Von Rom
Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000 Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: IronDuke quote:
You simply can't leave it alone, eh? OK. . . Let's get a few things clear, shall we? There are three reasons why I left this thread: 1) Where I live we are in the middle of a heat wave. Some places here are hotter than in Morocco or Saudi Arabia. So do not equate being tired of the heat with anything you have to say. I am also not a young man anymore, so the terrific heat here is hard on me. This isn't worth anyone's health, if you can tell us when/if this becomes too hard in the weather conditions you're enduring, please say and I'll cease posting. I've no wish to affect anyone's health via this discussion. quote:
2) It was very clear from what you posted that you had absolutely NOTHING to say of your own about the Lorraine Campaign and Metz, your pompous posturing not withstanding. By using your own source, I clearly demolished your argument, and showed the state of Patton's forces before he even attacked across the Mosselle or at Metz. I did not even mention that Third Army faced torrential rain downpours and freezing rain during those three months in the Lorraine or that Third Army suffered 18,000 casualties from Trench Foot and other diseases alone. Not aimed at me, and I've dealt with Metz elsewhere. quote:
3) The obvious vitriol that is aimed at Patton by a few in this thread, is, quite frankly, bordering on the pathological. That a few people are so determined to destroy Patton's name and reputation by the twisting of facts and intentions, seems to me, to clearly indicate that people still fear Patton's name today, and only points out how dangerous Patton was to the Germans. I think this is rambling. Your defence of him is unwavering in it's adherence to the legend rather than fact. I don't think facts could persuade you that Patton was anything less than perfect. (You occasionally say he wasn't perfect but are yet to elaborate). quote:
Finally, What a few people seem to miss, and what seems to escape their limited view of Patton, is this: 1) Had Patton been given the fuel and supplies when he reached the Mosselle, he would have taken Metz and Nancy quickly. Both places, but especially Metz, was the hub of major railways and road networks (much as Cain was). Not only were the Germans using these railways and roads to move in reinforcements, but these were absolutely vital for any army in order to move through the heavily wooded and hilly terrain of Lorraine. Add in the rains, and moving anywhere but by road or rail, would have been a logistical impossibility. That is why Metz was a vital objective. D'Este points out that Bradley ordered Patton to stop the attacks when it became clear they were a waste of life, and tried to cover Patton's disappointment by telling him he could wheel around Metz and take it from the rear once supplies were available. Evidently, it wasn't that important to Bradley. Likewise, road hubs are not important if you are on the defensive. The Queen plan did not require Patton to go on the attack. He made Metz important by deciding to press for an offensive in his area anyway. Had he done as he was asked, Metz could have happily waited. quote:
2) Most historians (Liddell Hart, Kemp, D'Este, Blumenson, et al), plus most military professionals, agree that Patton had the German forces on the run in September, 1944, and could have been at the Siegfried Line by mid-September. Disingenuous at best, wilful misleading at worst. It is correct to say that they agree Patton could have reached the Siegfried line, but you've left out all the best bits, which I shall take the time to reproduce so critical forum readers can make up their own minds: To quote Colonel D'Este: quote:
Patton believed that the war could have been won in 1944, if only he had been given adequate fuel and ammunition., as did Liddell Hart, who has written that the war ought to have been won in 1944 at a great savings lives. Patton cited 29th August as the critical date: Patton: "I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried line before it could be manned." Now for the interesting bits you missed out: quote:
D'Este Unfortunately, the evidence weighs heavily against this notion. There was, of course, no conspiracy by Eisenhower, SHAEF, Montgomery or Lee's supply services to keep the third army immobilised. Historian Anthony Kemp has drawn a compelling scenario for what would probably have happened if Patton had been given all the supplies he needed in the autumn of 1944. Not a great start for either the idea the good General would win the war single handed in 1944, or the fantasy there was a Patton conspiracy. But what does Messr Kemp and d'este think would have happened. Well Patton would have taken the undefended Metz and reached the Siegfried line. Then what? quote:
Kemp: All the Allied strategists were in agreement that the prime objective was the Ruhr. Patton, however, with his forces in the Frankfurt-Mannheim area, would have had to turn north and advance up the narrow Rhine valley. Simply advancing blindly into Germany would not have fulfilled any strategic purpose, and unless other Allied units had been able to keep pace, the Third Army would have been out on a limb and liable to have its communications cut. Oh dear, but before moving on we should note that "all allied units able to keep pace" was what the broad front strategy was all about. Historian Anthony Kemp continues: quote:
Kemp As we know that there were insufficient sources to maintain an offensive along the whole front, Patton would have been on his own anyway. But it gets worse... quote:
Kemp Every mile advanced by Patton in September would have proportionately increased his lines of communication, requiring more and more trucks to keep up the flow of stores, trucks that were in desparately short supply. More divisions would have had to be immobilised in order to use their transport, which would have further aggravated the main background problem to the Lorraine campaign - shortage of manpower. Patton was simply flying in the face of a situation that had to be faced by all the Army Commanders in Northwest Europe at the time. Hmmm....but there's more. D'Este goes onto point out that Senior Engineers at the time said they would not have been enough suitable airfield sites along Pattons axis of advance to keep him covered in the air, to drop him supplies, or provide him with sufficient close air support. quote:
D'Este Although he would not hear of it, the truth was that Patton was not a victim of Eisenhower or Montgomery, bot of the broad front strategy and a logistics system that was simpy incapable of keeping pace with rapid, mobile warfare. To round it all off, D'Este quotes yet more reasons why this fantasy should not be entertained. quote:
D'este ...as Pattons earlier biographer Ladislas Farago right concludes: "Despite it's apparent excellence and Patton's unbounded enthusiasm for it, his plan never had a chance to be accepted, or even to be taken seriously anywhere beyond general Bradley's command post. Not only was close air support vital if the plan was to succeed.. which would have been missing (see above) quote:
Farago: ...but the Luftwaffe still retained the capability to interfere seriously with Patton's offensive. Among the other problems Patton faced but failed to acknowledge was the physical exhaustion of the Third Army, which would have faced fgurious resistance from a German Army defending its homeland for the first time. Indeed, from the moment the Third Army reached the Moselle, Patton had disregarded the reality that the conditions for a breakout and pursuit, which had carried it across the soft underbelly of Normandy, no longer existed in Lorraine. In other words, Patton would have dragged an exhausted 3rd Army through the undefended Siegfried Line before heading for the Ruhr into a hornet's nest of fanatical German defence. His supply lines would have required the immobilisation of every other allied soldier in Europe, and he would have been without much close air support. Third Army would have been destroyed. quote:
3) Had Patton and Third Army been given the supplies that went to Monty (for his failed Market Garden), Liddell Hart agrees that the war in Europe could have ended in late 1944. One of the Patton fantasies, as shown by D'Este, Kemp and Farago above. Also, Patton resumed the offensive into Lorraine on 5th September, five days before Monty was given supply priority for Market Garden on 10th September. quote:
Von Rom To Bradley's credit, he did argue with Ike against the Broad Front strategy. He wanted Ike to give supplies to 1st and 3rd Armies so that they could punch through the German lines and strike for the German border. I'd love to know where you got this from. I see Bradley is getting some credit now. Anyway, the supply situation did not warrant this. What Patton fanboys miss is that Antwerp and the ports in Monty's area of operations were vital for the continuing flow of supplies. Monty made a mess trying to get them, but no one doubted they were a priority. quote:
Von Rom However, Ike refused, preferring the Broad Front strategy of "pushing" the Germans back. It was also Ike, who commanded all Allied ground forces by September 1, 1944, who ordered ALL Allied armies to attack on a broad front. Patton's forces were along the "Mosselle Front" and so he attacked at Nancy and later at Metz, to secure their road networks, which were absolutely vital due to the terrible mud and rains that struck Lorraine in the fall of 1944. Ike's broad front was essentially about keeping everyone happy, but everyone at SHAEF felt the drive had to be to the north to some degree to secure the Ruhr, which was the industrial heartland of Germany. This wasn't in front of Patton. quote:
Ike's strategy resulted in thousands more Allied and German soldiers dying. Sources? quote:
4) Had Patton's advice been heeded, and the war ended in late 1944, then the following would have been the result: a) Countless tens of thousands of Allied and Axis soldiers' lives would have been spared. b) There would have been no Battle of the Bulge c) Countless Holocaust victims' lives would have been spared d) There would have been no need to bomb German cities in 1945 thus sparing hundreds of thousands of civilian lives e) The Soviets would not have taken Berlin f) etc, etc, etc. . . As the piece above indicates, quite the opposite. An unsupported drive, bereft of proper air cover in to desparate German defences inside the Reich by an exhauseted third Army would have resulted in a military defeat that would have set the Western Allies back months. More Allied soldiers would have been killed (most from Third Army) no holocaust victims would have been saved and more German cities would have been bombed. Ike saved a lot of souls refusing to back Patton's scheme. quote:
5) Patton's tactics and strategy WERE correct: No, and by an awful long way, no. quote:
a) At Falaise he wanted to close the Gap - Allied timidity on Bradley's part caused over 100,000 German soldiers to escape, who would later turn up in the Battle of the Bulge and at Lorraine (Metz). To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake. It's funny this, but you used to claim (go and have a look if you don't believe me) that only 75000 escaped. D'Este and Hastings put the figure at 20000. Do you have a source for this figure? (Please say Rohmer). Army Group B reported it's eight Panzer divisions got out with about 50-60 tanks and 8 battalions of infantry. The German Army was smashed in Normandy. We've already gone over (or at least I have) the broad versus short envelopment, and proved Patton actually wanted to head for the Seine. Falaise is not nearly as important as most make out. Also, I like: quote:
To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake More unusal credit for Patton's biggest critic, Bradley. What is your source for this? D'Este reports: quote:
D'Este Bradley never wavered in his original declaration that Montgomery had nothing to do with his decision to halt Patton at Argentan. In his opinion, there were sound ordes and "I believe so to this day." To the Bulge: quote:
b) In the Bulge, had Patton been allowed to close off the salient behind the German thrust, most of the Germans would have been caught. But due to Allied timidity (Ike), the Allied armies were forced to push back the Germans, resulting in many thousands of needless deaths. I know this, I pointed it out to you when you were praising the Bulge about turn and drive. About it, all I would say is that it is debatable. I don't think he could have severed two army groups with three divisions. Bastogne was essential if the Germans were to cross the Meuse, so keeping it in Allied hands ensured the German offensive failed. There were also Allied troops there needing to be relieved (without getting into the 101 debate, no one could assume they would have defended so heroically). Attacking into the base would have drawn German reinforcements like flies, so it was riskier. I think the jury is out, if this is all you have, it doesn't prove genius. Merely a difference of opinion. quote:
c) In Siciliy, Alexander's strategy allowed the bulk of Axis forces to escape to Italy (some of which would later re-appear in Lorraine to fight Patton again). Even with a two week delay imposed upon him, Patton STILL beat Monty to Messina, conducting lighting armoured thrusts and amphibious operations to by-pass entrenched Germans in mountainous terrain. Patton's delay was largely caused by his charging in the opposite direction on a glory run rounding up Italian soldiers who didn't want to fight. It took him days to regroup on the northern coast. Also, his drive in the north didn't face the defensive positions in the east Monty faced, which prompted Monty to ask Patton to make the drive in the first place. quote:
6) After the war, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Ike, Bradley, their supporters and biographers, to try to paint Patton as being less than he was. Martin Blumenson (in "Patton: The Man Behind the Legend") wrote this: "Eisenhower invited the four American army commanders to lunch on May 10. He spoke 'very confidentially' of the need for them all to maintain a united and solid front if called to testify before congressional committees that might later investigate the conduct of the war. To Patton, Eisenhower's talk sounded like 'covering up probable criticism of strategical blunders which he unquestionably committed during the campaign.'" (p.269) They have to destroy Patton's reputation, because if they don't do so, then the light is then directed towards them, and the costly mistakes they made: I love this. Ike et al decide to detroy Patton's reputation at a meeting on 10 May. Please explain to us why they invited Patton to this meeting??????????? This sounds like Ike wanted all his Generals (Patton included) to come together. It doesn't sound as if he's after Patton in any way. If he was, what a blunder to invite the Good General to the gathering????? I would have hated to be in the shoes of the Staff Officer who arranged this and had to explain why Patton was there to Ike afterwards. quote:
a) Attacking on a Broad Front by Ike - led to needless waste of lives and the inability to supply all armies properly Attacking on a narrow front would have led to military disaster. It is proven above. quote:
b) The failure to close the Falaise Gap by Bradley - due to timidity Well warranted timidty. With your 100 000 Germans facing four American Divisons strung out with flanks in the air. quote:
c) The failure to give Third Army the supplies to drive into Germany Which saved Patton from defeat, see above. quote:
d) The failure to allow Third Army to close the salient behind the German army at the Bulge. Highly speculative at best, and bearing in mind how long it took Patton to reach Bastogne and then clear the environs, highly doubful. quote:
Anyone can read about these things. I wouldn't advise them to if I were you, you'll lose support. quote:
When viewed by a far-minded person, it can easily be seen that Patton's strategy WAS CORRECT, and that the strategies proposed by Ike (Broad Front; giving Monty supplies for Market Grden), Bradley (failure to close the Falaise Gap), Monty (Operaton Market Garden; failure to seize the Schelt Estuary before the Germans occupied it, etc), were WRONG. Patton wasn't perfect - he was flawed - as we all are - as Ike, Bradley, Monty, etc were. . . But Patton was a fighting general, and he knew how to fight. He knew how to strike for the enemy's juggular. That is why the German High Command feared him, and NOT Bradley, Ike, Monty, Alexander, etc. . . One of the main problems I have with the Patton legend, is it is always someone else's fault. At Falaise, it is Bradley, or Monty, Ike and Bradley. In Sicily, Monty and Alexander. At Metz, Bradley and Ike. At Hammelburg, everyone but Patton. It is how conspiracy theories develop and sustain themsevles, and how legends are born. Patton's greatest problem is his supporters. It is impossible to discuss his talents as a Commander, because his supporters claim the earth for him, and you have to spend most of your time correcting their fantasies. They are easy to correct, but what happens is you discredit everything about him in the process. If his supporters thought about him seriously, he'd be thought of far better, by far more people. IronDuke This post was addressed to Kevinugly. Do you really think he is so inadequate, that he cannot address these issues on his own? BTW, the Lorraine Campaign discussion is between "Kev" and I. Even so, here again, you completely ignore the fact that what I have written is based on the facts. These can be confirmed by anyone. And, as always, you simply twist the facts. BTW, when are going to see that analysis of the German blitzkrieg victories you promised? You may cling to conspiracy theories; I don't. Simple fact of the matter is, with Patton dead, everyone involved tried to present themselves in a good light. Where are the big investigations of Lee, Ike, Bradley, Monty, Alexander, etc, etc?
< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/25/2004 11:38:03 PM >
_____________________________
|