Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It will be the case if supplies are severely straightened. In fact, if there's only one ton of munitions that can be brought in, and it can go to either the infantry battalion or the artillery battalion, the entirety would probably go to the infantry battalion, and none at all to the artillery.

That's absurd. The quartermasters aren't idiots. They know the supply requirement ratios and fill them accordingly. Most of the supply tonnage will be artillery ammo. In fact, it's easier to supply the artillery because it is in the rear, while the infantry is at the front - under fire.

quote:



And the supply requirements aren't that disparate when you consider how many more infantry squads there are (even counting just frontline ones) than artillery peices. Add in the mortars, food, and fuel (for motorized infantry) needs, and it closes even more.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

You mean in 3.40 or before?

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

As a bit of history here, in the beginning there was TOAW flak as it was represented in OPART I, WGOTY, ACOW, etc.

It didn't shoot down many planes. Of course, real flak doesn't shoot down all that many planes either. Some planes go down of course -- flying TacAir isn't safe -- but on any given sortie, the attacker has a pretty good chance of coming home safe and sound.

Curtis, however, in his wisdom detected what he assumed was an error in the program that was producing these low kills. Curtis fixed this 'error.' My own suspicion is that Norm realized the slaughter that the unmodified values would cause, and deliberately cut the effect, but that's not really either here or there.

The point is that Curtis 'fixed' the value. Rather typically, he doesn't seem to have bothered to run a few test cases and seen if the resulting slaughter bore any relation to the general run of historical outcomes. It would have been easy enough: I can think of two tests right off. No -- every day just became Sedan bridgehead day for attacking air forces.

Also rather typically, Curtis tried to defend this mayhem. His arguments, of course, were fallacious, but he kept tirelessly presenting them.

All the above is an outrageous lie. I had absolutely nothing to do with the increase in AAA lethality in the release of TOAW III. In fact, I lead the way in finding how far off it was and getting it changed.

Okay, someone else did it. However, you certainly defended -- and as far as I know, continue to defend -- the notion that AA's effect can be modeled simply by having it shoot down planes. It couldn't have been anyone else.

The point is that we'll never get anywhere that way because that's not how AA works.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It's also worth mentioning that a lot of units that are about to be surrounded would just as soon not stand there and take their licks. If they come under attack, and they're about to be surrounded, they will want to take advantage of that hole before it closes.

What I'm saying is that if the net isn't closed by the time the attack starts, the defender may not stick around for the whole battle. That's at least as likely as the scenario where honor demands that he stay put and see who's the better man whilst his one route of escape is sealed off.

Now of course there are situations where the unit cannot disengage, or it is operating under a very rigid command structure, or it's simply unaware that it's about to be cut off -- but all the same. It's not really valid to assume a unit that is about to be surrounded is going to stay put and fight the good fight if it has a choice about it. In fact, units that find themselves without support on their flanks tend to pull back pretty readily.

Indeed, it's worth thinking about modifying a unit's ability to retreat according to its loss setting. If it's set to 'ignore losses' it sticks to the hex no matter what. If it has a different setting, the engine would check to see if all the blocking units were actually in place when the attack began. One could come up with something even looser for 'minimize losses'. Like it attempts to pull back as soon as it is has units on four sides.

There'd be some complications, though. Right now, I'll settle for anything that prevents a unit that tries to retreat on Monday being blocked by a unit that won't get there until Saturday.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Sure Curtis. I hang on your every word and am intensely aware of every suggestion you've ever made. That's how you know I'm 'lying.'

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In your case I don't think the denseness is willful. 'Bomber tactics' are not something fixed -- they vary in direct response to the intensity of the flak encountered.

Since that level of flak varies widely, the tactics bombers employ -- and hence their efficacy -- will vary.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

All my calculations allowed for that. I assumed 800 men in an infantry battalion and twelve guns in an artillery battalion.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Regardless, TOAW has to model the normal distribution patterns. That means that deliveries are proportioned to the actual requirements. Anything else would be insane. It would cumulatively result in huge imbalances in one item or other. And we do not want to give players the burden of picking and choosing special items to prioritize. That would create a quartermaster game. Nobody wants that.

quote:






And another factor I omitted. Infantry is primarily a defensive arm (at least by 1939). So, while some infantry is used offensively, most is just holding ground.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

As a bit of history here, in the beginning there was TOAW flak as it was represented in OPART I, WGOTY, ACOW, etc.

It didn't shoot down many planes. Of course, real flak doesn't shoot down all that many planes either. Some planes go down of course -- flying TacAir isn't safe -- but on any given sortie, the attacker has a pretty good chance of coming home safe and sound.

Curtis, however, in his wisdom detected what he assumed was an error in the program that was producing these low kills. Curtis fixed this 'error.' My own suspicion is that Norm realized the slaughter that the unmodified values would cause, and deliberately cut the effect, but that's not really either here or there.

The point is that Curtis 'fixed' the value. Rather typically, he doesn't seem to have bothered to run a few test cases and seen if the resulting slaughter bore any relation to the general run of historical outcomes. It would have been easy enough: I can think of two tests right off. No -- every day just became Sedan bridgehead day for attacking air forces.

Also rather typically, Curtis tried to defend this mayhem. His arguments, of course, were fallacious, but he kept tirelessly presenting them.

All the above is an outrageous lie. I had absolutely nothing to do with the increase in AAA lethality in the release of TOAW III. In fact, I lead the way in finding how far off it was and getting it changed.

Okay, someone else did it. However, you certainly defended -- and as far as I know, continue to defend -- the notion that AA's effect can be modeled simply by having it shoot down planes. It couldn't have been anyone else.

The point is that we'll never get anywhere that way because that's not how AA works.

The above was a complete and total fabrication out of thin air. A lie. And quite elaborate if you examine it. Took some effort. That makes you quite the liar.

The AAA lethality level is totally independent from your notions about flak's effects on bomber accuracy. To try to cover your guilt by inserting that issue just drops your character one more notch.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In your case I don't think the denseness is willful. 'Bomber tactics' are not something fixed -- they vary in direct response to the intensity of the flak encountered.

Since that level of flak varies widely, the tactics bombers employ -- and hence their efficacy -- will vary.

Baloney. Once they start shooting at you, you will take every measure you can to avoid being killed. You won't leave some of them in the toolkit for later. That includes flying at top speed, zig-zagging, using altitude, etc. Remember that flak enters the front of the cockpit - the armor plate is in the back.

quote:



Where is your evidence that the bombing effects in TOAW are too high?!? Remember the AAA thread. I made very specific tests using historical examples.

quote:



And, here's an easy test for you: Start "France 1944 - Cobra" and bombard Panzer Lehr with the entire 8th AF Bomber Command. You'll be underwhelmed.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


...Remember that flak enters the front of the cockpit - the armor plate is in the back...

quote:

The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

From US FIELD MANUAL NO. 7-8

quote:

The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

Colin, I don't agree with many things Curtiss has said, but I think in the infantry-artillery supply issue, I think he is right.
One thing that you are forgetting is that the infantry also base much of his combat potential in their heavy weapons: an infantry division has artillery, so an infantry battalion, and the companies. Only when you get down to the basic level of infantry formations, you will find only small caliber weapons. And since the supply runs through higher echelons than the section, as long as the unit is not isolated, it would recieve all kinds of ammunition that needs, unless there's a problem with the availability of some items (but that doesn't concern us here)

quote:



You are (corret me if I'm wrong) advocating for a higher drop of the combat effectiveness, in the event of low supply situations, for the artillery compared to the artillery. I don't think that should be the case, because 1) the infantry also has artillery and 2) as Curtis said, the supply would be delivered according to the unit's needs

quote:



Now, the case when the unit is isolated: is only natural that the ammunition that is faster consumed, is the most effective and longer ranged one, and that would be heavy weapons ammunition. And that is true for the artillery and also for the infantry units.
So, in this case, the infantry will expend first the heavy weapons rounds, and (if it was not yet destroyed) the small arms ammo. Of course, when out of ammo, (if attacked) it would be destroyed.

So I think a case could be made that, once out of ammo in their most charasteristic weaponry, the artillery units would be more effective than the infantry ones, because the artyllery men could fight as infantry, as they also have rifles/carabines. Should be then TOAW model the arillery units, when isolated and out of supply for their heavy weapons, as low quality infantry? IMO this would be a unnecessary complication.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

The whole supply problem is interconnected, so I think I'll set down what my thoughts are on each part of it -- all in one place.

First, the program needs to look at the supply demands of all units in terms of total tonnage required. That's going to call for some work, but I don't see any insuperable obstacle. Happily, lots of data on vehicle fuel capacity and shell weights and full combat loads and so on.

Second, this will need to be modified by various factors. For example, a unit in an arid hex obviously has a water requirement. Then too, I would think the distance the unit is outside the fully-supplied net should exert a multiplying effect. Obviously, some things to be hammered out and defined here, but again, no apparent obstacle.

Then the program should use an adjustible priority setting to adjust each unit's demand. Happily, a similar algorithm is used to distribute replacements, so this should be doable. You want to fuel Patton rather than Montgomery? Fuel Patton rather than Montgomery.

Finally, the total available supplies should be distributed in proportion to the adjusted 'demand' for each unit. You may well want to fuel Rommel. Too bad virtually nothing is coming up the pipeline.

Now, what we need -- and what will be tricky -- is adjusting the supplies by the maximum that can be pushed up each supply route. This is actually a major consideration outside OPART-land. For example, the Germans in 1918 failed partly because they were unable to clear the major rail line leading into the bulge they'd driven into the Allied front. Or maybe the Allies threatened to cut the rail line. Anyway, the point is that to resume the offensive, they needed that rail line open. No doubt they could have supplied ten divisions lavishly enough to permit an attack, and evidently they were able to supply fifty or however many divisions were in that sector lavishly enough to permit it to be defended -- but absent that rail line, they couldn't resume the offensive with all fifty divisions. More generally, choices of axes of attack are often dictated by such considerations. You can't mount a twenty division offensive along a route of advance that can only support supply for ten divisions. This is why -- for example -- the Germans only attacked Murmansk with two mountain divisions. Ten divisions would have been a fine idea -- if supplies for ten divisions could have been brought up through the tundra.

Anyway, so each unit gets its supplies. Then what? Then we need the combat strength of each unit adjusted according to the type of weapons it contains and how directly the value of those weapons is affected by any shortfall. A tank with 5% of its full load has perhaps 20% of its defensive value, virtually none of its offensive value, and it essentially can't move. An infantry squad with 5% of its full load might have 40% of its defensive value, 20% of its offensive value, and 60% of its normal movement allowance.

Finally, other values will need to be adjusted to compensate for the changes this will cause. For example, now that starved infantry can keep going but starved tanks can't, we'd want a higher mechanized movement rate to better simulate the enormous advantage it is to drive rather than walk if you do indeed have fuel. Supplied tanks should be able to advance two hundred miles in a couple of days -- now that they can't advance at all if they haven't gotten more fuel.

To repeat history in a game is to be predictable.
If you wish to learn more about EA, feel free to pop over to the EA forums Europe Aflame Forums.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
...Second, this will need to be modified by various factors. For example, a unit in an arid hex obviously has a water requirement. ...

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Believe it or not, the extent to which you will concentrate on evasive maneuvers and the extent to which you will concentrate on hitting the target does vary in proportion to the amount of incoming flak. Lotsa pilots don't immediately abandon the mission if there's light flak.

quote:

Also, great to hear your discovery about how armor plate is futile when it comes to flak. I bet the Russians wish they could have had you on the Sturmovik design team.

quote:

I never said the effects were too high. I noted that there's no adequate mechanism to cause them to vary in proportion to the AA defenses of the target.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

!

Even by your standards, Curtis, that's breathtaking. Do you ever actually read any military history

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

If I've already granted that I may well be mistaken about whose bright idea it was to 'fix' AA lethality, how am I seeking to 'cover my guilt'?

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Let me use Seelowe again for another illustration of the problem I see.

In Seelowe, the German first wave is of course initially very poorly supplied (this wouldn't have been Overlord.)

That's more or less okay for the infantry. They're leg infantry, they would be landing with a full combat load, Southeast England is loaded with larders to loot and chickens to steal. Their continuing combat ability reflects something like what could have been lugged up from the beach and brought in by Ju-52. They all tend to sink to about 40% of their original combat value and stay around that level until Dunkirk comes on line -- and that's about right.

However, there are also four amphibious tank battalions in the First Wave. Very nice, and they certainly do a lot to make the invasion a viable proposition. However, in TOAW, they're Energizer batteries. They just keep running, and running, and running... A week after S-Day, those tanks will still be in there punching. Doesn't matter that they haven't seen a drop of fuel since they came ashore, and it doesn't matter that they fired off their last shell four days ago. They're still in there punching. A bit groggy, but...

This in spite of the fact that a full refill of fuel and ammo for them would come to something like two hundred tons. That would be about one full day's airlift right there -- even assuming the planes could all land somewhere near the tanks. It would be a major part of the German supply effort just to keep those four battalions in motion.

...But not in TOAW! Just keep going! It doesn't matter how many tons of supplies this represents. That's 'cause the good quartermaster appreciates your needs, and just magically fills them -- no matter what they are.

Sounds like our budget balancing process...

The essential point is that different units do have different supply consumption rates -- and they respond differently to being starved. I'd like to discuss how to reflect that.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Well, actually, a lot of designers put light rifles into their artillery battalions for just this reason: artillery does have some value as infantry, and when the need arises, will fight as such. For example, in Seelowe I've found it best to put in about one light rifle for every two artillery tubes in the artillery regiments. These don't add to the bombardment strength -- but do keep attackers that have broken through the line from rampaging through the entire enemy artillery park.

quote:

. It doesn't matter that the firepower they still have represents about a ton of shells per hour, and what would be coming ashore would allow for about a tenth of that ammunition expenditure -- the artillery can just keep blazing away. So I have to have a house rule: German orange- or red-light artillery can't provide assigned fire support.

quote:

As noted, this objection can be dealt with if the program looks at the actual weapons rather than the unit icon.

quote:

If the rifle battalion needs one ton, and the artillery battalion needs fifty tons, what happens if only one ton of munitions can be brought in? You'll obviously do better if you supply the rifle battalion.

quote:

This in spite of the fact that a full refill of fuel and ammo for them would come to something like two hundred tons. That would be about one full day's airlift right there -- even assuming the planes could all land somewhere near the tanks. It would be a major part of the German supply effort just to keep those four battalions in motion.

quote:

Anyway, as I said, the thing to do would be to make the calculation by weapon rather than by unit icon. As a unit fell into negative supply, the rifle squads would retain say 50% of their combat value. The tanks and artillery pieces would cease to have any value at all. So a well-equipped infantry division -- which derives a lot of its firepower from heavy weapons -- would retain only a fraction of its combat strength. At a lower scale, the artillery would shut down, but the infantry battalions would continue to have considerable value.

quote:


A tank with 5% of its full load has perhaps 20% of its defensive value, virtually none of its offensive value, and it essentially can't move. An infantry squad with 5% of its full load might have 40% of its defensive value, 20% of its offensive value, and 60% of its normal movement allowance.

quote:


I have rather extensive records for the Korsun operation in february 1944. I shall see if I can find some data on tank ammunition expenditure. I know this was discussed, because the spearheads of III. Pz.Korps had to receive tank ammunition by air drop, due to the extremely poor condition of the roads.

quote:


In any case, here is some data:

In the period 12 – 19 february 1944, the following amounts of ammunition was air dropped to the spear heads of III. Pz.Korps: 79,6 tons of Tiger ammunition, 68,6 tons of Panther ammunition and 4 tons of Pz IV ammunition. These weights include the complete rounds and the stuff they were packed into to be air dropped. It seems that these weights correspond to 3800 rounds of Tiger ammo, 4100 rounds of Panther ammo and 300 rounds of Pz IV ammo.

Before the corps jumped off, it reported (10 february) that it had, operational, 34 Pz IV, 81 Panther and 13 Tiger I in its units (1. Pz.Div., 1. SS-Pz.Div., 16. Pz.Div., 17. Pz.Div., 506. Tiger-Bat. and heavy tank regiment Bäke, the latter consisted of one Panther battalion, II./23, and one Tiger battalion, 503). Also the corps had 20 assault guns operational

It is worth noting that supply problems were encountered almost immediately, and it seems that only the Tigers and Panthers pushed on, leaving the Pz IV and StuG in the rear and on the flanks, which may explain the vast preponderance of Tiger and Panther ammunition dropped. The corps had several tanks in workshops and it was explicitly reported that few were victims to enemy fire, rather most were mechanical breakdowns or simply bogged down in deep mud during the preceding week of fighting. Thus further tanks were added, but on the other hand more tanks broke down or got stuck in the mud. The net effect was gradually declining tank strength.

If we look at these deliveries, they represent (if we use the initial tank strength as a yardstick) 7 rounds per day and Panther delivered and 42 rounds per day and Tiger. Obviously the small number of operational Tiger tanks can distort the picture. The Panther strength declined more rapidly and on 15 february there were 28 Panther operational and 11 Tiger (using these strangth figures as a base, we arrive at 21 rounds per Panther and day (49 for Tigers)). But of the Panthers four could only fire with their machine guns (no explanation given, but ammo shortages can possibly have been a factor, because on the following day 20 tons of Panther ammunition was dropped, compared to 6 tons of Tiger ammunition)

The ratio between AP and HE ammo dropped is not clear, but according to what was brought up to the airfields, it seems that the ratio was approximately 1:1, with a slight preponderance for HE ammo.

So, how representative are these figures. First, an unknown part of the ammo dropped was lost, the Germans estimated that 70 – 80 % did get to the units (this has not been accounted for in my calculations above). Second, this was a period of very intensive fighting, the corps had to rescue about 50,000 fellow soldiers from Soviet encirclement and no effort was spared. On the other hand, the difficult ground may have made it difficult to get into action for many tanks. Also, it is not known if the tanks were topped up with ammo before they jumped off.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

The whole supply problem is interconnected, so I think I'll set down what my thoughts are on each part of it -- all in one place.

First, the program needs to look at the supply demands of all units in terms of total tonnage required. That's going to call for some work, but I don't see any insuperable obstacle. Happily, lots of data on vehicle fuel capacity and shell weights and full combat loads and so on.

quote:

Second, this will need to be modified by various factors. For example, a unit in an arid hex obviously has a water requirement. Then too, I would think the distance the unit is outside the fully-supplied net should exert a multiplying effect. Obviously, some things to be hammered out and defined here, but again, no apparent obstacle.

quote:

Then the program should use an adjustible priority setting to adjust each unit's demand. Happily, a similar algorithm is used to distribute replacements, so this should be doable. You want to fuel Patton rather than Montgomery? Fuel Patton rather than Montgomery.

Finally, the total available supplies should be distributed in proportion to the adjusted 'demand' for each unit. You may well want to fuel Rommel. Too bad virtually nothing is coming up the pipeline.

quote:

Now, what we need -- and what will be tricky -- is adjusting the supplies by the maximum that can be pushed up each supply route. This is actually a major consideration outside OPART-land. For example, the Germans in 1918 failed partly because they were unable to clear the major rail line leading into the bulge they'd driven into the Allied front. Or maybe the Allies threatened to cut the rail line. Anyway, the point is that to resume the offensive, they needed that rail line open. No doubt they could have supplied ten divisions lavishly enough to permit an attack, and evidently they were able to supply fifty or however many divisions were in that sector lavishly enough to permit it to be defended -- but absent that rail line, they couldn't resume the offensive with all fifty divisions. More generally, choices of axes of attack are often dictated by such considerations. You can't mount a twenty division offensive along a route of advance that can only support supply for ten divisions. This is why -- for example -- the Germans only attacked Murmansk with two mountain divisions. Ten divisions would have been a fine idea -- if supplies for ten divisions could have been brought up through the tundra.

quote:

Anyway, so each unit gets its supplies. Then what? Then we need the combat strength of each unit adjusted according to the type of weapons it contains and how directly the value of those weapons is affected by any shortfall. A tank with 5% of its full load has perhaps 20% of its defensive value, virtually none of its offensive value, and it essentially can't move. An infantry squad with 5% of its full load might have 40% of its defensive value, 20% of its offensive value, and 60% of its normal movement allowance.

quote:

Finally, other values will need to be adjusted to compensate for the changes this will cause. For example, now that starved infantry can keep going but starved tanks can't, we'd want a higher mechanized movement rate to better simulate the enormous advantage it is to drive rather than walk if you do indeed have fuel. Supplied tanks should be able to advance two hundred miles in a couple of days -- now that they can't advance at all if they haven't gotten more fuel.

quote:

ORIGINAL: jmlima

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
...Second, this will need to be modified by various factors. For example, a unit in an arid hex obviously has a water requirement. ...

Can you imagine the discussion about exactelly how much water? ie, do the Italians drink more water or Chiantti when they are in the desert? How about the British officers in Cairo, should we still factor the water or do we need to compute the amount of ale? What about tea? How much does the average human beeing drink? Well, the Germans are bigger than the Italians on average, so, do they require more water?

This sounds silly, but judging by the previous discussions this was where we would go.

In the wise words of Jamiam, what we need is to copy the OCS supply model and that's it. As simple as that.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

This is the heart of the discussion. And I don't agree with you. A tank with 5% of its load compared with a rifleman squad with 5% of rounds: I don't see any difference, the tank would be able function for not very long, but how is that different compared with a squad with soldiers with and average of seven 7.92mm rounds for their K98k's?. They are both very limited. And since here in TOAW we not have individual tanks, but tank units, what would happen in a case of a armor battalion of fifty tanks with 5% of fuel/ammo, is that they would fill perhaps ten tanks to 20%, and not use the rest. So, yes, the unit will still be able to operate, but at reduced capacity. The same could be said about the artillery.

The only point that have some vality is movement points for the infantry in the case when units are entirely out of supply, but does really matter? I mean, units almost never ran out of supply, because if they do they are pulled out of the line. So we are only concern with which can not reciev any supply at all, and most of those cases are when units are isolated and sourrounded by enmy units.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Well, actually, a lot of designers put light rifles into their artillery battalions for just this reason: artillery does have some value as infantry, and when the need arises, will fight as such. For example, in Seelowe I've found it best to put in about one light rifle for every two artillery tubes in the artillery regiments. These don't add to the bombardment strength -- but do keep attackers that have broken through the line from rampaging through the entire enemy artillery park.

You mean you put rifle squads, or actually rifles? (I'm sorry, I know nothing about how to design a scenario). About the latter, well that's ok, since most artilery men had rifles/carabines. And, the first case could be a good woorkaround that problem.

quote:

quote:

. It doesn't matter that the firepower they still have represents about a ton of shells per hour, and what would be coming ashore would allow for about a tenth of that ammunition expenditure -- the artillery can just keep blazing away. So I have to have a house rule: German orange- or red-light artillery can't provide assigned fire support.

Well, to me the problem is not that they could "keep blazing away", but the bolded part. They would still firing, but much less than usually.

quote:

quote:

As noted, this objection can be dealt with if the program looks at the actual weapons rather than the unit icon.

That would be very nice, to calculate the combat effectiveness of each unit.

quote:

If the rifle battalion needs one ton, and the artillery battalion needs fifty tons, what happens if only one ton of munitions can be brought in? You'll obviously do better if you supply the rifle battalion.

Not so sure, I guess would depends on the situation that the forces are involved (see below*). And I can see the case when the artillery recieves 800kg and the rifle unit 200kg (sorry for using metric on you )

quote:

quote:

This in spite of the fact that a full refill of fuel and ammo for them would come to something like two hundred tons. That would be about one full day's airlift right there -- even assuming the planes could all land somewhere near the tanks. It would be a major part of the German supply effort just to keep those four battalions in motion.

Well, the Germans in no way are gonna be able to do a Seelowe only with air supply, and I don't care if they use only infantry

quote:

quote:

Anyway, as I said, the thing to do would be to make the calculation by weapon rather than by unit icon. As a unit fell into negative supply, the rifle squads would retain say 50% of their combat value. The tanks and artillery pieces would cease to have any value at all. So a well-equipped infantry division -- which derives a lot of its firepower from heavy weapons -- would retain only a fraction of its combat strength. At a lower scale, the artillery would shut down, but the infantry battalions would continue to have considerable value.

quote:


A tank with 5% of its full load has perhaps 20% of its defensive value, virtually none of its offensive value, and it essentially can't move. An infantry squad with 5% of its full load might have 40% of its defensive value, 20% of its offensive value, and 60% of its normal movement allowance.

This is the heart of the discussion. And I don't agree with you. A tank with 5% of its load compared with a rifleman squad with 5% of rounds: I don't see any difference, the tank would be able function for not very long, but how is that different compared with a squad with soldiers with and average of seven 7.92mm rounds for their K98k's?. They are both very limited. And since here in TOAW we not have individual tanks, but tank units, what would happen in a case of a armor battalion of fifty tanks with 5% of fuel/ammo, is that they would fill perhaps ten tanks to 20%, and not use the rest. So, yes, the unit will still be able to operate, but at reduced capacity. The same could be said about the artillery.

quote:

quote:



The only point that have some vality is movement points for the infantry in the case when units are entirely out of supply, but does really matter? I mean, units almost never ran out of supply, because if they do they are pulled out of the line. So we are only concern with which can not reciev any supply at all, and most of those cases are when units are isolated and sourrounded by enmy units.

But that's just it. In TOAW-land, you don't pull them out of the line. You keep banging away with them. It's the land of the perpetual offensive. The tanks are energizer bunnies, the artillery always acts as if somehow a quarter of its stocks grew back overnight, and the morning dew is apparently diesel fuel. You never need to stop.

quote:




* see these Niklas Zetterling's quotes:

quote:


I have rather extensive records for the Korsun operation in february 1944. I shall see if I can find some data on tank ammunition expenditure. I know this was discussed, because the spearheads of III. Pz.Korps had to receive tank ammunition by air drop, due to the extremely poor condition of the roads.

quote:


In any case, here is some data:

In the period 12 – 19 february 1944, the following amounts of ammunition was air dropped to the spear heads of III. Pz.Korps: 79,6 tons of Tiger ammunition, 68,6 tons of Panther ammunition and 4 tons of Pz IV ammunition. These weights include the complete rounds and the stuff they were packed into to be air dropped. It seems that these weights correspond to 3800 rounds of Tiger ammo, 4100 rounds of Panther ammo and 300 rounds of Pz IV ammo.

Before the corps jumped off, it reported (10 february) that it had, operational, 34 Pz IV, 81 Panther and 13 Tiger I in its units (1. Pz.Div., 1. SS-Pz.Div., 16. Pz.Div., 17. Pz.Div., 506. Tiger-Bat. and heavy tank regiment Bäke, the latter consisted of one Panther battalion, II./23, and one Tiger battalion, 503). Also the corps had 20 assault guns operational

It is worth noting that supply problems were encountered almost immediately, and it seems that only the Tigers and Panthers pushed on, leaving the Pz IV and StuG in the rear and on the flanks, which may explain the vast preponderance of Tiger and Panther ammunition dropped. The corps had several tanks in workshops and it was explicitly reported that few were victims to enemy fire, rather most were mechanical breakdowns or simply bogged down in deep mud during the preceding week of fighting. Thus further tanks were added, but on the other hand more tanks broke down or got stuck in the mud. The net effect was gradually declining tank strength.

If we look at these deliveries, they represent (if we use the initial tank strength as a yardstick) 7 rounds per day and Panther delivered and 42 rounds per day and Tiger. Obviously the small number of operational Tiger tanks can distort the picture. The Panther strength declined more rapidly and on 15 february there were 28 Panther operational and 11 Tiger (using these strangth figures as a base, we arrive at 21 rounds per Panther and day (49 for Tigers)). But of the Panthers four could only fire with their machine guns (no explanation given, but ammo shortages can possibly have been a factor, because on the following day 20 tons of Panther ammunition was dropped, compared to 6 tons of Tiger ammunition)

The ratio between AP and HE ammo dropped is not clear, but according to what was brought up to the airfields, it seems that the ratio was approximately 1:1, with a slight preponderance for HE ammo.

So, how representative are these figures. First, an unknown part of the ammo dropped was lost, the Germans estimated that 70 – 80 % did get to the units (this has not been accounted for in my calculations above). Second, this was a period of very intensive fighting, the corps had to rescue about 50,000 fellow soldiers from Soviet encirclement and no effort was spared. On the other hand, the difficult ground may have made it difficult to get into action for many tanks. Also, it is not known if the tanks were topped up with ammo before they jumped off.

Very intertesting. Now, I don't know how much ammo their infantry (the infantry on the panzer units) was receiving, or how much fuel was delivered, but here we have a case when tank units are operating, supply problems are encountered, and and the quartermasters adapt to the situation to keep the tank units on the move. Also noticeable is how they left the PzIV and Stugs behind, and choose to keep the heavier panzers supplied (some people would think that in that situation, they would choose the lighter panzers due to the less fuel consumption, but that's a different topic )