Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

RE: Seven Days

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> After Action Reports >> RE: Seven Days Page: <<   < prev  65 66 [67] 68 69   next >   >>
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
RE: Seven Days - 7/11/2010 11:39:30 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
11/11/44 and 11/12/44
 
China:  This was the turn of decision...invade Swatow (risky, but likely to succeed) or reinforce through ports already held by the Allies.  I went back and forth.  My gut told me invade Swatow.  But I finally decided to reinforce.  Clicking on the "end turn" button left a sour taste in my mouth.  The decision hinged on a variety of factors; some small and some large:  (1)  The Allied airborne assault against the adjacent hex gained 2:1 odds but didn't quite manage to take the base; (2) I read a post by Miller describing how IJ fighters assigned to escort faired badly while those assigned to sweep faired very well, and I blanched at the thought of him being able to put up 1,000 or 2,000 aircraft that might take light losses and hammer my carriers; (3) None of the troops in this wave are prepped for Swatow; I can land them at Pakhoi and Kwangchoan and move them inland where they can add impetus to the Allied advances; plus the base forces can be put to good use at both bases; (4)  I have a bunch of troops prepped for Swatow currently ready to go at Hainan Island; so as soon as these transports are empty I can reload and proceed with the invasion if I still feel like it's worth it; and (5) the Allies are firmly in control of the region and will remain so as long as I have sea and sea/air supremacy; better to not expose that position to massed waves of kamikazees unless absolutely necessary.  So the equivalent of about four divisions (including two US Army divisions) and many support units will land over the next few days.

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 1981
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 1:22:01 AM   
witpqs


Posts: 26087
Joined: 10/4/2004
From: Argleton
Status: offline
This comes straight from the "What Do I Know?" file - you did the right thing.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1982
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 1:49:22 AM   
pat.casey

 

Posts: 393
Joined: 9/10/2007
Status: offline
What's your supply situation looking like? I'd naively think you need to open an overland supply route back to coastal china b/c its not exactly a safe convoy route to bring in more supplies by sea (the area is still something if a Japanese lake). Seems like capturing and holding a bunch of isolated coastal bases in China might just let your opponent cut them off and destroy a few isolated garrisons for free VP.

(in reply to witpqs)
Post #: 1983
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 2:29:03 AM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Supply situation analysis:

1) Hainan Island - 250,000 spread between the two bases with another 100k to begin unloading tomorrow. This island should be easy to keep supplied unless the Allies somehow lose supremacy of the sea.

2) China Ground - the supply situaiton is currently sufficient to handle all troops in the area. In part, this is because supply arriving via transports at Rangoon funnel through the Burma Road into China - my Chinese troops have been fully supplied for months now. The American troops have brought additional supplies, so the situation is very good for the ground troops at present.

3) China Air - the big question is whether the Allies can keep the airfields that will service B-24 and B-29 strategic bombers supplied. I'm afraid supply will trickle away into the countryside to feed distant troops. However, I would also think it would be easier to utilize coastal cities like Swatow and Amoy since the supplies will unload in bulk there before frittering away.

I think the Hainan Island bases are a bit too far from the Home Island to support strategic bombing, so my medium term objective in China is to take Swatow and Amoy.

(in reply to pat.casey)
Post #: 1984
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 3:00:48 AM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
I've read through all the posts made here today - thanks for contributing, folks.  I've paid attention and I've learned some things.

I hope those who think the China invasion was too risky will keep an open mind for awhile to see how it turns out.  To my way of thinking it's already been a major success.  Here's my thinking:

1)  I could have advanced more carefully under cover of LBA (as I had done in the DEI since mid-1943).  Doing so would have taken a long time as I beat my head against Miller's strength in the Philippines, Java, Sumatra or Malaya.  In six months or so I might have been somewhere advantageous, but the cost in time, ships, and aircraft would have been tremendous.

2)  Through Operation Seven Days the Allies have won a decisive carrier victory, decisive combat ship victories, are ahead in the air, and have unhinged the entire Japanese defense.  Miller is actively evacuating the Philippines and his positions in Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Vietnam are islolated.  The Allies will be able to deal with all of those relatively easily and inexpensively.  In the meantime, the Allies are advancing in China and will be in position to commence strategic bombing in early 1945.

The Allies have lost six CVE, a handful of CL and DD, and a bunch of transports...and that's essentially it.  The return for that investment has been remarkable.  I bet I would have lost much more than that following a more secure strategy and I wouldn't have accomplished nearly as much in return.


(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1985
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 3:34:31 AM   
BrucePowers


Posts: 12094
Joined: 7/3/2004
Status: offline
No matter how things turn out this shows there are many different strategies for conducting the war!

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1986
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 9:02:49 AM   
CaptBeefheart


Posts: 2301
Joined: 7/4/2003
From: Seoul, Korea
Status: offline
Looks like a bold masterstroke that paid off quite handsomely. Well done, Canoerebel. And thanks for keeping the drama level high on this AAR.

Regarding USAAF fighters, I found vs. the AI that I don't have any shortages at any point (but extensive USN/USMC shortages until early/mid-43). Probably the lack of attention to pilot training hurt you quite a bit and has had a follow-on effect as you lost more aircraft than you should have early on.

Also, regarding Allied production, I'd love to see some flexibility. I don't think it should be about losing Hawaii gets you X additional DDs, CAs or whatever, but rather an option be offered in which you can produce additional equipment, but it costs extra in victory points and supplies and/or fuel, or it costs in other production. Also, being able to shift production from 1E to 4E, army to navy aircraft, etc., should be allowed to a certain extent with factory down-time periods thrown in.

EDIT: One issue is the U.S. essentially has unlimited supplies, so perhaps some tweaking is needed to make supplies more scarce, and thus more valuable, if production/supply tradeoffs are going to be made.

Cheers,
CC

< Message edited by Commander Cody -- 7/12/2010 9:09:31 AM >


_____________________________

Beer, because barley makes lousy bread.

(in reply to BrucePowers)
Post #: 1987
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 2:27:39 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
11/13/44 and 11/14/44
 
Reinforcements:  The reinforcing units are coming ashore at Pakhoi and Kwangchoan in good shape.  150 base force have landed at the latter, which now has a level five airfield, so I've moved in five new fighter squadrons to assist with local CAP.  It will take at least two more days for the transports to unload; then a mass migration will take place inland.

China:  The Allies will try an important attack at Loc Song tomorrow - the combined American/Chinese army needs to break through here.  The Chinese army at Liuchow will attack, but I don't have high expectations there (yet).

Air War:  No massed attacks by the Japanese, but Miller did load up the airfields at Canton and Hong Kong.  I'm sure he was anticipating an invasion of Swatow after the American airborne assault on the adjacent city.  The Allied carriers will move to a point just east of Hainan Island tomorrow (the fleet carriers are already there, but the CVEs had accompanied the transports that went to Pakhoi).

(in reply to CaptBeefheart)
Post #: 1988
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 3:49:08 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Here's the "Seven Days" situation as of 11/15/44:




Attachment (1)

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1989
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 3:57:15 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
SEAC on 11/15/44:




Attachment (1)

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1990
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 4:11:00 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
11/15/44 and 11/16/44
 
Quiet everywhere but China, where good things are happening:

Lang Son:  The combined American and Chinese army defeated the Japanese and took this key base.  Importantly, the IJA units were really trashed, meaning they won't be any good for a long time.  Now Hanoi/Haiphong/Vinh are a Japanese-held pocket that the Allies can work on by both land and air.

Liuchow:  The Chinese army here performed surprisingly well- dropping forts from four to two.  The Chinese will need to rest a few days, but should be capable of taking this city without reinforcement.  If so, that will leave just Nanning in Japanese hands in this area.  Once Liuchow falls, the Chinese units there will move to Nanning.

Which Means:  The successes at these two places mean that alot of the Allied reinforcing troops currently landing at Pakhoi and Kwangchowan can move move northwest to reinforce the Chinese army besieging Kukong.  Unless Miller reinforces that base it will quickly fall.  Then the Allies move on to Kanhsien.  Then the roads leading east to the important coastal cities are open.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1991
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 6:20:02 PM   
Q-Ball


Posts: 7336
Joined: 6/25/2002
From: Chicago, Illinois
Status: offline
I wouldn't bother advancing down the Malay peninsula, and instead focus everyone on securing bomber bases.

With your lodgement at Hainan, and previous incursions in the DEI, the flow of Oil is stopped; taking Sinagpore won't change that.

In fact, any Japanese troops in the SRA are now cut off, and can't really contribute to the defense of the homeland. I would let them rot there, and point everyone East (or is it North) along the Chinese coast, and establish a bombing platform.

_____________________________


(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1992
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 6:36:31 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Q-Ball - thanks.  I only have a few units pressing outside of the main theater of action, but I think they are worthwile for a couple of reasons:

1)  I can't tote everybody to Hainan Island in the near future anyhow, so they may as well do something.

2)  It would be helpful to take Singapore - besides the good port facility it would permit the Allies to bring supplies and reinforcements by sea rather than across SEAC.

3)  There's always a slight risk that Miller could concentrate his units into something that would pose a risk.  Better to keep up some pressure as a way of detecting "hot spots" that might develop.

The army advancing down the Malay peninsula is small - led by a Chinese unit of 500 AV making for Kota Bahru.  There are also three units totaling about 400 AV besieging Victoria Point. 

The Allies are also doing a little bit of mop up work around the DEI - landing at the base just north of Jesselton.  This is part of a campaign to eventually stop "blockade running" tankers from getting oil at Brunei.

Essentially all of the Allied effort is going into China now so that the Allies can try to take Swatow, Amoy and possibly Foochow for strategic bombing purposes.




(in reply to Q-Ball)
Post #: 1993
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 6:39:15 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Just received this email message from Miller:

"I expect this turn to be the final death ride of the KB (assuming your CVs are still in range). Lets just hope they can take a few of your ships with them."

My carrier TFs remain about six hexes south of Hong Kong.  My strike aircraft are set to a range of four hexes to prevent them from launching massive raids against low-value targets.

So unless Miller closes to within four hexes there won't be any Allied strikes.  But I do hope Allied CAP wears out Japanese aircraft.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1994
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 7:12:26 PM   
CapAndGown


Posts: 3206
Joined: 3/6/2001
From: Virginia, USA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Just received this email message from Miller:

"I expect this turn to be the final death ride of the KB (assuming your CVs are still in range). Lets just hope they can take a few of your ships with them."

My carrier TFs remain about six hexes south of Hong Kong.  My strike aircraft are set to a range of four hexes to prevent them from launching massive raids against low-value targets.

So unless Miller closes to within four hexes there won't be any Allied strikes.  But I do hope Allied CAP wears out Japanese aircraft.


Well, it is not going to be the final death ride if you are not going to shoot back.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1995
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 7:33:12 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline
Foolish play on his part. He continues to hurl his forces at your phalanx and continues to be surprised when he finds himself impaled on your sarissas.

What happened to turning the flank and hitting the baggage train?

Or, translated, he should be hitting your support SLOCs. That would slow you down at little cost to his shipping. Instead he just accepts combat on terms unfavourable to him again and again

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to CapAndGown)
Post #: 1996
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 7:49:01 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Nemo, I agree.  He could do a number of things that would be more effective than a banzaii charge - in part because Japanese air is still so powerful that I don't have control of the skies.  It's not time for desperation yet.  But I do understand where he's coming from  The sitaution in China has panicked Miller and the Allies can seemingly reinforce at their pleasure.  He's desperate to stop the bleeding so he came up with this plan.  It's possible that he's even grown tired of being on the defensive at this point and is psychologically willing to banzaii in expecatation that failure will put him in a position of honorable concession.  I'm not saying that's definately what's going on - just a possibility.

This entire operation proves once again that strong offensive operations - even if muddled or a failure (which this one isn't, thank goodness) - can often apply such pressure that it leads your opponent to make mistakes.  (Was it Stonewall Jackson who said:  "When in doubt, do something!" or words to that effect?)  The best example I can recall was in my WitP game with Miller.  An Allied invasion of Java was ultimately repulsed, but not before the KB was mauled and the Allies were able to advance almost at will well up into the Philippines.

Cap, you're right, although Miller may seek battle as close as possible in order to enhance the likelihood that his carrier- and LB-air will fly (he knows from repeated instances that often his aircraft won't fly if there's a far gap between them and my CVs).

There is a chance that Miller could achieve a victory of sorts - perhaps overwhelming my CAP while remaining out of range of counterstrikes.  Or perhaps he sends in his remaining surface assets and they throw my ships into confusion.  Or perhaps my carriers react against orders and get mauled.  (*ack* - that's a noxious thought!).

On the other hand, if the Allies win a big battle here then the game may became an unwelcome drudge to Miller.  When you have no navy left, can you enjoy playing a Pacific war?

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 1997
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 9:23:11 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
11/17/44 and 11/18/44
 
Major carrier clash south of Hong Kong.  The Allies are fortunate that the KB comes close enough to fall within the four-hex range I had set for my strike aircraft.  Both sides get in licks of various kinds, but the Allies came away with a victory.

Surface Combat:  I had detailed two small combat TFs to raid Japanese shipping around Hong Kong and Swatow.  They hammered a bunch of small transports, escorts, a CL, five DD and some ACMs.  However, in doing so I left my transports at Kwangchoan unprotected and a combat TF led by CA Mogami savaged them - sinking a handful of AK, another handful of APA, some LCI, and a few small escorts.

IJ Strikes vs. Pakhoi Transports:  A bunch of Japanese LBA chose to go after Allied transports unloading at Pakhoi (rather than my carriers), doing a fair bit of damage there and sinking a CVE.

Carrier Clashes: The big action was a massive exchange of carrier strikes over two days.  The Allies got the best of this exchange.  The damage suffered by Allied carriers:  CVL Langley (1 T), CV Indomitable (2 B), and CV Randolph (1 T).  My notes on the damage to Japanese shipping:  CVE Unyo (9 B, 1 T); CVE Kaiyo (4 B); CVL Ryujo (1 B, 1 T); CV Akagi (5 B, 1 T); CVL Mizuho (4 B, 2 TT); CVE Chuyo (5 B, 2 T); BB Fuso (1 B, 3 T); BB Nagato (13 B, 6 T); BB Yamashiro (13 B, 5 T). 

For the main fleet assets:

Allies Lose :  1 CVE; 1 CL (the latter in the surface combat); Allies suffer light/moderate damage:  two CV and one CVL. 

Japanese lose: 2 BB, 1 CL; 2 CVE; 1 CVL; Japanese suffer heavy damage to:  one BB; CV Akagi; a CVL and CVE.

Air Losses:  Tallying the results in the combat reports shows that the Japanese lost 550 aircraft and the Allies 261.  Japanese losses were probably much higher than that (due to damage aircraft not making it, flak, and ops).

Dearth of Cruisers:  One interesting feature of this battle was that the KB didn't have any cruisers present.  I already knew Miller was woefully short of BB, CA, and CL.  This battle essentially wiped out that remnant.

Summary:  This battle didn't end the war, but it made the job for the Allies easier as the already diminished threat from carriers and combat ships eroded significantly.  Or, as Miller put it:  "I was right and the fat lady is warming up."

What's Next:  I'll probably keep my CVEs in the vicinity of Hainan Island to provide protection.  It's time for my CVs to return to the DEI for two reasons:  to pick up the next wave of reinforcements and to permit a few damaged carriers to head to a shipyard (their absence will be partially covered by one of my CVs at Capetown -she just finished repairs).


(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1998
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 9:35:40 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline
When you have no navy left, no hope and limited strategic options it becomes time to see what can REALLY be done. If he quits in the near future I'd be interested in having a look at the situation and possibly rolling things back a few days or weeks to some interesting fork point ( at which there were multiple options ), having a few days to re-organise his air and naval forces and then taking over.

I've been looking at this recently thinking there were many opportunities to do much more damage and handle things very differently strategically. It might prove a challenge but, obviously, I'd want to see the map before I could commit. Some situations are so utterly borked that there's no way back.... There's hopeless and then there's starting a game already tied to the execution post as the officer commanding the squad says "Aim...." One can be an opportunity for a great challenge, another is simply an execution no matter what you do.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 1999
RE: Seven Days - 7/12/2010 9:39:50 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
One of the things I can't evaluate is Miller's industrial health.  Quite awhile ago he mentioned that he needed some help sorting through industry, which I think another player kindly provided. 

I know that his biggest oil producing centers (Balikpan and Palembang) took fairly heavy damage when he seized them at the start of the war; they were never repaired.  Given that plus the Allied presence in the DEI over the past six months of game time, I wouldn't be surprised if oil was a problem for him.

There's no quit to Miller, though of course it takes a few hours or a day to recover morale from a tough carrier loss.  But I suspect he'll regroup and continue the battle for some time yet.


(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 2000
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 5:56:35 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Miller is tenacious and I think our game will continue for a long time to come, but Japanese fortunes are waning fast.  So I've been mulling over some of the major strategic decisions that shaped our game:

1.  Allied Carrier Raid on Java; April 1942:  The combined British and American carriers met south of Australia and proceeded north to hit the Japanese carriers at Soerabaja and Semereng.  The first replay led to a decisive Allied victory, but a bug forced a re-do that was decidely more balanced.  The raid was risky, but I think it was well-conceived and the kind of chance-taking that the Allies can engage in from time to time with careful thought given to what happens if it turns sour.  I give the Allied CinC a B+ for this effort.

2.  Allied Invasion of Luganville; June 1942:  The Allies wanted to reclaim this important base to secure the LOC between the West Coast and Australia.  Thinking that the KB was still suffering a hangover from the Battle of Java, the Allies put together a strong force...but then puzsyfooted around instead of driving to the beachhead as quickly as possible.  The delay allowed several repaired IJN CVs to arrive on the scene.  The Allies suffered a major defeat though they were able to re-take Luganville.  CinC gets an D- for this effort (it would have been an F but for taking Luganville).

3.  Allied Invasion of the Kuriles; March 1943:  This massive, long-in-developing plan caught the Japanese totally by surprise.  The Allies succeeded in taking Paramushiro Jima and Onnekotan Jima with strong forces that I felt sure could withstand a protracted counterattack.  However, IJA shoreguns on Paramushiro really roughed up the Allied transports resulting in the loss of most supply.  Moroever, the invasion triggered Japanese home guard units that permitted Miller to cobble together a strong counter-invasion force much sooner than expected.  Due to the chronic low supply and the failure of Allied CD guns to exact a heavy toll, the Japanese counter-invasions in June '43 were successful.  The Allies lost a tremendous number of transports and something like six BBs.  The Japanese, in turn, lost their four Kongo Class BBs.  For three months, Miller had to commit everything he had in the Kuriles to defeat this threat to the homeland.  This gave the Allies freedom to move forward in the DEI and establish a strong chain of bases between Lautem and New Guinea - an important development in the game.  Still, the entire affair ultimately failed and left a sour taste in my mouth.  The CinC gets a C- for this effort.

4.  DEI First:  Early in the game the Allies determined that their main push would take place in the DEI.  Consequently, the Allies transferred alot of Indian and British units to that theater.  Beginning in the summer of '42, the Allies engaged in a steady, difficult push into the DEI that cost both sides dearly in terms of aircraft and capital ships.  The Allies suffered a terrific beating in the Battle of Morotai in November '43, but the Japanese likewise lost alot of carriers - Allied subs claiming an important share.  By the summer of '44, the Allies had taken the Moluccas, Celebes, and most of Borneo.  CinC gets a C+ for this effort (which, truth be told, is where the war's outcome was determined).

5.  SEAC Second:  Despite the dearth of Allied troops in India, the Allies began to advance into Burma and surprised everybody by outmanuevering the enemy in this region.  Japan lost Akyab and then Rangoon and then faced a breakthrough into Cambodia and Vietnam.  The Allies committed the least resources to this theater and made the most progress; but ultimately the Japanese extracted alot of troops and rebuilt an MLR that succeeded in holding the coastal Vietnam cities plus Bangkok.  To be honest, I think the successes here were more a consequence of Japanese CinC mistakes than Allied CinC cleverness, but....a B seems reasonable.

6.  Allied Invasion of China:  The late-war Allied invasion of Hainan Island and coastal China would be an unqualified success except for one nagging problem that I'll address in a moment.  The successes were the defeat of the KB, near anhiliation of the remaining Japanese combat ships, and the success of the invasion on the ground.  The nagging failure was several mistakes I made in protecting my transports - mistakes that unnecessarily cost the Allies scores of these vessels.  Nevertheless, the invasion has been a tremendous success that bypassed the Japanese MLR, rendering much of it irrelevant, and dealt severe blows to the Japanese Navy.  I give the CinC a B+ for this effort.

Those six items are really the tale of the war from the Allied perspective.  Overall, I'd rate my play in this match a C+. 

Edited: Nah, make that a C.

< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 7/13/2010 6:01:04 PM >

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2001
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 6:25:42 PM   
anarchyintheuk

 

Posts: 3921
Joined: 5/5/2004
From: Dallas
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel


4.  DEI First:  Early in the game the Allies determined that their main push would take place in the DEI.  Consequently, the Allies transferred alot of Indian and British units to that theater.  Beginning in the summer of '42, the Allies engaged in a steady, difficult push into the DEI that cost both sides dearly in terms of aircraft and capital ships.  The Allies suffered a terrific beating in the Battle of Morotai in November '43, but the Japanese likewise lost alot of carriers - Allied subs claiming an important share.  By the summer of '44, the Allies had taken the Moluccas, Celebes, and most of Borneo.  CinC gets a C+ for this effort (which, truth be told, is where the war's outcome was determined).



Think your being overly harsh here. AFAIK it was the first example of an early DEI offensive in an aar (have to admit that I don't read all that many however). You stayed true to it and sucessfully wore down Miller's cv and surface fleet. Still don't think your going to be invited to any cve reunions tho.

Hadn't really studied the production rates for USAAF fighters late '44. With the destruction of the Luftwaffe and IJA/IJN air forces (except for kamis) the production scaleback for fighters made sense irl, it sure doesn't if you're in the middle of the DEI with Japanese AE production. That one surprised me.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2002
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:00:24 PM   
FatR

 

Posts: 2522
Joined: 10/23/2009
From: St.Petersburg, Russia
Status: offline
Throwing the remnants of KB in the front of Allied spearhead at the moment when Allies weren't off-balance due to an ongoing landings, and ships damaged at the previous battle were still in yards was a bad idea. Or it might indicate that the Japanese surface fleet is desperately low on fuel.

(in reply to anarchyintheuk)
Post #: 2003
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:10:27 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Doing so wasn't totally reckless.  Miller has something like 1,000 LBA at nearby Canton and Hong Kong (not to mention contributions from more distant fields like Takao, Pescadores, etc.).  Also, he knows that Allied carriers react against orders - and indeed they did so in this case.  I have five or six fleet carrier TFs south of Hong Kong, the bulk of the CVE TFs one hex to the NW, but inexplicably two fleet carrier TFs didn't react and are still about five hexes west close to two other CVE TFs.  In other words, my carriers ended up all over the place and I'm fortunate something terrible didn't happen.

(in reply to FatR)
Post #: 2004
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:23:42 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
I've just had a chance to review the map with respect to the (naval) Battle of Hong Kong.  Highlights:

Air War:  The table shows that Japan lost 950 aircraft and the Allies 650 over the two-day turn.  Losses were much higher - especially for the Allies - than indicated in the combat report.

Carrier Air:  Allied carrier air is deplated.  There's nothing left with which to pursue cripples.

React:  The Allied carrier TFs had taken position near friendly airfields at Hainan Island.  They were all set to "do not react" and to follow combat TFs.  Neverthless, most (but - incredibly - not all) of the carrier TFs reacted.  I ended up with a bunch of fleet carriers 120 miles south of Hong Kong, and five CVE TFs 120 miles southwest of Hong Kong.  But CV Yorktown and three CVE TFs did not react, so they are all well to the west (120 miles).  IE - my carriers are spread out and were in a position where they could not support each other.  This raises questions and problems:

1)  WHY CAN'T WE DO AWAY WITH THE REACT FEATURE SINCE IT DOESN'T WORK AND USUALLY LEADS TO SILLYNESS AND MAYHEM?  It's bad enough that CV TFs will react against orders, but that some do and some don't is even more ridiculous.  Like carriers would separate by 120 miles or more and steam right into the face of HUGE concentrations of enemy LBA.  Not only that, the carriers left the protection provided by the combat fleets, so they went sailing into the heart of enemy territory, where enemy combat TFs were prowling, without friendly combat TFs to provide support.  SILLY.

2)  I now have a bunch of carriers very low on aircraft that are jam up next to those huge enemy airfields.  If my carriers react again and remain close to the coast they'll get chewed alive.  Of course, I'll issue orders for them to flee for safety, but who knows what's going to happen.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2005
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:51:42 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline
No, Miller was reckless. He could have achieve dthe same result with his land-based air and saved his CVs for raiding your SLOCs.

if his LBA attrited your CV air then his CVs would have been able to raid with excellent chances of surviving if they ran into your CVs.

The end result would have been to tie your CVs down hunting his far from the front and his LBA holding the front against your CV-light advances.

That would have been a reasonable strategy. What he did, instead, was exacerbate his weaknesses



As to your current situation. Well, this is why you should have gotten out of dodge. I doubt you'll get crucified now but if you do it'll be nothing you can complain about. Allowing CVs to run out of planes that close to enemy LBA isn't exactly the height of strategic acumen.

So, run, run fast and run far and concentrate on using the USAAF to attrit his IJAAF as you should have been doing all along. Trying to attrit them with the USN and USMC is strategically flawed.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2006
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:57:26 PM   
paullus99


Posts: 1985
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline
I believe the problem there is he is running out of planes for his USAAF units - which could be a big problem (and probably is).

_____________________________

Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 2007
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 7:58:03 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Edited: Nah, never mind.

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 2008
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 8:09:38 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline
Well, Paulus, then one can always reduce the tempo of the advance or focus on training pilots better to reduce loss rates at the sharp edge. In mid-March 1942 my fighter squadrons are beginning to fill nicely with 70 Exp A2A pilots from my reserves and many of my USAAF squadrons have 1/3rd to 1/2 of their pilots with mor than 70 A2A Exp.

End result when the Zeroes etc come up against my P40Bs and P40Es they lose somewhere between 2 and 4 to 1 ( in my favour ) on average at that early stage. This is late-44 when things should be even more extremely in the Allied favour. But Canoerebel didn't train sufficiently and so now he pays the price. There's nothing surprising or unfair about that. The reality though is that there are clear player-originated reasons for why things are turning out the way they are on both sides of this game. People can choose not to accept this if they wish but that doesn't alter the reality of the situation.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2009
RE: Seven Days - 7/13/2010 8:21:56 PM   
paullus99


Posts: 1985
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline
Is what it is - you play with what you have, take your chances & sometimes you roll snake-eyes. On the flip side, sometimes you get lucky. Canoerebel has done a commendable job & I've certainly enjoyed following along.

_____________________________

Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...

(in reply to Nemo121)
Post #: 2010
Page:   <<   < prev  65 66 [67] 68 69   next >   >>
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> After Action Reports >> RE: Seven Days Page: <<   < prev  65 66 [67] 68 69   next >   >>
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.828