Disintegration
Posts: 27
Joined: 10/17/2007 Status: offline
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Impressive, yes, but not enough. I was brought up in the Cult of Lee and still find the man very admirable in many ways. But ultimately, his strategic vision fell short. Gettysburg wasn't a plan to win the war, it was a gesture. Lee could not hit on any strategy that, if successfully pursued, would win the war for the South. (Much of that, of course, wasn't his fault: he had little if any control over the loss of Tennessee and the Mississippi which is what really doomed the South.) Like Hannibal, he won battle after battle but they only prolongued the war rather than bringing it closer to a conclusion. Also like the Japanese in WW2, they faced political systems that were more likely to increase their resolve with every setback than to decrease it (although the ACW is the most marginal in this regard... the Union was nowhere near as implacable as Rome or the post-Pearl Harbor US). They lacked the military means to win a quick decisive victory and lacked the material and political means to win a long war of attrition. The 1918 offensives were somewhat different, but IMO Ludendorff's failing was the same as Schlieffen's: the plan was theoretically a war-winner, but the means at his disposal were not capable of executing the plan as written even under the best possible circumstances. Schlieffen's (and Moltke's) painstaking logistical plans and studies simply could not deliver the required number of troops at the place and time the plan marked as decisive - the road net and available transport could not carry them. And if Ludendorff was to win he had to keep up the momentum of relentless attacks, but the only way he could be sure to keep winning was to react to events, to follow the path of least resistance, rather than to stay fixed on the goals that would beat the Allies. It was either continue to make suceesful attacks that led nowhere in particular, or mount a losing attack that would win the war if successful. To quote a line from a bad movie, the only way to win was not to play. However, after the war, he couldn't admit that his gamble was doomed from the outset, so he had to invent a fictitious narrative to explain the defeat. Haig et al had what you'd think would be an easier task: to argue that their eventual success justified the losses. However, poking holes in his defense didn't implicate Sacred National Honour the way disagreeing with Ludendorff would. It's instrumental to note what happened to Longstreet after he published his memoirs.
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