Canoerebel
Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002 From: Northwestern Georgia, USA Status: offline
|
Continuing my previous thought (just to clarify that I'm not replying to Nemo's point yet): Right before the Second Battle of Assam, I had the opportunity to order my ships at Akyab to flee. I weighed all the factors at hand and ultimately decided to commit them to a battle against a Japanese navy that appeared to be coming in overwhelming force (it wasn't overwhelming, but all indications said it was). My decision wasn't predicated on "victory disease" or "overconfidence" or "impatience." I simply made an informed decision based upon a weighing of all the information at my disposal. After making the decision, I wrote that I was "at peace" with it - come what may, I felt it was right. And had John emerged from that clash victorious, I would have had to tip my cap to him. IE, I wouldn't have been chagrined or embarrassed or mortified, but rather satisfied that I had given it my best. The same things hold true in this situation. I've approached this carefully and done my utmost to create conditions in which the Allies can succeed. There is an absence of the kinds of signals or intel or information that would lead me to believe John was prepared in a way I wasn't allowing for. I am committed to the plan and I am satisfied that I have given it my best. The gleanings from SigInt and patrols uniformly confirm that decision. So, if John has configured a strong response in a way that eluded SigInt, patrols, flankers, pickets ships, subs, etc., I really will have to tip my cap to him. Back in July 1942 in my first AE match against Miller, he killed me in a big carrier clash near Luganville. In that case, I was embarrassed and chagrined because I had done so much wrong and shouldn't have been there in the first place. That was on me (though Miller too deserved his own share of plaudits). This time, though, I've done my best and I'm ready to see how it unfolds.
|