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Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies.

 
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Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 1/25/2015 4:44:03 PM   
Araner

 

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Now that it seems"Offset" has replaced 'Air-Sea Battle" as the term du-jour amidst Pentagon City think tank circle,s I thought I would modelsome of the concepts behind the buzz words play out in a simulated battle. Specifically, I'll be examining two studies published by the influential CSBA which focus on how to defeat the growing threat of "Anti-Access/Aerial Denial" weaponry like smarter IADs and ASuW systems.

The first study entitled "Commanding the Sea: A Plan to Reinvigorate Surface US Navy Warfare" argues for retooling existing surface ships with better long-range offensive capabilities. Recommendations include replacing the Tomahawk Cruise Missile with a land/sea attack variant of the new LRASM.

The second study entitled "Toward a New Offset Strategy" argues that the navy needs to "offset" A2/AD threats by doubling down in areas where the U.S retains a clear technological edge. So less focus on the F-35 and more on combining stealth with unmanned assets like the UCLASS. They also strongly advocate prioritizing research in the undersea domain including more capable UUVs and sub-launched recon UAVs. Perhaps the most ambitious recommendation envisions underwater missile trucks spread all over the ocean either as "undersea payload modules" deployed on the seafloor or as a kind of "missile trailer" that can be towed into place by manned or unmanned SSNs.

Scenarios

I chose to simulate two common scenarios involving hostilities between the US Navy/Air Force and the PLA/PLA Navy. The first modified the existing "Play the Fool" scenario which takes place in the South China Sea, while the second was created from scratch and took place in the East China Sea. Both scenarios were set in 2020 and assumed platforms like the DDG 51 (Flight III), LCS (Small Surface Combatant), Ford Class Carrier,UCLASS, F-35s, Virginia Payload Modules, Naval Strike Missile, LRASM and MMT Tomahawk were operational along with various sea and sub launched ISR-UAVs. The only developmental combat system I left out was the Long Range Bomber, as not enough information exists to model it accurately.
Deployment of PLA/PLAN weaponry assumed legacy platforms like the older Type 053 frigates and J7 fighter had been replaced by modern J-10s and 052D Destroyers. It also assumed a fully functioning ASBM kill chain, including the launcher vehicles themselves, multiple OTH-SW radar installations and long endurance naval UAVs. High profile technologies like the J-20 Stealth fighter were included in smaller numbers.
Obviously, not all the recommended technologies are available in the CMANO database, but a reasonable representation can usually be substituted. This was generally the case with the "Undersea Payload Modules" for which I just used all four SSGNs instead. The toughest piece to model was the need for persistent tactical aerial ISR in the form of small sub-launched UAVs about the same size as a Scan Eagle.

Layout and Loadouts
In both scenarios, I replaced every version of the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) with the land and sea "Multi-Mission" Tomahawk (MMT). In some cases, the total number of MMTs was cut to allow space for the long range LRASM missiles, but there was usually enough space to accommodate all of them. Every version of the LCS came equipped with a complement of Naval Strike Missiles as a Mission Package and one LCS even added a small MK54 VLS with ESSM missiles for extra air protection.
I also replaced many of the Super-Hornets with Growlers as they were all used in the SEAD role.

Outcomes
Scenario results generally aligned with the reports'recommendations in that manned strike aircraft were generally useless in the SEAD role and UAV technology has not been optimized with either the speed or stealth to be used as an effectiv first strike platform. That leaves long range cruise missiles as our front line. While the supersonic LRASM-B is in the database, in reality it was cancelled meaning the LRASM remains a subsonic weapon, albeit a very smart subsonic weapon. The MMT has less range than the preceding TACTOM as it had to sacrifice fuel for extra sensory equipment. Lacking a missile with sufficient speed to hit the enemy first, from a distance, I had to shorten the distance traveled by locating launch platforms as close to enemy targets as possible. That means forward deploying submarines with as many strike missiles as possible. In this regard, the SSGN with it 156 missile tubes (vs a current Virginia Class SSN with 12) made the critical difference. One SSGN positioned relatively near the enemies littoral, was enough to sufficiently degrade enemy IADs AND surface assets to allow manned aircraft a chance to take on the enemy in the air.
The MMT performed sufficiently well enough as a naval weapon to take on vessels like the Type 054A Frigate and Type 056 Corvette but did seem to be easily spoofed by higher-end 052C+052D Destroyers. The LRASM on the other hand might have to circle around a few times but always managed to avoid enemy defenses and find its target without fail. Coupled with the fact that the MMT can also give submarines a long range ASuW option, I see the MMT emerging as the workhorse weapon of the future, with the LRASMbeing reserved for high value targets like future CBGs and escorting Destroyers. Much depends on the MMTs ability to get targeting updates in mid-flight. Thus far the LRASMs autonomous targeting capability seems to make it a better "fire and forget' weapon. Nevertheless, I could envision a scenario where the early battle phases are solely made up of two or three missile types fired en-masse wherein they can linger until targets meeting a certain criteria are all located.
In my modified version of the South China Sea-based "Play the Fool" scenario, one SSGN/undersea payload module and three Virginia Class subs (with VPNs) carrying a mixture of MMTs and LRASMs were sufficient to completely degrade enemy aerial defense capabilities before carrier craft could even get half way there.
The East China Sea scenario was somewhat different, as the priority targets were the mobile ASBMs and the OTH targeting capabilities. The OTH radars are large static installations, so they were relatively easy to eliminate, but the mobile launchers are always tough to find. This outcome exposes a major gap in the Pentagon's anti-A2AD strategy as currently envisioned... The lack of a long endurance, low-altitude, tactical ISR platform. Over blue water the navy has its choice of Triton/Global Hawk/E2D Hawkeyes for broad area search and the P8 Poseidon for taking a closer look. No such option currently exists over enemy territory, where mobile missile launchers form a crucial piece of any A2/AD system. The RQ-170 stealth UAV is currently the only option with any reasonable expectation of survivability available for ISR over mainland China in both scenarios, but this is likely insufficient for targets like mobile launchers. What is really required is something akin to the fuel-cell powered "Sea Robin XFC" which was fired underwater using a Tomahawk launcher before unfolding an x-wing shape and staying in flight for up to six hours. Various methods of recovery are also being tested.
I could also envision a UAV element being incorporated into the missile itself in lieu of the current submunition payload. Such payloads could be a single, Scan Eagle-sized vehicle, a swarm of microcopters or a more practical implementation of DARPAs "Perch and Stare" project. DARPA's current "Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node" (TERN) program is attempting to develop more options in the "Medium-Altitude Long Endurance"(MALE) category but an undersea capability is only envisioned as a possible follow-on upgrade. Relying on surface vessels for launch and recovery would either require the vessels put themselves in considerable risk in range of costal weapons systems, or it would require the UAV spend most of its fuel transiting to station. A sub launched version would have much shorter distance to station and therefore could be considerably smaller.
Post #: 1
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 1/26/2015 3:50:12 PM   
magi

 

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This is very interesting… I was wondered how the future systems could be modeled.....honestly I've been thinking about this quite a bit lately…this is exactly my area of greatest interest… And I believe that command is an outstanding platform could express some good facsimile of future operations and force structures, tactics etc etc... for this part of the world in expressing their naval policy issues…

I would like to ask you to be a really good guy and share these with me… So I could play them… I would even grovel a little if you would like…... I will invite you over for dinner I'm a fabulous cook I promise you'll enjoy…I was my mother's "kitchen slave" growing up..... So I'm a really good cook now i've been doing it a long time… But I don't know how to design scenarios… as I am a simple man…

< Message edited by magi -- 1/26/2015 5:09:41 PM >

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 2/4/2015 1:28:38 PM   
Araner

 

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Sorry for the delayed response-
I'm certainly happy to see there are others who share my interest! I'd be equally happy to share them, but I'm afraid I have a long ways to go before I can build anything that would be remotely playable without constant editing mid-game. One of the scenarios is really just a modification of "Play the Fool" from the Community Scenario Pack wherein I've pushed the date from 2014 to 2020 and updated aircraft,ships, weaponry as explained in the above post. I suppose I could share my most heavily customized models like my jerry-rigged LCS-SSC, and my approximation of a Flight III DDG-51? Meanwhile, I'll do my best to make my East China Sea simulation into something remotely playable.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 2/6/2015 6:24:49 PM   
magi

 

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thats cool... when your ready.. im interested....

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 2/6/2015 10:42:57 PM   
hellfish6


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Having just finished "Commanding the Sea", I'd like to take a gander at your platform edits as well.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 2/7/2015 7:37:38 AM   
poaw

 

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I'm wondering how you came to your conclusions on the efficacy of current systems for SEAD, because I came to the opposite conclusion based on my experiences with CMANO.

It works for me as long as I'm willing to dedicate assets to peeling the layers back in sequence but less so when I attempt to simply dash through them. It's just too easy when attempting to penetrate for something to go wrong (hostile fighters, previously undetected SAM, untimely BINGO status, etc), which ends up causing a cascade of failures.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 3/12/2015 2:08:39 PM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: poaw

I'm wondering how you came to your conclusions on the efficacy of current systems for SEAD, because I came to the opposite conclusion based on my experiences with CMANO.

It works for me as long as I'm willing to dedicate assets to peeling the layers back in sequence but less so when I attempt to simply dash through them. It's just too easy when attempting to penetrate for something to go wrong (hostile fighters, previously undetected SAM, untimely BINGO status, etc), which ends up causing a cascade of failures.


I'm not sure I really had any conclusions on the efficacy of current SEAD systems as the MMT was able to take out most fixed facilities including radar stations, SAMs, airbases etc... There was certainly a major weakness when it came to mobile radar/missile launchers. Luckily, the ASBM threat appeared to vanish as soon as the first MMT missile reached one of the giant, static OTH-SW radar installations. But the DF-15/DF-16 IRBM launchers remained a threat as they were also aiming at fixed targets.
My thoughts regarding SEAD/DEAD systems have also evolved a bit since my first post. With everything from the JSOW to the TACTOM currently able to deliver sophisticated secondary payloads its becoming clear that the line between platform and payload is becoming increasingly blurred. If the parameters set by the recent "Offset" strategies are any indication, future development is likely to expand the capabilities of existing weaponry rather than procure expensive new platforms from scratch. Beyond the adding Multimission capabilities and Supersonic or even hypersonic speed to LRASM, MMT or Standard Missiles, I see the iTALD/MALD as the platform with the most expansive potential. In its current incarnation, the iTALDs main value is purely in its expendibility as a decoy. But such a platform could easily evolve into a UAV mothership if modified to fit into a submarine payload tube or VLS. Components of the iTALD/MALD or even the vehicle itself could be redesigned for retrieval which would make it a UAV by definition.
In a "Breaking Defense" article entitled "Stopping Mobile Missiles: Top Picks For Offset Strategy:" (I still can't paste links yet...) author, Robert Haddick references a mid-1990s program called the "Low Cost Autonomous Attack System" (LOCAAS) which was designed to linger autonomously and accurately identify targets using LIDAR. Under the new Offset Strategy, the author reasons, warrants a return to the LOCAAS concept albeit in a much improved incarnation using the MALD as its primary platform.
Such integration and overlap between what is defined as a UAV vs Missile, Payload vs Platform, Vehicle vs Ordnance etc... is surely in the cards. The question is whether or not such capabilities will eventually result in perhaps just 2 or 3 missile types performing tasks assigned to aircraft, satellites, artillery etc... in the present. One would hope such a process would happen organically as opposed to the F35 boondoggle...

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 3/12/2015 3:15:36 PM   
jarraya

 

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You mentioned the difficulty of locating targets.

Have you considered/modelled how satellites, both radar and optical, would be employed for locating targets? Also, I presume IAD sites would generate a lot of electromagnetic noise. Could ESM satellites, in conjunction with Rivet Joint type assets play a significant role in locating targets?

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 3/21/2015 6:02:35 PM   
magi

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: jarraya

You mentioned the difficulty of locating targets.

Have you considered/modelled how satellites, both radar and optical, would be employed for locating targets? Also, I presume IAD sites would generate a lot of electromagnetic noise. Could ESM satellites, in conjunction with Rivet Joint type assets play a significant role in locating targets?


^^^ what he says…

I thought of one cool possible weapon system that would be good in this high intensity missile environment.... Would be a converted Ohio class SSGN.... Full of AAW missiles… They would not need directors… As they would get all their targeting information via datalink… And they would have a sht load of anti-air weapons on them......

< Message edited by magi -- 3/21/2015 7:03:33 PM >

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 5/31/2015 5:18:43 AM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: jarraya

You mentioned the difficulty of locating targets.

Have you considered/modelled how satellites, both radar and optical, would be employed for locating targets? Also, I presume IAD sites would generate a lot of electromagnetic noise. Could ESM satellites, in conjunction with Rivet Joint type assets play a significant role in locating targets?


I'm not sure that IADS would be the most challenging A2AD threat for the very reasons you mention. So long as they require active emissions to be effective, they will make themselves vulnerable to detection. The threat that continues to vex U.S/Allied planners goes back to the failed "Scud Hunt" in 1991 in the form of mobile, truck-mounted, SSM launchers. Indeed, the PLA took an almost obsessive interest in the lessons of Gulf War 1, and drew two major conclusions.
#1-Their Soviet-era "quantity>quality" approach wouldnt hold up in the PGM era
#2-The allied failure to successfully locate and destroy the SCUD launchers highlighted a weakness that could be exploited through the adoption of "asymmetric" warfare.

Or in the concise words of a Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, “There are two ways to fight the U.S. military: asymmetrically and stupid,”...

So while Kilo SSKs and Type 022 FACs could be considered components of an asymmetric A2AD strategy, the cornerstone is going to be in the land-based forces operating from deep within home territory. This is why their marquee weapon system is not an aircraft carrier or stealth fighter but rather an ASBM. Whether or not they can ever come anywhere close to targeting a US CBG is irrelevant as another lesson drawn from Gulf War 1 proved that the SCUDs didn't have to even reach their target to have its intended psychological effect of drawing the enemy away from where it was most effective.

I suppose its entirely possible that satellite capabilities have increased significantly since 1991 and could be capable of distinguishing a truck with a covered trailor full of missiles from the other millions of vehicles in densely populated China. Perhaps this is why the PLA made a point to demonstrate that they have the capacity to shoot down a satellite? Again, the psychological effect should not be dismissed here... In any case, a persistent, low altitude search platform would be able to focus on a narrow region and have a better domain awareness. Of course this would only be effective if you had a whole bunch of small cameras to build up a big picture. Which means they have to be relatively inexpensive... and thus far this does not appear to play to the U.S Military's strengths...

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 5/31/2015 5:53:30 AM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: magi

I thought of one cool possible weapon system that would be good in this high intensity missile environment.... Would be a converted Ohio class SSGN.... Full of AAW missiles… They would not need directors… As they would get all their targeting information via datalink… And they would have a sht load of anti-air weapons on them......


You bring up an interesting point! I have to admit this had not occurred to me before and judging by the results of some quick Google searches, it hasnt occurred to defense policy circles either... Yet it would fit in well with the new "Distributed Lethality" doctrine of emphasizing the offensive in surface warfare. (Note:I still don't think I've earned the right to post links but if you search "Distributed Lethality you'll find a series of articles detailing the concept...)
Currently, the thinking is that surface forces should trade off long range SM-6 interceptors for a mix of long range ASuW missiles (aka LRASM) and shorter-range interceptors like the ESSM, which are much cheaper and can fit four to a single VLS tube. Of course this puts a lot of faith in the capabilities of a yet untested offensive missile. The calculus is based on the fact that the enemy simply has more ASMs than the Navy has long range interceptors, especially if the enemy uses older, less accurate missiles to attrite the expensive SM-6s before deploying more capable weapons once the long range defenses are expended.
Your proposal would significantly mitigate the offensive/defensive imbalance by shifting some of the defensive capabilities to the submarine. This would be especially effective when you consider they can carry four ESSMs for every one Tomahawk! It would probably be wise to equip the subs with a mix of offensive/defensive weapons as with the surface forces, but for illustration purposes an SSGN would be able to carry 1016 ESSMs!!!

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 6/11/2015 10:27:38 PM   
AlanChan

 

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Type 022 can not be used as a A2AD asset, its range is so short.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 6/11/2015 10:44:39 PM   
AlanChan

 

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Could you list the Chinese OOB you used in both missions? especially the ELINT and AWACS assets?

I think the problem is: which kind of threats are you simulating? Does the PLAN side have 055 destroyer/cruiser? Airbrone AESA AWACS? (the KJ-2000 in the game is way off, KJ2000 have homemade AESA instead of Russian radar) What kind of Jamming is your LRASM is facing? which kind of decoys? These things really affect the effect of weapons you are using.

----------
Plus, you used subs to launch MMTs at PLAN units from close range, how do they recieve targeting information and control those missiles during flight? I think the subs you used must go to periscope depth to recieve information and emit to control missiles, that makes them a good target for GX-6 family of MPAs.

< Message edited by AlanChan -- 6/14/2015 11:51:40 AM >

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 6/29/2015 2:47:00 PM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: AlanChan

Type 022 can not be used as a A2AD asset, its range is so short.


I ask this with full knowledge that the term may have already run its course, but might I ask why you think an Anti-Access/Area-Denial defense would consist entirely of long range weapons?
While the term can be applied loosely, it was in the context of preventing US intervention in a potential China-Taiwan conflict that A2/AD thinking started gaining traction and in this context it is undeniably a form of layered defense in depth. This widely distributed graphic by US think tank CSBA illustrates the thinking of the time it was published in 2003-



Both the Df-21d and the Type-022 are "asymmetric" weapons in that they are relatively cheap to produce in large numbers but can exact a tremendous cost on the enemy by sinking multibillion dollar warships. The problem with the Type 022 specifically is it is really only useful as a "counter-intervention" asset in a high-level conflict with the United States, in which Taiwan was the presumed catalyst. However, much has changed since the graphic-above was published in 2003. Taiwan is no longer considered the sole potential flashpoint in US-China relations, nor is it the dominant focus of PLA military doctrine. This is highly relevant to the Type 022 as production of the craft was halted after only 60 vessels in favor of the Type 056 Corvette.
In a recent report entitled "Projecting Strategy:The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention" by M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey (note: I still can't post links but a search will bring up the PDF). The report argues that the shift from the Type 022 to the more versatile Type 056 indicates a broader policy shift in PLA thinking away from one in which the U.S is considered the primary adversary towards one that views multiple missions including conflicts with other regional powers like Japan, Vietnam, India etc...
Other developments pointing towards the creation of a "blue water" capability (e.g CV-1 Liaoning, SSNs>SSKs, etc...) as well as the recent island building activities arguably support this view as such examples pose far less of a threat to the U.S than they do to smaller regional powers.
In short, I disagree with your assertion that short range assets like the Type 022 aren't components of an A2AD strategy. However, it could be argued that the specific A2AD scenario for which the FAC was designed is becoming less relevant.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 6/29/2015 2:58:52 PM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: AlanChan

Could you list the Chinese OOB you used in both missions? especially the ELINT and AWACS assets?

I think the problem is: which kind of threats are you simulating? Does the PLAN side have 055 destroyer/cruiser? Airbrone AESA AWACS? (the KJ-2000 in the game is way off, KJ2000 have homemade AESA instead of Russian radar) What kind of Jamming is your LRASM is facing? which kind of decoys? These things really affect the effect of weapons you are using.

----------
Plus, you used subs to launch MMTs at PLAN units from close range, how do they recieve targeting information and control those missiles during flight? I think the subs you used must go to periscope depth to recieve information and emit to control missiles, that makes them a good target for GX-6 family of MPAs.


You bring up a good point about realism in the SCS simulation as the lack of information on PLA capabilities sometimes creates an unbalanced projection wherein US forces are equipped with weapons like LRASM, F-35, Ford Class Carriers, DDG51 Flight III etc... that will likely take over a decade for IOC, while adversary equipment has changed little from the present day. Add in the fact that construction of military facilities in the SCS has happened so rapidly that its outpaced even the ability of Google Earth to update its imagery!

The accuracy of the PLA OOB therefore is unlikely to reflect reality in any case, but for my purposes I'm waiting for some way to add the island facilities from the database before I make any changes to my simulation.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 6/29/2015 10:44:03 PM   
mikmykWS

 

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What's holding you back from adding the island facilities?

Mike

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 7/9/2015 1:02:37 AM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

What's holding you back from adding the island facilities?

Mike

Other than the time it will take to manually download each individual facility onto a land mass before dragging each one over to the approximate location, whats holding me back is the lack of updated aerial imagery which I can overlay as a reference. At least Fiery Cross and Subi Reef should be included alongside database imports like the Woody Island Airfield for China. For the smaller bases, I could combine generic DB entries like Military Base, Heliport and Naval Dock but without any idea of what kind of equipment will be stationed there, they'd just be a missile vacuum the way my scenario is set up right now.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 7/9/2015 4:46:28 PM   
Primarchx


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I'd like Japan to get some of those ASBMs and see how China likes a little AA/AD action from a nearby, unsinkable platform.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/3/2015 2:16:04 PM   
AlanChan

 

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Type 022 is not cheap, they come in at 200M CNY each. they are specially designed to operate near heavily contested littoral waters which big ship is hard to survive. 60 of them is enough for taiwan strait. More of them could be added if Vietnam got some really good ASuM capacity. But now, enough 022 were built, so PLAN turn to 056. It is not 022 was replaced by 056. 056 replace 037.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/14/2015 9:54:14 PM   
magi

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Araner


quote:

ORIGINAL: AlanChan




this is a cool picture..... I would love to see a number of scenarios on how to deal with this sort of situation in the West Pacific South China Sea…
It is my understanding that we would not be able to take out their network in one big bush… you are correct that it is a layer defense network… That it would have to be destroyed like peeling an onion one layer at a time… However I have read the Navy believe taking out thier islands would be easy.....

I believe the flaw in my notion of a aaw ssgn.... Is that it would be used in a missile rich environment…… it would shoot and squirt.... However the time to target of supersonic missiles probably would be in the minutes… and the envelope of time for the ssgn to position itself to launch if submerged would probably be too long... But it is still a cool notion if those huge details could be worked out…

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/15/2015 12:25:17 AM   
Dysta


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We also forget the rapid redevelop-ability of Chinese satellites with solid fuel rockets.

If orbital warfare also comes in play, there will be generating more space debris than the entire space exploring history combined.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/15/2015 7:17:21 PM   
magi

 

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May be… With space laser mounted satellites… We can just burn them so they don't function instead of blowing them to pieces... Which would probably happen in hour one.....

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/15/2015 9:04:04 PM   
AlanChan

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: magi

May be… With space laser mounted satellites… We can just burn them so they don't function instead of blowing them to pieces... Which would probably happen in hour one.....


Don't try to match the power of ground based laser from space. Space deployed, lasers are more useful for trick IR star sensor to confuse sat for its position. But ground based laser could burn sats or blind their primary sensors.

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/16/2015 2:05:18 AM   
Dysta


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They don't have to redeploy sensor satellite, but rather, disruptive satellite with robotic arms, or wavelength jamming satellite that immune to photonics kill (laser).

Unless the US is extremely desperate to scrap their old-school ASAT doctrine, and bring out 1MW laser that needs a NPP to power it.

< Message edited by Dysta -- 10/16/2015 3:10:26 AM >

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RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/18/2015 9:02:22 PM   
temkc5

 

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future A2/AD offset strategies seem like an interesting to put it mildly.
Araner is their any way to convince you to release a alpha/beta for the community to get more involved in this fascinating topic
and Test the inner strategist

currently my money is on something DARPA is working on "ECM/EMP"

Ps. AGM-158C LRASM also SLAMER-ATA for second strike & damage reporting

Honorable mention UGM-109I Tomahawk Blk IV MMT

_____________________________

Non mihi, Non tibi, Sed nobis


(in reply to Dysta)
Post #: 25
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 10/19/2015 12:32:39 AM   
Dysta


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TACTOM and LRASM aren't the critical solution of naval conflicts. It is still the strategic and tactical expense do the answer to which side can last longer. I am pretty sure area denial with AA missiles and MRBMs can deal more efficient damage than actually invading the others.

Of course, offense is the best defense, the problem is how big the offense can equalize their defense.

(in reply to temkc5)
Post #: 26
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 11/3/2015 11:30:29 PM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Primarchx

I'd like Japan to get some of those ASBMs and see how China likes a little AA/AD action from a nearby, unsinkable platform.


Make those ASCMs and it looks like you may get your wish... http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2015/05/17/18524/

(in reply to Primarchx)
Post #: 27
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 11/4/2015 12:44:11 AM   
Araner

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: temkc5

future A2/AD offset strategies seem like an interesting to put it mildly.
Araner is their any way to convince you to release a alpha/beta for the community to get more involved in this fascinating topic
and Test the inner strategist

currently my money is on something DARPA is working on "ECM/EMP"

Ps. AGM-158C LRASM also SLAMER-ATA for second strike & damage reporting

Honorable mention UGM-109I Tomahawk Blk IV MMT


I certainly appreciate the interest! Moreover, it seems like a new PLAN vs USN thread is created every other week requesting something aloong the lines of a 2020s-era conflict in the ECS/SCS... As for my being able to share an Alpha scenario, I did get pretty far along in modelling the oft-cited PLA missile attack on Okinawa with US/JSDF response. I even made sure to base every unit on known locations and capabilities, which took a LONG time as you might imagine! This was especially true of the Second Artillery units.

Nevertheless, the scenario yielded interesting information even before I got the chance to run it! By this I mean the fabled "1000 missile strike" of carrier-killing MIRVs is much more likely an "80 missile strike". If you actually map known locations for each 2nd Artillery unit with their reported missile batteries its pretty easy to figure out that the vast majority of the 2nd Artillery missile inventories are aimed at Taiwan. When comparing the range of a DF-15 to a DF-16 one can see the latters range is just barely long enough to reach Okinawa, but nowhere else in Japan, unless stationed north of North Korea... So that leaves the DF-21C (the coventional land attack variant and Df-21D the infamous carrier killer). I have the citations somewhere, but the best sources I could only find 1 and maybe 2 units deployed with DF-21Ds. If we assumed that number were to double in the next few years that still wouldn't account for more than 100 missiles that have never actually successfully been tested hitting a ship at sea... Moreover, as I was able to map each 2nd Artillery unit to their garrison HQ and suspected launch sites, another observation became immediately clear...It would be a lot harder to quietly launch a rocket in heavily urbanized China then it was in the deserts of Iraq. As easy as it was for me to map launch sites from open sources online, I'm guessing the Pentagon has more recent data to work with. Not to mention, if people were Tweeting about the Bin Laden raid while it was happening in Abbotabad, one would imagine the sudden launch of 15 ballistic missiles within the same area would attract some kind of notice on Social Media. Of course, the authorities could always black out access to that area but that alone would signal a red flag for the US.
Anyway, I've been meaning to report all these results in greater detail once the actual scenario came anywhere close to a playable state but I've been running into some technical issues that makes the scenario unplayable after a certain point. Namely, the sheer number of units involved slow the gameplay down to the point where its hard to make an accurate depiction without straining the games resources... I tried streamlining the units down to those most likely to be involved in a PLA vs US/JSDF conflict by getting rid of the DF15 units etc... but it still winds end being a large file.
Something that might be more achievable would be if I could share something like a scenario attachment package in the interim. Such a package could include all the relevant 2nd Artillery units located in their presumed deployment sites, and the "Skywave Radar Brigade" with the four OTH-SW radar sites, and the only known OTH-B site which are considered to be crucial to the "ASBM Kill Chain". If I can figure it out, I can also add the georeferenced image overlays that I used to identify each location. Of course, there seem to be technical issues with sharing even this much as i've found my .inst exports tend to be missing certain random files... I'm sure there's a write up on how to do it properly though so hopefully I'll figure it out soon enough...

(in reply to temkc5)
Post #: 28
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 11/5/2015 11:22:47 PM   
Vici Supreme

 

Posts: 558
Joined: 12/4/2013
From: Southern Germany
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Araner


Something that might be more achievable would be if I could share something like a scenario attachment package in the interim. Such a package could include all the relevant 2nd Artillery units located in their presumed deployment sites, and the "Skywave Radar Brigade" with the four OTH-SW radar sites, and the only known OTH-B site which are considered to be crucial to the "ASBM Kill Chain". If I can figure it out, I can also add the georeferenced image overlays that I used to identify each location. Of course, there seem to be technical issues with sharing even this much as i've found my .inst exports tend to be missing certain random files... I'm sure there's a write up on how to do it properly though so hopefully I'll figure it out soon enough...

Go for it! I already wanted to ask. I'm sure a lot of guys here could benefit from your work!

_____________________________


(in reply to Araner)
Post #: 29
RE: Modelling future A2/AD offset strategies. - 11/22/2015 3:29:24 AM   
falcon2006

 

Posts: 57
Joined: 7/8/2014
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quote:

ORIGINAL: AlanChan

Type 022 is not cheap, they come in at 200M CNY each. they are specially designed to operate near heavily contested littoral waters which big ship is hard to survive. 60 of them is enough for taiwan strait. More of them could be added if Vietnam got some really good ASuM capacity. But now, enough 022 were built, so PLAN turn to 056. It is not 022 was replaced by 056. 056 replace 037.

Under every circumstances, the type 022 is useless. This is even a conclusion by PLAN and PLAAF. For where the PLA gains air superiority, enemy warships will be destroyed by aircraft with ASMs and even conventional bombs, other enemy ships will be deployed in enemy's air superiority region.Type 022 will never get a shot chance at that circumstance. On the other hand, 022 has to get into enemy's air superiority region and becomes a prey of enemy weapon platforms. When type 022s were built, the biggest challenge for PLA was and now still is airborne threat. These threats are mainly long range cruise missiles, ASMs, and sometimes torpedoes and missiles from submarines. Type 022 has no capability of engaging all these targets, and its only role of striking enemy ships is just impossible.

(in reply to AlanChan)
Post #: 30
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