Matrix Games Forums

 Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Page: <<   < prev  5 6 [7] 8 9   next >   >>
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
- 7/18/2002 9:59:13 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		The P40's tactic was indeed the hit and run approach. It is inaccurate to characterize it as a "1 time slash and run away." In level flight the P40 was 10-40 mph faster than the Zeke, all altitudes. The usual P40 tactic was to hit, run, regain altitude, return and hit again, if there was a combat to return to. Since engaging in an energy bleeding turning engagement was not personally desirable to P40 pilots nor strategically to the AAF, the fight had often "moved on" and could not be relocated.

You can, if you like, based on that, assert that the Zekes in getting bounced, shot down, and losing several of the bombers that they were escorting to a superior fighter "accomplished their mission" because the fight moved on, because the P40 sped off to regain altitude and energy, rather than engage in an energy bleeding turning engagement. Since pilots and planes are expensive, that was a poor strategic position to occupy for Japanese pilots. A better plane would have served them better in the role of an escort.

The rest of your post is moot. If your "narrative," if you will, of the conflict characterizes the Japanese pilots and planes as superior, but overwhelmed by numerically superior foes who suffered a high attrition rate but "could afford it" the facts do not support you. The Zeke's performance against even the F4F was poor as measured by combat losses in 1942, even before the IJN ran into pilot replacement problems. USN/USMC pilots were better trained than their Japanese counterparts in teamwork, used better formations, flew a sturdier a/c with some outstanding superior characteristics over the Zeke, and caused Japan from the outset to lose more pilots in direct confrontations than the USN/USMC lost.

I do not agree that had significant numbers of P40s met the Japanese strikes on the PI or Pearl on 7/8 December that the Zero would have dominated. I think the Zekes would have in the short run been chewed and screwed. In the long run, Japanese tactical bombers would have prevented logistical reinforcement of the PI anyhow, and in time so few P40s would have been serviceable that the Japanese would have gained air supremacy by default. They would, however, have experienced their late 1942/e.1943 evidence of deteriorating pilot quality by the end of March 1942. Subsequent campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons would have gone worse for them faster, at least insofar as air combat goes.

Other comments:

The F6F was not "built to beat the Zero." This has been addressed many times and needs no further comment. If you really believe that, you need to read about the development of the F6F.

From your comments about "superb" late war Japanese models, it seems like you do not know the design histories of these a/c. Few of these flew. When they did, they very rarely performed up to spec, and usually not for very long. They never did make it through the "teething-problems" stage of development. They were simply thrown into the fray "as is" for desperate want of anything at all.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 181
- 7/18/2002 10:04:51 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		And one more thing:

"If the pilot wishes to fight and does anything other than a narrow energy attack he's going to be bleeding off speed, unless in a shallow dive."

The energy attack has been the mainstay of air supremacy doctrine since 1944 as far as gun combat goes. The first real innovation in aerial tactics came with stealthy designs. There is now also considerable emphasis on maneuverability through vectored thrust (although the tech is quite old). Stealth helps against guided (self or secondary) missiles, and gives the stealthy a/c an big advantage in detection. Will maneuverability now supplant speed, as the Japanese had assumed it would in WW2? We shall see.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 182
- 7/19/2002 1:09:55 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		Moot? I think not.

what is moot is your continued reliance on quoting maximum "sustained" flights as if this is some kind of war winner more esp with figures as close as 10mph....big whoop as JB7 would say. In a dogfight it is the moot factor. The P-40's weakness was not in it's maximum speed but in it's medicore handling characterisitics and equally mediocre acceleration once the speed was bled off....esp at heights above 15,000 feet.
It also experienced compressability in steep dives and would not be able to quickly climb out of it's "hack and slash" dive nor would it be able to quickly gain altitude and realign for an attack, thus the 1-time slash and dive out of combat is a valid assertation.....not 100% of the time of course but in a quick changing air combat situation it could easily lead to those situations Matrix described where a % of the planes in a CAP or Escort group would not be in a position to add their weight to the furball. You are also assuming that the Japanese are going to be caught playing the allied game 100% of the time. What if the Japanese make them play their game?

Certainly if the P-40 was as good as you are implying then the US should not have wasted it's resources developing newer and better and more powerful fighters to replace it. We should have just kept building more P-40's, no?


"Superior" plane? the P-40? we'd better re-write all the history books. I think i begin to see your angst now.

My "narrative" as you quaintly put it was not so one to stress the superiority of the Zero and the Zero pilots, but one to point out that the Zero was a good plane deserving of the stats it earns in the wargames it's played in.....i was also addressing the comments you made about it "not" being a strategic fighter, one of which you have been careful to avoid of late now. Your continued "bouncing" of the Zero's flaws without recourse on the strengths of the planes needed addressing. As for the pilots.....i've already gone over that.

You are entitled to your opinion of course vis-a-vis large numbers of P-40's against Zeros at Pearl. An argument i've already hashed out and participated in on another board. The conclusions and flaws within are similar here. Like the Long Lance, the Zero at the time was an unkown as were the quality of the pilots flying them. Given the tendancy of the time for Western nations to underestimate the Japanese, this is a formula for a rude shock.....unless one is loading up the DVD of the latest version of "Pearl Harbor" that is. Two P-40's there did the kind of job you are putting forth.

The Japanese pilot pool was not that small.....thats the classic and revisionist arugment of late that all the Allies (or should i say "US" had to do) was cause some losses and the Japanese would immediately or near immediately suffer serious pilot degredation. Even throwing in a disaster like Midway the Japanese continued to to fight gamely in the carrier dept.....and had enough pilots left over after those to egage in the wasteful "I" operations thereafter. The "changes" theorized about do not all belong on one side of the war.

I'm aware of the F6F's design history. When i said "built to beat the Zero" i should have clarified that the plane was in development before the Zero's characteristics were fully known.....however intense study of the Zero further refined the development of the plane. It a nutshell it was more of what the Wildcat had, more power, more weight, more protection. This was the kind of plane that could beat the Zero......not the P-40.

I think it's you that needs to read up more on the late war IJN planes. As for "teething problems" All planes have them.....it helps to have an intact air industry, free of bombardment or harrasement (not to mention trained pilots) and bountiful resources. Despite your claims it did not stop experienced or expert Japanese pilots from taking these new mounts and not only holding their own on occasions against the now massive numbers of american fighters but to also occasionally run rings around them as well (guess we can throw in your "numbers" reasoning here and argue against the US planes qualities)

Given enough time these planes, with an adequate industry behind them and decently trained pilots would have readdressed the air balance leading to yet another round of r&d leading to yet again the next gen on the other side. (such as the F8F......P51H etc etc)

I take back the earlier statement. You dont just not like the Zero.....you dont like any Japanese fighter. Fortunately i dont think Matrix is going to be downgrading them nor is the P-40 going to be promoted to one of the great warbirds of the conflict

quote:



The energy attack has been the mainstay of air supremacy doctrine since 1944 as far as gun combat goes. The first real innovation in aerial tactics came with stealthy designs. There is now also considerable emphasis on maneuverability through vectored thrust (although the tech is quite old). Stealth helps against guided (self or secondary) missiles, and gives the stealthy a/c an big advantage in detection. Will maneuverability now supplant speed, as the Japanese had assumed it would in WW2? We shall see.



*since 1944*. UV, and the Zero are early war presentations. This is part of the flaw in your argument.....the incorrect assumption that the USAAF and USN pilot corp will by default, turn to the hard learned tactics that could match and later defeat a plane like the Zero from the get-go.....with no exp of actual combat and no knowledge of the enemies planes and their attributes. In other words, a current world approach or at the least, a late war WWII approach to an earlier time period with a glowing prediction of success. This isn't Afghanistan or Desert Storm being modeled......but 1942. School is still in session

As for energy vs maneuverability. Energy tactics do not simply negate the value of maneuverability in absolutum.......its not all about hack and slash. Only if one has a plane that truely and well exceeds the energy capabilities in the other (and has a pilot who knows how to make the other fight his game) will this be case. Battles in Europe were not simple hack and slash contests either. the battle to produce fighters that could roll better, turn better and preform high G maneuvers was all part of the game along with speed. Important given that the average speed differential between the premier US, German and British fighters was.....tada, usually within 20-30mph of each other so guess what? your argument about the P-40 blithely sailing away from helpless Zeros is mooted. Such a small differnence in speed......usually obtained in level flight at war emergency or full power will lead to 'dogfighting' situations unless the pilot is simply trying to run away. In a furball there will be if anything, just as many turning fights as slashing attacks......especially if bombers are thrown into the mix. The time factor, the adreniline factor and being tied to vulnerable bombers will all play their parts in dicatating the situation.

Again it comes down to the pilots and team tactics. the men behind the machines. that will be the ultimate factor.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 183
- 7/19/2002 2:33:38 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"What is moot is your continued reliance ..."

Yawn. I never said that compressibility wasn't a problem for any a/c, esp not eth P40. The Zeke's compressibility problems of course occurred at slower airspeeds. The rest *is* moot. Air power doctrine for decades, starting in 1940, has emphasized speed, team tacitics, and hit & run attacks. There are good systemic reasons why. An adequately trained pilot with a faster plane can use these tactics and will have the tendency to be able to control the fight, tending to engage and disengage at his option. Even 10 mph can make a difference, but of course in a dive it was a much bigger difference when one talks Zekes & Oscars, F4Fs and P40s.

"..not 100% of the time of course but in a quick changing air combat situation it could easily lead to those situations Matrix described where a % of the planes in a CAP or Escort group would not be in a position to add their weight to the furball...."

Quite so. The absence of radar at PM and lack of early warning was a significant contributor to early Japanese success there.

"You are also assuming that the Japanese are going to be caught playing the allied game 100% of the time. What if the Japanese make them play their game?"

No I'm not. You can't "make" anyone play your game. That's the reason why speed advantage is very important. The guy who can boom an zoom tends to control when, where and how teh combat occurs. Generally speaking, the guy in the slower plane just has to take it. In extreme situations all the slow plane can hope for is that the energy ship will get bored or run low on fuel. There are accounts of this in Fire in the Sky. IIRC, one major Soviet ace in Vietnam was bagged by an F4F pilot because he had to disengage. It's one of those classic engagements but I've honestly forgotten the names.

"Certainly if the P-40 was as good as you are implying then the US should not have wasted it's resources developing newer and better and more powerful fighters to replace it. We should have just kept building more P-40's, no?"

Well, we *did.* Through 1944 anyhow, through the N version. The fastest variants had top speeds of, IIRC, about 360-370 mph in sustained level flight. Then there was the general loss of production that happens when you retool for a new a/c. In 1942 the need for planes was considered more important than the need to get everybody building TNG planes like the P47 and P38, which, in any case, were in their final stages of pre-deployment work.

But what really drove the desire to abandon the P40 was it's manifest inferiority to the FW190, and the simple availability of better a/c. Most of these were in design in 1940, and power plant improvments made the disparity between, say, the P40 (short range, low speed, poor accel, and all that) and, say, the P47 or P38 all the more obvious.

"Superior" plane? the P-40? we'd better re-write all the history books."

Scoff all you like. Show me any 3 month period in WW2 in which you can verify that A6Ms in direct confrontations with P40s shot down more 40s than the Zekes lost, *where all the a/c were in the air when the confrontation occurred* (i.e. leaving out targets destroyed on the ground) and I'll be more convinced. But the myth of superior Japanese plane+pilot combination vis a vis the Zeke vs. F4F has been a chestnut for many years. And yet the loss ratios are what they are, so the myth's bubble has been burst.

"My "narrative" as you quaintly put it was not so one to stress the superiority of the Zero and the Zero pilots, but one to point out that the Zero was a good plane..."

No doubt.

"... of the stats it earns in the wargames it's played in..."

I don't agree. Maybe we've played different games.

"....i was also addressing the comments you made about it "not" being a strategic fighter, one of which you have been careful to avoid of late now."

Because it seems, now, to me anyhow, to be a matter of semantics. It was a great plane in part because of circumstances that had nothing to do with performance or pilot quality. I'm not certain what you mean by "strategic."

"The Zero at the time was an unkown as were the quality of the pilots flying them. Given the tendancy of the time for Western nations to underestimate the Japanese, this is a formula for a rude shock....."

I think many people commenting on this have a remarkable inability to distingusih between propaganda, and the not too subtle ethnocentrism often involved, and the actual attitudes of combatants (soldiers, pilots etc) and their training. No doubt whatsoever that the low-speed performance of the Zekes sharpened Allied pilots situational awareness. Nevertheless, the tactics in which Allied pilots were trained and which beat the Zeke were in place before the first shot was fired. Not because of some psychic anticipation, but because it was correctly deemed that this was the direction that good doctrine should go. it remained the dominant paradigm until the 1980s.

"The Japanese pilot pool was not that small...."

I quite agree. The pilot pool at start was substantial and the replacements were pretty good through 1942. Despite that, they lost more pilots than they killed in 1942. A problematic phenomenon if you have smaller pilot reserves and less training throughput than the opponent.

"Even throwing in a disaster like Midway the Japanese continued to to fight gamely in the carrier dept.....and had enough pilots left over after those to egage in the wasteful "I" operations thereafter."

Quite so. And yet they remained unable to achieve > 1:1 loss rations in any sustained campaign in 1942. With the proviso that I'm trying to find out more about the interval from January through April 1942 vis Allied army pilots.

"I'm aware of the F6F's design history. When i said "built to beat the Zero" i should have clarified that the plane was in development before the Zero's characteristics were fully known.....however intense study of the Zero further refined the development of the plane."

Oh, well, okay. But the basic design was not radically changed and the basic changes (much more powerful motor, wing-mounted landing gear) were completely indifferent to the recovered Aleutians Zeke (I assume that's the one you mean). Personally I do not view the F6F as a great plane. It was chosen for carrier ops because of its handling and landing characteristics and rather forgiving flight profile. It's not one that I think of when I think of the really superior WW2 a/c designs.

"As for "teething problems" All planes have them....."

Quite so. The B29 being a classic example. Those engines....! And they required much more maintenance per air hour IIRC than early model P/W engines. But I think of the late war Japanese a/c as having engines that were comparably reliable to the earliest deployed B29 engines.

"It helps to have an intact air industry, free of bombardment or harrasement.."

Agreed. The Japanese designs would have been better for them if they'd had another year to work out the kinks in design. Would the logistical system ever have caught up w/ respect to parts or fuel? Or rather, how long would that have taken? Who can say?

"Despite your claims it did not stop ... run rings around them as well."

Sure, there were as in all aerial combats situational circumstances that could give an inferior plane a local advantage. Of course, the primary opposition to these, uh, "advanced" Japanese designs were naval tactical bombers, F6Fs (which I view as somewhat mediocre) and unescorted strategic bombers. When P51s and F4Us were airborne the clear advantage was with the Allies.

"... leading to yet again the next gen on the other side. (such as the F8F......P51H etc etc)"

The 51H was designed to provide a longer-ranged escort for the VLR US bombers then in service (the B29) and in design (the B36). The F9 and other jets were already in demand spec before the first, say, Ki-100 was encountered. Jets were clearly the wave of the future. The writing was on the wall in mid 1944.

"I take back the earlier statement. You dont just not like the Zero.....you dont like any Japanese fighter."

Some WW2 a/c were "classics" by virtue of the situations in which they found themselves. You're right. I view the late war Japanese a/c as inferior products for their time. They were a generation behind the best Allied and German piston-engined models, and 2 generations behind jets.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 184
- 7/19/2002 4:43:54 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		"Yawn"

I agree :)

"I never said that compressibility wasn't a problem for any a/c, esp not eth P40. The Zeke's compressibility problems of course occurred at slower airspeeds. The rest *is* moot. Air power doctrine for decades, starting in 1940, has emphasized speed, team tacitics, and hit & run attacks. There are good systemic reasons why. An adequately trained pilot with a faster plane can use these tactics and will have the tendency to be able to control the fight, tending to engage and disengage at his option. Even 10 mph can make a difference, but of course in a dive it was a much bigger difference when one talks Zekes & Oscars, F4Fs and P40s. "

How is it moot? The P-40's generally sluggish attributes and time consuming climbs will not allow it to dominate in the way of 2nd generation fighters that did indeed clearly outclass the Zero.

Agreed, airpower after around 1942(ish) did stress team tactics (started by the Germans earlier) especially in theatres where the aircraft preformance characterisitics were similar. However it is deceptive to state that this was the only tactic as menaeuver fights could still develop quite easily. Gotta disagree on the 10mph thing. Its like saying a fast battleship can outrun a shell. Not going to happen, unless again, the plane in question is diving out of combat in which case it is not either shooting down enemy fighter planes or bombers.

"Well, we *did.* Through 1944 anyhow, through the N version. The fastest variants had top speeds of, IIRC, about 360-370 mph in sustained level flight. Then there was the general loss of production that happens when you retool for a new a/c. In 1942 the need for planes was considered more important than the need to get everybody building TNG planes like the P47 and P38, which, in any case, were in their final stages of pre-deployment work."

agreed....in terms of producing airframes and wanting to minimize disruption to production, the plane was continued....but the fact remains that the bulk of zero killing went to the 2nd gen fighters, most notably the P-38 which is a far better example for what you've been banging away at in terms of a responsive and (pardon the pun) "lightning" quick energy fighter vs a far slower opponent.

"Because it seems, now, to me anyhow, to be a matter of semantics. It was a great plane in part because of circumstances that had nothing to do with performance or pilot quality. I'm not certain what you mean by "strategic." "

Uhm.....that is the case with "all" planes. Like tanks, like ship crews....its all the same. A weapon is only as good as the man behind it. Thus a FW-190 can be death in 1942, and negligable in 1945 (i.e. a green pilot vs an experienced one......a numerically superior and rested a force vs the opposite)

"Strategic" in terms that the "positive" attributes of the Zero allowed it to do in effect the same thing that the P-51 did also escort bombers and conduct raids and sweeps at great range. Hell i'm doing this now in UV......forget stats i'm just happy to be able to occupy fighters while my bombers conclude my air offensive against the enemy base....


"Oh, well, okay. But the basic design was not radically changed and the basic changes (much more powerful motor, wing-mounted landing gear) were completely indifferent to the recovered Aleutians Zeke (I assume that's the one you mean). Personally I do not view the F6F as a great plane. It was chosen for carrier ops because of its handling and landing characteristics and rather forgiving flight profile. It's not one that I think of when I think of the really superior WW2 a/c designs. "

heh, i guess thats where alot of this comes down too....what different people view as "Great attributes" in a plane. I agree the F6F did not have the greatest stats, yet it is considered one of the great warplanes of the war. Amoung other more glamerous attributes it was easy to fly and forgiving, allowing a host of green US pilots to learn the ropes and become proficient pilots. it was very durable and had a decent enough boost in speed to give it the ability to better hack and slash vs the F4F.
The F4U was faster, but far far more tempermental (why it was called the Ensign eliminator) and less maneverable

Someone else could look at other attributes and qualify the same plane differently

"No I'm not. You can't "make" anyone play your game. That's the reason why speed advantage is very important. The guy who can boom an zoom tends to control when, where and how teh combat occurs. Generally speaking, the guy in the slower plane just has to take it. In extreme situations all the slow plane can hope for is that the energy ship will get bored or run low on fuel. There are accounts of this in Fire in the Sky. IIRC, one major Soviet ace in Vietnam was bagged by an F4F pilot because he had to disengage. It's one of those classic engagements but I've honestly forgotten the names. "


Bull.....you can always make someone play your game, if the situation is right. You just may not always succeed thats all :)
Sticking to game terms alone, the Japanese can force one to play the game by attacking at higher altitudes where the first series USAAF planes did not preform as well. There are accounts of tactics the Japanese used to draw Allied pilots into traps and fights better suited to their style of play. Vietnam is not a good example to use. From what i've read the USAF really let itself go in comparison to kill ratios achieved in WWII and Korea. A trend that was fortunately reversed.



"Scoff all you like. Show me any 3 month period in WW2 in which you can verify that A6Ms in direct confrontations with P40s shot down more 40s than the Zekes lost, *where all the a/c were in the air when the confrontation occurred* (i.e. leaving out targets destroyed on the ground) and I'll be more convinced. But the myth of superior Japanese plane+pilot combination vis a vis the Zeke vs. F4F has been a chestnut for many years. And yet the loss ratios are what they are, so the myth's bubble has been burst."

Big time Yawn. Round we go. The kill ratios alone will not and never will tell the whole story as has been explained time and time again, because the circumstances of those kills, the tactics, the distances and the offensive/defensive posture of the combatants, and the use of team tactics *developed in war* all remain just as important as the statisics you keep putting forth to prove that the Zero (and apparantly all Japanese a/c) was an inferor plane. Doesnt work that way. Keep digging but that truth will remain. The myth of Allied superority at all times may not be a chestnut of old......more like a recent kidney stone infection perhaps. I fail to understand the drive. The differences alone between the Japanese pilots and American pilots when team tactics are concerned go much to explain the kill ratios. you'll note that plane stats dont even fall into the equation. Its much like the BoB. "Stats" were not nearly as important as the team tactics used by the Germans against the British who were a little behind the times in this regard.

"I think many people commenting on this have a remarkable inability to distingusih between propaganda, and the not too subtle ethnocentrism often involved, and the actual attitudes of combatants (soldiers, pilots etc) and their training. No doubt whatsoever that the low-speed performance of the Zekes sharpened Allied pilots situational awareness. Nevertheless, the tactics in which Allied pilots were trained and which beat the Zeke were in place before the first shot was fired. Not because of some psychic anticipation, but because it was correctly deemed that this was the direction that good doctrine should go. it remained the dominant paradigm until the 1980s. "

Really? strange that it didn't happen that way then and that many an Allied pilot had to learn the hard way not to dogfight a Zero. I wonder what then inspired Thatch to come up with his weave if the situation was in place pre-war? why wasn't it already established doctorine? hmm.

"Sure, there were as in all aerial combats situational circumstances that could give an inferior plane a local advantage. Of course, the primary opposition to these, uh, "advanced" Japanese designs were naval tactical bombers, F6Fs (which I view as somewhat mediocre) and unescorted strategic bombers. When P51s and F4Us were airborne the clear advantage was with the Allies. "

really? Against equivilent pilot skills, i'd beg to differ.

"Some WW2 a/c were "classics" by virtue of the situations in which they found themselves. You're right. I view the late war Japanese a/c as inferior products for their time. They were a generation behind the best Allied and German piston-engined models, and 2 generations behind jets"

Agreed.....that is I agree we are definately reading different texts as well as playing different wargames. :)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 185
- 7/19/2002 9:57:12 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

Posts: 588
Joined: 9/27/2001
From: Ontario Canada
Status: offline 		The development of the P-38 and F6F were seen as critical in overcoming the general stalemate between the US and Japan in the South Pacific. These aircraft were seen as true superiors to their Japanese counterparts. The P-40 and F4F were mainly seen as equals when compared to the IJNAF and IJAAF fighters. These are from a multitude of different sources, that take into account both aircraft deployment, tactics and quality. Both sides used their early war aircraft to the best of their abilities, but were no clear winners. Had one type been superior to the other, then the war would have been over much sooner, and the need felt by both sides for immenent replacement of their frontline aircraft would not have been felt.

WWI was much easier to determine aircraft superiority, as each side had a period of superiority in quality, starting with Germany and their Fokker Endeckir (SP), moving to the Allies and their SE5.A, back to the Germans by the introduction of the Albotross, and so on.

WWII in Europe did not experience such a disparity between aircraft, as there was usually never a clear superior. The Spitfire and Me109 were generally equals. The introduction of the FW190 did result in panic when it outclassed the Spitfire V, but the development of the Spitfire IX evened out everything.

WWII in the Pacific, success of aircraft did not solely rely on actual technical stats on how well one will perform in battle. Things like range and utilization of primitive airfields is what really counted in the Pacific. This is what made the A6M a remarkable aircraft. It was able to reach the ranges of escort that were only dreamed of by Western developers without relying on drop tanks. Sure, the A6M suffered because of it, but it worked as the area of operation for a single A6M group equalled that of around 2-3 P-40 groups. It could expand its influence over a much greater area, meaning that fewer A6Ms were needed to gain air superiority over a region. Had the Japanese used a shorter ranged, yet stronger, aircraft, they would not have survived as long as they did (primarily becasue they were perpetually outnumbered in the South Pacific as early as mid 1942). The A6M could project its power further then the P-40, which in the strategic place would do more then had it been a superior to the P-40 in actual handling.

Counter to much revisionist thinking (funny how thought swings from one extreme over to the other, tending to ignore the truth in the middle), the Japanese were neither the great superior pilots and aircraft producers, nor were they perpetually posessing planes of dubious quality. The must true conception of the air war in the Pacific was that it was of virtual parity between the two forces, with initiative passing from one to another within the first year due to regional circumstance (much like being cut off from general supply, or facing problems of having poor airfields to base their operations from while your opponent has well stocked bases). Production levels of aircraft, as well as the earlier introduction of 2nd Generation aircraft in the Pacific War by the United States is primarily why intitiative permanently shifted in their favour. The Japanese responded to every single aircraft developed by the US, but usually too late and in too few numbers.

The development of latter and better aircraft for the IJAAF was hampered by development problems (much like those experienced by the early introduction of the British Crusader and German Panther tanks). The Ki-61 was a definite superior to the P-40, and was probably an equal to the P-38, except the P-38 could outrange it and in effect do what the A6M did to the P-40 in regards to power projection. Maintenance problems occurred in the Ki-61 due to the complexity of its engine, and the primitive state that New Guinea airfields were in. Even later Japanese aircraft were better still, but due to circumstances, had they been produced they would have been of dubious quality due to shortages of vital material and poor substitution.

The introduction of the F6F and P-47 one year before the Japanese Ki-84 and N1K did much to destroy the ability of the Japanese airforce. Indeed, even the poor state that it was in, in 1944-45, these aircraft made good showings in the defense of the homeland by having kill ratios greater then their losses. However, these tended to be from the remnants of the regular air force, while the vast majority of the forces were of low pilot quality of the new air force. Had the introduction of Japanese 2nd Generation aircraft been sooner then the United States, the war would have been longer, however, still the same outcome due primarily to the production of the United States.


Using immature tactics like "YAWN" will not add to your arguments, and will in fact result in the community taking your points less serious because it looks like you really do not know what you are talking about.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 186
- 7/19/2002 12:00:28 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Using immature tactics like "YAWN" will not add to your arguments, and will in fact result in the community taking your points less serious because it looks like you really do not know what you are talking about.[/QUOTE]

Let 'em go, they're enjoying themselves. Can't wait till they start insulting their mother's virtues.

From my own readings, I tend to side with Nikademus. Either way I think both of you blokes did a stirling job.

Well fought, bring on round 2.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 187
- 7/19/2002 12:50:32 PM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		I think there is a commonality to all that has been said.

All of the posts agree generally with the view that the Zero was a superior manuvering craft in certain conditions, and that the typical enemy craft it faced had energy characteristics that, if used, could result in something approaching parity in air-to-air engagements.

There can't be much question that most pilots in Zeros at the beginning of the war had much more training and certainly more combat experience. The lack of experience and training on the part of most Allied pilots was rectified as time went on. Indeed it was Japanese pilots at the end of the war that were poorly trained while the Allied were highly so. However, the training disparity could also mean in the initial phases of the war Allied pilots did not have the numbers, discipline, or knowledge, to understand and use the energy attack against the Zero. As these numerical and training disparities were addressed, the Zero became less effective in engagements that could be liable to energy attacks.

The Japanese also launched a surprise attack which caught the Allies strategically dispersed and not organized for collective coherent defense. As long as the Japanese kept attacking and gaining territory, the expectation of defeat followed the Allies. This was broken at Midway and Guadalcanal. Morale suffered, lent engagements a desperate quality, and played into the hands of the Japanese.

Finally, the range factor did provide immense strategic advantages, as Jeremy has eruditely pointed out. The Zero air groups could go where they please and strike where they pleased, allowing them to retain morale and numerical advantages at the points of contention.

Of course I am generalizing. You have to do that to see the commonality of the posts. Don't pick on me.

Suffice to say that the Zero was in its prime and a fearful opponent when the pilots were well trained, facing an enemy that was demoralized, undertrained, outnumbered, an enemy which could not match the Zero's capacity to strike at targets from long ranges, and during which time the Japanese had a strategic initiative. Once the momemtum of the Japanese offensive was broken or slowed, and there was an opportunity to redress the immediate gaps in training and experience, the Zero became less significant precisely because in air to air combat it was NOT the overarchingly superior craft that it had appeared to many at the time to be.

The Zero is a classic aircraft because it possesses the characteristics of "classics" in virtually any genre : it was the right tool for a precise job at the exact right time. A flightsim does not capture the real reasons the Zero was a classic because gamers are engaging in the endemic problem for sims : hindsight and perfect knowledge. The sims I've played suggest the Zero to be a somewhat slow, highly manuverable, but also very vulnerable craft. Against a newbie pilot, they are fun to fly because newbies don't know anything about flying. Against a good pilot flying, say, a P-40, I have to be even better than they are, and have REALLY good aim, to even have half a chance. On the other hand, perhaps sims aren't such a bad tool after all. ;)

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 188
- 7/19/2002 6:11:38 PM   
Supervisor

 

Posts: 5166
Joined: 3/2/2004
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]. . .one major Soviet ace in Vietnam was bagged by an F4F pilot because he had to disengage.[/QUOTE]
Pretty impressive for a Wildcat (considering it's age, and all). :D :D :D :D :D

_____________________________


(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 189
Re: nonono - 7/19/2002 7:22:23 PM   
panda124c

 

Posts: 1692
Joined: 5/23/2000
From: Houston, TX, USA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Chiteng
[B]I am sorry you wont convince Dhaad of anything with regards to B-17's. He has read some article on skip-bombing and that has cemented his opinion. I offer the performance of the B-17's
at Midway as an example of how they DONT hit moving ships.

I offer Morrison who flatly states that only ONE destroyer
that was NOT moving was ever hit by a B-17. But that doesnt matter to Dhaad. He will site some article that actually pertains mostly to B-25s in late 1943 as an example of how B-17's could have been used. It is useless.

In responce to Dhaads request that someone state how a B-17 should be used 'ingame':

I suggest that it be limited to recon, asw and strategic bombing.

However I see nothing wrong with allowing it to come in at 100 feet over the airbase. I just think that the flak algorithm be upped
to make it NOT cost effective.

Heck right now you can use the B-17's to attrit Zeros over Rabual
because you KNOW the B-17 wont get more than damaged.
That is flatly silly. [/B][/QUOTE]

As an additional note on B-17 bombing performance against ships, I believe it is in the book "Destroyer Captain" where the author states that dodging B-17 bomb runs was easy you just wait until the bomber released it's bombs then do a hard turn since the time it takes the bombs to reach the surface is longer then the time it takes to turn the ship. Oh course this was high altitude bombing.

As for low level I doubt seriously any commander would order his B-17 in at low level, he would have a pilot revolt on his hands. Training, doctrine, and equipment prohibits the normal use of a B-17 at low altitude.
If you wish to ignore training and doctrine while playing UV then you can do a lot of weird things that were not done in reality, and that the program does not know how to handle historically.

B-17 boxes over Rabaul are great as anti-aircraft patrols, a box of B-17 at altitude have so much fire power the Japanese tactic of single aircraft attacks just gets a lot of Zeros shot down. I do this and don’t even care it they hit anything it just means fewer Zero as escorts over PM.
.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 190
- 7/19/2002 7:50:20 PM   
panda124c

 

Posts: 1692
Joined: 5/23/2000
From: Houston, TX, USA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Nikademus
[B]hmmm just to add fuel to the fire......i briefly played the Operation Cartwheel scenerio a few turns, mainly to see how the 7-day "turn" thing went (yukkkko :) )

Having never tried the high altitude tactic before i set all my PM B-17's on 30,000 feet airfield attack. I noticed to my suprise that despite the typical B-17 invulnerability in the face of concerted CAP efforts that only about a dozen hits or less were being scored on the runway

Lowering things down to 15,000 feet produced better results. Maybe there is con in place for high altitude attacks after all (if so, good job Matrix!)

On the con side of the B17 (and B-24) argument though......the true "uber" ness comes from their immunity to counter-attack. Talk about helpless. On three occasions Rabaul suffered ship attacks by groups of 3-4 B-24's and 2-3 B-17's, unescorted.
Each time they were intercepted by 30-40 fighters...ranging from Zeros to Nicks to Tonys to Oscars.

For the most part.....only a few runs were made against them causing maybe damage to one or two. The high point was the last attack. The CAP managed to bag one B-24. Unfortunately the big four engined bombers scored 6 bomb hits against two different ships so the exchange was still in favor of the US. (worse....the altitude was left at 6000 feet!)

The thing that disturbed me more than the lack of ability to knock down one of these bombers (since they "were" hard for IJN planes early and mid war to knock down) was that even in such unfavorable matchups (unescorted.....heavily outnumbered), there were no instances of attacks being pressed home so that at least the planes got shot up to the point where disruption and damage would greatly curtail their ability to carry out the mission.

Thats the true uberness [/B][/QUOTE]
You also have to cosider the tactics used by the Japanese to attack bomber, they did not use mass attacks like the Germans, it was more of a one on one attack. The Germans estimated that it took between 20 and 30 20mm cannon hits to bring a B-17 down. The range of the Japanese 20mm cannon was short compared to the .50 Cal MG on the B-17. One B-17 carries 10 or more .50 Ca. MGs. of which 3 to 5 can be brough to bear on any sector of the sky. The Zero has two 20mm cannon (short range) and two .30 Cal MGs. One on one the Zero is out gunned by a B-17.
And once again it's a big sky, it is easier to slip a couple of bomber in for a quick raid than to sneek in a squadron. Any clouds are of great help. Consider the PBY shadowing a convoy hiding from CAP in clouds, happpened more that once or twice.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 191
Re: a reasonable solution? - 7/19/2002 8:00:37 PM   
panda124c

 

Posts: 1692
Joined: 5/23/2000
From: Houston, TX, USA
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by brisd
[B]
3) The Norden bombsight modifier for US aircraft has been limited below 6000 feet and totally taken away below 4000 feet (it had a minimum altitude that was not being accounted for which Mike just realized that Gary had not accounted for).
:D [/B][/QUOTE]

A Norden bombsight that is as accurate at 1000 feet as it is at 20000 feet, no wonder there's a problem. You should be able to put a 500 pound bomb into a tea cup at 1000 feet with this setup. Oh my gosh the B-17 are not accrate enough with the new improved Norden bomb sight at low altitudes. :D :D :D

As alway it's best to change one thing at a time to see the effect.

There is a need for a new Smiles one the is for throwing fuel on a burning fire. :D

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 192
- 7/20/2002 1:15:07 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by pbear
[B]
You also have to cosider the tactics used by the Japanese to attack bomber, they did not use mass attacks like the Germans, it was more of a one on one attack. The Germans estimated that it took between 20 and 30 20mm cannon hits to bring a B-17 down. The range of the Japanese 20mm cannon was short compared to the .50 Cal MG on the B-17. One B-17 carries 10 or more .50 Ca. MGs. of which 3 to 5 can be brough to bear on any sector of the sky. The Zero has two 20mm cannon (short range) and two .30 Cal MGs. One on one the Zero is out gunned by a B-17.
And once again it's a big sky, it is easier to slip a couple of bomber in for a quick raid than to sneek in a squadron. Any clouds are of great help. Consider the PBY shadowing a convoy hiding from CAP in clouds, happpened more that once or twice. [/B][/QUOTE]

*yawn*

(KIDDING! :p )

Hi Pbear, I would have to disagree. The "Big Sky" argument, even without radar alone does not account for "Der Uberness" of small unescorted B-17's and B-24's sublimely waltzing through even 60+ CAP patrols (with multiple airframe types) to calmly bomb their targets scoring hits as if noone was trying to shoot them down.

Let me clarify too in case you misunderstood my posted example.......this was a consistant case of *three or four big bombers*, attacking Rabaul by their lonesome at low altitude, and facing (up to) a 60+ plane CAP. No enemy fighters....no bomber "boxes" (i.e. no massed 50cal fire).

It also wasn't just a case of the bombers proving resistant to damage and being shot down, it was also a complete lack of the CAP pressing home the attack to the point where the damage/disruption of the surviving bombers would be that their ability to press home their attacks would be compromised. Now a rare "exception" i could understand as all things are possible in war.

This however is common and as other AAR's have reported, the presence of even minute #'s of four engined bombers can make even a strong, rested Rabaul a hazzardous place to sail your ships near.

As it is though, Matrix has addressed this in 1.20 so i'm greatly looking forward to seeing the new patch in action! (hopefully they can address the bomb issue too quickly)


On your other argument that the Zero's (not to mention the Tony's Nicks and Oscars) would all considerately try to attack one at a time-ish. I could see something like that early in the war before the Japanese learned of the Fort's impressive characteristics.. At the time of the scenerio i played however? They would have learned and would have been throwing everything but the kitchen sink at them, especially if such small unescorted groups are flying into their laps.

Unless the groups are dead-a** green (which these wernt) i would not expect them to adhere to losing tactics. Its the other side of the coin of the argument of Allied tactics vs the Zero. By 43, few are going to try the old way of dogfighting it and will resort to more energy based attacks. Same here. By this date, the CAP is not going to mimic tactics that were proven ineffective against the bombers in earlier brushes.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 193
- 7/22/2002 11:11:20 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		IIRC, the Soviet ace was bagged by an F4F. Uh, Douglas F4 (Phantom) F variant. Ironic that the nomenclature is so, well, ironic. Actually, both planes (Douglas F4, Grumman F4) illustrate the basic design philosophy that "with enough thrust, even a brick can fly."


"Round we go. The kill ratios alone..."

Okay. So, the P40 was faster in level flight and the A6M never achieved a positive kill ratio against it, just as it never achieved a positive kill ratio over a 3 month period against the F4F3/4. I expect a strategy game to reflect that history if the circumstances in which the planes are used in a game are substantially similar to the historical circumstances of their use. GGPW nevere accomplished that.

"...the use of team tactics *developed in war*"

In re "developed in war" it's not true if you think that this was a result of combats w/ Japan. It was primarily a result of studies of the BOB. The USN had adopted team tactics in late 1940, and Thach simulated most of these in 1941. It's not as though the "Thach weave" was the only kind of mutually supporting team tactics of which pilots were aware in 1941. You don't have to take my word for it. See the concluding chapters in either of Lundstrom's case studies of USN naval aviation in WW2. Chennault of course had also studied the BOB and the AVG more or less consistently kicked butt using team work. The open question for me is how well USAAF pilots fared in P40s in the early going, both in terms of raw numbers and allowing for ratio of combatants involved.

"Doesnt work that way. Keep digging but that truth will remain."

I'm not sure what "doesn't work that way." And I obviously don't agree with your version of The Truth As Revealed By History. In a debate, what works is the facts deployed and the arguments based on them. The A6M +pilot combination never achieved a positive kill ratio, and was demonstrably inferior in ruggedness of design or armor, speed (better than the F4 by about 10 mph, worse than the P40B by about the same) and armament. In the 1st quarter of 1942 it and the Oscar enjoyed remarkable success in the PI and NEI but it is not clear that they ever achieved 1:1 ratios against 1st line Army fighters *in flight.* So, almost all of their success has nothing to do with the plane or pilot training, but rather to surprise, good operational and strategic planning, and superior numbers. When opposed by a/c that were logistically well-supported and in situations that did not involve surprise, the A6M consistently came up short. If you want to call it a great plane, you are, of course, entitled to your opinion.

"The differences alone between the Japanese pilots and American pilots when team tactics are concerned go much to explain the kill ratios."

Getting back to GGPW, and some other games like ERS (a board game by former AH) you don't see that reflected in the results. You see kill ratios that favor the Japanese even in situations where the number of combatants is roughly equal.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 194
- 7/23/2002 4:54:28 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]IIRC, the Soviet ace was bagged by an F4F. Uh, Douglas F4 (Phantom) F variant. Ironic that the nomenclature is so, well, ironic. Actually, both planes (Douglas F4, Grumman F4) illustrate the basic design philosophy that "with enough thrust, even a brick can fly."


"Okay. So, the P40 was faster in level flight and the A6M never achieved a positive kill ratio against it, just as it never achieved a positive kill ratio over a 3 month period against the F4F3/4. I expect a strategy game to reflect that history if the circumstances in which the planes are used in a game are substantially similar to the historical circumstances of their use. GGPW nevere accomplished that. "

How? by having the P-40's and P-39's conduct "only" diving one time passes and then getting the hell out of dodge before being bounced by alerted enemy fighters?

Who's history i would add? I've been doing some research from the other side of the pond of late, and it would seem that some of these early war "kill ratios" which you keep running back too over and over again are in dispute. Further, wartime accounts of some of the better Zero pilots (like Sakai) were certainly not impressed with the P-39 and 40 and go into detail on superior attributes of their plane's preformance and handling *in a dogfight* (yes....the allied pilots, Americans included did dogfight....not this deceptive, all we did was try to conduct horizontal slashing attacks crap). Of particular interest were the sections that described the Zero's ability to rev up to full power and turn away/into attacking fighters if spotted and/or detected.

A particularily relevent section occured around the time that UV starts in which, after pilots encountered *for the first time*, singular and small group, flat out diving tactics against escorting and sweeping zeros. Now the question i would ask... is, if the P-40 (and 39) are so **** superior that they can just shove the throttles forward and leasurly outrun the zero and conduct these alleged energy attacks....why did the PM pilots have to resort to these brash hit and run tactics?




"In re "developed in war" it's not true if you think that this was a result of combats w/ Japan. It was primarily a result of studies of the BOB. The USN had adopted team tactics in late 1940, and Thach simulated most of these in 1941. It's not as though the "Thach weave" was the only kind of mutually supporting team tactics of which pilots were aware in 1941. You don't have to take my word for it. See the concluding chapters in either of Lundstrom's case studies of USN naval aviation in WW2. Chennault of course had also studied the BOB and the AVG more or less consistently kicked butt using team work. The open question for me is how well USAAF pilots fared in P40s in the early going, both in terms of raw numbers and allowing for ratio of combatants involved."

A nice play on words. Generalized team or more accurately "Formation" tactics were standard in pretty much all air forces before the war. the "Team tactics" i refer to are the specific group tactics that were developed in war, after actual exp to counter the superior individual superiority of the Zero in certain key preformance aspects. Were this not the case as i've said before, Thatch would not have had to "come up" with his weave......and the ABDA pilots at Surabaya wouldn't have gotten their ***es kicked.


"I'm not sure what "doesn't work that way." And I obviously don't agree with your version of The Truth As Revealed By History. In a debate, what works is the facts deployed and the arguments based on them. The A6M +pilot combination never achieved a positive kill ratio, and was demonstrably inferior in ruggedness of design or armor, speed (better than the F4 by about 10 mph, worse than the P40B by about the same) and armament. In the 1st quarter of 1942 it and the Oscar enjoyed remarkable success in the PI and NEI but it is not clear that they ever achieved 1:1 ratios against 1st line Army fighters *in flight.* So, almost all of their success has nothing to do with the plane or pilot training, but rather to surprise, good operational and strategic planning, and superior numbers. When opposed by a/c that were logistically well-supported and in situations that did not involve surprise, the A6M consistently came up short. If you want to call it a great plane, you are, of course, entitled to your opinion."

Myself and a whole bunch' other people. I'll leave the highly subjective and murky world of "Kill ratio" research to you along with the artificial world of non-combatal level speed chases. Pilot quality is indeed the most important factor as i've been saying though having a good plane helps too. . "History" and the "facts" as i've come to learn are highly subjective things depending on the viewpoint of the individual and how he interprets said "facts"


"Getting back to GGPW, and some other games like ERS (a board game by former AH) you don't see that reflected in the results. You see kill ratios that favor the Japanese even in situations where the number of combatants is roughly equal. "

Ah, i see, you must have been the author of that great PACWAR post who said that the Japanese should never score more than 1:1 ratio tops. Here's a tip. Games like UV and PACWAR have to simulate a wide swarth of potential situations, air, land and sea. If 30 P-40's meet 30 Zeros, how it goes is going to depend largely on the plane characteristics, pilot exp, situation, advantage/disadvantage etc etc. To suggest that based on a dubious kill ratio presented without considerable qualifications that regardless of this wide ranging variable situation that the game has to cover that one side should not or cannot do better than the other would be the true ahistorical thing to do.

Look at it this way, it would be like suggesting that before a certain date, the USN at night couldn't expect to score more than even losses with a Japanese surface force because "statistically" they won most of the battles up too the evacuation of Lunga. You'll have noticed that the results in UV can vary widely as well, even when one side has an exp edge. The reason is because of all the add'l variables that go into the combat resolution.

As for UV.....i've yet to see any "uberness" of the Zero's part anyway so i continue to marvel at your angst and can only conclude that as before, you have a thing against Japanese aviation and wish to reasset the "myths" of the prewar Allies before the war started

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 195
- 7/23/2002 5:40:45 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"How? by having the P-40's and P-39's conduct "only" diving one time passes and then getting the hell out of dodge before being bounced by alerted enemy fighters?"

We're going in circles now. You say it was a "1 time diving pass and bug out" and I don't find that characterization supported by the things I've read re either the 23 PG or the F4Fs over the canal, or any of the F4Fs in carrier engagements in 1942.

"Who's history i would add?"

Lately, Richard Frank (for general stats on losses) and more recently John Lundstrom for the USN/USMC F4Fs. I can't attest to the accuracy, but I'd say that for example his ability to name which Japanese pilot was shot down by which F4F by matching eyewitness accounts of *both* US and Japanese pilots makes Lundstrom about as reliable as they get. He's also very clear about stating which Japanese pilots disappeared apparently w/o a trace, and when.

"Further, wartime accounts of some of the better Zero pilots (like Sakai) were certainly not impressed with the P-39 and 40 and go into detail on superior attributes of their plane's preformance.."

Sakai did not know anything about the P40s characteristics and was not then or after the war qualified to assess them. Same goes for the F4F. I'll concede that most variants of the P39 were dogs, but they have not been the a/c that we have discussed. primarily, here. FWIW, Sakai probably never encountered a P39.

"...and handling *in a dogfight* (yes....the allied pilots, Americans included did dogfight....not this deceptive, all we did was try to conduct horizontal slashing attacks crap)."

Jeremy Pritchard, this is why I occasionally interject "Yawn" into my text. It's my response to an ad hominemn argument. Nikademus, it's never been my contention that no Allied pilot ever got caught at slow speed. It's always been my contention that by the end of 1941 most Allied pilots were taught to avoid losing energy in low-speed turning engagements and to fight as teams. I've cited specifically the research of Lundstrom and could in a day or to provide the long list of 23 PG victories using such tactics. You've cited, specifically, Sakai, I guess, as a source about Allied losses. He wouldn't know. (Footnote: Japanese estimates of Allied a/c losses run very high as compared with their Allied counterparts, as well of those of German and Italian pilots. It seems to be an understandable consequence of the misperception of an Allied a/c shot-at-and-diving-away as an allied a/c out of control.)

"Of particular interest were the sections that described the Zero's ability to rev up to full power and turn away/into attacking fighters if spotted and/or detected."

Uh, yeah, it was basically the only thing the A6M could do. A head on run was a losing proposition for the A6M against any US PTO a/c other than the undergunned F2.

"A particularily relevent section occured around the time that UV starts in which, after pilots encountered *for the first time*, singular and small group, flat out diving tactics against escorting and sweeping zeros. Now the question i would ask... is, if the P-40 (and 39) are so **** superior that they can just shove the throttles forward and leasurly outrun the zero and conduct these alleged energy attacks....why did the PM pilots have to resort to these brash hit and run tactics?"

Not following you here. A "brash hit and run attack" is an attack that preserves energy is it not? If as a result of these the combat loss ratio favors the Allies, and if there's no long-term effective tactical counter for the A6M to this P40 tactic, in the end can one not reasonably conclude that the P40 was the better plane?

"A nice play on words. Generalized team or more accurately "Formation" tactics were standard in pretty much all air forces before the war. the "Team tactics" i refer to are the specific group tactics that were developed in war, after actual exp to counter the superior individual superiority of the Zero in certain key preformance aspects."

I don't often play at words, and have not here. The Thach weave was (1) not the only weave in the arsenal, and (2) developed in 1941 before the first Wildcat and Zeke ever met face to face. The "team tactics" of which I speak were concomitant with a shift from the 3-plane sectino to finger 4 in late 1940, early 1941, the finger-4 being the kind of formation that's flexibile (it can break into 2-ship elements) and internally mutually supporting. Basically a consequence of the outcome of the BOB and lessons learned therein.

Note. Japan never developed that particular kind of team tactics until mid 1943 and then only reluctantly when they dropped their 3-plane section for the finger 4.

"Tatch would not have had to "come up" with his weave......"

Thach developed this tactic in 1941 anticipating combat with ME109s. His test bed if you will was USAAF vs. USN aerial mock combats in which the P40 was consistently able to thwart high-speed energy runs by P40s by turning into them. At the time in 1941 when Thach came up with the plan, it was specifically to counter a/c that had both superior speed and maneuverability on the F4F.

"The ABDA pilots at Surabaya wouldn't have gotten their ***es kicked."

The ABDA pilots would have had their butts kicked anyhow because of poor logistics. But as I have said many times, I've yet to find a credible source that details actual combat losses in ABDA of P40s when engaged with A6Ms from December through March 1942. If you've got a reference other than "Sakai said so" I'm interested.

"Myself and a whole bunch' other people."

Are free to ignore whatever facts you want to ignore. I don't honestly know how else to measure success. The kill ratio favored the Allies. I don't know why you think that's "murky." It means in direct confrontations between the fighters typically employed by both combatants, the Allied pilots shot down more Japanese a/c than they lost. When you look at the performance data and the doctrine, you understand why.

"Pilot quality is indeed the most important factor"

Its relative importance is greater when a/c have roughly comparable performance characteristics... or when one side fields pilots who are so horribly undertrained that they aren't basically qualified.

"your bitter because the Japanese produced a good number of aces considering the small number of pilots they turned out, mostly using Zeros with many of the kills racked up against P-39's and P-40's....the best even able to hold their own against truely superior fighters such as Corsair."

And your suspicion would be wrong. Frankly, based on the proclivity to insult, I'd say you're the bitter fellow, but it is hardly germane to have you or me assessing each other's motives. *My* motive is to see good game simulations.

"Getting back to GGPW, and some other games like ERS (a board game by former AH) you don't see that reflected in the results. You see kill ratios that favor the Japanese even in situations where the number of combatants is roughly equal. "

"Ah, i see, you must have been the author of that great PACWAR most who said that the Japanese should never score more than 1:1 ratio tops. Here's a tip."

When I want tips or preaching I'll pay for good advise. FWIW your unsolicited tip is worth to me what I paid for it.

"Games like UV and PACWAR have to simulate a wide swarth of potential situations, air, land and sea. If 30 P-40's meet 30 Zeros, how it goes is going to depend largely on the plane characteristics, pilot exp, situation, advantage/disadvantage etc etc. To suggest that based on a dubious kill ratio presented without considerable qualifiacations that regardless of this wide ranging variable situation that the game has to cover that one side should not or cannot do better than the other would be the true ahistorical thing to do. "

A tidy mischaracterization. What I said was that played out over the course of a campaign, if the historical a/c are deployed in roughly the same numbers and circumstances as historically used, the simulation ought to produce roughly historical results. The issue of the details of the sim (altitude, airspeed, firepower, durability, tactics, training &c) can be modeled to whatever extent the game designer wants.

But, and this is the crux of the matter, if given a roughly historical set of parameters you can't get roughly historical results, then something in the details of the simulation is broken.

"An obvious "fact" why nooone has taken your suggestions to heart (thankfully)."

I would not be so sure. Whether it will be taken to heart in UV or, say, WitP remains to be seen. But as I've had this discussion here and in other places, there are some who can suspend the myth of Axis superiority at everything long enough to wonder why, if the Japanese pilots and planes were so great, they could not routinely win air battles, even in 1942.

"As for UV.....i've yet to see any "uberness" of the Zero's part anyway so i continue to marvel at your angst and can only conclude that as before, you have a thing against Japanese aviation and wish to reasset the "myths" of the prewar Allies before the war started."

Precisely why you're not qualified to comment. You've admitted that no quantitative data are relevant to you on this matter. instead, your rhetoric boils down to: (1) ad hominem remarks (vis, your cheap-shot quasi psycho-analytical assessments of my motives), your assertion that, essentially, (2) "everyone agrees with Nikademus" (about which I would care naught, even were it true, because being right has nothing a priori to do with democracy). If that's all the ammunition in your arsenal, debate wise, I'm quite well prepared to trounce you again any time you like.

Of course, there is the matter of wanting to hear something new. So let's try it this way from the ground up:

Since you've rejected combat losses and performance as germane to the question at hand, what objective standard would *you* use to assess which plane-pilot combination is more effective?

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 196
Historic Hysterical Histrionics - 7/23/2002 6:17:44 AM   
1089

 

Posts: 210
Joined: 7/4/2001
From: Portland, OR
Status: offline 		It is obvious, historically speaking, that the Allies won the war. This, despite the underpreparedness of the Allies, and the superior training of the Japanese. While it can be argued that with its vast production capability, the U.S. "sleeping giant" would eventually have produced enough to come back from any edge it were pushed to, the fact is that it didn't have to. Victories in the face of superior numbers such as Midway and Guadalcanal, clearly show that God had weighed in on the side of the free peoples versus the military dictatorships.

My question is: When is this going to be modeled in UV? If the player who plays the Allies is not very experienced, and goes up against an opponent like Mogami, for instance, it is even possible that the Allies would lose, if you can imagine that! This is clearly ahistorical, and needs an instant, if not sooner remedy! For instance, if the Japanese player were to sink all of the Allies carriers, and threaten to invade Noumea, thereby endangering the free people of Australia (although they were once prisoners), surely a violent typhoon with hailstones the size of beach balls would come up to wipe out the invasion fleet and several battleships and carriers, as well. Yet, this doesn't happen!

The game itself recognizes the ridiculousness of a Japanese victory in that if an automatic Japanese victory is triggered, the game simply crashes, unable to reconcile the obvious paradoxes involved. While this is laudable, I think that a smoother interface to the winning Allied player could be achieved through a surface combat screen showing the Japanese ships on one side, and God lobbing lightning and hailstones on the other. That way the Allied player would be able to see what happened, instead of speculating about his victory, as is now the case. When the Japanese player, not realizing that the crash is due to his inability to win, tries to claim victory, the Aliied player at the moment is limited to saying, well if you won, send me the replay file that shows it, and then claiming victory because the other side doesn't send it, and forfeits. It takes some of the fun out of winning in this manner as the Allies, and should be fixed poste haste.

Now, why do I bring this up on a B-17 thread? Well, obviously, the B-17 super fortress concept was introduced to avoid this situation in the first place, by fighting one ahistorical effect with another. Now that it is being removed, I think we will start to see this situation arise on a more constant basis, and so the God factor has to be put in more rapidly to achieve the proper historic play imbalance. Also, if those pesky zeros really do act as ueberwaffen, a few beach ball sized hailstones ought to slow 'em down!

So, Matrix, can we expect this feature in 1.21? Or will it be sooner?

kp

_____________________________

The Earth is but a hollow nougat, reverberating with the sounds of the big bands... :cool:

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 197
zzzzzzzz.......boom - 7/23/2002 6:30:05 AM   
doomonyou

 

Posts: 144
Joined: 6/26/2002
Status: offline 		I know so much about the p40 and zero know....I think I forgot how to eat...no more room in brain for useful information.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 198
- 7/23/2002 7:35:03 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"How? by having the P-40's and P-39's conduct "only" diving one time passes and then getting the hell out of dodge before being bounced by alerted enemy fighters?"

"We're going in circles now. You say it was a "1 time diving pass and bug out" and I don't find that characterization supported by the things I've read re either the 23 PG or the F4Fs over the canal, or any of the F4Fs in carrier engagements in 1942"

Nor do i find the references to continual trouncings by P40's and P-39's in Japanese sources. So it seems the 'viewpoint' can vary depending on which side is being querried.


"Lately, Richard Frank (for general stats on losses) and more recently John Lundstrom for the USN/USMC F4Fs. I can't attest to the accuracy, but I'd say that for example his ability to name which Japanese pilot was shot down by which F4F by matching eyewitness accounts of *both* US and Japanese pilots makes Lundstrom about as reliable as they get. He's also very clear about stating which Japanese pilots disappeared apparently w/o a trace, and when. "

As I thought. So you have sources written by Americans and i have sources that tapped Japanese sources and they say different things. By what concept do you stand to present such ego that you offer to "Trounce me" any time i wish. Bring it on i say.


"Sakai did not know anything about the P40s characteristics and was not then or after the war qualified to assess them. Same goes for the F4F. I'll concede that most variants of the P39 were dogs, but they have not been the a/c that we have discussed. primarily, here. FWIW, Sakai probably never encountered a P39."

Right, he was only there.....and actually fought agaiinst them while you quote unqualified statistics as gospel to dispense with the entire Japanese airforce


"Jeremy Pritchard, this is why I occasionally interject "Yawn" into my text. It's my response to an ad hominemn argument. Nikademus, it's never been my contention that no Allied pilot ever got caught at slow speed. It's always been my contention that by the end of 1941 most Allied pilots were taught to avoid losing energy in low-speed turning engagements and to fight as teams. I've cited specifically the research of Lundstrom and could in a day or to provide the long list of 23 PG victories using such tactics. You've cited, specifically, Sakai, I guess, as a source about Allied losses. He wouldn't know. (Footnote: Japanese estimates of Allied a/c losses run very high as compared with their Allied counterparts, as well of those of German and Italian pilots. It seems to be an understandable consequence of the misperception of an Allied a/c shot-at-and-diving-away as an allied a/c out of control.)"

I see nothing different in your argument. Essentially you are placing American FG sources above Japanese ones with no other evidence but to faithfully say "i believe these guys are more reliable"

"Uh, yeah, it was basically the only thing the A6M could do. A head on run was a losing proposition for the A6M against any US PTO a/c other than the undergunned F2. "

Then the pilot accounts of who i'm reading of must all be lying because their tombs are not filled with despair and frustration at their Zeros sitting still in the air while P-40's and 39's routinely pick them apart



"Not following you here. A "brash hit and run attack" is an attack that preserves energy is it not? If as a result of these the combat loss ratio favors the Allies, and if there's no long-term effective tactical counter for the A6M to this P40 tactic, in the end can one not reasonably conclude that the P40 was the better plane? "


The point, which i will try to make clear one more time, is that there is a big difference between an all out dive, making one pass and then hitting the floor in evasion and one where a more powerful plane is able to make a more controlled high energy pass and then close on the hells of the attack pull up to regain altitude and thereby energy and position.

How quickly is the diving P-40 or 39 going to reach attack position again given their modest stats, and given the superiority of the Zero in a climb? Sakai, who does'n't know a thing about P-40's and 39's routinely describes "catching" P-40's that werent' in straight out dives to the floor. By the way, he also verifies the absolute toughness of the Fortress and the problems Zeros had dealing with it too. So he's right there....because it supports your worldview....but he's wrong when it comes to fighting P-40
s hmm.


"I don't often play at words, and have not here. The Thach weave was (1) not the only weave in the arsenal, and (2) developed in 1941 before the first Wildcat and Zeke ever met face to face. The "team tactics" of which I speak were concomitant with a shift from the 3-plane sectino to finger 4 in late 1940, early 1941, the finger-4 being the kind of formation that's flexibile (it can break into 2-ship elements) and internally mutually supporting. Basically a consequence of the outcome of the BOB and lessons learned therein."

Sure you dont. I ask again.....why the need for the weave if all these blocks are in place? As for team tactics, i never disagreed with the point that such things could defeat a Zero because they did. However it no more proves that the Zero was a poor aircraft then it proves that the F4F was superior. It shows that said tactics and the pilots can negate material advantages in an enemy or enemy pilot.....or counter inferior qualities in one's own mount.

"Note. Japan never developed that particular kind of team tactics until mid 1943 and then only reluctantly when they dropped their 3-plane section for the finger 4."

agreeed here. It is a major facet in your vaunted "kill ratios" that you keep using to attack Japanese aircraft



The ABDA pilots would have had their butts kicked anyhow because of poor logistics. But as I have said many times, I've yet to find a credible source that details actual combat losses in ABDA of P40s when engaged with A6Ms from December through March 1942. If you've got a reference other than "Sakai said so" I'm interested.

Sakai disputes this. He was t here. he said that the air battles there were large and intense filled with P40's, P-36's and a few Buffalos. (the pilots nationalities are in question). "Logistics" played no part.....it was a simple trouncing by a group of well trained pilots fighting in a new-ish plane of unkown characteristics


"Are free to ignore whatever facts you want to ignore. I don't honestly know how else to measure success. The kill ratio favored the Allies. I don't know why you think that's "murky." It means in direct confrontations between the fighters typically employed by both combatants, the Allied pilots shot down more Japanese a/c than they lost. When you look at the performance data and the doctrine, you understand why."

Its "murky" when you take unqualified statistics and dont promote "success" but instead promote the idea that one side's equipment was junk and/or it's pilots of a similar caliber. The 'preformance' data you attest too is not so blatently superior when considering older airframes such as the P-40. I look at the same stats and see strengths and weaknesses on both sides. One side was better able to adapt and adjust to exploit this difference thats all. As time went by, logistics began to be the deciding factors along with a very finite pool of qualified pilots on the other.



"And your suspicion would be wrong. Frankly, based on the proclivity to insult, I'd say you're the bitter fellow, but it is hardly germane to have you or me assessing each other's motives. *My* motive is to see good game simulations."

As are mine. and i dont wish to see a great game influenced by views which are clearly one sided....on any account. I'm not advocating Japanese superiority, but fair treatment. I see nothing fair in what are narrow interpretations of broad "facts"





"When I want tips or preaching I'll pay for good advise. FWIW your unsolicited tip is worth to me what I paid for it. "

Stating the obvious is hardly preaching.


"Precisely why you're not qualified to comment. You've admitted that no quantitative data are relevant to you on this matter. instead, your rhetoric boils down to: (1) ad hominem remarks (vis, your cheap-shot quasi psycho-analytical assessments of my motives), your assertion that, essentially, (2) "everyone agrees with Nikademus" (about which I would care naught, even were it true, because being right has nothing a priori to do with democracy). If that's all the ammunition in your arsenal, debate wise, I'm quite well prepared to trounce you again any time you like."

Thats odd.....i dont see myself looking up from the floor.


"Since you've rejected combat losses and performance as germane to the question at hand, what objective standard would *you* use to assess which plane-pilot combination is more effective? "

Nice try. I never rejected the combat losses, though i question them because of the source and because they dont agree with Japanese sources You on the other hand have provided no real proof that your quoted sources are any better other than to assume that the winning side which writes the history must always be correct.

What i reject is your interpretation of these facts to use them in a campaign to downgrade Japanese pilots and planes where i dont see a need for it, historically or game wise.

As for "what i would do" I posed that question to you a while back. How, in an operational or strategic level game are you going to factor in some of the things we have talked about? what pilots will have the smarts to use the winning tactics you assume they all use all the time? which dont? The best that can be done in such a large scale model is go with the essentials, and UV builds on these basics by having added many more facets. Its not pefect....but i'd say its a good improvement and no it wont cover 'every' situation....no broadbased wargame can.

And having compared the final product the GGPW, i'd say it balances out much more realistically than that game did, so i still dont know what your problem is other than not wanting to see a Japanese airgroup score more than a 1:1 success rate.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 199
Re: Re: nonono - 7/23/2002 9:00:37 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by pbear
[B]



As for low level I doubt seriously any commander would order his B-17 in at low level, he would have a pilot revolt on his hands. Training, doctrine, and equipment prohibits the normal use of a B-17 at low altitude.
If you wish to ignore training and doctrine while playing UV then you can do a lot of weird things that were not done in reality, and that the program does not know how to handle historically.


. [/B][/QUOTE]

They WERE done in Reality. Many times. The actual commanders made numerous such orders to B-17 squadrons during the war, and the pilots and crews not only obeyed, but were relatively successful at it. General Kenney developed skip bombing tactics with the B-17 FIRST, then migrated it to other types of craft. Between October, 1942 and April, 1943, and beyond, B-17s alone made hundreds of low level sorties, sinking and damaging dozens of ships. Low level attacks by Medium and Heavy bombers were a "violation of doctine", a doctrine that was based on the theories of Douhet, and was in fact outmoded, and was dispensed with NUMEROUS TIMES and FINALLY flushed when such attacks proved effective.

Persisting in the line of argument that B-17s were not and cannot and should not be used at low level is an insult the the many brave and insightful pilots and officers who challenged doctrine, made these attacks, inflicted destruction on the enemy, and helped the US and its allies win through to "absolute victory".

You may choose to forget this bravery and courage. I don't. Any game that fails to remember it will be forgotton by me. Quickly.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 200
Re: nonono - 7/23/2002 9:10:20 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Chiteng
[B]I am sorry you wont convince Dhaad of anything with regards to B-17's. He has read some article on skip-bombing and that has cemented his opinion. I offer the performance of the B-17's
at Midway as an example of how they DONT hit moving ships.

I offer Morrison who flatly states that only ONE destroyer
that was NOT moving was ever hit by a B-17. But that doesnt matter to Dhaad. He will site some article that actually pertains mostly to B-25s in late 1943 as an example of how B-17's could have been used. It is useless.

In responce to Dhaads request that someone state how a B-17 should be used 'ingame':

I suggest that it be limited to recon, asw and strategic bombing.

However I see nothing wrong with allowing it to come in at 100 feet over the airbase. I just think that the flak algorithm be upped
to make it NOT cost effective.

Heck right now you can use the B-17's to attrit Zeros over Rabual
because you KNOW the B-17 wont get more than damaged.
That is flatly silly. [/B][/QUOTE]

I suppose, Chiteng, we could agree if I hadn't myself read numerous first person accounts of B-17s being used in low level attacks by brave pilots and crews. I suppose we could agree if I hadn't read secondary sources by reputable historians that have recorded in their accounts replete evidence that B-17s scored dozens of hits in low level attacks on shipping. I suppose I could agree with you if there weren't numerous primary sources which tell the story of General Kenney's experiments with and use of B-17s to develop skip bombing. I might agree with you if I hadn't read the accounts of Japanese pilots in the South Pacific who complained that the "biggest problem" for them in the theater was the "four-motored American B-17 bomber". Not lack of supplies, not lack of fuel, not being outnumbered, but the pesky B17.

Hey, wait, I have an idea. Why don't you read my sources and agree with me? No, wait, you won't do that. I guess my question is why you won't, or why you haven't, or why you persist with these arguments that are clearly ignorant of the many historical facts?

Your argumentation is about as good as your spelling of my name, which has almost never been right. I suppose that's an indication of how carefully you investigate the historical facts.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 201
dgaad - 7/23/2002 9:27:11 AM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline 		Does your source give a "number of ships sunk" by B 17s during the total time frame using this method of low altitude bombing? I would like to compare the actual total for the duration of the war to the UV success rate and total. I'd bet UV could match that real total in about 1/10th of the time.

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 202
Re: dgaad - 7/23/2002 11:53:38 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
[B]Does your source give a "number of ships sunk" by B 17s during the total time frame using this method of low altitude bombing? I would like to compare the actual total for the duration of the war to the UV success rate and total. I'd bet UV could match that real total in about 1/10th of the time. [/B][/QUOTE]

There is not any single source that breaks down the number of ships sunk by what kind of aircraft and what type of attack, at least not one that I have. Even the most authoritative sources don't have numbers like that. Fire in the Sky records numerous instances of B17 low level attacks, with good successes. I've also visited a number of veterans sites that contain good information including specific recollections and numbers of ships hit, etc., and I've also read dozens of secondary sources which discuss Kenney's effort, the whole skip bombing campaign in general (because it had a "strategic effect" on the campaign by preventing daylight surface resupply in New Guinea), along with the occasional story about Japanese pilot experiences. Also trade magazines (those that cater to the defense industry), history magazines (like Military History), etc, have the occasional interview with contemporaries of the war, including B17 pilots and crew, and Japanese military men. So, the bottom line is, no I don't have information which is that specific.

Its a facetious thing you want to do though, Ron. Don't you think? The only way you could get results that meant anything would be to play the entire game exactly as history went, down to the number of times that B17 squadrons attacked. That way you could compare the sortie / hit rate with the actual history and see if there is any difference.

All I can do is, from all of this information, give you my "best educated guess". I've read that General Kenny's men eventually got low level skip bombing tactics down (before it was actually used in combat, mind you), so that there was about a 50% chance that a B-17 on an "attack run" would hit the target. They had ships they used for practice, as well as towed targets to practice at moving targets. (Note : this is not the same thing as a Sortie / Hit ratio, since not all aircraft that leave the ground actually get to make an attack run on a target, etc.)

In combat, ratio of attack runs to hits was a bit less. Do a Google search on "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and you will run across a number of sites that talk about this "battle" which involved almost entirely low level attacks on shipping by almost every model of US bomber aircraft in the theater at the time, including 17s. The result to the Japanese was devastating; they never again attempted daylight surface convoy resupply runs to New Guinea, thereafter instead using only single ships or small groups of small ships, usually moving short distances at night.

This battle happened, IIRC, in April 1943, when these tactics had been practiced and used in combat for months, so the skill levels were probably quite high.

But, Ron, my main issue or point here is this : there can't be much question, if one *cares to investigate the issue themselves* (not you Ron, but others on this board ;) ) that 17s were used, and used effectively in this role. Naturally, we players are not playing with real lives and have the benefit of hindsight, so we will use 17s much more aggressively than was the case historically. The fact that the players are using 17s this way is in my judgement the best evidence that the game is modelled correctly. Tools and methods and tactics that have been proven effective in a war, will be used even more aggressively and effectively in a simulation of that war made years later, unless "special delimiters" are put in place to prevent the application of hindsight. Like rules which, for example in other games, prevent large-scale deployment of the BEF in France in 1940, or which prevent large scale development of the Me 262 in 1942, etc.

IMHO the so-called problems with the 17 have been identified by Matrix : there was a piece of code that was supposed to prevent the application of enhanced accuracy (based on the Norden bombsight) which was not working correctly and will be fixed in 1.2. In addition to the other changes, I think we will see somewhat more reserved use of 17s, at least by intelligent players. I for one am not going to waste my 17 squadrons once I have several Mitchell and Marauder squadrons that can do the job, not even with the game as it is now.

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 203
- 7/23/2002 9:51:50 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		"You on the other hand have provided no real proof that your quoted sources are any better other than to assume that the winning side which writes the history must always be correct."

Uh, for numerical facts I've quoted specifically: Richard Frank (Guadalcanal) Appendix Data tables, and John Lundstrom (two volumes on the USN in 1942), for combat losses. I won't argue whether or not a source (a peer reviewed book by a PhD historian who has consulted the operation records of the air units involved and can name who saw who shot down and where) is credible. If it isn't nothing is.

For general conclusions I can give you the closing chapter in The First team at Guadalcanal (sorry, no page number, it's back at the library, but you can read it) in which Lundstrom attests to the high quality of USN F4F pilots trained in 1940-1941 both with respect to team tactics and deflection shooting.

We could go through the same analysis for the 23rd FG in China except that it isn't conclusively clear that Zeros operated in that theater, despite Shilling's claim that they were. Or Ford's.

What we are then left with is the actual combat losses sustained in aerial combat in the first three months of the war by Allied pilots in Malaya, Burma, the PI, the NEI, Darwin and PM. Good sources on actual combat losses in this area are difficult to come by. Sakai is not a good source. It is a personal biography, and necessarily is heavily clouded by FOW and the absence of verification of his claims. AFAIS, most of the P40s shipped to Java never left their boxes, having been sunk on Langley, or voluntarily destroyed (burned) in Soerbaja. Most of the Hurricane losses in Indonesia that I can document so far were operational write-offs. Six shot down by virtue of being bounced in a landing pattern (not what you'd call a head to head meeting engagement in which the pilots can fly the planes to the virtue of their training and the a/c's capabilities), and they seem to have shot down as many Japanese a/c (30 claimed, which I read as 5 kills and 5 possibles).

I won't dispute Sakai's observation that the A6M was a much better plane than the F2 or P36.

In any case, I'm done. We don't agree, fine. To repeat, if you have a credible source of actual losses in combat of Allied army fighters against Japanese fighters prior to April 1942, I'll read it. Sakai is not a credible source on Allied losses. He did not and could not know how many allied a/c were engaged in any particular engagement. He did not and could not know with any accuracy how many Allied a/c were shot down. Since his claims were not verified by his co-author (nor did they try, because it was a personal narrative not an in-depth military assessment), they mean nothing.

I'm glad, by the way, that you think UV is better than GGPW. It gives me hope for more improvement on the way to WitP.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 204
- 7/23/2002 10:54:14 PM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		Thats good to hear. I'm done as well, considering i did find the now 2 year old thread over on the PacWar forum in which much the same things were said by you, me and a slew of other people (hence the comment about me and "alot others", hardly the "Cult" of Nik, given i had maybe three or four entries in dozens but i found some good nuggets that explained certain points i've tied to make better than i did, moot since all you care about are kill statistics from your one or two source books)

Agreed. We could talk "kill ratios" till the cows come home and its clear we wont agree on the signifigance of them vis-a-vis IJN/A planes and their pilots. Its no different then......its no different now. I'll leave it to others to decide for themselves. The posts are all there. Thats what the're for after all

I've heard that said about Sakai and others before too. Often sources that disagree with glowing USN/AAF conclusions are thus labeled. Never the less, he shot down a *confirmed* 64 planes, most of them in the Pacific war (only 2, possibly 3 in China) and his experiences belie the impression that all the Japanese air force did in the first six months of the war was shoot up crated planes or those in a landing pattern. And no....they were not all P-36's and F2's.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 205
Quality of Information - 7/23/2002 11:15:19 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		I'm not gonna let you walk with anaspersion on Frank or on Lundstrom. Lundstrom has an MA. Frank, a PhD. You don't have either, AFAIK. Sakai didn't. Their books were peer-reviewed scholarly *research based* books. Sakai's was a non-peer-reviewed narrative with no substantive research. They're not equivalents. Frank, and Lundstrom used *both* IJN (in order to get reliable counts on Japanese losses) and USN (in order to get reliable accounts on USN losses) unit records. Sakai's "confirmed" victories are "confirmed by the Japanese." They are no more reliable than the "confirmed" claims by B17 crews of Axis fighters shot down over Germany or Allied pilots claims over Guadalacanal.

For reliable numbers you have to go to the most credible source. That means Japanese unit records for Japanese losses, and not Allied pilot claims. That means Allied unit records for Allied losses and not Japanese pilot claims.

Again, to the point. Have you any source that uses losses from unit records to account for combat losses prior to April 1942?

Name one, if you can, and I'll try to find it. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 206
- 7/24/2002 1:22:30 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		Thought you said you were done? :)

I'm not gonna let you walk all over Sakai either. I found his book to be well written, thoughtful, insightful and hardly "one sided". Much of what he said and related on directly touches upon many of the subjects dwelled up herein. But as always, i find high amusement in the "pick and choose" method people like you use when considering such sources. They're reliable and accurate, as long as their agreeing with your viewpoint. In the end you dismiss him and others because they failed to confirm your 'theory' of helpless Zeros and experienced pilots holding their heads in despair as P-39's and 40's effortlessly took them apart regardless of what they might do to counter it

Ye old " They dont know what their talking about" spiel. Nothing new here


I'm not gonna talk about the numbers anymore. Been there done that, its been discussed here and on the other thread ad-nausium Cling to them and the one or two books you got them from if you must because they are all you can fall back on whenever a new point or factor is introduced. The air war remains a much larger equation.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 207
Quality of source - 7/24/2002 2:26:51 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Look here, Nikademus. It's not a matter of "pick and choose" or arbitrary choice, or rejecting a viewpoint because it is contrary, or "guys like you" as you put it. You're opretty consistent about trying to make this about *me,* and I'm trying to make it about the *evidence* presented by scholars. Your arguments are ad hominem, non-sequitur, and not scholarly. Do you really think that your approach to argumentation is enhancing your credibility?

When I compare Lundstrom and Frank and Sakai, it's a matter of assessing who is qualified to make what kind of observation. I'm not dissing Sakai. He was a great pilot and knew his plane well. Neither he nor his co-author researched the unit losses of the Allied units that Sakai engaged. *They did not even try.* *That wasn't the puropse of their book.* They were not presenting Samurai (which is, I assume, the source you mean) as a *research* book and its specific purpose was not to assess the efficacy of the various combatants pilots and a/c. Sakai talks about his opinions, but they are anecdotes.

"I'm not gonna talk about the numbers anymore."

You haven't talked *numbers* at all. You've just claimed either that the numbers aren't relevant, or more incredibly, that the research done by historians Richard B. Frank, PhD, and John B. Lundstrom, MA, is unreliable even though the peer-reviews of their works are overwhelmingly praiseful. Geesh!

It's supremely ironic that you accuse me of "clinging" to a position or selectively retaining information from a limited suite of books, when:

1. You won't state your criteria for evaluating the issue.
2. You have not named, yet, *any* source for your claims, although I gather from your remarks that you've read "Samurai."
3. You can't cite a scholarly source that rebuts the numbers presented by Frank or Lundstrom (all you seem to be able to do is vaguely accuse them of bad scholarship).
4. You can't address the basic question of combat losses or a/c performance.
5. Still can't name a credible source for combat losses during the early part of the war.
6. Given the apparent absence of hard evidence to support your position you fall back on the fundamentally illogical and irrational tactic of insulting me.

I may be wrong on all this. At this point, I've had my fill of your aspersions, your unwillingness or inability to address the points that I've raised, and your inability to support any of your own claims.

I welcome the participation of anyone who can name credible sources with quantitative information on this matter, in regards to aerial combat prior to April 1942 in the ABDA, Malaya, and SWPac areas.

Cheers to all of you who have patiently read from the sidelines.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 208
- 7/24/2002 2:50:49 AM   
dgaad

 

Posts: 864
Joined: 7/25/2001
From: Hockeytown
Status: offline 		I do find Mdiehls arguments persuasive because they appear to be based on sources that based their conclusions, numbers, assumptions, on the most reliable primary source documents available.

I find Nikki's viewpoints and arguments to have some value as well. But he is evasive when faced with the numbers, as he realizes that's an argument he cant win. The numbers pertaining to kill ratios do not bear out the general claim that the zero was a "much better plane" or that the Japanese were "much better pilots."

[QUOTE]

TMBR: Authors such as Eric Bergerud argue that Japanese aircraft ultimately proved unsuitable for the demands of Second World War air combat? Do you agree?

Peattie: Yes, I do. Again, the problem goes back to mistaken Japanese assumptions about the kind of war it planned to fight ---- a lightning war which would bring us to our knees after a few slashing offensives -- as opposed to the kind of war it was actually obliged to fight -- a grinding war of attrition. The aircraft it had available in the first few months of Japan's lightning offensives at the opening of the Pacific War were eminently suited to that strategy and to the navy's tactical air doctrine: fast aircraft, with incredible range, and, in the case of its fighter planes, aircraft that were agile and powerfully armed. In the hands of outstanding pilots these aircraft were formidable. But they had inadequate protection for the most valuable assets of the navy's air service: its aircrews. Attrition of experienced aircrews and the vulnerability of the navy's aircraft thus had a fatally symbiotic relationship in an ever-increasing spiral of destruction for both.

One other element of the eventual unsuitability of Japanese naval aircraft should be mentioned : inferior power plants. The Zero, for example, had an engine that was well suited to the intricate maneuvers of relatively low-speed, low-altitude dog fighting. But by 1943 they were hopelessly outclassed by American aircraft like the Corsair and Lightning and their greater power plants which were admirably adapted to the new American tactics of climbing and diving pursuit.


[/QUOTE]

_____________________________

Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. ;)

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 209
- 7/24/2002 3:58:30 AM   
Joel Billings


Posts: 32265
Joined: 9/20/2000
From: Santa Rosa, CA
Status: offline 		We are very close to releasing the new patch. Thanks to some quick response testing and comments from Erik (also U2 and a few others), we may finally have the combination of changes that will resolve the low level bombing issue. One bug was found (CAP diving down were taking added disruption when this was not intended) which made it easier for the low level strikes to get through CAP. In addition to previous changes I said we were going to make, Gary also added code that would make low level bombers without experienced pilots (exp 70 +rnd(20)) very bad at hitting targets that are defended by decent CAP/flak. At this point, if anything, the delay in repairing heavy bombers will probably be considered overkill and we'll start hearing complaints that the B-17's aren't performing as well as they should.

No promises, but we hope to be releasing a patch by late tonight or tomorrow morning so cross your fingers and hope the test group doesn't find something today that will delay release of the patch. This is an "unofficial" announcement, as Matrix still has to put their stamp of approval on the patch and actually set it up for public access.

(in reply to Jagger2002)
Post #: 210
Page:   <<   < prev  5 6 [7] 8 9   next >   >>
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Uncommon Valor - Campaign for the South Pacific >> Page: <<   < prev  5 6 [7] 8 9   next >   >>
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.765