Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Apollo11

IMHO, the best military axiom of all times is:
"Hope for the best but plan for the worst!"

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But every military conflict (just as Mogami says) proves that even best military plan does not survive the first encounter with enemy.

Regardless of good and/or bad plans - combat is unpredictable!

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Some might say that's providence... some might say that's bad/good luck... but in any case any combat (just like our everyday life) depend on many of those "small" things that, at the end, have very significant impact...

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl
The difference between a good operational plan and a cruddy one is the degree to which a single error does not ruin the plan. The Allied plan at Midway was a good one. The Japanese plan at Midway was a bad one. The Allied plan at Balikpapan was a good one. The Allied plan on 8 August with respect to disposition of forces was a poor one. The Japanese plan that night was a good one.

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None of those things were ideal. Indeed, they almost certainly HURT the US effort at Midway far more than they helped. There was a strong likelihood that a series of strung out attacks would occur, owing to the operation from 2 TFs and a land base making uncoordinated attacks with respect to each others' launches. One cannot view some other general set of conditions in re the timing of American airstrikes as likely, or even reasonably plausible. If, however, one insists on pretending that somehow the "wearing down of the IJN CAP" was a factor, you have to consider the alternative. More than 120 USN naval aircraft arrive as a coordinated effective mass, wholly overwhelming the paltry Japanese CAP, rather than allowing them to defeat the first couple waves in detail. In addition, B17s attack at a time when IJN ships are unable to maneuver to avoid all possible attacks concurrently, along with B26s and Midway based SBDs and TBDs. It's a recipe for slaughtering Japanese ships that makes the real event look like a lucky outcome for Japan.

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Now flip the coin on its head. You are a Japanese operational planner. You have a major enemy land-aerodrome operating against you, and possibly one enemy CV operating in the area. It's challenging to maintain effective CAP-cac... despite your pilots' experience you've never before faced a prepared enemy capable of opposing you with real force, w;though your comrades on Sho and Zui have. Coral Sea, an action that occurred some weeks before, has taught some of your peers you that your uberpilots in their uberplanes ARE NOT capable of stopping an Allied air strike in its tracks, and that Bushido Spirit will not prevail, nor the gods intervene to protect you, if a moderate force is projected against you. You lost 1 CVL, almost lost a CV (escaping by the skin on your cuticles) and had several IJN air groups wiped out both to the operational exigencies of operating CV-based airgroups in a real carrier battle against pilots and equipment that were better than you imagined them to be.

Now there's Midway, and possibly a US CV. Your plan can assume that you will have the usual plane-handling snafus, that there can be errors in the search etc, and that the US, like you, will probably not have any propensity to coordinate land based strikes with CV based strikes. So you do, as Strike Force did at Midway, put up the same CAP as a force structure, and assume all the Allied pilots will fly like dunces like the propaganda said they would, despite previous experience to the contrary? Moreover, you assume that the opposition will arrive at a time and place of your own choosing and of the greatest convenience to you?

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And people act like the fact that the Japanese CAP was overwhelmed was an unlikely or even unforeseeable event. Jeesh!

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ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

A few more military axioms that may or may not fit Midway:

'War is based on mistakes - the side which makes less mistakes will win.'

'War is based on deception, deceive the enemy, not yourself.' (say 'Aleutians')

'Anything you do may get you shot, including doing nothing.'

'Order - Counterorder - Disorder.'

'Everything being equal, the side with the simplest uniform wins.'

and my old sig: 'If your attack is going really well, you are walking into an ambush.'

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#1
Keep all my CVs (no Aleutian stupidity) for fleet battle cover only (since US was expected to intervene).

#2
Shut down Midway airbase with surface ship during initial night bombardment (that bombardment would precede all other actions).

#3
Keep all ships together (in coherent way) and concentrated on single task - invading Midway and destroying US fleet if it tries to intervene.

Isn't this plan (from naval amateur) much better than historic Japanese one?

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If this was done no way US could have won even with in advance warning via "Magic" and all preparation in the world...

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

On the face of it, it seems better. Your proposed naval bombardment isn't likely to work, however, since Midway is probably going to mess up the attacking force unless you dedicate CVs to suppressing Midway. If you suppress Midway, you're back in the same shoes that Japan was in historically. If, however, you cancel the Aleutians operation, you will have a little more CV based air to engage in your move against Midway. Frankly, however, the only really good way that I see to make Midway work is to cancel operation MO and send Sho and Zui to Midway along with the other big four. Then you can dedicate 2 fleet CVs and 2 baby CVs to suppressing Midway whilst keeping four fleet CVs to engage any opposition.

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I don't buy that. Even with no advance warning, the best you can get is something like 5 on 4 combat. Coral Sea except on a bigger scale. I do, however, think that if you send 6 CVs, 2 baby CVs to Midway and encounter 4 USN CVs, you have a better chance than sending 4 CVs to combat 3 USN CVs. In that event I see the following. 1. Spruance fulfills his orders, inflicting greater damage on the enemy. 2. The USN loses 1-2 CVs and has 1-2 escape crippled. 3. The IJN loses 2 CVs, loses maybe another one crippled & foundered on the way home, is basically stripped of 5 CVs worth of air group pilots, and seizes Midway. A Pyrrhic Strategic Victory for Japan and a tactical draw or victory for the USN.

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ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

Mind if I ask a question in all of this?

What purpose does Midway serve in Japan's war plan? I never really came to terms with it. Even had it somehow succeeded, what was the point? PH was and always would be an untouchable goal.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, You could hedge your bet with Naval Bombardment by having the carriers 150 miles behind 30kt ships can move 360 miles in 12 hours. How long is darkness in June in that part of the Pacific?

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, The way I understand it Midway was a target the Japanese believed the US would have to come out to defend. They thought the US reaction would not begin until after they had closed the airfield on day one. They would spend day two setting up an ambush of the USN reaction and fight the big battle that won the war on day three or four. I'm not sure what the northern force was actually for since it was too small, the weather too bad and the target not likely to detract from whatever reacted towards Midway.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, If both sides had understood the other there would have been no war.

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ORIGINAL: Rummy

I'm new to this topic, so I don't want to come across as all-knowing, but the first post really intrigued me when Apollo 11 suggested Japan should take what can be taken, then go on the defensive.

As an amatuer WWII scholar, I couldn't disagree more, since that essentially was Japan's strategy and it failed miserably. Granted, their greatest setback came in an offensive move, but trying to bleed the Americans dry by leaving garrisoned strongholds in the middle of the Pacific was a disaster. I've not played UV enough to know whether this will be possible in WITP, but I would go on the offensive and stay on it for as long as possible.

Japan gave the initiative to the U.S. and never recovered. That was their doom.

I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, If both sides had understood the other there would have been no war.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

(When I hear the phrase "They came to an understanding" I don't usally expect to then hear "And then they beat the crap out of one another")

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(When I hear the phrase "They came to an understanding" I don't usually expect to then hear "And then they beat the crap out of one another")

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

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Based on this, I would certainly expect a 4:1 result in favor of the U.S. to occur more often than a 3:1 result for the Japanese.

We disagree.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

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I don't think it is unreasonable to say that there was 25% chance that the Japanese would spot the U.S. first, or that the U.S. carriers would be spotted in time to launch the second reserve wave against the U.S. carriers before the U.S. strike arrived over the Japanese.

I think the chance of the IJN TF finding the USN TF first is less than 1 in 500. The problem remains the factor that you have conveniently ignored in your alternate formulation. Midway atoll.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi The problem is what do you do if the USN says "OK take Midway"?
The IJN can't stick around forever and Midway is a very close invasion target from PH. The IJN does not want to get in range of all those aircraft (Hawaii)

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ORIGINAL: Rendova

Hartmann's records are genrally accepted as being correct, Although he had alot (all?) on the Eastern Front, which, was where the USSR was operating the a REALLY bad airforce and the Germans cut them to peices, not taking anything away from Hartmann I am sure he was a excellent pilot, but on the east front he had some a whole lot of bad planes flow by a whole lot of bad pilots. Another thing to remember is that all US pilots only served a set tour of duty, and were then rotated back to the US. Richard Bong was actually a test pilot back in the US when he was killed in an accident. Also US pilots flew less missions per pilot then did Japan or Germany (ie a P-51 Pilot would fly one escort mission for B-17's and a German Pilot would fly 2-3 missions agaisnt that same raid). Plus the US was active in the war for a much shorter period of time (if I remeber right Hartmann had most of his kills by the time the US got into the war). This is not to take away from the other countries' aces, just trying to explain why US scores are lower.

PS one more point. The US I believe had stricter standards for crediting kills which led to more "probables" and less "confirmed"

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, All I know is when I am Japan. I will win Midway. I won't move there for any reason other to sink USN vessels beginning with CV. I'll know how many USN CV exist and plan for them all to be waiting. The only way the USN will win is if they are commanded by one lucky SOB.

(of course I could be wrong, I've lost CV battles in UV where I thought right up to the moment the combat ended "Boy is he going to get it")

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Why wouldn't night naval bombardment work?

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Japan had plenty 29-30 knot BBs with big guns that would vaporize anything on that small piece of land called Midway.

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In my plan Japanese CVs would never be used for Midway suppression.

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Japanese CVs should only be used to protect other Japanese ships and to destroy US fleet if it comes to intervene.

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Also, there is no force separation - there is force unification with CVs as core and strike force with all other forces to support and protect it.

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But Japan could have won some battles (many of which were historicaly lost).

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The Midway was one of those since almost whole Japanese naval strength was in action and US forces were many many times smaller...

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BTW, I would always bet on Japanese 6x CVs + 2x CVLs (and whole fleet with lost of CAs + BBs) against US 4x CVs + some CAs...