mdiehl
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Joined: 10/21/2000
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Thanks for adding Badoeng Strait to the growing list of battles in which Allied ships did *launch* said multiple ship torpedo doctrine attack as described by poster "Yamamoto."
Let's look at the battle in detail, boysengirls. Gee, it was a *daylight* action fought at the limit of range of Allied torpedoes. How does zero hits in a daylight action compare with the IJN record? Lookitthat, zero hits happens to be the modal hit rate (also zero) for the IJN in *all* attacks including day and night battles, looking at 26 engagements. At Badoeng Strait, however, Asashio did some exceptionally good shooting for the IJN, hitting the Dutch DD Piet Hein with 1 torp. Of the 8 Type 93s fired by the IJN in the engagement, this was the only hit giving the IJN in that engagement a 12.5% hit rate. In the same battle, IJN DD Michisio was considerably damaged, suffering 96 cas from gunfire.
Let's look at other engagements shall we. How about Java Sea.
IN this stellar performance, IJN ships executed 38 separate launches of a probable 164 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 3 hits which sank the RNN CL De Ruyter, CL Java and DD Kortenaer. The attack was neither a torpedo doctrine attack as described by the fix posited by "Yamamoto" (an initial torp salvo). The stellar IJN shooting yielded them a hit rate of 1.8%.
On to Sunda Strait. Let's let Joseph Czarnecki's analysis speak for itself. "During action the six IJN ships executed 7 launches of a
probable total of 37 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 5 hits which sank USN CA Houston and RAN CL Perth. This is a probably hit rate of 13.5%. This performance is marred by an additional five hits scored on IJN transports and a minesweeper by a misaimed
launch from CA Mogami. This action fits into the Decisive Battle scenario as representative of the chaos of having a small hostile unit slip into the midst of multiple friendly formations. This would cut both ways during the projected night battle."
The costs of this battle? Roughly 17000 displacement tons of Allied hardware, most of which started the battle out of ammo (and Houston with a turret jammed in train from a previous bomb hit), in return for over 27,000 long tons (note to wonks: a MCS capacity in long tons is by definition less than its displacement) of IJN shipping. Notably, these attacks were not delivered as an initial broadside as advocated by "Yamamoto" but rather in a series of attacks. Mitigating circumstances would indicate that the IJN had reason to shoot with guns, given that some IJN vessels were taking fire *immediately* from Perth. In hindsight, given the major self-inflicted gunshot wound inflicted by the IJN, they'd have been better served to let Perth and Houston slip away (Houston would have been laid up until the G'canal campaign anyhow, given her damaged turret and the need for refit, so her short term strategic significance was nil), but it is not in the nature of talented warriors to shirk from their tasks.
We'll skip Savo except to note that attacking a lax, fatigued Allied force divided into two groups with no CIC, and with tactical surprise, the IJN had a hit rate of 12%. I'm talked out on Savo.
Let's look at the loss of Blue, again from Joseph Czarnecki's excellent analysis of IJN torp doctrine: "Having dropped off its Tokyo Express run, an IJN DD encountered two USN DDs escorting a pair of transports, making an attack of opportunity. The IJN DD crippled one USN DD which was later scuttled, but failed to follow up its success. The IJN DD made a probable single launch of 4 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 1 hit which crippled USN DD Blue."
This is a rather nice 25% hit rate (and a statistical outlier) against a USN group tied down to transports. The USN DDs fulfilled in substance the duty of pickets -- to warn of enemy attack and conduct spoiling attacks in defence of escorted vessels. You'll see this card played again at 2nd G'canal.
Cape Esperence. "The Battle of Cape Esperence: A USN force of two CAs, two CLs, and five DDs looking to intercept a Tokyo Express run encountered and ambushed its covering force
of three IJN CAs and two DDs. The USN forces sank one CA and one DD and severely damaged a second CA, handing the IJN its first defeat in a surface engagement, but failing to intercept the supply run. During the action, one CA may have conducted a
launch of at least 2 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 0 hits. This is a hit rate of 0%. This action fits into the Decisive Battle scenario as an example, on a small scale of how an attacker can be surprised and defeated in disorder."
With respect to UV and conversations in this forum, this battle also shows that rumours of night training giving the IJN better reactions to being ambushed at night (a position supported by the results of Tassafaronga), Cape Esperence contradicts the claim.
Must I go through every battle to explain why initial conditions, CAC, alert status, assigned jobs (escort, picket, battle line) had a much more obvious impact on outcomes than such intangibles as training or the *manifestly* fallacious claim that USN DD commodores lacked a torpedo doctrine? Let's skip to the ending.
Here' are Czarnecki's conclusions, FYI:
"In terms of efficiency (rounds expended per hit obtained) the Japanese needed to achieve a rate of 6.67:1. In actuality, they achieved a rate of 16.76:1. Instead of achieving a hit rate equivalent to slightly more than one per average destroyer (8-tube Kagero Class) firing a full load, the IJN achieved a rate slightly worse than one per two full loads fired from an average destroyer."
To repeat. "Slightly worse than one per two full loads fired from an average destroyer."
Why was this?
"The first [the second is a discussion of IJN torp duds and depth setting probklems -- MD] is a review of the Type 93 torpedo by range fired, and speed setting employed. The dismal performance in such long-range actions as Java Sea and Komandorski Islands, and the relative success in the close-range actions of the Solomons Campaign, imply that the weapon’’s speed was a greater asset than its range. It may be that the Japanese misappreciated their own weapon and would have been better
served by a plan which eschewed ““long-range concealed firing”” in favor of short- range attacks that offered the enemy less time to evade."
That conclusion is consistent with the fact that most IJN torp hits were at ranges under 8000 yards, fired, not as initial volleys from the cloak of darkness and distance ("Yamamoto's" proposed fix to UV) but in the heat of the brawl.
So, I'd expect a USN DD group if it were undetected to attempt a torp doctrine attack. The success would be primarily contingent on the range, the alert status of the enemy, and the disposition of forces, as it seems to have been for the IJN victories.
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