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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/9/2010 8:40:20 PM   
Meyer1

 

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Just readed the whole thing (well kinda)... and a couple of points:

1) Curtiss - AA fire (regardless of enemy aircraft shotdown) vs precision of the bombing, there was definitely a connection! It wouldn't be if the pilots were robots

2) Collin - I don't know where you got the idea that the AOK 6 in Stalingrad only had/received supply for the infantry units. You are not gonna hang in there for months without tanks, and specially, artillery.

Also, ref the reliabilty of tanks: thing is, is very difficult (or impossible?) to find objective data regarding the respective level of serviceable tanks, in different armies, to compare. And even if you do, that not only would reflect how "reliable" a tank is, but many other things. And, the Tigers were not concentrated in separate battalions because of this, but since they were supposed to be used in the focal center of an attact, they were at dispossal of the Corps/Army level. And, I may add, at first some units were integrated in the divisions with other Panzers (see SS units at Kursk), or even mixed with other tanks in the Battalions (Pz III)

Finally
quote:

I'm reminded of Guderian's observation that when his division commanders would claim to be out of fuel, he could safely assume that actually they still had enough for another day and would issue orders accordingly.

I believe that was in Mellenthin's book, and I think he was quoting Balck..


Nothing personal, just bussiness

Regards, Hernán.

< Message edited by Meyer1 -- 2/9/2010 8:53:49 PM >

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 781
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/9/2010 9:36:43 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

Just readed the whole thing (well kinda)... and a couple of points:

1) Curtiss - AA fire (regardless of enemy aircraft shotdown) vs precision of the bombing, there was definitely a connection! It wouldn't be if the pilots were robots

2) Collin - I don't know where you got the idea that the AOK 6 in Stalingrad only had/received supply for the infantry units. You are not gonna hang in there for months without tanks, and specially, artillery.


The point really is that the infantry was able to operate at much closer to its full potential even under conditions of straitened supply, and that in any case, infantry requires far less in the way of sheer tonnage. Food and ammo for a day of heavy fighting for an infantry battalion might come to ten tons -- and they could have considerable combat value even if that number was divided by four. The requirements for food, ammo, and fuel for a day of heavy fighting for a tank battalion would be more on the order of a hundred tons -- and there'll be a more or less straight line decline in efficacy if that value is reduced. You can make a hungry man march -- and he can pose a meaningful threat with even a pound of cartridges. A tank without fuel simply can't move, and each one of its shells weighs thirty pounds or so. Artillery is going to be even more extreme.
quote:



Also, ref the reliabilty of tanks: thing is, is very difficult (or impossible?) to find objective data regarding the respective level of serviceable tanks, in different armies, to compare. And even if you do, that not only would reflect how "reliable" a tank is, but many other things. And, the Tigers were not concentrated in separate battalions because of this, but since they were supposed to be used in the focal center of an attact, they were at dispossal of the Corps/Army level. And, I may add, at first some units were integrated in the divisions with other Panzers (see SS units at Kursk), or even mixed with other tanks in the Battalions (Pz III)

Finally
quote:

I'm reminded of Guderian's observation that when his division commanders would claim to be out of fuel, he could safely assume that actually they still had enough for another day and would issue orders accordingly.

I believe that was in Mellenthin's book, and I think he was quoting Balck..


Nothing personal, just bussiness

Regards, Hernán.


The Tigers you could quite well be right about -- although they do seem to have broken down a lot. As to the quote, though, it's definitely in Panzer Leader. That's sitting right on my bookshelf.

Anyway, sure varying reliability is difficult to determine, subjective, dependent on factors external to the actual design, etc. Nevertheless, it was also very much a reality. The ideal would be a rating that could be modified in the Bioeditor. The stock rating could simply be some undifferentiated value -- or if someone wants to impose their opinion, I don't care. The point is that then designers could adjust it to suit the historical behavior of the Super Wombat III or whatever in the campaign they're trying to model. As it is, early British cruisers can charge from Tobruk to El Agheila with no greater losses than Stuarts would suffer.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/9/2010 9:37:41 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 1:06:33 AM   
dicke bertha

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
correct


Well you could ponder upon the amount of "corrects" you've received from the community for all your diligent service in this long patch release time, and the innumerous pats on your shoulder, and the allaround merry go-ons in friendly tone. I am sarcastic of course. I'm signing off probably for good, and leaving TOAW behind me, you exhaust me. Gosh where are all the people who used to make up the community, on several sites, I think they fell one at a time at the roadside, awed and overimpressed by your very specific logic. Maybe soon only the scenario makers are left, and you know what, that makes a dead game, maybe quite to your taste, and remember no critics or players of your scenarios mean fine scenarios. Good luck with stalling volume supply much longer.


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Post #: 783
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 2:35:52 AM   
Panama


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

The point really is that the infantry was able to operate at much closer to its full potential even under conditions of straitened supply, and that in any case, infantry requires far less in the way of sheer tonnage. Food and ammo for a day of heavy fighting for an infantry battalion might come to ten tons -- and they could have considerable combat value even if that number was divided by four. The requirements for food, ammo, and fuel for a day of heavy fighting for a tank battalion would be more on the order of a hundred tons -- and there'll be a more or less straight line decline in efficacy if that value is reduced. You can make a hungry man march -- and he can pose a meaningful threat with even a pound of cartridges. A tank without fuel simply can't move, and each one of its shells weighs thirty pounds or so. Artillery is going to be even more extreme.


Soviet Rifle division first day supply of munitions, food fodder and fuel was 404 tons.

Soviet Tank brigade first day supply of same was 86 tons. Tank corp 440 tons. Mech corp 854 tons. (The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, Walter S. Dunn, Jr)

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Post #: 784
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 5:24:24 AM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

The point really is that the infantry was able to operate at much closer to its full potential even under conditions of straitened supply, and that in any case, infantry requires far less in the way of sheer tonnage. Food and ammo for a day of heavy fighting for an infantry battalion might come to ten tons -- and they could have considerable combat value even if that number was divided by four. The requirements for food, ammo, and fuel for a day of heavy fighting for a tank battalion would be more on the order of a hundred tons -- and there'll be a more or less straight line decline in efficacy if that value is reduced. You can make a hungry man march -- and he can pose a meaningful threat with even a pound of cartridges. A tank without fuel simply can't move, and each one of its shells weighs thirty pounds or so. Artillery is going to be even more extreme.


Soviet Rifle division first day supply of munitions, food fodder and fuel was 404 tons.

Soviet Tank brigade first day supply of same was 86 tons. Tank corp 440 tons. Mech corp 854 tons. (The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, Walter S. Dunn, Jr)


A 'rifle division' happens to include a lot of artillery. I think that if you work out and compare the fuel and ammo an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, and a tank battalion need for a day's fighting, the situation becomes pretty clear.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/10/2010 5:27:36 AM >


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Post #: 785
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 4:15:24 PM   
Panama


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Ammo is the main item of supply. You can fight in rags and forage for some food. A gun is a club without ammo. Two measures of ammo. Basic amount assigned and what's needed to replace what has been used. A division is allocated based on what is required for tow or three days of combat before more supplies could be sent to them. This supply issue is referred to as the first issue of supply. Type of activity determines estimated expenditure and replacement. Attacking fixed positions (fortified/entrenched) took more than a 'quiet' sector. For a Soviet Rifle division, 9373 men in 1944. Not generous and these are maximum amounts. Probably less in real life. Amounts are in tons:

Rifle: 16.9, light machine gun: 11.9, heavy machine gun: 8.3, pistol: .3, machine pistol: 7.7, AT rifle: 6.1, 50mm mortar: 11, 82mm mortar: 45.4, 120mm mortar: 27, 45mm AT gun: 37.3, 73mm gun M1927: 18, 76mm gun M02/03: 30.1, 122mm howitzer: 32.6, grenades: 37.5, explosives: 15.

That's about 305 tons, the lions share of supply in weight for the division. Of couse what is supposed to be issued/used and what actually was done will vary, It is war you know and by 1944 I do believe the 50mm mortar was/had been phased out. Nothing would be 'normal'.

So, the above is 'first issue'. Differing from daily use and resupply requirements. Kind of like a unit in FitE sitting for a couple turns stocking up. Daily resupply would differ according to what the unit was doing but an average would be (in tons):

Rifle division: munitions - 76, food - 20, fodder - 15, fuel - 7, total = 118
Tank brigade: munitions - 25, food - 2, fuel - 7, total = 43
Cavalry division: munitions - 25, food - 10, fodder - 5, fuel - 8, total = 48

Guard units would typically be more.

If a Rifle division were to be attacking the average munitions per day would be about 50% more than if in a 'quiet' sector. Also as the war progressed less was used per Rifle division for food and more ammo was used. Between 1942 and 1943 food and fodder rations went down by about 40%. Munitions went up by about 52%. Fuel usage went down by about 50%.

What do all these numbers mean besides giving me a headache? If you try and get too exact in your supply rules you are going to end up in a quagmire from which there will be no extraction because things will and did change in a campaign of any length. Use the KISS rule.

BTW, if you compare a Soviet Rifle division munitions expenditure to a US Infantry division munitions expenditure in WW2 you will find the Soviets shot at the Germans more. Maybe the US didn't dislike the German people as much.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 5:24:11 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

BTW, if you compare a Soviet Rifle division munitions expenditure to a US Infantry division munitions expenditure in WW2 you will find the Soviets shot at the Germans more. Maybe the US didn't dislike the German people as much.


Something's wrong with that. We were notoriously profligate with munitions.

Anyway, I'm not calling for any kind of detailed breakdown -- that was actually Curtis. I merely think that infantry-icon units should be less severely affected by lack of supply than artillery and mechanized-icon units.

Then too, if we ever do get volume-based supply, 'refilling' some units should cost more than others. Again, leg infantry, cavalry, and other foot, non-artillery types of units consume less, generally speaking.

You keep using figures for divisional level units, and here the formula wouldn't work so great, since of course an 'infantry' division contains a lot of artillery. One could either (a) accept the distortion, (b) jigger the icon choices (i.e., have a couple of visually identical but materially different 'infantry' icons), or (c) have the program look at the actual weapons in the unit. This last would be the ideal choice from the standpoint of accuracy, but perhaps not as easy to program.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 5:46:14 PM   
Panama


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Yeah, infantry divisions do contain artillery. So do regiments. For that matter so do battalions. I don't understand what you are getting at. I know you're not suggesting making one set of supply rules for battalion level scenarios, another for regimental, etc.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 6:01:47 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

Yeah, infantry divisions do contain artillery. So do regiments. For that matter so do battalions. I don't understand what you are getting at. I know you're not suggesting making one set of supply rules for battalion level scenarios, another for regimental, etc.


In the case of most regiments and battalions, not much artillery. Thinking about a German infantry battalion, we've got twelve 5 cm mortars, and six-eight 8.1 cm mortars. Go to the regiment, and add eight 7.5 cm infantry guns. Most of the firepower is still coming from infantry weapons -- and the supply requirements are correspondingly modest.

Anyway, your remarks make me think that if possible, the program should make its calculations by weapons type. A unit would be rendered more completely hors de combat by supply shortage the more it consisted of weapons which lose all utility without a substantial tonnage of supplies.

So for example the program might limit the loss of firepower and mobility for rifle squads without supply at 50%; for artillery, trucks, tanks, etc at 100%. The results would then be calculated for the unit as a whole. Your larger composite units would retain something like 20% of their maximum potential value. In a scenario with separate tank, infantry, artillery, etc battalions the results would be more varied.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/10/2010 6:24:27 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 6:21:39 PM   
ColinWright

 

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In an ideal world...(and yes, this is an item for the wish list)

If a unit whose supply has fallen to or below 0% attempts to move, all fixed equipment and all equipment which requires fuel to move should be treated as 'static' equipment -- i.e., it would have to be abandoned.  It's been suggested, for example, that this is one reason Manstein was equivocal about Sixth Army actually breaking out of Stalingrad.  As long as it stayed where it was, it had considerable combat value, and was tying down quite a large number of Russian troops, and giving him some hope of building up a front to the West.  If it did break out, it would do so as a horde of mostly weaponless fugitives, and would effectively release many Russians while not doing a whole lot to bolster his ability to contain them.

Anyway, some related considerations.

Obviously, in the case of pure tank and pure artillery units, there's the problem of the unit simply vanishing.  Some designers already include light rifles in their artillery battalions, which would be one route -- designers just need to make sure there's going to be something left in the units.  Alternatively, they could simply be left to their fate.

However (again in an ideal world) we would have a 'heavy weapons crew' that would replace the abandoned gun or tank.  This is, after all, what generally happened.  One commonly had 'artillery fighting as infantry' in forces such as those on Crete.  Then whenever the unit started to get its tanks back, these 'crews' would vanish back into the restored equipment.  However, this sounds a bit ambitious for now.

Finally, I would be inclined to favor horse-drawn guns being abandoned as well.  One can make a theoretical argument that they should have elasticity like leg infantry, but they effectively didn't, as a rule.  Units in straightened supply circumstances usually either didn't have the fodder to keep their draft animals strong, or they were eating them. Guns -- whether truck- or horse-drawn -- notoriously get abandoned by retreating armies.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/10/2010 6:23:33 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 8:22:32 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

Just readed the whole thing (well kinda)... and a couple of points:

1) Curtiss - AA fire (regardless of enemy aircraft shotdown) vs precision of the bombing, there was definitely a connection! It wouldn't be if the pilots were robots


I'm not saying otherwise. I'm saying that the system already has this built in. We know that because current bombing effects aren't unhistorical. Virtually every unit will have some AAA ability, so the game simply assumes it. The case that isn't covered is where the target has no AAA and the bombers know it. Then they can adapt techniques to exploit this that would increase bombing efficacy. But that's so rare it can basically be ignored.

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Post #: 791
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 8:28:07 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

Just readed the whole thing (well kinda)... and a couple of points:

1) Curtiss - AA fire (regardless of enemy aircraft shotdown) vs precision of the bombing, there was definitely a connection! It wouldn't be if the pilots were robots


I'm not saying otherwise. I'm saying that the system already has this built in. We know that because current bombing effects aren't unhistorical. Virtually every unit will have some AAA ability, so the game simply assumes it. The case that isn't covered is where the target has no AAA and the bombers know it. Then they can adapt techniques to exploit this that would increase bombing efficacy. But that's so rare it can basically be ignored.


Logically therefore, there should be no AA units or weapons in the game at all.

Since their effect is already built in.

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Post #: 792
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 8:31:21 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

... and that in any case, infantry requires far less in the way of sheer tonnage. Food and ammo for a day of heavy fighting for an infantry battalion might come to ten tons -- and they could have considerable combat value even if that number was divided by four. The requirements for food, ammo, and fuel for a day of heavy fighting for a tank battalion would be more on the order of a hundred tons...


But that would only matter if the infantry battalion and the tank battalion were being sent the same tonnage of supply. They won't be. That would be idiotic. The quartermasters know the tonnage requirements for each type of unit and fill them accordingly.

quote:

-- and there'll be a more or less straight line decline in efficacy if that value is reduced.


I disagree. There are diminishing returns for artillery the same as for infantry. A fire mission of 100 shells/gun is not 10 times as effective as one of 10 shells/gun.

Edit: note that I added the "per gun" qualifier, which was what I meant.

< Message edited by Curtis Lemay -- 2/11/2010 9:15:43 PM >

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Post #: 793
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 8:33:42 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In an ideal world...(and yes, this is an item for the wish list)

If a unit whose supply has fallen to or below 0% attempts to move, all fixed equipment and all equipment which requires fuel to move should be treated as 'static' equipment -- i.e., it would have to be abandoned.  It's been suggested, for example, that this is one reason Manstein was equivocal about Sixth Army actually breaking out of Stalingrad.  As long as it stayed where it was, it had considerable combat value, and was tying down quite a large number of Russian troops, and giving him some hope of building up a front to the West.  If it did break out, it would do so as a horde of mostly weaponless fugitives, and would effectively release many Russians while not doing a whole lot to bolster his ability to contain them.

Anyway, some related considerations.

Obviously, in the case of pure tank and pure artillery units, there's the problem of the unit simply vanishing.  Some designers already include light rifles in their artillery battalions, which would be one route -- designers just need to make sure there's going to be something left in the units.  Alternatively, they could simply be left to their fate.

However (again in an ideal world) we would have a 'heavy weapons crew' that would replace the abandoned gun or tank.  This is, after all, what generally happened.  One commonly had 'artillery fighting as infantry' in forces such as those on Crete.  Then whenever the unit started to get its tanks back, these 'crews' would vanish back into the restored equipment.  However, this sounds a bit ambitious for now.

Finally, I would be inclined to favor horse-drawn guns being abandoned as well.  One can make a theoretical argument that they should have elasticity like leg infantry, but they effectively didn't, as a rule.  Units in straightened supply circumstances usually either didn't have the fodder to keep their draft animals strong, or they were eating them. Guns -- whether truck- or horse-drawn -- notoriously get abandoned by retreating armies.


This is all based upon the common misconception about unit supply values. They do not equate to the unit's actual supply stockpile. A unit at 1% supply is not out of supply.

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Post #: 794
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 8:35:56 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Logically therefore, there should be no AA units or weapons in the game at all.

Since their effect is already built in.


No. Their effects are not built in. But the game is making a safe assumption that all bombing targets have some AAA.

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Post #: 795
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 9:00:20 PM   
ColinWright

 

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The fact of the matter, of course, is that if anything is 'built in' it is only built in in the sense that TOAW makes no allowance for the truly devastating effects aircraft can have if they are operating against forces with no effective means of air defense at all (the Iraqi army vs the USAF in 'Desert Storm' comes to mind).

Actually, the impact aircraft have been able to have has varied a lot, and generally, in inverse proportion to the effective air defense the enemy has been able to offer. The really rather small Luftwaffe of 1939-1941 was able to exert a strong effect because the forces it was attacking had grossly inadequate means of air defense. In contrast, German forces were always lavishly equipped with flak, and they were able to continue to operate to some extent even under the conditions of overwhelming Allied air supremacy that obtained in 1944-1945.

Had the effect been somehow 'built in' and constant, either the Luftwaffe of 1939-1941 would have been a negligible quantity, or the Allies of 1944 would have swept to victory in a few weeks on the strength of their thousands of rocket-firing fighter bombers, tactical air forces of medium bombers, etc.

That's the first point. Flak matters. You put a couple of batteries by a bridge, it's going to stay up a lot longer than if you don't.

The second point is that flak doesn't exert its effect primarily by shooting down planes. Naval warfare as an example has its pitfalls, but if one looks at the British experience off Crete, one will notice that they were hardly mowing the Luftwaffe down. However, they weren't getting sunk either -- not until they started running out of AA shells and their formations started breaking up.

Then they got creamed. That's when all the ships went down.

Similarly with some bridge or panzer column that has some flak around. It's not going to shoot down twenty aircraft -- but it will do a lot better than if the flak isn't there.

This needs to be modeled. It's all been said before, and it's depressing that it has to be said again, but there it is. Flak does not work by shooting down planes any more than your local police department reduces crime by culling the population of young males. It works by exerting a disrupting effect -- by forcing planes to fly fast and erratically rather than low, slow, and putting that bomb right in the ol' pickle jar.

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Post #: 796
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 9:02:17 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Logically therefore, there should be no AA units or weapons in the game at all.

Since their effect is already built in.


No. Their effects are not built in. But the game is making a safe assumption that all bombing targets have some AAA.


However, that's not a 'safe assumption.' Many armies have effectively had no AA -- and have suffered accordingly. Many others have had considerable AA assets -- and while they haven't necessarily been able to shoot down many aircraft, they have been able to continue to fight effectively even in the presence of enormous enemy airforces.


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Post #: 797
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/10/2010 9:04:27 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Logically therefore, there should be no AA units or weapons in the game at all.

Since their effect is already built in.


No. Their effects are not built in. But the game is making a safe assumption that all bombing targets have some AAA.


So in your scenarios you omit a certain quantity of AA on that basis? Since it's already assumed to be there by the game engine?

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Post #: 798
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/11/2010 9:13:13 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So in your scenarios you omit a certain quantity of AA on that basis? Since it's already assumed to be there by the game engine?


That's not what I'm saying. Make an effort to understand. Bombers are assumed to already be taking precautions against AAA in their targets. That's what's built in.

Otherwise, we would have to slash bomber efficacy whenever a target had AAA. There's just no basis for doing so.

Perhaps there is a rationale for providing a bomber boost whenever the target totally lacks AAA, but I still think those are just footnote cases.

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Post #: 799
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/11/2010 9:36:20 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So in your scenarios you omit a certain quantity of AA on that basis? Since it's already assumed to be there by the game engine?


That's not what I'm saying. Make an effort to understand. Bombers are assumed to already be taking precautions against AAA in their targets. That's what's built in.

Otherwise, we would have to slash bomber efficacy whenever a target had AAA. There's just no basis for doing so.

Perhaps there is a rationale for providing a bomber boost whenever the target totally lacks AAA, but I still think those are just footnote cases.


As so often, your remarks just fly in the face of historical reality.

What you are saying implies some 'normal' level of AA protection. A generic average, so to speak. Like the top speed of a family sedan. They can all do 100 mph. Few can do over 150 mph. That sort of distribution is what your argument implies.

That just wasn't the case. As I've previously noted, AA ability -- and the protection it afforded -- varied enormously. There was no norm, which is what your argument would require. There is also, parenthetically, absolutely no evidence any assumption of any such norm was built into the engine.

In fact, TOAW sets out the AA weapons that would afford significant protection. 2 cm Oerlikons, 40 mm Bofors, 3.7 inch AA, 'dual AA machineguns,' etc. The protection they afford isn't 'built in' -- any more than AT firepower is 'built in.'

The difficulty -- which is obvious, although you won't admit it -- is that TOAW attempts to model the effect of these weapons simply by having them shoot down planes. That -- although you have also attempted to deny this in the past as well -- simply doesn't work.

AA can shoot down planes. It does shoot down planes. The local police do plug a bad guy every now and then. But like the local police, AA exerts most of its effect through forcing its targets to change their behavior.

A classic example would be French ground attack aircraft in 1940. They went out on May 11-12 and attacked as their doctrine called for: low, straight, and right into the German columns. Got slaughtered.

Were they all shot down, though? Not at all. Most of the force was still there and serviceable. However, thereafter the French bombed from a considerable altitude -- and with considerably less effect.

That's how AA works -- and that's the effect AA weapons should exert. I don't see why this is so hard to accept.

Now, implementing such an effect might pose some problems -- but we never get that far. We get stuck with you denying the shortcoming is there at all. That's what I find so frustrating.

******

These things -- the crippling effect of not having a volume based supply system, the 'soft' power of AA, that exposure to interdiction is a function of how much of a unit's potential movement allowance it expends, that wadis and rivers pose essentially similar military obstacles, that leg infantry units are not crippled as quickly or completely as other types of units by absence of supply -- range from at least tenable propositions to self-evident facts. But they all get short shrift with you. You won't admit there's any problem at all. The only problems that exist are those you feel you've discovered all by yourself and that you feel inclined to address.

It is as if Obama announced that the economy was fine, that there was no terrorist threat, that the budget deficit was a figment of his opponents' imagination, and that global warming wasn't happening. It's not really a very satisfactory way of improving the system -- simply denying each shortcoming as it is brought up.

Initially, I thought, well, if not Curtis, who? That is to say, better to have you around than nobody at all. I may even have entertained some delusion that you would be susceptible to either logical argument or historical fact. But I no longer think that. You are an actual and acutely harmful presence, as far as the development of TOAW goes. I'd rather have Ralph Tricky just cherry-pick whatever appeals to him and then ask people to test the results of the change.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/11/2010 10:23:25 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/11/2010 10:14:07 PM   
Panama


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I kind of thought whenever an air unit went on a sortie it was assumed it would encounter some kind of ground fire. Type dependant on altitude. So a tac unit would encounter small arms fire at the least. I know if I had a chance I would have shot a low flying aircraft. Not that there were any.

Well, I did in Battlefield Europe. Shot down an ME 109 with my submachine gun. Dumb luck.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/11/2010 10:15:17 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

... and that in any case, infantry requires far less in the way of sheer tonnage. Food and ammo for a day of heavy fighting for an infantry battalion might come to ten tons -- and they could have considerable combat value even if that number was divided by four. The requirements for food, ammo, and fuel for a day of heavy fighting for a tank battalion would be more on the order of a hundred tons...


But that would only matter if the infantry battalion and the tank battalion were being sent the same tonnage of supply. They won't be. That would be idiotic. The quartermasters know the tonnage requirements for each type of unit and fill them accordingly.


Indeed. However, the point is that sometimes an unlimited amount of munitions is not available. Under such circumstances, a couple of tons will suffice to restore some combat value to an infantry battalion -- and they can just go hungry for a day.

Try that with an artillery battalion, and you get ammo for six salvos. Physically, the guns can't be moved a few kilometers even though there's no gas -- they can't be moved at all.

This exerts an effect in real life. Sixth Army's artillery and armor quickly lost most of its combat value -- and certainly wasn't going to be able to come along if there was a breakout. The infantry retained some viability. When the Germans advanced over the Caucasus, the trickle of supply they were receiving sufficed to maintain the infantry -- but any effective artillery was out of the question.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/11/2010 10:27:04 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/11/2010 10:22:28 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

I kind of thought whenever an air unit went on a sortie it was assumed it would encounter some kind of ground fire. Type dependant on altitude. So a tac unit would encounter small arms fire at the least. I know if I had a chance I would have shot a low flying aircraft. Not that there were any.




Sure -- but the point is that in TOAW this fire, and the volume of this fire, will affect the aircraft only if it shoots it down. Actually -- as can readily be realized if one considers the effect of someone shooting at you -- they needn't hit you to significantly affect your job performance.

Curtis notwithstanding, there isn't some 'built in' AA factor. Every weapon has an AA rating. For some, it's zero. For rifle squads, it's one. For 40 mm Bofors, it's something else. The game directly models flak. What it does not do is model it correctly.

You go and bomb an undefended bridge, you won't get shot down. You go and bomb a bridge with four Oerlikons guarding it, you probably won't get shot down either. You're just much less likely to hit it.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/11/2010 10:27:35 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 12:48:01 AM   
Panama


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Indeed. However, the point is that sometimes an unlimited amount of munitions is not available. Under such circumstances, a couple of tons will suffice to restore some combat value to an infantry battalion -- and they can just go hungry for a day.

Try that with an artillery battalion, and you get ammo for six salvos. Physically, the guns can't be moved a few kilometers even though there's no gas -- they can't be moved at all.

This exerts an effect in real life. Sixth Army's artillery and armor quickly lost most of its combat value -- and certainly wasn't going to be able to come along if there was a breakout. The infantry retained some viability. When the Germans advanced over the Caucasus, the trickle of supply they were receiving sufficed to maintain the infantry -- but any effective artillery was out of the question.



You are correct in this. Out of the 6 1/2 German divisions at Korsun, 56,000 men, a total of 38,000 escaped. But they had only small arms and some not even that. Effectively speaking the divisions were eliminated. Without anything to move the heavy equipment it becomes only a lump of metal and if a breakout is to be made it is necessarily left behind even if there is ammunition for it.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 1:32:44 AM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In an ideal world...(and yes, this is an item for the wish list)

If a unit whose supply has fallen to or below 0% attempts to move, all fixed equipment and all equipment which requires fuel to move should be treated as 'static' equipment -- i.e., it would have to be abandoned.  It's been suggested, for example, that this is one reason Manstein was equivocal about Sixth Army actually breaking out of Stalingrad.  As long as it stayed where it was, it had considerable combat value, and was tying down quite a large number of Russian troops, and giving him some hope of building up a front to the West.  If it did break out, it would do so as a horde of mostly weaponless fugitives, and would effectively release many Russians while not doing a whole lot to bolster his ability to contain them.

Anyway, some related considerations.

Obviously, in the case of pure tank and pure artillery units, there's the problem of the unit simply vanishing.  Some designers already include light rifles in their artillery battalions, which would be one route -- designers just need to make sure there's going to be something left in the units.  Alternatively, they could simply be left to their fate.

However (again in an ideal world) we would have a 'heavy weapons crew' that would replace the abandoned gun or tank.  This is, after all, what generally happened.  One commonly had 'artillery fighting as infantry' in forces such as those on Crete.  Then whenever the unit started to get its tanks back, these 'crews' would vanish back into the restored equipment.  However, this sounds a bit ambitious for now.

Finally, I would be inclined to favor horse-drawn guns being abandoned as well.  One can make a theoretical argument that they should have elasticity like leg infantry, but they effectively didn't, as a rule.  Units in straightened supply circumstances usually either didn't have the fodder to keep their draft animals strong, or they were eating them. Guns -- whether truck- or horse-drawn -- notoriously get abandoned by retreating armies.


This is all based upon the common misconception about unit supply values. They do not equate to the unit's actual supply stockpile. A unit at 1% supply is not out of supply.


I don't see how this addresses the issue at all. The point is that artillery, armor, etc both require a large amount of supply to function and decline in effectiveness in direct proportion to the lack of that supply. An artillery piece without shells is useless. It doesn't have 30% of the potency it would have if it was at full supply -- it's useless. A tank without fuel can't drive 80 km a day instead of 200 km a day -- it can't move at all.

Infantry, on the other hand, retains a considerably greater proportion of its ability to function under straitened circumstances -- and will be able to retain it with a volume of supply that wouldn't do much to restore your panzer regiment to life.

Now, I can see how this would create problems with immortal infantry plunging on in the advance when the tanks have come to a halt, and I'm interested in considering how to deal with that -- but we never get to that point. We bog down -- as always -- with your attempts to deny there's any problem at all.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/12/2010 1:40:24 AM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 4:13:46 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

What you are saying implies some 'normal' level of AA protection.


No I am not. I'm not saying anything about the level of AAA in the hex. I'm only addressing the bomber's tactics. Bombers are already assumed to be taking precautions against AAA. The reduction in their bombing accuracy due to AAA is already built in.

If it weren't, then we would need to slash their bombing accuracy whenever they target a hex with AAA in it. And no test shows such a need. Bombing effects are not excessive.

That only leaves the rare case of a target that has no AAA whatsoever being poorly modeled. I don't think that's such a big deal.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 4:15:43 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

I kind of thought whenever an air unit went on a sortie it was assumed it would encounter some kind of ground fire.


Exactly. For most of TOAW's topic range, that's a safe assumption.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 4:20:14 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Indeed. However, the point is that sometimes an unlimited amount of munitions is not available. Under such circumstances, a couple of tons will suffice to restore some combat value to an infantry battalion -- and they can just go hungry for a day.

Try that with an artillery battalion, and you get ammo for six salvos. Physically, the guns can't be moved a few kilometers even though there's no gas -- they can't be moved at all.


Again, this assumes that the infantry battalion and the artillery battalion are being sent the same tonnage of supply. That won't be the case.

quote:

This exerts an effect in real life. Sixth Army's artillery and armor quickly lost most of its combat value -- and certainly wasn't going to be able to come along if there was a breakout. The infantry retained some viability. When the Germans advanced over the Caucasus, the trickle of supply they were receiving sufficed to maintain the infantry -- but any effective artillery was out of the question.


Sixth Army didn't have a line of communications. It is not a typical example.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 4:27:27 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I don't see how this addresses the issue at all. The point is that artillery, armor, etc both require a large amount of supply to function and decline in effectiveness in direct proportion to the lack of that supply. An artillery piece without shells is useless. It doesn't have 30% of the potency it would have if it was at full supply -- it's useless. A tank without fuel can't drive 80 km a day instead of 200 km a day -- it can't move at all.


The issue is when does that tank or gun actually run out of ammo/fuel. You are making the false assumption that it happens when the unit supply reaches 1%. It's a common misconception. But it's wrong.

It would be absurd if it were true: Waffen SS Division fights for one player turn, then is out of ammo/fuel and is reduced to zero combat strength and can't move. In the subsequent enemy player turn it is wiped out by a squad of grandmothers and their brooms. Real units were much more resilient than that.

This has already been discussed to death in an old supply thread here:

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=1515321

< Message edited by Curtis Lemay -- 2/12/2010 4:44:46 PM >

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/12/2010 6:06:50 PM   
Meyer1

 

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I'm not sure about the "bomber's tactics" to avoid excessive losses to AA fire, and in that way losing precision. Let's use an example, a heavy bomber raid against Germany: they would fly the mission in the same way regardless how heavy the AA fire they expect. Now, of course, if they knew that there was not to be any AA fire whatsoever, they could bomb at low altittude, but that is not realistic. So, they would bomb as always at 6000-7000m, and still, their precision would be affected by how accurate the AA fire is. So, it is possible that two different bomber raids, using the same tactics, would lose the same number of aircraft due to the AA fire, but the accuracy could vary a lot. .

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