pasternakski
Posts: 6565
Joined: 6/29/2002 Status: offline
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One difference between PacWar and WITP that factors into the equation, Jeremy, is that PacWar was designed around one-week turns as the baseline, whereas WITP, being based on the UV engine, breaks down into one-day elements in resolution of all game-relevant details. For example. Suppose you are the Japanese invading Port Moresby in PacWar. You have assembled all your troops, ships, planes, and materiel at their points of origin. When you shove off, seven days' activity will roll by during the execution phase - this is not separable into smaller segments. In WITP, as I understand it from the designers' comments and from having played UV, each day that passes, notwithstanding whether you have chosen one-day increments, seven-day increments, or something in between, the events of each day will have their individual effect on the ultimate outcome of the battle. Small wonder, then, that many potential players want to have control over the daily decisions that are crucial to the conduct of the operation. The designs, and the designs' intentions, are very different, it seems to me. The practical result? Being satisfied with seven-day turns in WITP (or UV, for that matter) turns you into a bystander when you should be a crucial arbiter of the course of action. PacWar is one game, with its own design features. The UV series is just a different environment, from both design and gaming standpoints. Again, what works for you is fine with me. Just don't expect to see me shirking my command responsibilities for seven days of wine, women, and song in between "command opportunities." As far as what Nimitz would have loved at Leyte Gulf, he had no better information than Halsey. Just because you are playing one-day turns does not mean that you have better intelligence or that it is always possible to make major changes to plans that are already being executed. It does give you the opportunity to be flexible - as, historically, good commanders have always been (witness Alexander at Issus). And woe be to the commander who is unable to change the direction of his task forces to meet a new threat - unless that new threat is a diversion, a misapprehension, or not as much a threat as the one that was already being met, in which case, woe be to the commander who abandons carefully laid plans. Such is the burden of command.
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Put my faith in the people And the people let me down. So, I turned the other way, And I carry on anyhow.
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