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akileez -> RE: Napoleonic Cavalry charges (11/4/2005 8:36:37 PM)
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Here are my thoughts, revolving around the Waterloo campaign and infantry versus cavalry events.
All indications show the Allied infantry at Waterloo were saved by the mistimed French cavalry charges, which Napoleon, upon getting wind of the hasty decision by Ney fully supported thereafter, with his 'what's done is done' thinking. Much debate goes on about the French artillery role that day. Many say the French guns were ineffective due to the mud/Wellington's reverse slope tactics... and indeed these are valid statements.
However, the actual evidence shows that the Allied infantry suffered from cannon fire horribly even still. Remember, Ney's initial reason to attack Wellington was seeing streams of Allied soldiers pouring back on the road to Brussels... Prussian ADCs and liasons in the battle point out this fact as do the journals of Allied soldiers in Wellington's center. Wellington himself was considering a general retreat back to the ports at this crucial stage of the battle. No effective major French attack was taking place on Wellington's center to have wreaked such havoc, so the power of French artillery was indeed colossal, and with drier ground and not for the use of Wellington's reverse slope tactics the French cavalry would have been likely pursuing an army in full retreat by 4 p.m that day.
Back to the cavalry aspect, Allied soldier's accounts state at Waterloo they were relieved to see the repeated French cavalry attacks since in between the assaults, French artillery fire did considerable damage to their formations. One Brit unit -27th foot- was slaughtered in square formation by 2 french guns brought up for close support/canister. In the days of Wagram and other 'glorious' victories, the Fench would have brought up 2 or 3 batteries directly behind large set-piece cavalry attacks to shatter enemy infantry formations.
Why were Ney's repeated cavalry attacks beaten back with 'ease'? Allied infantry morale though shaky was not shattered which is one crucial aspect of repelling a cavalry attack. Also Wellington wisely deployed his more 'untried' forces [several untouched fresh divisions] in reserve behind his 'veteran' front line which absorbed the initial brunt of French skirmishers/artillery fire/cavalry attacks, thus giving these raw infantry formations the confidance to beat off the petered out French horsemen that did make it back that far into the Allied lines. A defiant cohesive force generally beats back cavalry. This occured in the final dramatic events at Waterloo when several units of Napoleon's Imperial Guard held out in squares [and in one case a 'trangle'!] against Allied and Prussian cavalry intent on delivering the coup-de-grace. Remember also how British gun-battery Captain Mercer defying orders to retire his men back into the nearest square instead steadfastly delivered terrible carnage on attacking French cavalry at point blank range.
Another factor that saves the infantry's bacon or destroys it in the face of cavalry attacks is terrain. Though the slope at Waterloo in front of Wellington's position was not very steep, it was a muddy wheat-trampled slippery incline - thus the paintings showing full blown long strided charges uphill are inaccurate. Witness accounts attest to this. The cavalry were exhausted once getting to the summit and reduced to milling about the prepared Allied squares until counter-attacked by fresher Allied cavalry. Also, a large portion of Wellington's center was bisected laterally by a significantly deep sunken road [Ohain road] which in effect broke up a cavalry units 'charge' impteus in order to attempt crossing this feature.
Infantry in motion/not in square caught in the open by cavalry appearing out of nearby obscuring terrain or smoke was often crushed. As with Halkett's brigade at Quatre Bras and other Dutch/Belgian units that day. The tall crop fields where the Highland brigade was caught in line by a French lancer attack at the same battle fared better [ cooly turning their rear rank about face].
Leadership/tactics also was an element. At Waterloo the Prince of Orange ignored his veteran subordinate staff appeals to march a Hanoverian battalion in square to support their besieged comrades at La Haye Sainte. Halfway to the farmhouse they were caught in Line and smashed by French cavalry lurking hidden in the area.
Lord Uxbridge, commanding the Allied cavalry was definately in 'his game' at Waterloo and his superbly timed attacks against D'Erlon's infantry and the French cavalry were stellar. Ney on the otherhand, flawed commiting too many fresh cavalry against an unbroken enemy and without bringing up substantial artillery units in close support. The fact that he repeatedly charged this units until utterly exhausted totally spent their effectiveness for the remainder of the battle, who knows... perhaps a fresh intact French cavalry force could have staved off the rout and pursuit of the French army.
As for commanders and care of their infantry alot can also be said.
Wellington with foresight and prudence ordered the standard 2 rank line of his forces compacted to 4 ranks at Waterloo after seeing the devastation wreaked by surprise French cavalry attacks at Quatre-Bras. Meanwhile, foolishly, French commanders at Waterloo, D'Erlon and Soult along with Napoleon's blessing doomed their infantry in their grand assault on the Allied left. Marching their men in phalanxes of battalions in line as a compact entirety unable to deploy in the event of a cavalry attack. Though this infantry phalanx did indeed push back the Allied infantry by sheer weight of manpower at some points after sustaining the first shattering British volleys, they stood no chance as a disorganised mob caught in the sunken roads and upslope against the 'finest cavalry' in Europe appearing suddenly in the fray- the elite Household and Union brigades - which too more galloped lightly into their attack rather than a thunderous charge - the fact that they carried their attack downhill too also added to the attack's effectiveness.
Late edit- Sorry for post's length,lol- I get so carried away regarding this battle, I didn't realise I wrote so much.
In short, [ [8|] ] I suppose it all comes down to surprise of the cavalry on an unprepared enemy - either due to terrain and/or mentally. One extraordinary feat of cavalry arms in the Napoleonic Wars that supports this is the attack by Saxon cavalry that singlehandedly captured the formidable Raevsky redoubt at Borodino even after losing half its men to cannonfire from this mini-fortress. [edit; for those unfamiliar with the episode, the attack was aided by shrouds of gunsmoke in the area]
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