most probably not hit at the torpedo mounts. But it isn't certain because no one survived since the rescueing destroyer was sunk later.

I'd say in the early war the torpedo served the japanese cruiser quite good. Later they did only damage to them. But there were not too many surface engagements with japanese heavy cruisers during the whole war.





Tiornu -> RE: Oi and Kitikami (4/16/2005 3:43:56 AM)

"At 0859, a secondary explosion, probably caused by the CHOKAI's armed torpedoes on deck, knocks out her engines and rudder. She shears out of formation to port and moves eastward."
Nihon Kaigun site




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