Slitherine

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I think the US public was fully prepared to go to war with japan over tha Japanese attacks on British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. The Japanese certainly believed this to be the case, and so rejected a "non-American" solution to their problems. They knew that they would never ave as good a crack at US forces as they would have on December 7th, and so their plans always included an attack on the US.

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I don't disregard the antiwar sentiment, I simply say that it had largely died out by Late 1941. The fact that Roosevelt could apply harsh sanctions on Japan (which were predicted to cause war) without significant Senate opposition tells you how much things had changed. The passage of the Two Ocean Naval Act in June 1940 was not the act of a pacifist/isolationist navy. See HP Wilmott (cited above) for more specifics. Feel free to cite the sources of your own info.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Grumbler, I had hoped we could have a nice friendly debate without resorting to this tedious siteing of sources stuff, but if you insist.

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"The Eagle against the Sun"pg N/A;
(QUOTE) "Now, in the summer and autumn of 1941 , army and navy stategist considered four alternatives (1)to sieze the DEI first, then the Philipines and Malaya;(2)to advance step by step form the Philipines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Malaya;(3)TO BEGIN WITH MALAYA AND THEN ADVANCE IN REVERSED ORDER TO THE PHILIPINES, THUS DELAYING AN ATTACK ON AMERICAN TERRITORY;(4)to attack Malaya and the Philipines simultaneously, followed by a quick siezure fo the DEI. The navy prefered option 2,because it offered a secured line of advance while the Army prefered option ,because it siezed the most important objectives first and it delayed an attack on American territory, which intern allowed for the possibility avoiding a war with America if it did not react. They eventually compromised on option 4.

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I also have read pretty much the same thing in "Yamamoto the Reluctant Admiral" unfortunately I dont have the book in hand so I cant site specifics. That being said, I never said the Japanese didnt have some legitimate reasons for attacking America, just that it was the wrong decision and as demostrated by Van Der Vat that it was a decision skewed by the exageration of the American threat by the Navy to justify their bugetary prominience. Also that there was at least other alternative plans debated.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Grumbler; I dont know who HP Wilmont is, but you quote him as saying " Only after the imposition of the allied blockade in mid 1941 ect.ect....."
Well there was no Allied blockadethere was however a Allied embargowhich is quite a different thing. The embargo consisted of only certain strategic materials and was imposed only by the US,Netherlands and Britain. Other countries freely traded with Japan at this time. Even the US allowed non-strategic trade to continue to Japan. This inaccuracy does not give me much confidence in Mr.Wilmont as a credible source.

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Except for your van der Vat quote, I have found no works which support your contention that the Japanese seriously considered, in 1941, any plans which bypassed the PI and left the US the initiative on whether or not to start a war. Toland has the Japanese understanding that the US would have to be attacked at the onset if the Japanese were to suceed, though he doesn't describe in detail the planning process and the conferences that Wilmott spends 8 pages on (pages 71-79, barring the descriptions of orders of battle, which take up an additional 10 pages.

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Originally posted by grumbler:
HP Wilmott is the author of many books on world war two, but in particular two works on the strategies each side pursued in the Pacific War: Empires in the Balance, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 and The Javelin and the Barrier, Japanese and Allied Strategies February-June 1942. I think that these are probably the essential works on the topic, given that strategies are the focus of his work, and not just an intro into another general history. I can only guess that, from the japanese viewpoint (which is what he is writing about) the embargo looked to the Japanese like a blockade of their vital resources. In any case, I think his dispationate view of Japanese strategy sounds more convincing than the judgemental view of van der Vat (who, I will emphasize, I haven't yet read, but whose views you obviously have taken to heart, what with your comments on the japense navy exactly mirroring his). I will continue to look into this, however. I appreciate your cues on to van der Vat - he may convince me yet. In the meantime, you can get H.P. Wilmott and see if he convinces you!

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Oh... "Empire in the Balance" the name just didnt click. I have been wanting to read that book for sometime, becuase I see it cited often in other books that I have read. I will try to get a copy.

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However, you state that van der Vat is "a little too judgemental and moralistic for your taste" , but your own quote from Wilmont " ...it was inconcievable that America would stand aside tamely and leave china and Europe's colonies to their fate" shows he is not immune to being somewhat judgemental.]

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By the way, have you ever read a book from Toland, titled "But not in Shame", its out of print but its a book that concentrates on the battles of first six months of the war. I am interted in it becuase most books on the Pacific war tend to breeze through the period between PH and Midway because its a mainly a story of allied defeats. What I am looking for are detail accounts of these obscure loosing battles and the men who fought them. I dont mean Bataan and the Death march becuase that subject is fairly well covered.]

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Originally posted by grumbler:
It is interesting that you should mention But not in Shame, as that was the work that got me interested in the Pacific War to begin with! It is a great bit of writing, IMO. I have always found it interesting that Toland has been poo-pooed many times, and yet in the end he has almost always been proven right. A few weeks ago, on www.warships1.com, there was a scholorly debate about the Battle of the Surigao Strait, and which Japanese cruiser rammed whom, and from what angle. In the end, both sides abandoned their starting positions when Toland's account turned out to be the only one that described what the first-person accounts agreed upon. I think it was Toland's lack of academic credentials that hurt him - he certainly has a far better grasp of Japanese psychology (and certainly had far better access to first-person accounts) than any writer in English before or since. BNIS is available in used book stores specializing in history, and isn't too expensive (I bought a copy as a gift that was $7 in good condition). You can probably also get it through the ILL system. Some other books to look for on the subject are H.G. Winslow's The Fleet the Gods Forgot, a good treatment of the US Asiatic Fleet, and The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, a very detailed description of the wartime career and death of USS Houston. Winslow was one of her crew. He sometimes makes extravagent claims for the Asiatic Fleet and Houston (insisting, for example, that the Japanese lost several ships in the Battle of the Java Sea and have consistently refused to admit it since then). Also, Oliver Lindsay's The Lasting Honour is an excellent book on the fall of Hong Kong and the political decisions that doomed 5,000 UK and Canadian troops to defend an indefensible position. Though his fopcus is on the futility of the dispatch of the Canadian reinforcements to Hong Kong, he is not Canadian (though I would bet that 60% of the sales of the book were in Canada!) I am still trying to find the journal article that chronicles the changes in US public opinion towards war during 1941. Until I find it, I will simply note that the received wisdom is not always the full truth.

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Originally posted by Graham:
A gloss on this debate. What if everything had gone as it did historically, except that Hitler did not declare war on the USA after PH. Churchill would have declared war on Japan - at the latest when they attacked Malaya. So the USA and the UK would both have been fighting Japan. But could FDR have won popular support for a declaration of war on Germany? And if he did, could he then have won popular support for the "Germany first" strategy?

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Originally posted by grumbler:
TIMJOT, I've been extremely busy recently and haven't had much time to do research, but hopefully the next week will be a bit less tense. As to your question, I think the US would have decalred war immediately upon the Japanese attacking the British and Dutch. Waiting for newer ships would not have compensated for the loss of time during which the Japanese would have taken the Malay and Indonesian resources they needed, and then gathered their forces for a fight over the Central Pacific. The US would have attempted, I think, to reinforce the PI and send planes and supplies to the DEI (the latter much as they did historically). Certainly Wake and Guam would be high priorities for reinforcement, and the air-sea battles near Guam might well determine the course of the war. The Japanese, under these circumstances, would be in a difficult position. If they had committed the bulk of their air sea and land forces to the battles in the south, they might find it difficult to muster the forces needed to neutralize the PI air threat to their LOC without compromising all of their planning. They would be fighting an ad hoc war, just as the US was, and much of their advantage would thus be gone. Even if the US delayed its entry into the war, the PI would be in a much stronger position in late March than it had been in December. I cannot imagine the Japanese proceding with the Burma campaign, giving the dire need for troops and aircraft in the Battle for the Philippines. I wonder if Japan even had the ability to conduct an amphibious landing against the sort of opposition they would face in the reinforced Philippines? Somehow, I think, they would prevail, but the cost on both sides would be high. Would they have the strength to threaten the South Pacific as they did historically, giving the fact that they would probably just have completed a debilitating 6-month campaign in the PI? An interesting idea for a campaign. Let's hope the game designers allow for the possibility.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
With all due respect Grumbler, IMHO this is where your argument doesnt hold up. Lets assume the US declares war immediatley. How are they then able to reinforce the PI. Due to its isolated location it would be almost impossible to reinforce it meaningfully once war is declared.

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Wake could be reinforced but due to its small size and proximity to Japanese bases in Marshall Islands could only serve as an isolated outpost. Guam would be over run with miminal effort, before it could be reinforeced.

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Why would the Japanese be in a difficult position? Why do you suppose they would have to commit anymore of there forces south than they historically did? Historically, they were able to mount both operations simutaneosly. Why then could they not hold back in reserve the forces they historically used to attack the PI. Then if the US declares war, they immidiately launch there attack.

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Yes it would not be a surprise, but remember the PI attack was not a surprise. It occured hours after PH. Also without the PH attack the powerful carrier strike force would be availble to counter any sorte of the USN. Before you say that fleet was needed elsewhere. I would just say other than two operations of dubious value, ie; the attack on Darwin and the sorte into the Indian ocean the carriers were not even needed in the south. Nor was the IJN battle fleet.The operations were carried out soley by cruiser and destroyer squadrons, supported by light carriers and land base airforces.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT: The Japanese had available for these operations 3 divisions under Homma, 4 under Yamashita, one under Iida, and 2 under Imamura. Imamura had to be reinforced from Homma for his plan to work. Thus, the Japanese were spread too thinly for simultaneous attacks on all their targets. Some prioritization had to occur. The decision was made, rightly in my opinion, that the PI had to be neutralized before the attack on the DEI could occur. Thus, there was no reserve of forces just waiting to attack the PI while the DEI and Malaya were conquered. Now, if as you suggest the US delays declaring war, then I agree things get more difficult for the Japanese, but not immpossible. First the US would probably have to wait unitil April at the ealiest, becuase MacArthur had said it would take until then before the PI could be ready. By then the 4 divisions used in Malaya and 2 divisions used in DEI would be available suppliment Homa's original invasion force of 2 divisions. For a total of 8 Divisions that could be brought to bare against the PI. More than enough even for a reinforced PI. Thats not even counting the two divisions used for the Burma campaign. So no, they would not need to cancel that operation. You also have to remember due to its location, even a reinforced PI is easily cutoff and isolated.

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Come to think of it, this scenerio could solve the IJN main delema and the reason Yamamoto originally proposed the PH attack. Which was that the IJN long held plan of luring the USN to a decisive battle somewhere around the PI was flawed becuase there was no way to be sure the USN would sail to relieve the PI. Under this scenerio however, after the US spent months massively reinforceing the PI with men and material it would be unthinkable to leave it to its fate. The USN would be forced to run the guantlet and come to the rescue. The IJN would then get what it always wanted a decisive naval battle in the place and time of its chooseing. I dare say owing to its weaknesses in early 42 the USN would be instore for a much more greater defeat than it recieved at PH. Such a defeat in a less than wholeheartedly supported war, could very well bring the US to the negotiating table. Just my opinion.

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Reinforcing the Pi would have taken time, it is true, but the links via Guam and Wake would still be active, since the Japanese would not be in a position to sieze them upon the outbreak of war. the japanese would have to account for the fact that these would now be opposed invasions, and thus would have to allocate naval and air support to them that they did not plan for in their initial plans.

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the japanese could launch two of three operations simultaneously: Malaya, the PI, and the DEI. you are supposing that they followed van der Vat's claimed strategy of attacking the DEI and Malaya first. Thus, they would not have the forces that attacked the PI historically in the PI theatre, they would all be in the south attacking the DEI. The forces that they used against the PI (barring the two divisions they left to keep the US forces bottled up on Bataan) were, in fact, required and used in the DEI campaign.

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Originally posted by grumbler:
The Japanese carriers were extensively used in the Malaya and DEI campaigns. Had they not been available, then these operations would have been much more difficult and lengthy. More later...

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The Japanese had available for these operations 3 divisions under Homma, 4 under Yamashita, one under Iida, and 2 under Imamura. Imamura had to be reinforced from Homma for his plan to work. Thus, the Japanese were spread too thinly for simultaneous attacks on all their targets. Some prioritization had to occur. The decision was made, rightly in my opinion, that the PI had to be neutralized before the attack on the DEI could occur. Thus, there was no reserve of forces just waiting to attack the PI while the DEI and Malaya were conquered.

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The Japanese used more than two divisions in Burma. Initially, it is true, that only 33rd and 55th divisions were deployed, and they were successful, by late February, in taking Rangoon. However, the Japanese had to reinforce 15th army with the equivelent of three more divisions, 18th, 56th, and tank units, plus over 400 aircraft, before they were ready for the decisive campaign in central and northern Burma. These units would not have been available for Burma had they been sent to the PI.

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However, the Japanese could, as you suggest, muster up to eight divisions to attack the PI (if, of course, no garrison forces of divisional strength were needed in Malaya or the DEI, which was not the case in reality). However, these forces could not have been lifted simultaneously, so they would have to attack in some sort of sequential order. While I doubt that the decision on when to declare war would be exclusively based on MacArthur's ideas of what "ready" meant, it is probably not unreasonable to assume, as you do, that a 5-6 month wait would be undertaken in order to reinforce the PI and (especially) the LOC to the PI.

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In that case, the garrison of the Pi could easily have included several additional US Army divisions, plus the 11 divisions in the PI. Since the japanese were limited in the available invasion sites on Luzon, this would have made their task quite difficult. Far more so than was the historical case, certainly, especially as the air would be contested.

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Actually, this would model far more the US concept of the decisive battle than the Japanese one. The US would be arriving via the Central Pacific rather than via the Gilberts and Marshalls. They would thus avoid the guantlet of japanese air attacks. Meanwhile, Manila would be supporting a vast array of submarines, which would make life quite difficult for the japanese transport forces (and the poor merships trying to get those vital resources back to Japan). With aerial reconnaisance the subs could prove to be quite deadly, poor torpedoes or not.

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However, this does not take into account the impact of no American entry until 1942 on the resistance of the other allies in the area. Perhaps Malaya and the DEI would fall sooner if the USA was not on their side when they faced their final challenges. For those reasons, as wel as domestic politics, I think the US delaying a DoW is not likely.

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Originally posted by moore4807:
Grumbler & TIMJOT,
I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here. 1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war....
2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months! I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then.
Again only my opinion-feel free to disagree...
Jim

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
If war is declared immediately as you suggest then Guam is a goner. Warning or not, the garrison was only a couple hundred Marines, no artillary, no fighters and right in the middle of the Japanese held Mariana's. The Japanese would just dispatch its South Seas Detachment from Palau as it historically did, before the US could ever get reinforcements to it. Regarding Wake I have already conceded that the Japanese would probably have to forget about taking that island, but as I pointed out Wake is a tiny atol with no harbor and I believe its closer to 500miles from the Marshalls not 1000. In fact Wake was bombed almost daily from bombers from Kawajalen in Dec.41
It was exactly for these reasons that the recapture of Wake never figured greatly in US pacific strategy.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
null Only the 48th division was withdrawn from the PI to assist in the invasion of Java, in which it was hardly needed. The 4th division from Shanghia was quickly dispatched to replace it. For the sake of arguement though, give Imamura's 16th Army the 48th. Yamashita had 4 div. in which he only use three, the 5th,18th,Guards. He didnt bother to use the 56th becuase logistically it wasnt worth it. Now add that to the Southern Army reserve 21st Div, 32nd Div, 21 mixed Bgd., to Homma's 16th Div, 4th Div, 65th Bgd. and you have more than enough forces to cover a PI operation. Remember if war is declared immediatly as you suggest then the PI has no more significant forces than it did originally and would not need anymore than the 2 divisions it used originally. As far as airforces are concern the IJA 5th air div. was used in the PI operation, while the 3rd air Div. and 11 Naval air flottilla was used in the southern operarion so no conflict there. The only major naval units withdrawn south ther the CVL Ryujo and 2 Seaplane tenders. Hardly significant since with no PH you now have the 1st carrier feet available.

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Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I think "extensively" is an exageration. After PH the 1st carrier fleet covered landings on Rabaul with a garrison of few hundred Aussies and a handful of catalina's, then it covered the Ambon island invasion that had a small garrison of Dutch and Aussies with an airforce of 2 Brewster Buffalos, 12 Hudsons and a few catalina's. Next was Timore with even less garrison forces, Then the unneccessary raids on Darwin and Indian ocean. The 1st carrier divison was greatly under utilized in the DEI campaign, but again for the sake of arguement I say 2 carriers would have been more than sufficient complete these minor operations, save the Darwin and Indian Ocean raids which again in IMHO were unneccessary.By the way the 1st carrier fleet didnt take part at all in the Malaya campaign.[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

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