Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

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ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

I think it was obvious even by Dec 8 that there was going to be no relief of the PI.

There was a loss of will even on the Wake Is. relief, which might have worked.

But given the state of the USN command structure, Dominated by the Battleship Admirals, and no strike to take out the Battleships, they likely would have proceeded with WPO despite the reality we know.

1. In 1941, the Allies were not aware that the Betty/Nell could carry torpedoes. This can be very well seen by the fact that when told by a subordinate officer that the Betty's appeared to be making a torpedo attack, Admiral Phillips replied "There are no torpedo aircraft about." From eyewitness/survivor report. Source: http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/

2. During the 1930s and through 1941, the US and Britian had severely underestimated Japan's war machine. An article from a period magazine basically assumed that Japan's carriers were too small, and carried antiquated aircraft.

3. MacArthur would certainly have pressured for relief without a sinking of the fleet in PH...given his personality. And being that WPO did assume reinforcing PI it might well have been tried.

Now, granted no plan survives contact with the enemy, but before PH, the Allies did not have a healthy respect of Japan's combat abilities. And in fact, did not have good intel on their technological capabilities.

I didn't know that about poor intel on the Betty and torpedoes...but still it is hard to imagine that no lesson would be drawn from the fate of Repulse and Prince of Wales.


And then there is the nasty business about the utter defeat of the USAAF on Luzon within days. Forget about the battleships. How would they hope to get 100-200 transports unloaded at Manila? Surely, someone would have raised an objection?

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ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

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ORIGINAL: Joe D.

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ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

Even if the fleet had stayed near 32nd street and San Pedro, the Japanese wouldn't have gone that far east ... Think about the West Coast of the US at the time. There were a ton of air fields (both major and small grass fields), all sorts of fishing fields, and a very, very active trade route between all the major cities on the west coast of the US ...

The kido butai wouldn't have to go into US shipping lanes to launch an air strike, and if it attacked on a Sunday morning, IMO, all those air and fishing fields would still have been as asleep as those on PH.

Not ALL of the USAAF would have been asleep.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVR2pPFnkDU&feature=related

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ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

First the USN was keeping the fleet carriers out to sea both on the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic Coast. If the rumors are to be believed portions of the Atlantic fleet were sortied to screen convoys on the American side of the line from German Raiders. Plus the aggressive nature of the push against the German fleet, tween the U-boats attacking a couple of the destroyers (Reuben James, Keanry, and the Niblack) and the open secret that the US was supplying most of European defense needs. Though Hitler had forbidden his U-boats from attacking any USN ships, there again were rumors that a couple of times some of the pre-war carriers ran across some of the German U-boats during their neutrality patrols tween Norfolk and the Caribbean bases, and their escorts attacked them, or their aircraft forced those U-boats under the water.

The whole idea of pushing the Pacific Fleet itself to Hawaii was as close as the fleet could get without putting undo risk to it, let alone not violate some of the current arms control treaties and tact understandings the US and Japan had at the time. Remember we couldn't upgrade Agna Harbor and Guam defense iaw the Washington Naval Treaty. The same was true of the Cavitie Naval facilities. The most we could do was replace outdated defenses or cosmetic upgrades (like replacing older buildings with newer ones). In turn the most that we did was basically let those bases atrophy until the war started in Europe. At which there was a slow review of what we could and needed to do to turn those bases into forward operating bases. From what I have read in some trade journals, is that most of senior leadership had accepted that Guam was going to be a loss and that the fight was going to happen in the Philippines. Take a look at this book, this ship along with three other sail schooner were going to spy on the Japanese fleet. There was a belief that the Japanese were going to make a move against someone in the near time. With the belief they were going to push towards the DEI fields, along with the mineral fields in British control lands. This was cause their four year old war in China hadn't being going the way they were use to. Also since most of the European nations were up against the ropes cause of the Germans, the Japanese didn't expect that much of a fight.

I would also suggest that some of us have gotten tunnel visioned with the reasons behind PH. Just as the UK and US were starting to get chummy in 1940. There was a nationalist movement starting to make its rise in India and while Mohandas Gandhi believed in non-violent support, some of the others in Indian National Congress were pushing for a strong statement against the British. The British earlier in the year had lost the war for the Balkans and retreated to Egypt. While doing that they had also fought the major battle around Tobruk, gone into Ethiopia to push out the Italians, and though holding their own with the war at sea in the Mediterranean just on a whole the theater wasn't looking good for them. Rommel had switched from France to become the general officer supporting the Italians and German army in the Desert. Charles Lindbergh testified in front of Congress in February of that year about neutrality with Germany, then in April the America First Committee had chosen Lindbergh to be their public face. May 24, the German battleship Bismark was able to sink the HMS Hood. The British and Free French Forces invade Syria to prevent the Vichy forces stationed there to prevent the Vichy and Germans from invading British Trans-Jordan (now Israel and Jordan), the fear was that the German forces would go out of Greece into Syria and push from through Jordan into Saudi/Iraqi/and Iranian oil fields. Just earlier in 1941 both Iran and Iraq had shown possibilities to fall with in the German sphere of influence.
Basically if you look at it from the Japanese point of view, they could get their gains of economic needs for their wartime economy. Crush the Europeans in their colonies. Sue for a treaty on their terms and since the Europeans were basically stretched to the breaking point with their forces. So a quickie war in the Pacific was what the Japanese looked for. As to the US, the Japanese knew that any push against the Europeans would lead to the US getting involved. In turn the PH raid (which no one on the US/European side believe the Japanese were capable of) was an attempt to bloody our nose, get their gains. Then basically tell the US that nothing more then what we had of US land, IE Guam and the PI which protected their trade routes from DEI to the home islands, and we will become your trading partner again. Just look at the American population at the time in 1941 as well, although there was a growing feeling that we needed to get into the war. Most of the troops were still training with mock-ups, the AFC was making big news (that was until Lindbergh's Des Moines speech). Heck, even the German-American Bund was pushing for neutrality and let the Germans do their thing. Along with an attempt at a secessionist movement in the Western US. So how could the Japanese not think that the US wouldn't go to war?

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

Even if the USN didn't put WPO into motion, that would still play well for Japan with no PH attack. As Terminus pointed out, the US didn't have the political will to see a drawn out fight in the far flung Pacific...meaning Japan takes a few European Colonies, the war might last a year or two, then some form of armistice could be signed letting Japan keep some gains while returning others (this is in fact EXACTLY what the Japanese were banking on). PH was the stimulus that gave the US the political will to see it through to final victory.

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

Even if the USN didn't put WPO into motion, that would still play well for Japan with no PH attack. As Terminus pointed out, the US didn't have the political will to see a drawn out fight in the far flung Pacific...meaning Japan takes a few European Colonies, the war might last a year or two, then some form of armistice could be signed letting Japan keep some gains while returning others (this is in fact EXACTLY what the Japanese were banking on). PH was the stimulus that gave the US the political will to see it through to final victory.

Getting really tired of listening to this nonsense. Take a good long look at the American Civil War. Hardly a wildly popular conflict (the Democratic Candidate in 1864 ran on an "End the War" platform.), but it was pushed through to the bitter end anyway. Americans don't like war..., but they also don't like losing! And they really don't like being pushed around by "foreigners". Remember WW I? Wilson won in 1916 on the platform "He kept us out of war". Then in 1917 we plunged into it on a wave of national fervor ("The Yanks are Coming").

Japan certainly made life easier for Roosevelt by attacking PH, but under no circumstances was the US going to allow the Japanese to establish hegemony in the Far East without a fight.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

Even if the USN didn't put WPO into motion, that would still play well for Japan with no PH attack. As Terminus pointed out, the US didn't have the political will to see a drawn out fight in the far flung Pacific...meaning Japan takes a few European Colonies, the war might last a year or two, then some form of armistice could be signed letting Japan keep some gains while returning others (this is in fact EXACTLY what the Japanese were banking on). PH was the stimulus that gave the US the political will to see it through to final victory.

Getting really tired of listening to this nonsense. Take a good long look at the American Civil War. Hardly a wildly popular conflict (the Democratic Candidate in 1864 ran on an "End the War" platform.), but it was pushed through to the bitter end anyway. Americans don't like war..., but they also don't like losing! And they really don't like being pushed around by "foreigners". Remember WW I? Wilson won in 1916 on the platform "He kept us out of war". Then in 1917 we plunged into it on a wave of national fervor ("The Yanks are Coming").

Japan certainly made life easier for Roosevelt by attacking PH, but under no circumstances was the US going to allow the Japanese to establish hegemony in the Far East without a fight.

The PH attack forced the US NCA to increase the percentage of our production allocated to the Pacific from 33% planned to 40% actual. It doesn't sound like much, but most of the increase was in additional and earlier warships. Our pre-war plan to deal with Japan was a strategic defence until Germany was defeated. I.e., mid-1945 before we attacked the Marshalls. (I'm ignoring WPPac 46 here.)

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ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

Also, the thread title, as it suggests a conditional or hypothetical situation with the use of "If" calls for the subjunctive tense....."weren't"*



* Sorry, I couldn't help myself as I have been grammar Nazied hundreds of times.

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ORIGINAL: Dobey

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ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

Also, the thread title, as it suggests a conditional or hypothetical situation with the use of "If" calls for the subjunctive tense....."weren't"*



* Sorry, I couldn't help myself as I have been grammar Nazied hundreds of times.

Hi Cap,

Actually I was speaking in terms of geography.

I meant "What if HQ Pacific fleet, Pearl Harbour wasn't....well located at Pearl Harbour. Rather than the situation "what if it hadn't happened at all". Ofcourse they amount to the same thing, and you are probably still right about the grammar. English used to be my strongest subject. Once.

The original questions were basically more concerned with the military options available to both sides and likely scenarios there after if geography had meant a pre-emptive strike was not possible.

I would be very keen to hear from those who know, what was the "conventional" plan on the Japanese sides? Was it really just "Invade the Philippines and fight the decisive battle"? or were there other options that had been considered?

Obviously Striking PH was not even an option prior to the move in 1940, so what were there idea before that time?

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

Even if the USN didn't put WPO into motion, that would still play well for Japan with no PH attack. As Terminus pointed out, the US didn't have the political will to see a drawn out fight in the far flung Pacific...meaning Japan takes a few European Colonies, the war might last a year or two, then some form of armistice could be signed letting Japan keep some gains while returning others (this is in fact EXACTLY what the Japanese were banking on). PH was the stimulus that gave the US the political will to see it through to final victory.

Getting really tired of listening to this nonsense. Take a good long look at the American Civil War. Hardly a wildly popular conflict (the Democratic Candidate in 1864 ran on an "End the War" platform.), but it was pushed through to the bitter end anyway. Americans don't like war..., but they also don't like losing! And they really don't like being pushed around by "foreigners". Remember WW I? Wilson won in 1916 on the platform "He kept us out of war". Then in 1917 we plunged into it on a wave of national fervor ("The Yanks are Coming").

Japan certainly made life easier for Roosevelt by attacking PH, but under no circumstances was the US going to allow the Japanese to establish hegemony in the Far East without a fight.

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except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1,1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

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ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

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except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1,1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

This implies we were "on the hook", so to speak, until at least 1946.

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

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ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

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except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1,1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

This implies we were "on the hook", so to speak, until at least 1946.

Yes, but there was an end to it. From the way that reads, I understand it to say that if no new Act is passed after 7-1-43, no new country may receive lend-lease aid, and that those already receiving before that date can receive no more aid after 7-1-46.

The whole point being, the US did not want to get into a never ending commitment for a European War.

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It's been a long time since we had the 'US was isolationist pre-PH and would never have gone to war' argument so I don't remember the sources but from what I remember polls showed that the populace was beginning to see the necessity of intervention in Europe by PH time.

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

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ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

Even if the USN didn't put WPO into motion, that would still play well for Japan with no PH attack. As Terminus pointed out, the US didn't have the political will to see a drawn out fight in the far flung Pacific...meaning Japan takes a few European Colonies, the war might last a year or two, then some form of armistice could be signed letting Japan keep some gains while returning others (this is in fact EXACTLY what the Japanese were banking on). PH was the stimulus that gave the US the political will to see it through to final victory.

Getting really tired of listening to this nonsense. Take a good long look at the American Civil War. Hardly a wildly popular conflict (the Democratic Candidate in 1864 ran on an "End the War" platform.), but it was pushed through to the bitter end anyway. Americans don't like war..., but they also don't like losing! And they really don't like being pushed around by "foreigners". Remember WW I? Wilson won in 1916 on the platform "He kept us out of war". Then in 1917 we plunged into it on a wave of national fervor ("The Yanks are Coming").

Japan certainly made life easier for Roosevelt by attacking PH, but under no circumstances was the US going to allow the Japanese to establish hegemony in the Far East without a fight.

Whether you want to admit it or not, America of the early 20th Century was very isolationist. We had already gotten involved in 1 'European War', there was no desire to get involved in the 2nd. If we are attacked, there is the will. If not, why should we get involved? That was the mindset at the time.

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ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

Sunset provisions are more honored in the breach than the observance. They rarely get enacted. Once a bureaucracy is established (like the lend lease program) it is almost impossible to kill it. Besides it was great for business, had few entanglements and, for FDR, accustomized the US populace to the idea of war.

It's been a long time since we had the 'US was isolationist pre-PH and would never have gone to war' argument so I don't remember the sources but from what I remember polls showed that the populace was beginning to see the necessity of intervention in Europe by PH time.

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ORIGINAL: topeverest

I was only suggesting that a scenario mod where PACFLEET was still HQ'd on east coast AND Empire still goes to war in a PH style attack sparked my interest as something I might want to start Modding.  It would essentially cede Hawaii to Empire and create a whole new dynamic of war.  Anyway, interesting discussion to be sure.

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

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ORIGINAL: Pascal

IIRC the senior Navy leadership had already rejected WPO as feasible BEFORE PH. Stark, King, Leahy etc. were aware of all this enough that they would not have bowled headlong into this trap.

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

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It's been a long time since we had the 'US was isolationist pre-PH and would never have gone to war' argument so I don't remember the sources but from what I remember polls showed that the populace was beginning to see the necessity of intervention in Europe by PH time.

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ORIGINAL: rtrapasso
Agreed... and remember the US was solidly NOT in favor of going to war in Europe in 1916, but we were in it by 1917. Opinions change.

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

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ORIGINAL: Shark7

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ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

Sunset provisions are more honored in the breach than the observance. They rarely get enacted. Once a bureaucracy is established (like the lend lease program) it is almost impossible to kill it. Besides it was great for business, had few entanglements and, for FDR, accustomized the US populace to the idea of war.

It's been a long time since we had the 'US was isolationist pre-PH and would never have gone to war' argument so I don't remember the sources but from what I remember polls showed that the populace was beginning to see the necessity of intervention in Europe by PH time.

Still war with Japan could have been avoided. Yes, there was a necessity to stop Germany. The public was split on the issue, and probably would have remained that way for a while. FDR was getting ready to fight in Europe, and the citizens most likely have supported it. We don't disagree so much there.

Where we tend to disagree, and I think its best we leave it at that, is a war in the Pacific if Japan did not directly attack US territory. I'm not convinced the US would have intervened in the Pacific to allow European Nations to maintain their Colonial holdings.

And the whole Pacific War might have been avoidable in the first place. Diplomatic mistakes, couple with Japan's ambitions in China are what led to PH.

The real irony is that Japan was only doing what the European powers had done for the previous 200 years...grab chunks of Asia as foreign colonies. To the indigenous people, there was little difference between the Europeans or Japanese....both were brutal to the native populations.

Let's just agree to disagree on this subject, we can argue forever and not change each other's stance.