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- 6/24/2003 2:17:43 PM

Dagfinn

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From: Western Norway
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Rune Iversen
[B]Not here;)
The entire danish defence concept was based upon the fact that WAPA would have been unable to attack Denmark with anything during a 72 hour scenario. Barring the deployment of the strategic reserve of airborne forces, and the possibility of airraids, We reckoned that the 72 hour scenario would affect mobilization plans in minor ways only.
As regards attacks on Scandinavia, I do not believe that the 72 hour plan was viable for WAPA, and from what I have seen they didn�t even belive it themselves. The East Germans plans I have seen/heard off talked about a preparation time of weeks, and preferably months, in order to ensure that the amphibious invasion of Denmark would go off without a hitch. [/B][/QUOTE]

It's not about fearing that it SHOULD happen, it's about fearing what will happen if it DID happen.

I'm aware that a jumpstart scn aint the most viabel thing in Northern Norway.

But we have to consider it a viabel option on the central front, and then the flanks will have to "come as you are"

IMHO only that would have wrecked havoc in northern Norway.

Btw. I think you are wrong about the Soviets capability of suplying a MRD+ .

_____________________________

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Post #: 31

NATO and the WP - 6/24/2003 7:06:15 PM

LTCMTS

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First, I wouldn't consider the loss of northern Norway the end of the world (though I can't answer for the Norwegian civilians caught in the middle) for the Battle of the Atlantic, part 2. Airfields do not consist of runways alone, though runways long enough to support heavily loaded "Backfires" do not, I believe, abound in northern Norway. The use of fjiords by Soviet light forces would be possible, but again, the logistics needed to support such ops if the Norwegians render the small ports and fishing villages unusable, may degrade these ops. Just as important, any occupation of northern Norway would not be peaceful for the Soviets. Remnants of North Brigade and the Home Guard could be expected to conduct a guerilla war against Soviet forces, using better small unit tactics, marksmanship and terrain, much like the Afghans. More importantly, remember that in 1988-89, US/NATO strategy for a northern Atlantic battle had moved from passive defense to attacking into the Norwegian Sea at Soviet "schwerpunkts" placing their assets, especially their SSBNs at risk and forcing the commitment to this battle of assets, such as SSGNs, to this battle against forces (CBGs) better able to survive and retaliate.
Second, another good point from Dagfin. As Napoleon said (and Clausewitz paraphrased), focus on the main point, once that is resolved, all other issues will fall in place. If NATO won in the center, then northern Norway could be liberated as forces are redeployed from other theaters, if NATO lost in the center, then a successful defense of northern Norway will be wasted. As Frederick said, he who tries to defend everything, ends up defending nothing.

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Post #: 32

Re: NATO and the WP - 6/24/2003 7:30:00 PM

Dagfinn

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From: Western Norway
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
[B]First, I wouldn't consider the loss of northern Norway the end of the world (though I can't answer for the Norwegian civilians caught in the middle) for the Battle of the Atlantic, part 2. Airfields do not consist of runways alone, though runways long enough to support heavily loaded "Backfires" do not, I believe, abound in northern Norway. The use of fjiords by Soviet light forces would be possible, but again, the logistics needed to support such ops if the Norwegians render the small ports and fishing villages unusable, may degrade these ops. Just as important, any occupation of northern Norway would not be peaceful for the Soviets. Remnants of North Brigade and the Home Guard could be expected to conduct a guerilla war against Soviet forces, using better small unit tactics, marksmanship and terrain, much like the Afghans. More importantly, remember that in 1988-89, US/NATO strategy for a northern Atlantic battle had moved from passive defense to attacking into the Norwegian Sea at Soviet "schwerpunkts" placing their assets, especially their SSBNs at risk and forcing the commitment to this battle of assets, such as SSGNs, to this battle against forces (CBGs) better able to survive and retaliate.
Second, another good point from Dagfin. As Napoleon said (and Clausewitz paraphrased), focus on the main point, once that is resolved, all other issues will fall in place. If NATO won in the center, then northern Norway could be liberated as forces are redeployed from other theaters, if NATO lost in the center, then a successful defense of northern Norway will be wasted. As Frederick said, he who tries to defend everything, ends up defending nothing. [/B][/QUOTE]

I agree with your post, but... ;)

There IS actually three airstrips in northern Norway that has/had the capability of "serving" Backfire's. They all lay north of the Narvik area, and those was in my mind when I said holding Narvik wasnt enough. Its not the end of the world, but IMHO it WILL make the battle of the Atlantic seriousley harder.

IMHO those airstrips is THE reason Soviet would be interested in Northern Norway. It is quite hard to facilitate a scenario where WP forces can occupy the whole of Norway from the north. Getting past Narvik-area is IMHO impossible without MAJOR assets.

Btw. I understand you to hold the Norwegian soldiers in high regard. I look forward to your anounced post concerning the Norwegian army.

_____________________________

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Post #: 33

Dupuy - 6/24/2003 7:36:00 PM

LTCMTS

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I am a disciple of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz, in that I believe that military excellence comes from education and training, that such excellence can be institutionalized and that the Army is the People and the People are the Army.

I have read much of Trevor Dupuy's writings. I do not always agree with him, though his methodology for reducing war into distinct factors which can be placed into formulas that can predict combat resultion and end state determination is interesting (and parelleled the Soviets concept of "norms"). You can reduce the experience of history into a series of formulas that can reproduce and predict outcomes, this has been demonstrated by the theory and concept of wargaming. The problem is that many of the factors in those formulas CANNOT be produced from hard data and are subjective in the extreme. One of those that we have been discussing is morale.
These factors also give people like us something to debate and talk about, instead of being out playing pool and drinking with the "boys". I'm not sure my wife appreciates that this forum is keeping me off the streets.

As far as northern Norway (or Norway in particular) goes, the situation is dependent on political decisions along an event timeline and running from worse case to best case. We cannot be sure the WP could not have attacked out of their barracks with their CAT A forces in eastern Europe or at the end of a major exercise using chem and nucs. We cannot be sure they would have allowed the creation an atmosphere so threatening to NATO over a period of time, say a year, that would allow NATO's various governments to bite hard and mobilize. Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum is the most likely scenario. As we discussed before, there would be a number of warning signs, such as retention of time-expired conscripts in June or December, the withdrawl of equipment from storage, the reinforcement of forces forward, with activity at the choke points were the rail gauges changed over in Poland. The most probable pre-hostilities period would not exceed a month and could be as short as two weeks. Chem and nucs would probably be out of the question as long as NATO maintained the ability to place the Soviet "heartland" and leadership at risk and a balance of capabilities at the operational level (theater nuc forces). There would also be the question of competing theaters, not just Norway, but Thrace, northern Italy, Armenia, the Middle East, Central America, Korea and SEA. The Middle East could "bleed off" as many as 2 US Corps, Korea, possible, 1 and then the other theaters could demand some form of US forces as reassurance of US interest and commitment.
Again, any game/sim with a decent scenario and database editor or a very supportive development team, would allow the exploration of the entire spectrum of such event-timelines. Once terrain, rules and the basic OOB are established, we can take it from there.

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Post #: 34

Flashes of Inspiration? - 6/24/2003 7:52:13 PM

LTCMTS

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Actually, I hold all the NATO armies in high regard. I have never met a professional soldier from any NATO army who I would not have enjoyed serving with, and most conscripts demonstrated, if not total enthusiasm, at least a willingness to do the right thing, when and as required.
On the other hand, I have to admit that the impact of funding, the availability of training opportunities, ammunition, equipment and facilities, the constraints of small organizations with less growth opportunity and the ability to articulate the need for national and collective defense and security created different levels of capability between the NATO forces. Budget per capita based on defense budget divided into number of soldiers tends to be a rough, but fairly accurate indicator of CURRENT tactical capability. I do not rate the British better than the Belgians because the Belgians are some how inferior, but because the Belgians have one of the lowest per capita budgets in NATO impacting the length of service, quality of training and availability of modern equipment. I would expect a rough level of parity if every NATO army between 1988-91 was funded to the same levels per capita, provided the same levels of equipment and the same quality of training.

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Post #: 35

Another thought - 6/24/2003 8:08:09 PM

LTCMTS

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As a point, I am currently a Reserve officer on Active Duty with the US Army Reserve (AGR). When I was a MAJ, not so long ago (or maybe not), I was the S4 of the 205th INF Bde (Light) stationed at Fort Snelling in Minnesota. The 205th was organized as a seperate brigade, but assigned as "round out" to the 6 ID(L) in Alaska. We participated in Division "Warfighters" twice a year, and underwent a Bde ARTEP with OCs from the 6 ID once a year. In my estimation, our Reservists were equal to the AC troops at squad, platoon and, even, company level. We did not get the year round training that they did (254 days versus 38 days) but we maintained a stability of personnel in our units that created a cohesion they couldn't match and we enforced the Army standards on physical fitness and individual skills. I am not afraid to admit, however, that at the battalion and brigade levels, we could not equal their ability to manage the battle. The higher the echelon, the more practice is required. As a brigade, we often received newer equipment before the AC units (like ECWCS and Gortex boots, and we were to receive M119 105mm Guns to replace our 105mm M101 hows in 1995, but we deactivated in 1994) but I would have to have rated our overall readiness as below the two AC bdes. Put us on AD for 90 days, however, and we would have reached their levels of efficiency. The question would have been would we get those 90 days before ending up in northern Japan or Korea?
Remember that the ARNG divisions performed no worse (and no better) than the RA divisions when the US went to war in 1942, but that was because they had been on AD for a year, they had been reinforced by draftees, bringing their average age down and the RA divisions had been activated or completed on much the same time line.

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Post #: 36

Bundesheer - 6/28/2003 10:33:10 PM

LTCMTS

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Most of the conscript NCOs and the NCO shortfalls would have been limited to the support elements, primarily HQs and the service support company in the brigade. At mobilization, you could expect an influx of regular NCOs from support positions in organizations augmented by recalled reservists.
The reservists recalled to the brigade would also fill out the war only 4th companies in each battalion which are nominally organized into a battalion task force, armor heavy for the Pz Bdes and mech heavy for the PzG Bdes. They would also reinforce the support elements.
An interesting review of training costs per soldier (again an estimate as NATO budgets are not standardized and the economic costs of maintaining and training a soldier are not equivalent across NATO.

1. Canada
2. US
3. UK
4. Norway
5. Denmark
6. France
7. Netherlands
8. FRG
9. Italy
10. Belgium
11. Portugal
12. Spain
13. Greece
14. Turkey

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Post #: 37

Internal Security Forces - 6/29/2003 11:46:43 PM

LTCMTS

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How are the various internal security forces integrated into the game? The Danish Home Guard, the Bundesgrenzschuetze and Bereitschaftpolizei and die DeutschedHeers Heimatsschuetzkompanie u. zuge (Territorial Army) used for internal security and positional defense?

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Post #: 38

- 7/7/2003 7:20:18 PM

Dagfinn

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Been away for a while...

So basicaly what your saying LTCMTS, is that your rating of combatants is based on funding? :eek:

Have you atleast adjusted the prizelevel for eatch country? I'll bet that you can train quite a few turks on the budget for training a norwegian... :rolleyes:

IMHO all the money in the world wont make a good army if the serving personell aint interested...

And then there is politics and national pride ect ect

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Post #: 39

Re: Internal Security Forces - 7/7/2003 7:31:59 PM

Rune Iversen

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
[B]How are the various internal security forces integrated into the game? The Danish Home Guard, the Bundesgrenzschuetze and Bereitschaftpolizei and die DeutschedHeers Heimatsschuetzkompanie u. zuge (Territorial Army) used for internal security and positional defense? [/B][/QUOTE]

I suppose it will be a hard task, since most of these units operate at platoon level at most. Perhaps they can be provided as "attachments" to larger units.

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Fighting the EUnuchs from within

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Post #: 40

Actual training funding - 7/8/2003 5:58:27 AM

LTCMTS

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Actually funding for training is only one of many factors as I indicated in my previous posts. And you are right,, you can probably afford 5-6 Turkish conscripts for each Danish one. The numbers, however, are the best I can do at stripping away personnel and equipment procurement costs. Within the US Army, you can actually identify the dollars dedicated to individual and collective training, though it is spread through a number of accounts. What is interesting about this list is that in actual numbers, the first three countries fund their training per capita (per soldier) at 25% above no.4. As I said it is only one factor, but it is interesting that the three armies US, Canada and the UK) using volunteers only and with a reputation for consistent performance are also the three highest in dedicated training funding. Antway here's a second factor: length of basic training for individual soldiers:

1. Canada
2. UK, Turkey
3. US, Greece
4. FRG, Spain, Portugal
5. Netherlands, France, Norway
6. Denmark, Italy
7. Belgium, USSR

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Post #: 41

Heimatsschuetzen - 7/8/2003 6:00:00 AM

LTCMTS

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In many cases, German Territorial Army light infantry units were to be attached to US Army CS/CSS units at Corps and above to augment rear area security assets and base defense clusters.

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Post #: 42

Sloped Armor and finned sabot and HEAT - 7/8/2003 6:28:11 AM

LTCMTS

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Reading Ogorkiewicz, he seems to imply that slope has little or no effect on penetration by HEAT or APDSFS. I'm not sure he's saying this, or that the slope has no other effect than to increase the actual amount of protective material in the path of the HEAT plasma jet or the APDSFS (or in some cases damage the shape of the HEAT charge and deforming the jet). In this case, the actual versus the effective increase in thickness would be 200% at 60 degrees against HEAT and APDSFS and 350% against APC, APHE, HVAP/APCR and APDS. Comments, anyone?

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Post #: 43

Re: Actual training funding - 7/8/2003 12:53:32 PM

Dagfinn

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
[B]Antway here's a second factor: length of basic training for individual soldiers:

1. Canada
2. UK, Turkey
3. US, Greece
4. FRG, Spain, Portugal
5. Netherlands, France, Norway
6. Denmark, Italy
7. Belgium, USSR [/B][/QUOTE]

This would ofcourse lead us to discuss what eatch nation puts into its "basic training" ;)

Im not so sure extensivley basic training is better than "real unit" training...

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Post #: 44

Funding Is What It`s All About - 7/9/2003 5:08:31 AM

Black Cat

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" your saying ratings are based on funding ? " Yes indeed.

An example would be found in:

" Dragons At War 2-34th. Infantry in the Mojave "
Daniel P. Bolger
Presido
1986
ISBN #0-89141-246-8

Among other things It`s the story of the best Motor Rifle Regiment in the World ;)

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Post #: 45

Defense of Hill 781 - 7/9/2003 5:32:45 AM

LTCMTS

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Yes, and I would also recommend "The Defense of Hill 781", McDonough, James R., Presidio, 1988. Not only one of the best "lessons learned" books I've read, in the class of "The Defense of Duffy's Drift" but an accurate portrayal of the learning curve that the US Army's combat brigades' had already experienced.

Basic training provides the integration of the soldier into his "new " culture, provides him/her with the basic skills to survive and learn as a soldier and is essential to any training process. It goes back to the Romans, who conducted six months of individual basic combat training. Even now, I can remember my experiences at Fort Knox in the winter of '75-'76 as a recruit private in the last Vietnam era eight weeks basic course. Then it was airborne school, the best 4 weeks I ever spent in the US Army (we had an extra week up front) and rigger school, the worst 12 weeks in spent in the Army as an EM.
Advanced individual training provides the soldier with his/her necessary skills to functions as an individual with a small group/unit environment.
Without these phases, a recruit is worse than useless wjhen collective skills (ie. unit) training is conducted. Imagine the confusion in a mechanized fire team when one of the team cannot use his individual weapon, find cover and concealment or even obey simple orders?

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Post #: 46

- 7/9/2003 9:19:58 AM

Golf33

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Agree on basic training with LTCMTS et al. We noticed an immediate decline in the useability of new soldiers in our arty unit, caused by the reduction of time for basic training by about 60%. Because the arty IET is a fairly technical course, the recruits were not picking up the missed parts of basic training (discipline, toughness, fieldcraft, basic military skills like weapons and navigation) until they got to a unit. Moreover, they weren't absorbing the technical training as well as recruits with a longer basic course either, possibly due to the 'culture shock' continuing after basic training instead of being worked through during it.

Training time isn't the only factor, obviously what and how it is taught matter too. However, time is a minimum requirement without which you can't achieve anything else.

33

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Post #: 47