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RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/28/2004 11:52:14 PM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
I'm just saying that the reasonology that "they didnt' attack the harbor with torps on 12/7 (or 8)" therefore they couldn't" has some flaws in it. Hence the hindsight factor. The japanese were being cautious and conservative and trying to decide "exactly" how to deal with Force Z.


Well Nik, I may not be from Missouri but someone is going to have to show me before I change my stuborn ass.

Here what we got. I say a Pearl Harbor style attack was not attempted because of timming ( It was night ) A torp attack was never seriously considered for all the reason mentioned.

Subchaser has a source that indicates it was at least considered but rejected due to fear of excessive losses. IMO it was because more sober minds knew they stood a snowballs chance in hell in pulling it off.

My source indicates that the Kanyo Airgroup was loading bombs onto the aircraft for a planned attack on Singpapore Naval base on the 9th when it was discovered that Force Z was out of harbor and heading north. They quickly "changed" over to torps and began their frantic search for the ships. This indicates that as late as on the 9th, despite the clear and present danger of Force Z. the IJN was only planning on attacking the ships in Harbor with bombs.

Anyway looking forward to our game. Just keep those bombers off port attack on turn one.

(in reply to Nikademus)
Post #: 211
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/28/2004 11:57:25 PM   
Pascal_slith


Posts: 1651
Joined: 8/20/2003
From: back in Commiefornia
Status: offline 		It would be nice if everyone posted his original source when stating things. A few of us would like to be able to look them up on our own. Please?

_____________________________

So much WitP and so little time to play.... :-(


(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 212
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:01:35 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Pascal

You can read the Japanese operational orders on the Hyperwar website. See http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/index.html#usn

This is an EXCELLENT site with many, many primary and secondary sources.


Pascal, I cant seem to find anywhere on that site the operational orders for the Malayan campaign in general or a planned torp attack on Singapore Naval Base specifically. Can you direct me to it.

(in reply to Pascal_slith)
Post #: 213
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:04:34 AM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
Joined: 12/18/2002
From: Purgatory
Status: offline 		Pascal, like everyone else, I swiped it from someone else

If you want to contact the author and see where he swiped it from ... jeremy.lee@btinternet.com

The numbers jive quite nicely with all the other sites that happen to have other data on the subject.

(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 214
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:05:41 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Singapore does not suffer from the first turn suprise rules (like PH and Clark)
Because I expect the RN to come out of port on Dec 8th I do not tire out my airgroups on Dec 7th.


Hey Mogami thats the first I heard of this. Its something I been asking for all along. IMHO, Its a good thing. BUT does this mean Luskan got those results without the help or surprise rules?

(in reply to mogami)
Post #: 215
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:06:35 AM   
Pascal_slith


Posts: 1651
Joined: 8/20/2003
From: back in Commiefornia
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pascal

You can read the Japanese operational orders on the Hyperwar website. See http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/index.html#usn

This is an EXCELLENT site with many, many primary and secondary sources.


Pascal, I cant seem to find anywhere on that site the operational orders for the Malayan campaign in general or a planned torp attack on Singapore Naval Base specifically. Can you direct me to it.


Sorry, it's in the Pearl Harbor Attack section of Ibiblio. Here's the exact URL

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_12/x12-p431.html

_____________________________

So much WitP and so little time to play.... :-(


(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 216
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:10:42 AM   
Pascal_slith


Posts: 1651
Joined: 8/20/2003
From: back in Commiefornia
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

Pascal, like everyone else, I swiped it from someone else

If you want to contact the author and see where he swiped it from ... jeremy.lee@btinternet.com

The numbers jive quite nicely with all the other sites that happen to have other data on the subject.


Thanks, Frag.

_____________________________

So much WitP and so little time to play.... :-(


(in reply to Mr.Frag)
Post #: 217
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:22:51 AM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
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quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT


Well Nik, I may not be from Missouri but someone is going to have to show me before I change my stuborn ass.



Only two things come from Missouri.....


steers and......



awww......no Turn 1 Mogami-ish master plan of utter destruction, complete with a crack of thunder soundbit?

rats

_____________________________


(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 218
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:36:48 AM   
Pascal_slith


Posts: 1651
Joined: 8/20/2003
From: back in Commiefornia
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pascal

You can read the Japanese operational orders on the Hyperwar website. See http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/index.html#usn

This is an EXCELLENT site with many, many primary and secondary sources.


Pascal, I cant seem to find anywhere on that site the operational orders for the Malayan campaign in general or a planned torp attack on Singapore Naval Base specifically. Can you direct me to it.


I have another interesting source URL too:

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/interrogation_of_captain_sonokaw.htm

_____________________________

So much WitP and so little time to play.... :-(


(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 219
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:01:08 AM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline 		Dull's, Book; The Imperial Japanese Navy gives a decent acount of the action aganst the Price of Wales and Repulse in Chapter 3.


" The Japanese bases in Indochina were also Kept informed of the Various Courses taken by Force Z. On Dec. 9th observation and atack units were sent out, but they found nothing. During the Night, howeaver, it was concluded that an air atack on force Z, early on the 10th of December, would be posable, and at 0220, five Japanese planes left Camtanh Bay, refeuling at Poulo Condore Island and taking off again at o430. From Saigon a nine plane formation was sent out at 0525 to search a 40 degree arc up to 600 miles. Also from Saigon's airfields, from 0614 to 0730, 34 bombers and 50 torpedo planes took off. When Force Z was sighted at 1120, the location was pased to all units in the air."

So not all the planes were torpedo planes, as I mentioned way back in this thread, the Prince of Whalse was hit:

"Twice aft by 1,100 pound bombs, and was damaged in her starbord quarter by a near miss"

This in of course adation to 7 Torpedo hits.

(in reply to Pascal_slith)
Post #: 220
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:31:00 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline 		BRADY. You are, of course, absolutely right about some of the A/C hunting the
P-O-W and Repulse being armed with bombs. But please note another part of your
quote. Search planes were sent to check a "40 degree arc out to 600 miles". Now
obviously the Japanese plans for dealing with this threat included using both bombs
AND torpedos. And if, as a lot of you keep saying, their A/C could carry both for
much greater distances, WHY do you suppose they were limiting their search to the
exact distance I keep saying was the maximum realistic operational range for these
aircraft when operating as tropedo-bombers? Do you think there MIGHT be some
connection? Just pointing out the obvious.

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 221
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:35:51 AM   
mogami


Posts: 12789
Joined: 8/23/2000
From: You can't get here from there
Status: offline 		Hi, 600 miles out they hit land. No use searching for a TF there.

< Message edited by Mogami -- 4/28/2004 11:39:04 PM >

_____________________________






I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 222
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:43:10 AM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline 		Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko Units of WW2, by Osamu Tagaya, has a more detaied narative:


" In the pre-Dawn hours of ec. 8th, the Type 96 Land Atackers of the 22nd KoKu Sentai struled through severe weather to delever the wars first bombs on Singapore. The Type 1 Rikko of the Kanoya Kokutai Main body, howeaver remained on the ground. Assigned the specific task of dealing with the British Eastern Fleat, centered around the battle ship HMS Prince of Wales and the Battlecruisser Repulse, they waited in readiness for the chance to strike.
A Type 98 Land Based Reconnaissance Aircraft (C5M2, Babs) reported the two capatial ships in port on the 8th. They were still there at 0950 the following morning according to another reconnaissance flight, so preperations were begun to bomb the ships in port that night before they sliped out to sea. Then at 1540 came an unexpected report from submarine I-65, which claimed to have sighted two 'Repulse Class battleships' (sic) in the south china Sea at 1345. The contact report was almost two hours old.
A hurried re-examanation of the recon photo taken over Singapore that morning now revealed that the aeroplanes crew had mistaken two large tankers for the Battle wagons. The resulting message to all units confirmed that the British warships had broken out galvanised Japanese naval forces in the area."

"at 0644 three Chutai of Kanoya Ku Main body begain taking off fromThu Dau Moi. They caried Type 91 Kai 2 torpedos, designed for running in shalow depth, and with more powerfull warheads than the Type 91 Kai 1 Torpedoes carried by the Type 96 Rikko."

So this jives with what subchaser said.

Also of interest:

"It was standard procedure during training to release the torpedo 1000 meters from target, but Miyauchi was determined to boar into half the distance to inshure a hit. At 500 Meters he and the No.3 plane of the lead shotai droped their torpedos."

Prety darn close!

Another tid bit:

"Two Chutai of high leval Type 96s from Mihoro Ku droped 500-KG bombs, and scored one hit admidship"

This on the Prine of Whales, so Dull and Tagaya differ in the exact number of Hits scored but not the bomb type.

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 223
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:47:21 AM   
Bulldog61


Posts: 1517
Joined: 7/23/2000
From: Aurora,CO
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

BRADY. You are, of course, absolutely right about some of the A/C hunting the
P-O-W and Repulse being armed with bombs. But please note another part of your
quote. Search planes were sent to check a "40 degree arc out to 600 miles". Now
obviously the Japanese plans for dealing with this threat included using both bombs
AND torpedos. And if, as a lot of you keep saying, their A/C could carry both for
much greater distances, WHY do you suppose they were limiting their search to the
exact distance I keep saying was the maximum realistic operational range for these
aircraft when operating as tropedo-bombers? Do you think there MIGHT be some
connection? Just pointing out the obvious.


I've got to agree with Mike here, I've yet to find reference to non recon missions for betties beyond 600 miles.

_____________________________

You can run but you'll die tired!

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 224
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 6:48:40 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, 600 miles out they hit land. No use searching for a TF there.

It's 675 air miles from Saigon to Singapore..., and I believe Singapore is a Port which
would imply that there is some ocean next to it. So I would assume the Japanese
were looking for Phillips TF on that ocean and not in the Malayan jungle. Are were
you just being facecious?

(in reply to mogami)
Post #: 225
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 7:15:04 AM   
mogami


Posts: 12789
Joined: 8/23/2000
From: You can't get here from there
Status: offline 		Hi, No I mean the were looking for Force Z between Singapore and their landings. If force Z was still around Singapore it is not bothering the landings the landings are 450 miles from Saigon so there is no need to look much past 600 miles. Also you have to calculate the time needed to search and then launch a strike. Past 600 miles it will be dark before a strike can launch and reach and Force Z will have moved at least 60 miles in the mean time. Chicago was hit by a Betty with torpedos farther then 600 miles from home. (but they knew where to look) A betty sent west from Saigon would hit land at 450 miles why go any further?

< Message edited by Mogami -- 4/29/2004 12:18:45 AM >

_____________________________






I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 226
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 7:31:57 AM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline 		More from Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko Units of WW2, by Osamu Tagaya:



" The weather had improved greatly from the evening before, although scatered clouds were evident as the aeroplanes flew south. Meanwhile Adm. Philips had abandoned his raid on Saigora after his vessels were spoted the day before by the Japanese cruiser floatplanes, Force Z instead now heading back to singapore. A little after 1000, a Genzan Rikko flying the 3rd search sector finialy found the British ships, and at 1015 it signaled, ' Enemy main force sighted. North Lat. 4 degrees, East Lon. 103 degrees, 55 min. Bearing 60 degrees.
Receiving this signal at Saigon, 22nd Koku Sentai immediatly relayed the message to all units in the air.
The aircraft of genzan and Mihoro Ku all heard the first sighting report and headed immediatly towards Force Z, but the men of Kanoya Ku, having flown farther south in their faster Type 1 Rikko, did not. By 1028 they were 600 miles from base, and could see Singapore 80 miles to their right and the coast of Sumatra up ahead-But Not force Z Reculctantly, they turned and headed back North.
On the Ground at Thu Dau Moi, the Units CO, Captain Fujiyoshi, was worried and anxious that his men had not jeard the corect report. He telephoned 22nd KoKu Sentai HQ and requested that the enemys posation be sent in the clear, and Adm Matsunaga obliged by transforming the enemy's posation in plain language at 1130. Kanoya Ku caught this signal as they flew NW of the Anambas Islands, and finialy turned and headed toward Force Z."

" When Haruki Iki next flew over the scean of the battle, on 18th Dec., he threw out two bouquets of flowers onto the waves. He did so, he said in memory of both his fallen wingmaen and the two great ships and their crew."

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 227
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 7:42:47 AM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline 		G4M1's could fly 2315 nauticle miles in Combat overload condation, G4M2 could do better yet, their max range was 3031 Nauticle miles.

Source:Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko Units of WW2, by Osamu Tagaya.

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 228
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 9:07:05 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: A betty sent west from Saigon would hit land at 450 miles why go any further?

Actually, Mogami, a Betty sent WEST from Saigon would never see Malaya at all.
It would overfly the northernmost arm of the Gulf of Siam, then Thailand and Burma
and the Bay of Bengal. It would have to fly SOUTH-SOUTHWEST or SOUTH to have
been a danger to Phillips. South would be over water until you reached Sumatra.

(in reply to mogami)
Post #: 229
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 12:49:43 PM   
Subchaser


Posts: 1201
Joined: 11/15/2002
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT

Subchaser, I would be really interested in your source. Not that I doubt it, just that early war operations is a particular interest of mine and I am very interested in any new information can get on the subject.

I have no doubt a torp attack was initially considered, It obviously would be the first questioned asked as soon as the arrival of force Z was known. But I have never come across any information that would indicate that planning went much beyond that stage. Does your source indicate what the exact plan of attack was? The feasibility of flight paths, approaches, depths, dock locations, harbor defences, ect..... Did they train on a dummy harbor ala the Pearl Harbor attack force? Keeping in mind they only became aware that the Force Z was going to be deployed at Singapore on Nov.28th, that would only leave about a week to prepare for an attack.


TIMJOT, I was talking about initial plan of attack discussed at 22 Sentai meeting on 12/9/41, not about plan created before the war, I’m not aware of any such plan actually. The source is Sadao Takai’s “Rikko flyer”, Asahi Sonorama 1986, (Takai was commander of 2nd chutai /Genzan Ku in dec 41) this book is quite rare, and you probably won’t be able to get since it went out of print many years ago, however you can find some of Takai’s claims in book by Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi ISBN: 0743479394. Some parts of Takai’s chapter covering attack on Force Z were reprinted in this book. I have both books and both are not in English, so excuse my poor translation.

At noon Rear admiral Matsunaga gathered all Sentai officers for meeting at his headquarters. The main subject to discuss was the possible plan of attack on british warships in Singapore port. All pilots were hungry for combat, position of battleships was known and we had a chance to gain more glory than our fellow pilots in Pearl Harbor. HQ officers were analyzing data on depths in harbor in order to choose most acceptable direction of attack and most suitable combat formation. Genzan and Mihoro Ku were supposed to carry bombs, while Kanoya guys were ordered to attack with torpedoes. Pilots from my chutai were disappointed with this decision, they also wanted to attack enemy with torpedoes, they rightfully thought that this was the best way to succeed.

This meeting took place on 9th dec, from noon till 1700 when Matsunaga received I-56 report

Can anyone who have Horikoshi and Okumiya book repost this quote in good English please.

I think that Niiti and Matsunaga decided to arm only Kanoya bombers with torps for port attack, because only this unit at Thu Dau Moi airbase had modified torpedoes type 91 kai 2, designed to be used in shallow waters. All other torpedo bombers participated in attack on Force Z were armed with torps of kai 1 model. I guess amount of kai 2 torpedoes was quite limited.

Long time ago I’ve read very interesting article, probably in one of late 80s issue of Warbird international, on attack on Force Z where this point was discussed in detail. I’ll try to find this article.

_____________________________


(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 230
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 2:19:19 PM   
Luskan

 

Posts: 1897
Joined: 7/11/2002
From: Down Under
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: A betty sent west from Saigon would hit land at 450 miles why go any further?

Actually, Mogami, a Betty sent WEST from Saigon would never see Malaya at all.
It would overfly the northernmost arm of the Gulf of Siam, then Thailand and Burma
and the Bay of Bengal. It would have to fly SOUTH-SOUTHWEST or SOUTH to have
been a danger to Phillips. South would be over water until you reached Sumatra.


Mog says west but he means south west - the map is on at 45 degree angle - "west" is actually south west (but the directions you order troops to march correspond to the orientation of the map - not the actual reality of direction. Takes a little while to get used to, but you appreciate it when you're looking at the map.

_____________________________

With dancing Bananas and Storm Troopers who needs BBs?

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 231
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 4:16:18 PM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Subchaser

TIMJOT, I was talking about initial plan of attack discussed at 22 Sentai meeting on 12/9/41, not about plan created before the war, I’m not aware of any such plan actually. The source is Sadao Takai’s “Rikko flyer”, Asahi Sonorama 1986, (Takai was commander of 2nd chutai /Genzan Ku in dec 41) this book is quite rare, and you probably won’t be able to get since it went out of print many years ago, however you can find some of Takai’s claims in book by Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi ISBN: 0743479394. Some parts of Takai’s chapter covering attack on Force Z were reprinted in this book. I have both books and both are not in English, so excuse my poor translation.

At noon Rear admiral Matsunaga gathered all Sentai officers for meeting at his headquarters. The main subject to discuss was the possible plan of attack on british warships in Singapore port. All pilots were hungry for combat, position of battleships was known and we had a chance to gain more glory than our fellow pilots in Pearl Harbor. HQ officers were analyzing data on depths in harbor in order to choose most acceptable direction of attack and most suitable combat formation. Genzan and Mihoro Ku were supposed to carry bombs, while Kanoya guys were ordered to attack with torpedoes. Pilots from my chutai were disappointed with this decision, they also wanted to attack enemy with torpedoes, they rightfully thought that this was the best way to succeed.

This meeting took place on 9th dec, from noon till 1700 when Matsunaga received I-56 report

Can anyone who have Horikoshi and Okumiya book repost this quote in good English please.

I think that Niiti and Matsunaga decided to arm only Kanoya bombers with torps for port attack, because only this unit at Thu Dau Moi airbase had modified torpedoes type 91 kai 2, designed to be used in shallow waters. All other torpedo bombers participated in attack on Force Z were armed with torps of kai 1 model. I guess amount of kai 2 torpedoes was quite limited.
Long time ago I’ve read very interesting article, probably in one of late 80s issue of Warbird international, on attack on Force Z where this point was discussed in detail. I’ll try to find this article.

Thanks Subchaser, Yes I did misunderstand. I was aware of the order to attack Force Z on the 9th. It was my understaning this attack was an ad-hoc plan ordered out of desperation. I very much doubt the torp part of it anyway had any real chance to succeed. I am really curious just how they were planning on pulling it off. With no more than a few hours of preperation and planning. Bettys flying in formation down a strait between 1500yrd and 1700yrds wide, at a minimum speed of 170 knts, at a hieght of 20 meters, their targets berthed in parallel to the strait and protected by torp nets. Keeping in mind that the Dec 8th raid was picked up by the Changi Radar station 75 miles out making the chance of surprise slim to none. I really wish they had tried, then maybe we could end this debate.

Thanks again for the heads up on the books. I am going to see if I can dig them up, but I know English Books on the Japanese POV are hard to come by.

Regards

(in reply to Subchaser)
Post #: 232
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 5:44:01 PM   
Damien Thorn

 

Posts: 1107
Joined: 7/24/2003
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady

G4M1's could fly 2315 nauticle miles in Combat overload condation, G4M2 could do better yet, their max range was 3031 Nauticle miles.

Source:Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko Units of WW2, by Osamu Tagaya.


I hope they had a bathroom on board for such long flights.

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 233
RE: Torpedo Attacks in Ports - 4/29/2004 5:49:50 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT

quote:

ORIGINAL: Subchaser

TIMJOT, I was talking about initial plan of attack discussed at 22 Sentai meeting on 12/9/41, not about plan created before the war, I’m not aware of any such plan actually. The source is Sadao Takai’s “Rikko flyer”, Asahi Sonorama 1986, (Takai was commander of 2nd chutai /Genzan Ku in dec 41) this book is quite rare, and you probably won’t be able to get since it went out of print many years ago, however you can find some of Takai’s claims in book by Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi ISBN: 0743479394. Some parts of Takai’s chapter covering attack on Force Z were reprinted in this book. I have both books and both are not in English, so excuse my poor translation.

At noon Rear admiral Matsunaga gathered all Sentai officers for meeting at his headquarters. The main subject to discuss was the possible plan of attack on british warships in Singapore port. All pilots were hungry for combat, position of battleships was known and we had a chance to gain more glory than our fellow pilots in Pearl Harbor. HQ officers were analyzing data on depths in harbor in order to choose most acceptable direction of attack and most suitable combat formation. Genzan and Mihoro Ku were supposed to carry bombs, while Kanoya guys were ordered to attack with torpedoes. Pilots from my chutai were disappointed with this decision, they also wanted to attack enemy with torpedoes, they rightfully thought that this was the best way to succeed.

This meeting took place on 9th dec, from noon till 1700 when Matsunaga received I-56 report

Can anyone who have Horikoshi and Okumiya book repost this quote in good English please.

I think that Niiti and Matsunaga decided to arm only Kanoya bombers with torps for port attack, because only this unit at Thu Dau Moi airbase had modified torpedoes type 91 kai 2, designed to be used in shallow waters. All other torpedo bombers participated in attack on Force Z were armed with torps of kai 1 model. I guess amount of kai 2 torpedoes was quite limited.
Long time ago I’ve read very interesting article, probably in one of late 80s issue of Warbird international, on attack on Force Z where this point was discussed in detail. I’ll try to find this article.
I really wish they had tried, then maybe we could end this debate.
Regards


Seems to me that not ever having tried would cinch the debate for the nay sayers.

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to TIMJOT)
Post #: 234
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