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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> RE: Historical Sub Q

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RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 4:06:04 PM

rtrapasso

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Or at least the magnetic exploders were...

The contact pistols were almost as bad.

At LEAST 4 problems with the torpedoes - only 3 solved, AFAIK:

(1) Ran too deep (depth keeping failure to compensate for Bernoulli effect of high-speed water moving over the depth sensor lessening pressure - and thus torpedo would automatically reset to deeper levels at high speed).
(2) Magnetic exploders defective - common problem to British, German, US torps.
(3) contact pistols defective - complicated mechanism would bend on direct impact, not allowing the primer to be fired.
(4) gyro mechanism could be installed backwards - causing circular runs. Never fixed AFAIK.

(in reply to Nikademus)

Post #: 31

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 4:09:17 PM

Terminus

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Damn you, Bernoulli, damn you to heck!

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Post #: 32

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 4:09:20 PM

castor troy

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

I just happened to be reading Vol 3 of Samual Morrison's History of the Navy dealing with the start of the Pacific war.� His figures have 27 submarines in dock at Manila on Dec 7.� Four S-class, seven Perch class and the rest Salmon class, with 3 listed as in overhaul.� The only subs damaged in the initial air attacks were 2 of those in overhaul.� The rest presumably set sail.

Morrison states that about 230 torpedos were destroyed when the Japanese bombed Cavite.� Considering the generally low numbers of torps the US Navy started the war with, that was incredibly significant.

Was this strike on the torpedoe depot a dedicated strike to take out the depot or was it just a lucky hit when they blew up this important target?

(in reply to Panther Bait)

Post #: 33

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 4:18:33 PM

rtrapasso

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quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy

quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

I just happened to be reading Vol 3 of Samual Morrison's History of the Navy dealing with the start of the Pacific war.� His figures have 27 submarines in dock at Manila on Dec 7.� Four S-class, seven Perch class and the rest Salmon class, with 3 listed as in overhaul.� The only subs damaged in the initial air attacks were 2 of those in overhaul.� The rest presumably set sail.

Morrison states that about 230 torpedos were destroyed when the Japanese bombed Cavite.� Considering the generally low numbers of torps the US Navy started the war with, that was incredibly significant.

Was this strike on the torpedoe depot a dedicated strike to take out the depot or was it just a lucky hit when they blew up this important target?

iirc - they just bombed the naval base at Cavite... they probably figured most large building housed something useful for the USN (assuming their accuracy was that good that they just didn't blow up random stuff on the base...)

(in reply to castor troy)

Post #: 34

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 4:19:20 PM

Nikademus

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The attack was not targeted specifically at the depot but at port/military installations. The raid was well conducted and this time, it paid off handsomly with the fortunate (or unfortunate) hit as it were. Don't think the Japanese were ever aware of it and given the quality of the torps it probably didn't impact combat ops as much as it influenced the imenent withdrawl of the subs.

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Post #: 35

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 5:01:53 PM

mlees

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From: San Diego
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quote:

READ THE WHOLE THING! I mentioned the Torpedo problem as an EXAMPLE of the problems of dealing with the entrenched bureacracy of the Bureau of Ordinance. I didn't say it wasn't dealt with in the game. The point of the discussion was the inneffectiveness of pre-war submarine skippers and the material deficiencies of the US Submarines in the Philippines...., and how it might be represented in the game.

I did read the whole thing.

Allow me to repeat my point, as it seems I cannot make myself understood:

I do not understand the additional system damage to the USN subs in Manila (as suggested in post #10) to simulate reduced effectiveness of the USN subs, when:

1) It is already simulated in other ways.

and

2) There isnt a historical basis for additional handicaping of this force.

To explain my reasoning:

1a) Ineffective torpedoes: represented by 60% dud rate in the device file. Do you think it should be higher?

1b) Ineffective CO's and doctrine: represented by the leadership and crew experience ratings of the subs in question. Do you feel that they should be lowered?

2) Material definciencies: Not backed up by historical data. 24-25 of the 27 subs in port on Dec. 8 (PI time) sailed withing 48 hours of the DOW.

Please gently explain where I am mistaken, or where I have failed to understand your point. If you continue to post in caps, I will assume that you are being deliberately hostile. Thanks. :)

(in reply to Mike Scholl)

Post #: 36

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 5:22:23 PM

Nikademus

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

I do not understand the additional system damage to the USN subs in Manila (as suggested in post #10) to simulate reduced effectiveness of the USN subs, when:

1) It is already simulated in other ways.

arguably, the other simulated means don't go far enough though this may be due to exp levels not properly set. When ASW allows, the port camping tactic can be devastating, Mk-14 or no Mk-14

quote:

2) There isnt a historical basis for additional handicaping of this force.

In some class cases there is a basis. For example the S-class boats were old and not in the best condition for the most part. I could see them having some SYS as they routinely are more effective than they should be, mainly due to their Mk10 torps working correctly. In the case of newer "Fleet" class boats, as i mentioned earlier in the thread, i'd agree with you that giving them a bunch of SYS is not desirable.

< Message edited by Nikademus -- 5/18/2007 5:27:25 PM >

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(in reply to mlees)

Post #: 37

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 6:37:28 PM

mlees

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Hi. Thanks for the reply.

quote:

arguably, the other simulated means don't go far enough though this may be due to exp levels not properly set. When ASW allows, the port camping tactic can be devastating, Mk-14 or no Mk-14.

Ok. So, Are you suggesting that the ASW routine makes the IJN force less effective than it should be? So, to make things occur with a more historical result requires the USN boats to be handicapped? Hmmm... I need to think about that.

quote:

In some class cases there is a basis. For example the S-class boats were old and not in the best condition for the most part. I could see them having some SYS as they routinely are more effective than they should be, mainly due to their Mk10 torps working correctly. In the case of newer "Fleet" class boats, as i mentioned earlier in the thread, i'd agree with you that giving them a bunch of SYS is not desirable.

The only handicap that the S-boats had, as far as I can remember, was the lack of air conditioning, making tropical cruises a little harder on the crews than for the later fleet boats. Crew fatigue is not an issue for anything but air missions, though. Hmmm...

Neither the S-boats nor the later fleet boats were "falling apart", which is what sys damage implies to me. (The peacetime USN was all about spit and polish, and peactime promotions were based on the material conditons of the ships, planes, and subs.)

I don't recall any cites stating that the pre-war (or "at start" condition, if you will) condition of the subs in the PI was noteworthy, or poor compared to any other major command in the USN. However, with the game engine using matter transmogrifiers to change "supply points" into whatever parts or ammo are required by the unit, as needed, I can see your point that the ships in a cut off area like the PI in '42 should not be able to restore themselves to 100% tip top condition without a visit to Australia, India, or Pearl. Hmm....

System damage, once repaired, is gone. The S boats never did get air conditioning, so giving them sys damage that goes away would not properly simulate the lack of AC... because the S boats would become more fully effective within a few weeks. Hmmm...

You have given me food for thought. Thanks. :)

(in reply to Nikademus)

Post #: 38

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 6:41:36 PM

Nikademus

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

Hi. Thanks for the reply.

Ok. So, Are you suggesting that the ASW routine makes the IJN force less effective than it should be? So, to make things occur with a more historical result requires the USN boats to be handicapped? Hmmm... I need to think about that.

It used too. Not anymore. Now i'd say its a matter of the US subs assuming they have the proper exp/leader ratings getting in too many attacks and/or hits at times. Esp in port hexes.

quote:

Neither the S-boats nor the later fleet boats were "falling apart", which is what sys damage implies to me. (The peacetime USN was all about spit and polish, and peactime promotions were based on the material conditons of the ships, planes, and subs.)

I never said they were falling apart. I said they (The S-class) were not all in the best of condition due to wear and age. A light-moderate SYS is not unwarrented. SYS does not simply mean "falling apart" which would equate with "heavy damage" Heavy damage would be 50+%

quote:

I don't recall any cites stating that the pre-war (or "at start" condition, if you will) condition of the subs in the PI was noteworthy, or poor compared to any other major command in the USN.

See Blair....Silent Victory. It wasn't a major thing like say....the torpedo scandal but neither was the force in perfect condition either.

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Post #: 39

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 6:42:46 PM

rtrapasso

Posts: 22653
Joined: 9/3/2002
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quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

Hi. Thanks for the reply.

quote:

arguably, the other simulated means don't go far enough though this may be due to exp levels not properly set. When ASW allows, the port camping tactic can be devastating, Mk-14 or no Mk-14.

Ok. So, Are you suggesting that the ASW routine makes the IJN force less effective than it should be? So, to make things occur with a more historical result requires the USN boats to be handicapped? Hmmm... I need to think about that.

quote:

In some class cases there is a basis. For example the S-class boats were old and not in the best condition for the most part. I could see them having some SYS as they routinely are more effective than they should be, mainly due to their Mk10 torps working correctly. In the case of newer "Fleet" class boats, as i mentioned earlier in the thread, i'd agree with you that giving them a bunch of SYS is not desirable.

The only handicap that the S-boats had, as far as I can remember, was the lack of air conditioning, making tropical cruises a little harder on the crews than for the later fleet boats. Crew fatigue is not an issue for anything but air missions, though. Hmmm...

Neither the S-boats nor the later fleet boats were "falling apart", which is what sys damage implies to me. (The peacetime USN was all about spit and polish, and peactime promotions were based on the material conditons of the ships, planes, and subs.)

I don't recall any cites stating that the pre-war (or "at start" condition, if you will) condition of the subs in the PI was noteworthy, or poor compared to any other major command in the USN. However, with the game engine using matter transmogrifiers to change "supply points" into whatever parts or ammo are required by the unit, as needed, I can see your point that the ships in a cut off area like the PI in '42 should not be able to restore themselves to 100% tip top condition without a visit to Australia, India, or Pearl. Hmm....

System damage, once repaired, is gone. The S boats never did get air conditioning, so giving them sys damage that goes away would not properly simulate the lack of AC... because the S boats would become more fully effective within a few weeks. Hmmm...

You have given me food for thought. Thanks. :)

Actually, 1 S-boat had AC installed - done through private subscriptions... it was also one of the most effective S-boats, iirc.

(in reply to mlees)

Post #: 40

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/18/2007 7:03:27 PM

bradfordkay

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I have a personal rule I use on the subs at Cavite. On day one, four subs per AS can be readied and sent on patrol. After that, two subs per AS per day can be readied and sent out. This restriction is released should my opponent use a port attack to go after the subs (simulating a mass exit to get out of an obvious danger zone).

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fair winds,
Brad

(in reply to rtrapasso)

Post #: 41

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/19/2007 12:17:32 AM

Caliban

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: Caliban

My father was on one of those "s-boats". The alarum bells awoke them at 3:00am after radio communication ( I assume) informed them that Pearl had been attacked. They submerged in the bay to avoid aerial bombardment and then, that evening, set a northerly course where they encountered the invasion fleet the following day. They were sighted after a freak wave thrust their conning tower above the surface. They counted 57 explosions depth charges) as the Japanese sought them out. Their ship suffered structural damage and the loss of an their auxillary periscope. They spent the next 6 months attempting to find a safe port for repairs. This was finally accomplished at Balikpapan. His boat and the others of it's class, I assume, were primarily used for recon missions. He was 17 years old when he joined the "silent service" in June of 1941. He served the entire war in that service.

Larry Kocher (the very proud son of Wesley H. Kocher)

I think Dad's memory may be failing..., Balikpapan was taken by the Japanese well before 7 June, 1942 (six months). Maybe he meant 6 weeks...., which would seem like forever wandering around enemy infested waters in a broken submarine. Glad to hear he made it safely.

Mike, of course you are correct. It was my memory that failed me, not Dad's. I was trying to quote from a local newspaper's interview with Dad dated December 31,1942 which he gave while home on leave. I gave the newspaper to Brady, a worthy opponent and frequent contributor to this forum, as none of the existing members of my family valued this description of one sailor's experiences during the first year of the War in the Pacific nearly as much as Brady did. Balikpapan was one of those ports where they "attempted" to get repairs. To the best of "my" he did state that it took them 6 months to find a harbor where they could get repairs. As Balikpapan fell to the Japanese in either January or mid February (again my memory fails me) they obviously sailed on a southerly course after their confrontation near Lingyuan(sp?)

(in reply to Mike Scholl)

Post #: 42

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/23/2007 1:15:16 AM

wdolson

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From: Near Portland, OR
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quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Yep, there were many, many sub skippers relieved in 1942 for lack of aggressiveness, real or perceived.

And it went far above the skiipers too. As you said, the entire Navy was unprepared mentally, tactically and in many cases, logistically.

All the services had become bureaucratic organizations that steadfastly resisted change and stomped on the guys that dared break with doctrine and show any initiative. Only those that toed the line were rewarded with promotion. People like Mitchell, Chennault and many others were punished for daring to think outside the box. Well, the Japanese broke that box on 7 December and the brass didn't have a clue of how to respond.

Chez

In peacetime, most militaries tend to promote the officers who can play the game rather than those who would do best on the battlefield. The US lucked out in a major way that Georce C. Marshall rose to the top just before the war started. He was one of the few senior commanders to recognize this and he fast tracked the aggressive leaders who would make good combat ocmmanders. I suspect Admiral King followed Marshall's lead and did the same thing to the Navy.

Germany experienced a lot of early successes partially because their oponents had conservative, passive officer corps and when Germany rebuilt its military in the 1930s, they stressed battlefield innovation and taught commanders to be flexible. Later when Hitler started tying the hands of his field commanders, they suffered big loss after big loss. Of course the Allies had learned and updated their officer corps, as well as their doctrines.

Japan's early successes were also due to Allied unpreparedness and clueless officers corps.

Bill

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(in reply to ChezDaJez)

Post #: 43

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/23/2007 4:52:47 AM

Local Yokel

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

The only handicap that the S-boats had, as far as I can remember, was the lack of air conditioning, making tropical cruises a little harder on the crews than for the later fleet boats. Crew fatigue is not an issue for anything but air missions, though. Hmmm...

A significant problem with the S-boats was the high level of condensation from which they suffered. The real purpose of installing air conditioning was to lower such condensation levels, not because it would enhance crew comfort ( tho' that would be a side benefit) but rather because it would enhance performance of installed electrical/electronic equipment. The extent to which such condensation problems could compromise the S-boats' operational performance is indicated in this extract from 'The Forgotten Theater - US Submarine Operations in the Aleutians in World War II' (Here):

"Built to a World War I design based on early submarine technology, the S-boats assigned to the Aleutians were 20 years old, largely worn out, and clearly regarded as �second-line� submarines. Powered by only two 600-horsepower diesel engines, they could make only 12-14 knots on the surface � perhaps 10 submerged on battery � and with a test depth of 200 feet, there was little margin for error. Moreover, their surface displacement of somewhat less than 1,000 tons and their low freeboard made operating in the stormy, northern waters of the Aleutians and the Bering Sea a grueling, daily challenge. Despite the electric heaters that had been installed for the northern climate, life below decks was dispiriting, cold, and wet, not only from seawater sloshing down through the conning tower, but also from the condensation of atmospheric moisture on all the metal surfaces inside.

"Engine breakdowns, battery trouble, and electrical �shorts� were continuing problems, exacerbated by the age and condition of the machinery. S-35 was nearly lost in December 1942 to a chain of events that began when she took several massive waves over the bridge during a storm near Amchitka, sending tons of water into the control room and injuring her captain, LT Henry Monroe, who was forced to go below. Shortly thereafter, electrical fires broke out in both the control room and forward battery and began to spread, filling the boat with acrid smoke and forcing the engines to be shut down and the control room sealed off. The crew fought back with every trick they could think of, including bucket brigades to lower the water level, eventually restarting the engines under local control, and the boat retreated toward Dutch Harbor, fighting recurrent fires so serious that twice the crew was driven up to the bridge. After three days, they reached Adak, where assistance was available, and finally, on 29 December, under escort, S-35 made it back to Dutch Harbor and eventually to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, where she was completely overhauled � only to return to the Aleutians again six months later."

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Post #: 44

RE: Historical Sub Q - 5/23/2007 4:51:27 PM

mlees

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Yup. Thanks, LY. I remember reading this kind of stuff now. (It took some of you good folks here to shake the cobwebs out of my skull.)

Some S-boats performed better than expected, considering the working conditions the crews had to deal with. (Like hotbunking.)

However, you fight with what you have, not with what you wish you had.

In the game, I find that the S-boats are handy when used from Australia and raiding the SRA, not the Pearl/midway to Japan runs. (Thier endurance is a little short. Loiter time low on this route.)

(in reply to Local Yokel)

Post #: 45