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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >>

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- 8/29/2002 6:28:12 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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When the Japanese did their foray into the Indian Ocean in March-April 1942 neither the British nor Americans were sure wether or not this was a prelude to an invasion of Ceylon or not. At this time, a series of under strength Brigades garrisoned Ceylon, along with about 3 Squadrons of Hurricanes, and one of Blenheims. The IJN Spent about a month in the region, and used only a fraction of its strength (5, and later 4 Carriers, 1 CVL, 4 BB, 12 or so CA, a few CL and some DD). This was hardly the entire strength of the IJN, but this was capable of kicking the RN out of the Indian Ocean until late 1942.

The RAF was heavily committed in Europe and North Africa and could only spare emergency Hurricane squadrons. This would probably be sufficient (like historically) to keep neither side from gaining total air superiority, but not requiring either to commit major forces (since this would be a relatively low RAF priority area).

Also, the US made no attempts at any offensive other than the ineffectual carrier raids along the Japanese barrier during the months that the IJN carriers were in the Indian Ocean and East Indies. They did not have the fuel train, nor forward bases in order to mount an offensive in the Central Pacific, and would not have them until late 1942. The primary responsibility of the US Command was holding the current line and prepare for their next offensive move, which could only take place in a relatively limited attack (Guadalcanal type attack with one Division) that would be located fairly near built up bases (New Caledonia). It would take time for the US to adequately train enough forces to occupy and hold the islands of the Central Pacific. The 2 USMC Divisions were either occupied (1st Division at Iceland) and still expanding to Divisional size, with the other Infantry Divisions having no amphibious training or experience. Even though there was not much IJN opposition the US did not have the ability to secure all of the bases required to actually do some damage to the Japanese, plus have the inevitable counterattack by the IJN (wherever it is located at). Who is to say that the IJN might pull a "Midway" on the United States?

USN Shipping was also in a very tight situation at this moment. The Liberty and Victory ships had yet to be launched in high numbers, plus the European theatre had 1st dibs on transport. The ability for the USN to launch a series of amphibious assaults and maintain these bases in the face of an inevitable counterattack was not possible in early 1942, nor even in late 1942.

Also, the Allies did have a good codebreaking system, but did not know everything about the Japanese Army and Navy. They were not totally sure of the strength of Japanese Garrisions and tended to overinflate the numbers of Japanese. So even seeing an invasion of India the US might still think that there were significant forces to withstand an offensive that they did not yet have the tools to launch.

Also, ship transport would probably have not affected IJN operations in the Central and South Pacific since the IJA had their own transport fleet (about 2 000 000t of Japanese shipping was dedicated for the IJA). It was only by late 1942 when significant IJA formations were required in the South Pacific (2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions). The Japanese would have to scale back operations in other theatres, but this does not necessarily mean that it will be entirely the Central and Southern Pacific. Possibly seeing the state that Russia was in, troops could be withdrawn from Manchuria much earlier (one wonders why this was not actually done!).

Even though it is IMPOSSIBLE to say what would have happened, extrapolating from history what happened when similar situations occurred (i.e., what the USN did when the knew that the Carriers were at the Western end of the Pacific and totally tied up there). The USN did take some risks, but was primarily using these months to scout out the Japanese positions, to see what the IJN frontline was. There are no definite outcomes or finite requirements to an invasion of India. The defensive and offensive capabilities of the Allies was in question during this period, as until December 1941 it was of very low priority, and even afterward most resources were dedicated to the European war.

Basically there are three options for the Japanese after securing the East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines.

#1. Defend what has been captured. (cautious move, could extend the war into 1947 due to the IJN not being crippled by Midway)

#2. Bring a decisive battle in 1942 by attacking and risking your carrier fleet.

#3. Knock England, and thereby China, out of the Pacific War.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 61

- 8/29/2002 8:17:09 AM

TIMJOT

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Good post Jeremy, Especially since it echoes my sentiments exactly. I agree there was no way the US had the capability to launch an central pacific offensive in the spring of 42. Thats why the IJN decided it was safe to raid the Indian ocean in the first place.

Not sure about #3 though. I doubt that even loseing India would have knocked Britain out of the war, now that the US was in it. But it might have knocked China out of the war. I doubt Chang Kai Shek could have maintained even his nominal control without Allied aid. More likely the Nationalist front would have devolved into competing Warlord factions in much of china. Each eager to cut seperate deals with Japan to benefit their own positions.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 62

- 8/29/2002 10:36:31 PM

mdiehl

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The PI campaign was hardly "won" just because the USAAFFE were bottled up on the Bataan Peninsula. There was a massive commitment of aircraft to keep the US troops out of supply and demoralized. The stasis on the peninsula wore out two Japanese divisions faster than the US army ones, and resulted in the substantial delay of the Burma campaign. If you don't commit the a/c, the US could have resupplied via New Guinea-N.Australia-Mindanao.

(Equally important, although perhaps counterfactual, is you can do what I usually do in GGPW. Evacuate the PI and deny the Japanese all the casualty VP and redploy those nice tanks, guns and soldiers some place where they can be supported. ;) )

As to deep penetration raids: the USN *could* and *did* in April 1942. And lesser penetration raids from Rabaul to Marcus during the window of which you are speaking.

Re: Ceylon. Ceylon is feasible to invade although again it gives the IJN a hellacious line of supply. It's a whole different can of worms from India. And the historical case you mention would have been much more obvious to the UK and USN planners if any Japanese troops had landed somewhere in Ceylon (or, as discussed below, India).

But we're basically arguing about counterfactuals here. Any analyst at the time could look at India and know that *if* Japan is going to *try* it, they're going to have to commit a *huge* ground force, a *huge* air force, and Kido Butai for a *long time.* An invasion of India will be instantly and transparently "not a raid." The moment the first IJN Infantry division lands near Calcutta, covered by Kido Butai, you've sent the following message to the USN: "We're totally committed here in the Bay of Bengal, feel free to do anything you like from Palau to Rabaul to the Hawaiian Islands."

And that is basically what the USN would have done. Not only *could* they have mounted an invasion in the cenpac (the divisions and tranpsorts were available, and Japanese garrisons were incredibly weak in the CenPac at the time), but the invitation to do so (both to really hurt the Japanese war effort and to take some pressure off of India) might have been too tempting to let pass.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 63

- 8/30/2002 12:09:21 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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I still think you overestimate the US's ability to conquer the Central Pacific, even with the weak state of the IJN, you also overestimate the amount of commitment the IJN must have in the Indian Ocean. The RN was effectively defeated, with no forseeable effective reinforcements in the near future.

There were not enough USN transports, and these were the only thing that mattered in invasions of this scale. This has been a major part of PacWar discussion throughout the 10 years the game has been in existence that the game allowed for the Allies to do too many large amphibious assaults too early. There was a heavy shortage of landing craft (even up till 1943) which is critical to do a series of invasions over a large area.

The IJN had a very good system of invading relatively weakly held bases through their implementation of heavy reliance on SNLF detachments, trained and suited for exactly these types of operations (not very good when real opposition was encountered). The USMC had Marine Defense battalions, and 2 Divisions that were not yet ready for operations. The other formations did not have sufficient training to suddenly become amphibious formations.

More IJAAF aircraft were involved in the Pacific War operations in 1941 then there were in China, Manchuria and the Home Islands combined. The IJAAF was not involved in operations against the US until mid-late 1943. So sending the IJAAF to India, in whatever number, would not impair Japanese operations in the South-Central Pacific until possibly 1943 (which by that time China might have been totally cut off). Significant aircraft could be deployed to India without compromizing any actions in the Central-South Pacific.

The IJNAF was primarily responsible for the region that you stated cut off the Philippines from supply (Eastern East Indies was under IJN command). The IJAAF that fought in Burma was actually the one that fought in the East Indies (which was originally in the Philippines but withdrawn EARLIER then planned, along with the 48th Division because progress was ahead of schedule). As I said, it did fight in the Philippines, but the delay in the Philippines did not affect the deployment of these IJAAF formations to the East Indies (infact got their earlier then planned) or Burma (got their earlier too, due to the campaign in the East Indies runnng ahead of schedule as well). The IJNAF groups used to cut off the Philippines also served to cut off the East Indies (Java). The holdout of the Philippines did nothing to delay any Japanese action in the Pacific. In fact, the Japanese were ahead of schedule in every other theatre but the Philippines (including Burma).

The IJAAF units directly used in the Philippines were primarily obsolete units, such as the Ki-27, Ki-32 and Ki-21. Most of the IJNAF left the region to take up positions in the Eastern East Indies (and stayed there operating against North-Western Australia).

China and Manchuria did eat up a significant amount of IJA formations and aircraft, but significant numbers were freed up for the invasion of the Pacific. The IJA did not get involved with the US (except for the Philippines) until late 1942, and only heavily in 1943. The formations that fought the US in this theatre came primarily from China-Manchuria, not touching the sizeable forces (8 Infantry Divisions, 2 Air Armies) defending against the British.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 64

- 8/30/2002 2:30:08 AM

mdiehl

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The UK does not need the RN to thwart that. They can substantially destroy any Japanese invasion TF and any logistical train with land based air unless you deploy IMO all the IJN carriers to cover the operation *and keep them there a while.* The IJAAF hasn't the range (for most of its A/C) to even *get to* India, (from, say, Rangoon, except with Oscars), much less fly a more or less continuous CAP over the assault forces for the 5 days or so of daylight hours that would be the *minimum* amount of time to unload a full IJN division and its infrastructure. To give the job a prayer of success you'd need *at least* three months of continuous aircover, with the IJAAF infrastructure and a/c hopefully in place by the end of that to relieve the IJN. To protect the invasion it's Kido Butai and all the supporting light carriers or no invasion during those 12 weeks.

In the end, though, the critical problem is supply. Take whatever force you want, imagine it deployed in the PI. Take the same force, multiply the supply infrastructure needed to keep it running by at least ten. Add to the logistical requirement the ships and supplies (again, multiplied by ten) to support the IJAAF air units used to cover the ground units and supply train. The one-way distance from Japan to India via the S.China Sea, Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean is comparable to the distance from SF to Darwin. Throw in a few problems (like IJN container ships being generally smaller and slower) and you have a huge logistical train to provide. IIRC, the Japanese did not at any time have the ships for this commitment without cancelling *all* other PTO operations and (a) suspending operations in China and allowing units there to deteriorate in the field, or (b) biting deeply into the pool of vessels used to keep the basic economic infrastructure of Japan running.

As to the US capability. Since it is reasonable to assume a Japanese counterfactual (the premise: a serious attempt to invade India occurs) it is completely reasonable to assume a UK/US counterfactual. IMO these include substantial USAAF or Army division reinforcements to India, CV raids almost anywhere the USN wants to go, and small invasions anywhere along the defensive perimeter.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 65

- 8/30/2002 9:59:19 AM

TIMJOT

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Mdielhl.

Where to begin..... First Bataan surrendered April 10th . The so-called Battaan Air force never had more than 6 p-40s and 2 p-35s. The airfields on Battaan where nothing more than dirt strips that could not accomodate bombers.

Delay Burma?..... How did the PI delay Burma? The Burma campaign started when the Malaya Campaign ended. No Division in PI were deployed in Burma.

Massive committment of a/c ? ......Actually the entire11th Air Fleet was withdrawn in early Jan. This left only 1 army air-Bgd. operating in the PI theater.

Mindanao?..... The US Army tried to operate from Delmonte, but had to withdraw by the end of Dec. because it proved impossible to supply.

Deep penetration Raids?............. by this I hope you dont mean the Doolittle publicity stunt. The raids on Marshalls, Gilbers, Rabaul were totally enfectual.

RAF LBA????............ What RAF LBA? The Brits threw all the reserves they had in the Mideast to defend Singapore and DEI, losing a whole Bomber and Fighter wings. In April and May the RAF had only a few Hurricans and even less Blenhiems counter a Japanese invasion. Dont forget Rommels Gazala offensive starts early May.

Kido-Bhutai 3 months?..... The MO of the Japanese offensives were to quickly capture or establish airbases after landing. Air superiorty would not be too difficult to establish because like I said the RAFs presence in India was miniscule. I can see may 2 to three CVLs needing to hang as around as a precaustion to keep sea lanes secure.

US Offensive in April/May?.... I agree with Jeremy, your way off with this one. First the 1st Marines in the Atlantic, 2nd Marines reforming. Those "Geat National Gds Divisions" you speak so highly about were a joke. The 41st NG Div. was offered to MacArthur in the PI Nov. 41. and acually refused to take it becuase it was so badly trained. The 41st and 39th NGs were eventually sent to Australia in spring 42 for Coalition Political reasons. They needed almost 6months of intensive training before they were considered deployable. Not to mention as Jeremy states the USN wholly inadequate fleet train, amnd zero landing craft.

Ask yourself this question. Why if the US was so primed to go on the offensive? Did they not in March/April when they Knew by decrypts the IJN had at leas 5 Carriers and 4 BBs tied up in the Indian Ocean??

SF to Darwin??....... Hmmmm.. SF to Darwin is roughly 7000 nautical miles. Tokyo to Calcutta is roughly 4500 Nautical miles. I wouldnt call a 2500 mile difference the similar distance.

You might like to know that Churchill pleaded with FDR during the IJN raid, to have the USN go on the offensive in the Pacific to take pressure off the Indian ocean. FDR basically replied that the US was unable at this time.

You are right in one respect. A Japanese invasion would probably force the RN to commit more resources to the Indian ocean. Which intern would force the US to commit more resouces to the Atlantic/Med. Which might mean the Hornet and Wasp do not deploy to the Pacific.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 66

- 8/30/2002 10:52:52 AM

TIMJOT

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Jeremy, sorry for repeating much what you said. I only read your post after responding to Mdeihl's. Yours is much more well written than mine. Of course Mdeihl response once again ignores the points that correctly dispells his own historically incorrect assertions.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 67

- 8/30/2002 8:30:17 PM

Jeremy Pritchard

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The really good British Merchant Naval Interdiction air squadrons (Primarily Beaufighters) were very busy in the Medeterranean, and they did not start appearing in small numbers in the Indian theatre until late 1942 when the Italian Navy started to become subdued (with North Africa secured there was no reason to interdict as much shipping). In fact, the IJNAF had a better chance in interdicting USN shipping in its attack on the perimeter in 1942 then the RAF/FAA did during the same period.

Who really is to say what the British would sacrifice in order to save India. Possibly the RN, possibly an invasion of Italy? Maybe a trigger in the game should be that should the British require extra ships, aircraft and/or troops then some later reinforcement is sacrificed (due to the elogation of the war in Europe). Undoubtedly the North African campaign was lengthened with the removal of the 18th and 70th UK Divisions, many fighter and bomber wings, along with supporting Indian units (due to Malaya). I dont know wether or not this should be something that the player would accept or decline (I can only think of a few instances where extra troops were declined by a commander).

I was reading up on the Tarawa attack a few months back (in early 1943), and the invasion was surrounded with problems and limitations. Notably was the shortage of landing craft, especially tracked landing craft that were critical for invading defended Atolls (even lightly defended ones). The US had to rely on enough surviving the 1st wave of attackers to move the 2nd wave to the shore. This was in 1943. The only Atoll that the Japanese had to attack was Wake Island, and the result of that one is clearly documented (even with a very small garrision of around 300). Had the US attacked Japan's Atolls (one of which would have to be Kwajelein, which in 1941 was probably the best defended Atoll in the Pacific), it would have had to use tactics like the Japanese did attacking Wake Island, which was very costly in the lives of the attackers. Plus, even these attackers of Wake Island were trained in Amphibious assault, while most US formations were not. Supporting carriers were also a shortage, requiring CVE's to act in fleet roles to give air cover for the invasions (which resulted in the loss of 1 CVE during the Tarawa attack due to a sub).

However, with all of that said, I do think that an invasion of India will affect operations in the South-Central Pacific, but not at the same extent. It would give the US a very good breather which it could use to better prepare for its next move. The Japanese would have less access to IJA Land Units to defend its perimeter by 1943, and should the India campaign not positively affect operations in China (either causing complete collapse, or weakening the KMT enough that a smaller garrison was required) then the US will have a very easy time at rolling up the Japanese flank (when they started to get the required shipping).

The US Industry was huge, but it still did not perform miracles. It took until 1944 before both the US and UK combined could produce enough landing craft to land the invasion force for Normandy, and with the Pacific being a secondary campaign, even for the US, they were getting far less equipment.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 68

- 8/30/2002 10:41:21 PM

mdiehl

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Sorry for repeating much of what I've said but I must disabuse TIMJOT of his incorrect historical assertions.

(1) Corregidor surrendered in May, that's when the PI campaign ended.

(2) The IJA divisions sent to Bataan to finish off the USAAFFE there were originally slated for Burma, and the Burma campaign would have started earlier than it historically did had the USAAFFE not held out far longer than the IJA anticipated.

(3) The "ineffectual" raid on Rabaul delayed deployment of slated a/c reinfircements for 3 weeks. I do not have the infrastructure damage to hand, but the IJNAF all-Betty counterstrike of 17 a/c resulted in 11 Betties destroyed and 6 heavily damaged for *no hits,* thereby depriving the IJNAAF of valuable veteran air crew at no expense to the USN. As a result of the loss, the planned IJNAF build-up at Rabaul was delayed until after the Midway campaign, depriving Japan of an important strategic asset during the PM campaign. Here's a hint: recon.

(4) RAF. Since we're talking about *counterfactual* history it is completely reasonable to assume that the RAF/RIAF would have been given higher priority than they were, or that the USAAF would have lent a hand in India. Certainly the RAF had many a/c tied up in the UK at the time, and Germany was manifestly neither going to invade Great Britain nor launch any substantial, significant air campaign, given their overextended state in the Med and Russia.

(5) A dirt strip will support almost any single engined a/c and often (depending on underlying soils, substrate, and drainage) potentially much more. IL2s often operated from such unpleasant billets. I think a bunch of Army SBDs could manage it. More to the point perhaps is that given the US's heavy emphasis on logistics and air doctrine, any "dirt" airstrip can rapidly become a 2 mile long Marston mat on compact gravel, just as surely as the fact that with enough thrust, even a brick (or an F4 Phantom) can "fly."

(6) Yes. 3 months. IJA operational planners "were to quickly capture or establish" .. the key there is "were to." At Rabaul, Henderson, New Georgia, Pelelieu, really just about everywhere, Japanese operational planners were greatly optimistic in their assessments of the time required to put AFs in operation.

(7) The (your word) "great" NG brigades not only were not a casually dismissed joke, they actually formed the core of the excellent AmeriCal division and the initial army troops contributed to the G'canal campaign. You're way off on your assement of these divisions. By the way, there's 6 months of training separating the 41st as offered to Mac in October 1941 and as offered to ANZAC in 1942. The "political" reason was that these troops would likely have kicked the adz of any veteran Japanese division incautiously dumped into Australia. Not a ethnic supremacy thing: simply a consequence of the US Army's historic doctrinal emphasis on better living through fraking unbelievably massive firepower. What was the German saying? American troops were not so tough when you could see them through the curtain of exploding artillery shells, and when you weren't ducking jabos or direct fire from armor.

(8) Ask yourself, why, with 4 CVs in the Indian Ocean in April 1942, were the Japanese unable to mount any effective counterstrike, or even set any CVs to intercept, the two USN CVs bombing Tokyo, or even *find* them with land based air from, say, Japan, Marcus, Wake, Iwo Jima, Guam, Saipan, Kwajalein, Eniwetok? Why were they unaware of a single USN CV raiding Rabaul? Why were they unable to detect the CV raids at Tarawa?

The rest of your post is non-sequitur and I refuse to deal with it. Your incredulity invites response, but I decline.

Jeremy. Not all invasions required LC. Tarawa was horrid because of the large, very shallow surrounding coral reefs. Different situation entirely from, say, New Britain, Guam or Saipan, and most worthy targets in the Indonesian barrier. Bear in mind though that Tarawa in 1943 was a much tougher garrison than in early 1942 with respect to beach defenses, fortifications, AAA, garrison strength etc. LC were mandated in teh Normandy campaign because of the manifest need to get *lots* of material ashore in a really huge hurry.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 69

- 8/30/2002 10:45:17 PM

TIMJOT

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IMO, The reason to invade India is to knock China out of the war. Not to add a Nippon Raj to the empire. Its a risk, but if China can be taken out of the equation by Mid 42, then Japan will be in a much stronger position to defend its preimeter in 43/44. On the other hand if Japan finds itself bogged down indecisively in India and China still requireing the lionshare of the IJA resources. Then all bets are off and Japan would probably be in a even worst position than historically.

I personally think many players would enjoy taking the risk, if for no other reason than it would be an interesting change of pace. Much like a scenerio where a US DOW is not automatic. I never understand players who are obcessed that games play out exactly as historical. What fun is that? As long as a given strategy or scenerio has some level of historical basis, then why shouldnt it be allowed?

The fact is an Indian ocean strategy was seriosly considered by the IJN and if the IJA had been convinced that it could resolve its China problem then it might very well have been tried. The problem was that the IJA thought cutting the Burma road was sufficient. They never considered that the Allies would be able to pull off the "Over the Hump" air supply route.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 70

- 8/30/2002 10:52:45 PM

mdiehl

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There at least we agree. I see no reason why the Japanese player should not be allowed to *try* it. I see little reason, if the game is properly modeled with respect to logistics, and gives the Allies the same kind of counterfactual flexibility, to believe that Japan could succeed.

One way to reward a short-term success in this area is to give Japan some decent VP kudos for the effort. Taking Calcutta for example might hand the Japanese some permanent VPs, rather than the temporary ones that one gets in GGPW.

As to your rehtorical question: I do not think anyone demands a game taht plays out exactly as history. I think this has been stated before but I will say it again. The real fun (well, for me anyhow) both as the Japanese and the Allies, is to see if you can do better with substantially the same set of constraints with respect to productoin, economics, logistics, OOB and the like. That puts the player in the seat of assessing risks and costs for rewards, setting strategic and operational priorities, and putting the pieces in place to execute the plan.

What I do not find at all appealing is the idea that in a PBEM game one player has access to widely ahistoric flexibility (in many games this is of necessity the Axis, since they lost and the idea is to see if they can win), while the other side is saddled with the usual cliches. If it's plausible to speculate that Japan starts the war without attacking the US, it is entirely plausible to speculate that when the war starts the UK is, for example, not at war with anyone else, or that Singapore is heavily fortified from all approaches, or the US looks at the situation and says "Great! And puts the available interval into turning the PI into Japan's worst nightmare, and substantially fortifiying and beefing Guam, Wake, Rabaul, etc.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 71

- 8/31/2002 1:56:07 AM

TIMJOT

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Mdeihl,

I know full well, that Corregedore fell in May.... So what? Are you now saying that a handful of half starved and deseased men isolated on a rock somehow, delayed the Burma campaign?

I state again. What delay? The 15th Army captured Rangoon March 8th 42 and had captured Lashio on April 29 cutting off the Burma Road and for all practical purposes ending the campaign.

I have no knowledge of either of Hommas divs ( 16th & 4th ) being slated for the Burma campaign. Please state your source.

RE: Dirt strips & bombers......... For your information USAFFE had a group of SBDs sitting at Darwin, but THERE WAS NO WAY TO GET THEM TO THE PI! MacArthur pleaded with the USN to deliver them via carriers along with fighters and was flatly rejected. The USN refused to risk its carriers and besides rightly pointed out that there would be no way to supply them with the neccessary fuel, parts and ordance even if they could deliver them.

Now tell me. How exactly are you going to get that Marsten mat to the PI? Besides Im not even sure it had been developed yet.

Its all a moot point anyway. Since Bataan was already gone, or are you suggesting that the US could have operated a bomber group from Corregedore?

RE: RAF......You should read Churchills memoires. He and the British High command truely believed that the Japanese intended to invade Ceylon, India and perhaps even Madagascar yet the where unable to send subtantial reinforcements. At any rate air unitis form Britian would have taken months to deploy. The Mideast? Sorry a little thing at Gazala was going on.

RE:NG Div..... Sorry they simply where not ready for combat in spring 42. The 41st and 32nd spent an additional 5-6 months training before they were deemed ready to deploy. The reason they were sent to Australia was to asuage PM Curtain fears and to allow the Aus.6th Div. to be temporarily deployed to Ceylon. The Bgd Group that became the Americal Div. landed on NewCaladonia in April and spent 6 months on garrisson duty and training before seeing its first combat in Oct 42

Mdhiel,
I would appreciate it if we could keep this discussion civilized. I can do without the smugness. I apologize if I upset you, but its terribly frustrating when you ignore factual counter points from posters like Jeremy and I when they refute your often unsubtantiated assertions.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 72

- 8/31/2002 2:22:13 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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As this debate continues you do realise that everyone is coming more and more to realistic possibilities. However, we should ALL keep out the sarcastic and derogatory remarks that basically state "only a moron would beleive the sources and position you are defending" (which was done by both sides) as this really detracts from the argument which will result in nothing being solved.

Sure, we will all get some little facts messed up, like the fact that US National Guard units were indeed better than forces drawn up from conscripts (most of the IJA), and that the Bataan and Corregidor operations did not take up forces meant for Burma (the 4th IJA Division later went to Palembang as a garrison force, never to fight again, and the 16th Division stayed in the Philippines until it was eliminated at Leyte). However, we each do have valid main points. Since we are working in the hypothetical here, we must rely on guessing from historical similarities.

I have learned a lot during this discussion about possibilities that I never considered, and hope that others have learned from my information. Personally, I tend to play the Allies over the Japanese (I am a big fan of the early war, 1942, and am always up for the underdog).

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 73

- 8/31/2002 3:17:15 AM

mdiehl

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TIMJOT, I think we're just talkin past each other. You've posited a strong Japanese counterfactual, and seem to think that the Indian invasion would not have required a substantial diversion of air assets (both CV based and IJN Air flots) to the Bay of Bengal. I don't agree. Hence, when I say that the PI could be reinforced, it means you could get those SBDs, to the PI in any number of ship borne ways, and larger a/c by the more direct method of flying. They could do it, IMO, because there's not anything guarding the central Pacific to present a problem for the effort.

I'm willing to play the counterfactual history speculation and go along with all manner of pretty radical "what ifs." But these counterfactuals have plausible consequences, and one of them, IMO, is that if you really want to take India you really must weaken all the assets in the CenPac. In that event, Allied ships and planes that historically could not have gotten to the PI could *likely* have done so.

Unfortunate that you're annoyed about the Corregidor thing. I recall referring to the PI campaign, not just Bataan. But see here, you've said the invasion of India could start in March. Even Bataan was holding on at that point. The delays to which I referred were delays in starting, not delays in completion. But I will recheck some old sources, the later IJA divisions committed to Bataan/Corregidor were slated for another operation but will have to see whether it was Burma or China or GKW.

[QUOTE]I would appreciate it if we could keep this discussion civilized. I can do without the smugness. I apologize if I upset you, but its terribly frustrating when you ignore factual counter points from posters like Jeremy and I when they refute your often unsubtantiated assertions.[/QUOTE]

Sounds great to me. Do you see nothing slightly, er, ironic, in your remark? And I do recall being spattered quite thoroughly over a TYPO (the word was "doctrine" but mis-spelled) in another thread.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 74

- 8/31/2002 5:05:15 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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Here are the two arguments. (Correct me if I get parts or whole wrong).

#1. Any attack on India will take too many resources from the Central Pacific to withstand even a weak US attack.

#2. Any attack on India can still take place without drawing critical resources from the Central Pacific.

Details aside, these are the two points.

Points toward #1

China took up vast numbers of troops and aircraft, as well as supply. Attacking India would be like a 2nd China.

The US has shown some daring raids (Doolittle, March Atoll Raids) and could have landed some small forces to secure the vital Marshall Islands, then the undefended Marianas.

An attack on India will take up most of the supply ships.

Points toward #2

Most troops and equipment needed for the India operation were IJA. Most troops and equipment needed for the Central Pacific area were IJN.

The US was so short of transport that it could not take and hold all of the islands required to with any certainty and would not be a threat until late 1942. The USN will not risk their carriers.

The IJA had their own supply convoy system, independent of the IJN, so this would not impede IJN supply and military operations in the Central Pacific.

A big note of contention is the involvement of the IJN. It seems like this is the critical point to both arguments.

#1 Argues that the Carrier Air Fleet is required in the Indian Ocean in order to secure the naval supply routes.

#2 Argues that the RN is too heavily involved in the Atlantic and Medeterranean to offer much resistance so the IJN will only need token forces that were already based in the region.

However, we will never know the RN policy of a realized crisis in India. The Ceylon operation was a possible immenent crisis, but it never materialized. We dont know England's response to an actual invasion, and we don't really know what units could be spared from other fronts. We can only guess and compare what is going on in the rest of the Empire to see what could be avalible at what cost.

Basically, each side argues that the other overestimates the ability of one organization and underestimates the ability of the other, with a lot based in fact.

The technical facts about what could have happened in the Philippines is dependent COMPLETELY on the disagreement between the commitment of the IJN in any action in the Indian Ocean. The arguments over this subject are pretty much useless, as they are dependent on a larger topic of discussion totally.

*Some historical notes.

You might have mixed up IJA forces in Malaya and forces in the Philippines. The 18th Division participated in the Malayan campaign and was slated to join the 15th Army in Burma once this was completed. In reality, the holdout of Bataan and Corregidor did not impede any theatre of war other then the Philippine theatre (as all units used during this period ended up remaining in the Philippines or as garrison). The Philippines was pretty much written off by the US high command who were very keen in not risking their carriers (Rabul raid was called off even though the G4M's were beaten, Doolittle was launched far from their set launch area due to a run in with a fishing trawler). There were virtually no avalible troops to send to the Philippines had an opportunity arisen anyway.

We can argue in circles around what if this, what if that, then if this then that, but there are infinite possibilities to certain circumstances. I guess we will really have to wait and see how well things are modeled in this game.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 75

- 8/31/2002 5:20:55 AM

mdiehl

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Nice post Jeremy.

I'm arguing for Kido Butai to cover the invasion forces because I don't see how the IJAAF or even the land based IJNAF flotillas have sufficient range to cover much of India. You could get Betties and Nells there, but you'd leave their escorts behind except at Calcutta. (Do I need to point out what a disaster this would be for Japan?) Even there, much of the IJAAF OOB everywhere lacks planes with the necessary range. It's got to be the (cruddy) Oscars, or the (competitive) Zekes. The primary threat is not necessarily the RN. It could be land based air assets.

I think you're right about Malaya and where I recalled that 14th Army was supposed to be sent after the planned 6-week PI campaign. It begs the question though, if you're going to invade India, in March or April, where do you get the troops (never mind the logistical stuff)? Is it safe to assume that 14th Army is unavailable, and ditto for the armies refitting and resting from the Malay Peninsula campaign? Do you cancel Burma entirely and save these troops for the India campaign?

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 76

- 8/31/2002 5:38:49 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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Well, the Malayan units could possibly take place in an invasion, as the 18th Division was as heavily engaged as the 5th and 2nd Guards and was quickly sent to Burma/Ceylon after Singapore surrendered. It all depends on wether formations from China or the Home Islands could be sent down to take care of garrison duties, but this would not require very high quality units since an offensive out West would also mean that there would probably be no attack from the West either, and these units would only be needed to keep the local population subdued.

Securing Burma would be important, as it would cut off communications with the Chinese (the main reason behind the Indian invasion). However, strong garrisons in Burma would not be required as the Burmese population was very hostile to the British. Maybe the Japanese will expand the Siamese mandate to cover that of Burma? Who really knows.

This all depends really on the ability of the player to control ALL troops in all theatres, to be able to switch around units that they want, (not restricted by unrealistic restrictions, i.e., IJA units CANNOT leave China, but should they be removed then the position in China will weaken and possibly collapse). If not, then an invasion may end up in a stalemate very soon.

I do beleive that the two arguments really cannot be debated further, as they have both reached their own conclusions in regards to the necessity for air cover. The IJAAF was short of long range escorts (until the arrival of the Ki-45), but the RAF was also short of long range escorts as well, and each side would be handicapped. But this too is a theory. We just have to wait for the game to come out to see.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 77

- 8/31/2002 7:14:56 AM

TIMJOT

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Qutoe: Mdiehl

"Sounds great to me. Do you see nothing slightly, er, ironic, in your remark? And I do recall being spattered quite thoroughly over a TYPO (the word was "doctrine" but mis-spelled) in another thread."

Its kinda a tit for tat thing between us. But the this mis-pelling thing wasnt me. I would never critisize someones spelling. Im probably the poorest speller and typist on this board.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 78

- 9/1/2002 3:00:44 AM

mdiehl

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Tim, I guess that makes our spalling appalling ;). It was indeed someone else about the typo. Mostly I got sarcastic because of your previous post, and responded using the same friendly tone. But I think we're both well enough informed to bring the discussion back to numbers in a friendly old way. Pax.

Jeremy, on the defensive I'm not sure that the RAF needs LR escorts. Their objective is to cover the landing areas. They've no real need to mount deep raids into, say, Malaya Thailand. All they really need is interceptors, tactical bombers, and f/bs with a effective fighting radius of 300 miles or so.

Tim, you were right (IIRC it was you) pointing out that the IJA had its own logistical train. From WW2 Atlas (Japanese Merchant Shippin 1941-1945 pp.194-195) 2 million tons for the economy, and 1.5 million tons each for the army and navy, and another 600,000 tons as tankers. Another 600,000 tons in repair, and another 800,000 tons available for discretionary use.

The problem was that these were insufficient in December 1941, with all services and the economy requiring 9.3 million tons, of which 3 million were provided by ships under Allied flags. They captured some of course, but basically the 6.5-7 million tons available after the conquest of the PI and Indonesia/Malay barrier was 2.3 million short of demand.

The Japanese anticipated losing no more than 600,000 tons per year, which of course turned out to be wrong. The worst month was apparently November 1944 (losing 1.4 million tons in 347 ships). In November 1943 the monthly losses passed 200,000 tons.

It gets worse. Because of infrastructure problems at start, teh Japanese shipyards were unable to keep up with routine maintenance of the existing merchant fleet from the get go. So the 10% typically laid up (during peace time) increased to 44% by the end of the war.

Beyond that, apparently Jpns merchant fleet organizatioin was quite poor, and failed to implement cooperative convoy/sailing programs between the army and navy, and did not set up triangle trades (supplies to front, move to raw materials, bring raw materials to Japan), so they had a generally horrid logistical system

Source: Atlas of the 2nd World War, ed. by John Keegan, HarperCollins, 1999. [This is a handy quick n dirty reference for these really broad brush questions].

Answering the question of what Japan *could* do in March-May 1942 from a logistical POV requires knowledge of how many mcs were required to keep a division operating at 4500 nm, multiplied by the number of divisions, ditto for IJAAF lba, and ditto for IJN supply train to cover the landings until the IJAAF had enough airbasing capacity to relieve the navy.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 79

- 9/2/2002 1:34:15 AM

TIMJOT

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Hi Mdeihl

Logistics is always going to cause the Japanese problems and certainly India would be no different. All of Japans offensives were more or less "shoe strings". In Malaya, Yamashita was down to his last bullets when Singapore Fell. The PI, Burma, Guadacanal...ect. all possed logistical problems.

An an India scenerio, one has to assumes it becomes the over-rideing priority. Corregidore would have to be left to rot a little longer (denying Manila Bay BTW) The garrisons would have to make due with even less. As mentioned before PM would need to be delayed and any thought of showdown with the USN put on hold indefinitely.

Not having shipping numbers or IJA supply requirements at hand. One can at least make a presumption, that Japans Centrifugal Offensive demonstrates its capability to transport and supply at least 6 Divisions simutaneously at least for a short period of time. That being said takeing into account as you point out the growing logistical needs of the Empire, any India option would probaly have to be executed in phases.

A plausible possibility would be Burma as historical, Ceylon coincideing with historical IJN raid (March 26, Apr.18 ). and *limited* seaborn assualt on India sometime in May. Coinciding with a Land assualt eminateing from Imphal. Keeping in mind this is just a rough timeline and that each of these operations would have to overlap somewhat.

We all agree airforces are a critical factor, but you still havent convinced me that either Substantial UK reinforcements are available or If they were available, that they could be deployed within the April/May time frame. I do agree that the airpower issue becomes very probmatic by mid to late 42, owing to the stabilizing situation in the Mideast and the ever growing resources of the US.

Again the object isnt to occupy the whole of India, but to knock China out of the war. Hypothetically I think its possible that a seaborn assualt of 4 divisions on Calcutta coincideing with landborn assualt by the 4 divisons in Burma could be sufficient to secure the NE corner of India. Maybe invasion of India is bit of a misnomer. Invasion of Bangladesh is probalby more accurate.

Finally, I would just like to say, that were as the IJN&IJA would be operating under considerable logistical retraints. So too are the Allies. There is a shipping shortage. US shipping is being whacked by Uboats of the east coast. There are priority commitments to the USSR and Mideast. There is Rommel's offensive and the need to secure lines of communications to Australia and so on.

(in reply to IChristie)

Post #: 80