Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7
This is where game balance comes in over historical accuracy, if the game becomes unfun halfway through, it will never get finished.

So then "beefing up" the Allies at start so they can "have fun" instead of being over-run is a GOOD idea? I thought that was the central point of this thread?

The War in the Pacific was not an equal struggle. First one side had to fight with "smoke and mirrors", and in the end the other had to fight with with desperation and kamikazes.

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

To be "historical", there can never be "game balance". The Japanese themselves knew they could never defeat the U.S. in a protracted war,(let alone all the allied powers.)

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

To be "historical", there can never be "game balance". The Japanese themselves knew they could never defeat the U.S. in a protracted war,(let alone all the allied powers.)

That depends on the definition of victory. My personal point of view is that if the player does better than the Japanese actually did through most of the war, that defines a player victory -- although the war will certainly be lost. Just my two cents.

Cheers
fbs

Bigger boys stole my sig

(in reply to fbs)

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

To be "historical", there can never be "game balance". The Japanese themselves knew they could never defeat the U.S. in a protracted war,(let alone all the allied powers.)

That depends on the definition of victory. My personal point of view is that if the player does better than the Japanese actually did through most of the war, that defines a player victory -- although the war will certainly be lost. Just my two cents.

Cheers
fbs

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

To be "historical", there can never be "game balance". The Japanese themselves knew they could never defeat the U.S. in a protracted war,(let alone all the allied powers.)

That depends on the definition of victory. My personal point of view is that if the player does better than the Japanese actually did through most of the war, that defines a player victory -- although the war will certainly be lost. Just my two cents.

Cheers
fbs

This I would agree to..., that's EXACTLY how I see it. Those that try to postulate some form of "military victory" for Japan are simply deluding themselves in the same manner the Japanese Militarists were doing. I'm not opposing SHARK7's notion that both sides should have some chance of "tossing a spanner into the works" throughout play..., but the "victory's" available to each side should be representative of the historical reality.

So yes, in the early going, the Allies might well slip a cruiser TF into an unexpected (by the Japanese) location and pound a lightly covered invasion force. Or suddenly mass fighters at a particular point and beat up some Betty's. Maybe Percival grows a set and calls Yamashita's unsupplied bluff at Singapore.

And later in the war the Japanese have the same opportunities to mess up Allied plans. Kurita slips in off Samar (although in that case he bungled the opportunity badly). Or Kurabiashi's boys turn out to have 2 more levels of forts on Iwo than the Marines planned for, and hold the opperation up for a month. Or springing Kamikaze's on the Allies at an inopportune moment.

But overall, the War should go as Yamamoto predicted. The Japs can run rampant for 6 months to a year..., then the situation will start going to He11 in a handbasket for them.

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

Harry please clarify - are you saying that if the IJ player takes Kiska and Attu then the Allied player has until 31 January 1946 to gain a decisive victory?

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

Your idea is rather intriguing..., but I see a couple of flaws in the timing. The US fought on to a Decisive Victory against Germany even though the Germans had never directly attacked America at all. Nor were German atrocities nearly as well reported as those of Japan during the war. But Germany didn't surrender until May of 1945. So basically forcing the US to win "decisively" in the Pacific even before the bulk of the "Two Ocean Navy" arrives during 1944 doesn't make a lot of sense. Or or you thinking that "Germany First" was NOT Allied policy? And 70% of all American production is going to arrive in the Pacific?

How about if the Japanese surrender before August of 1945, the Allies win a decisive victory? If during August of 1945, the Allies win a victory. If before May of 1946, they win only a marginal victory.

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

Your idea is rather intriguing..., but I see a couple of flaws in the timing. The US fought on to a Decisive Victory against Germany even though the Germans had never directly attacked America at all. Nor were German atrocities nearly as well reported as those of Japan during the war. But Germany didn't surrender until May of 1945. So basically forcing the US to win "decisively" in the Pacific even before the bulk of the "Two Ocean Navy" arrives during 1944 doesn't make a lot of sense. Or or you thinking that "Germany First" was NOT Allied policy? And 70% of all American production is going to arrive in the Pacific?

How about if the Japanese surrender before August of 1945, the Allies win a decisive victory? If during August of 1945, the Allies win a victory. If before May of 1946, they win only a marginal victory.

Read War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Paperback) by Edward S. Miller (Author) for the discussions of this matter. The big question during the pre-war planning was how to defeat Japan before American war-weariness set in. What I'm doing here is giving players some challenging limited war victory conditions.

Here are the house rules:

1. All Chinese land and air units that are assigned to China Command HQ are only permitted to move, or base, within China, Japanese Occupied China or Manchukuo. Chinese land and air units can ONLY move to locations outside China if they are first transferred to another HQ.

2. Air units belonging to China Command are allowed to fly missions to hexes outside China.

3. All Australian nationality Brigade and Division LCUs are only allowed to move within Australia Proper, DEI, Solomon Islands, New Britain, New Guinea (For flexibility purposes, I could reason that Australia would see those as part of it's expanded defense perimeter). The exception is all Australian LCUs of this size that are designated as AIF units, e.g. 9th Division AIF; the two AIF Brigades that start in Malaya. This restriction is permanent, even if the units are reassigned to a HQ other than ANZAC Command, and still applies even if a Division or Brigade is split into smaller units.

4. There are no restrictions for Australian air units, other than the normal restrictions that apply to air units that are assigned to the ANZAC Command restricted HQ.

5. Canadian land and air units can only be deployed in North America, including Canada, the USA, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. This restriction is permanent, even if the units are reassigned to a HQ other than Canada Command.

6. Japanese land and air units that are assigned to the Kwantung Area Army HQ can not leave Manchukuo. They may leave if they are transferred to another HQ.

7. Allied Bomber attacks against Infrastructure restricted to industrial sites owned by Japan prior to the war (prevent allied player from destroying key infrastruture that they would knock Japan out too early; Allies would not bomb friendly populations.)

I also have some rules on Indian and Chinese armistices.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kadrin

I advocate Realism over Balance. There are enough "Balanced" WW2 games out there, we don't need another. Moving on...

A game like this you should have fun just playing it and not worrying about whether or not you're winning. It's a given that the Allies should win every game, and if you can't cope with the idea, this game probably isn't for you*. I for one had lots of fun just struggling to stop the Allied onslaught taking numerous losses for little gains, trying to hold on longer than Japan historically did, trying to make the Allies pay a higher cost. Playing the game is what we should enjoy, not winning. I second this notion! You play something this big and involved for the play itself more than the "win".



*I recommend the Hearts of Iron series if you want a balanced game where Japan can win. Yeah! It's "balanced" to the extent that America has to re-invent "mass production". (Apparently Henry Ford never built cars in Paradox's Universe!)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

HISTORY

The Japanese cabinet estimated they had about a 40% chance of being allowed to keep the Dutch East Indies in the peace treaty, which was their real victory criterion. The USN pre-war planning concurred with the Japanese perception of how the war would be decided, but Yamamoto's insistence on hitting Pearl Harbour put paid to that, converting what was supposed to be a limited war--resolved by war-weariness--into total war. That's the underlying concept of my War Plan Orange variant rules:

Victory: If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines or Taiwan and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory. If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

I think you can see that if the Japanese player keeps the war limited, it's much more difficult for the Allies to win.

Your idea is rather intriguing..., but I see a couple of flaws in the timing. The US fought on to a Decisive Victory against Germany even though the Germans had never directly attacked America at all. Nor were German atrocities nearly as well reported as those of Japan during the war. But Germany didn't surrender until May of 1945. So basically forcing the US to win "decisively" in the Pacific even before the bulk of the "Two Ocean Navy" arrives during 1944 doesn't make a lot of sense. Or or you thinking that "Germany First" was NOT Allied policy? And 70% of all American production is going to arrive in the Pacific?

How about if the Japanese surrender before August of 1945, the Allies win a decisive victory? If during August of 1945, the Allies win a victory. If before May of 1946, they win only a marginal victory.

Read War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Paperback) by Edward S. Miller (Author) for the discussions of this matter. The big question during the pre-war planning was how to defeat Japan before American war-weariness set in. What I'm doing here is giving players some challenging limited war victory conditions.

Here are the house rules:

1. All Chinese land and air units that are assigned to China Command HQ are only permitted to move, or base, within China, Japanese Occupied China or Manchukuo. Chinese land and air units can ONLY move to locations outside China if they are first transferred to another HQ.

2. Air units belonging to China Command are allowed to fly missions to hexes outside China.

3. All Australian nationality Brigade and Division LCUs are only allowed to move within Australia Proper, DEI, Solomon Islands, New Britain, New Guinea (For flexibility purposes, I could reason that Australia would see those as part of it's expanded defense perimeter). The exception is all Australian LCUs of this size that are designated as AIF units, e.g. 9th Division AIF; the two AIF Brigades that start in Malaya. This restriction is permanent, even if the units are reassigned to a HQ other than ANZAC Command, and still applies even if a Division or Brigade is split into smaller units.

4. There are no restrictions for Australian air units, other than the normal restrictions that apply to air units that are assigned to the ANZAC Command restricted HQ.

5. Canadian land and air units can only be deployed in North America, including Canada, the USA, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. This restriction is permanent, even if the units are reassigned to a HQ other than Canada Command.

6. Japanese land and air units that are assigned to the Kwantung Area Army HQ can not leave Manchukuo. They may leave if they are transferred to another HQ.

7. Allied Bomber attacks against Infrastructure restricted to industrial sites owned by Japan prior to the war (prevent allied player from destroying key infrastruture that they would knock Japan out too early; Allies would not bomb friendly populations.)

I also have some rules on Indian and Chinese armistices.

I have no doubt it would be "challenging". In fact, without driving through every rules loophole and gamey tactic available, I'd call Allied "Decisive Victory" impossible. Odd too..., because historians clearly seem to think they did win one.

As for WAR PLAN ORANGE, I don't find the arguements overly convincing. The "Color Plans" were primarily staff exercises and studies rather than genuine planning..., unless you want to believe the US was seriously planning war with Great Britain (War Plan Red). And American "war weariness" would be much more a for the political leadership than one for a bunch of insular Staff Officers working in a War Department Annex.

I've no quibble over the notion of playing around with "limited war" possibilities. I just find your's somewhat too limiting for the Allies. They smack more of Japanese "wishful thinking" than reality in my eyes. But if you and an opponant can agree on your house rules, then may both enjoy the experience.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rob322

Last I recall, the Allies won in real life and the Japanese never really had the moxie to compete with things like Allied production. The way a Japanese player "wins" is to not be crushed as quickly as they were in real life.

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

Mike, you have to look at the context of my variant. It's intended to be similar to Totaler Krieg--the Japanese player is allowed to make a choice between limited and total war. As long as he doesn't trip the triggers for total war, he has a chance. If he decides that he wants it all, he has to deal with the American response. In reality Yamamoto decided to hit Pearl Harbor and flipped the bozo bit. But he had announced he would resign if not given his way.

quote:

"I've no quibble over the notion of playing around with "limited war" possibilities. I just find your's somewhat too limiting for the Allies. They smack more of Japanese "wishful thinking" than reality in my eyes. But if you and an opponant can agree on your house rules, then may both enjoy the experience.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

Mike, you have to look at the context of my variant. It's intended to be similar to Totaler Krieg--the Japanese player is allowed to make a choice between limited and total war. As long as he doesn't trip the triggers for total war, he has a chance. If he decides that he wants it all, he has to deal with the American response. In reality Yamamoto decided to hit Pearl Harbor and flipped the bozo bit. But he had announced he would resign if not given his way.

As I Said...

quote:

"I've no quibble over the notion of playing around with "limited war" possibilities. I just find your's somewhat too limiting for the Allies. They smack more of Japanese "wishful thinking" than reality in my eyes. But if you and an opponant can agree on your house rules, then may both enjoy the experience.

But I have some severe doubts that Japan had the faintest idea what America's "triggers for total war" were. They evidently thought that PH would be "OK" as long as they broke off negotiations 30 minutes ahead of time. I have great doubt such a distinction would have made a damned bit of difference to Americans.

But to each his own. Personally I think the only way for Japan to have maintained any control over war with America would have been to avoid all attacks on any US territory. And given Roosevelt's moves to war against Germany (Lend Lease, the "Neutrality Patrols", etc), that wouldn't have done it for long..., merely handed the initiative to the USA. But such an event would justify your "war weariness" postulation. I suppose it's a matter of perspective and preference.

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
I doubt I'm really in disagreement with you. I've defined a limited war scenario that would encourage the Allied player to try to force events. (It was the war as both sides expected it to play out.) What would it have taken to trigger? I don't know, but the USN admirals were *very* happy that the IJN had managed to make the American public angry at Japan.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
I doubt I'm really in disagreement with you. I've defined a limited war scenario that would encourage the Allied player to try to force events. (It was the war as both sides expected it to play out.) What would it have taken to trigger? I don't know, but the USN admirals were *very* happy that the IJN had managed to make the American public angry at Japan.

That was pretty much my original contention as well. Disagreement was never about the idea..., simply that I felt you had set the "degree of difficulty" for the Allies at an impossibly high level (you gotta at least allow time for the ships of the pre-war Naval Bills to actually arrive in play). Given that historically the Allies didn't even begin the Central Pacific Offensive until Tarawa in November of 1943, failure to complete it by January 1944 seems an incredibly tight schedule.

Having some extra old BB's (from PH) may be fun..., but they can't do the vital tasks of the "Fleet Train", Amphibious Assets, and infrastructure units that arrive in 1944. Asking the Allied Player to preform the tasks of 1944-45 with the assets of 1942-43 seems excessive. Would make more sense (to me) if you timed your limits from the date of the first American Counter-Offensive (Guadalcanal historically) than the war's start. After all, that only happened because of the result of Midway (hardly a likely game event).

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

The draw date I give is not much earlier than we were really into Okinawa. So all the Allies have to do to win the limited war is push a bit faster than they actually went. Given an intact Battle Fleet, the USN admirals figured they could do it. Perhaps it would have been a bit challenging, but with more aggressiveness, who knows what might have happened? War Plan Orange had landings planned in the Eastern Mandates a few short months after the start of the war!, instead of late 1943! All of which was based on the idea of a "Battleship dominated Conflict" as postulated in the early 1920's..., and not the "Carrier/Aircraft dominated Conflict" of the early 1940's. By then "Warplan Orange" had long been shelved in favor of "Rainbow Five".

And I have seen AARs where the Allies were able to return to the Philippines in 1942...,and I have seen AAR's where Australia, China, and India were overrun by 1943. Lots of things can happen in the game..., but I think a scenario should be based on the most common outcomes rather than the extremes.

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob
An easy alternative might be to just agree with a time limit before the game starts, and tally the points at that time? Might figure "x" amount of points for slight,marginal, decisive victory levels as well.

This is of course a formula familiar to likely all gamers?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob
An easy alternative might be to just agree with a time limit before the game starts, and tally the points at that time? Might figure "x" amount of points for slight,marginal, decisive victory levels as well.

This is of course a formula familiar to likely all gamers?

The problem with this is that it is dependent on someone's decision as to what constitutes a "victory point"..., or a "level of victory". No matter who does it, it's going to be an arbitrary number based on one person's assessment of the factors.

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob
An easy alternative might be to just agree with a time limit before the game starts, and tally the points at that time? Might figure "x" amount of points for slight,marginal, decisive victory levels as well.

This is of course a formula familiar to likely all gamers?

The problem with this is that it is dependent on someone's decision as to what constitutes a "victory point"..., or a "level of victory". No matter who does it, it's going to be an arbitrary number based on one person's assessment of the factors.

Mike, I was referring to the "victory points" as displayed in game, in the intel screen..