Ranger-75
Posts: 610
Joined: 6/29/2001
From: Giant sand box
Status: offline
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Hi Byron,
I wasn't offended, I just needed to "clarify" things.
You wrote:
"I have not reread your comments that prompted my response, but as I recall, you were speaking in rather absolute terms. The Japanese could only do this, the U.S. would to this, Britain would never lose. But, to the extent that any of it was absolute (and I do not believe any of it is), it is absolute only with the perspective of hindsight. The situation when viewed at the present is almost always different when viewed in hindsight."
Hindsight & absolutes. It is only with the advantage of hindsight that I can state that with the then-in-charge leadership of both Germany and Japan, that certain things were going to happen, no ifs ands or buts. One was that Hitler was going to attack the Soviets as soon as he could which ended up being summer 1941.
Another was that Japan was going to attack the US along with the British and Dutch in the Pacific for reasons I already stated. The question was when and where, not if. Again as long as Tojo and Sugyiama were in charge (and these guys were worse than the Germans for getting rid of people they didn't like), there was nothing that Yammamoto could do or say to get them off their "warpath" The Japanese psyche just contributed to the slide into disaster that these unenlightened people were taking Japan down into. Japan was actually suffering from food shortages in early 1941 - before the US submarine campaign, and this was after they had been pillaging Korea, Manchuria and then Indo-China for (sorry, can't help myself here) "All the rice in China". The subtle shift in the Japanese warlords additude was the oil embargo as a response to the taking over of Indo-China. The Japanese could NOT back down or withdraw- it would be a massive loss of "face" which especially back then would mave meant suicide for Tojo, et al.
Lastly, Hitler was not willing to sacrifice his Luftwaffe as the price to clear the RAF from the skies above southern England and as such his forces could not create the conditions necessary for even a remote possibility of euccess at a cross channell invasion. Hitler needed the Luftwaffe for Barbarossa and the Air battle of Britain actually weakened the Luftwaffwe for this upcoming event. I never did say that Germany could not have Attempted an invasion, I just stated that Britain would not have surrendered even if some German ground forces got ashore in England (and even if London fell to an assault - wild fantasy thinking here). There was no way Germany could have maintained or enlarged their forces for a successful invasion and subsequent land campaign.
The problem that a lot of westerners (myself included) is that we are too logical and civil, etc. The brutal nature of the totaltarian regimes was foreign to our leaders (and the rest of us) and that is why certain events unfolded as they did. Only if one were to throw out all the leaders and start fresh would a lot of "options" start to creep into the picture. The problem I had was that this whole discussion was throwing out the Japanese (and to a lesser extent) German leaders' will (unfortunately in these regimes, the people had little influence over their government) will while making no allowances for changes in US, GB, French or other allied nations leadership or "national will" if you will.
Lets talk about Midway. As I said before, everything went right for the Japanese with the Pearl Harbor raid, while Most things went right for the US during the Midway battle. So the luck factor had changed hands, or so it seemed.
But let's look at Midway through the colored glasses of those nine little items known as the Principles of War (as practiced by the US Army - I have no idea what the Navy uses, but they are probably similar if not identical).
Objective (the most import one):
IJN: Here the IJN had assigned two conflicting objectives to the 1st Air Fleet, that of supporting the landings, AND that of finding and destroying any US fleet that was supposed to come our AFTER the landings were under way. This was perhaps their most crucial violation and it combined with Nagumo's vacillating nature to make a recipe for disaster.
USN: The USN's objective was simple and straightforward: ambush the Japanese carrier fleet off Midway thereby forcing cancellation of the landing attempt.
Offensive:
IJN: This is the only PoW that the IJN did not violate, they were on the attack and were using their initiative to fight at a time and place of their choosing (at least of Yammamoto's chosing).
USN: The USN made good use of an offensive defense posture in this operation.
Maneuver:
IJN: The IJN maneuver plan caused the entire Combined Fleet to be spread out over 1,00 miles of ocean and control was lacking in that the transport group was ahead of schedule (and was this sighted one day before Japanes plans stated that the UNS would sight them). Further, the entire plan depended on the USN doing Everything that the IJN expected them to do. It made no allowances for any unexpected eventualities.
USN: The USN movement plan was simple and placed their available forces where they could be most effective.
Mass:
IJN: While the IJN used nearly the entire Combined fleet, they dispersed it so much that none of the elements were mutually supporting (except the Close Support and Transport groups and look what happenned to the cruises in the close support group later).
USN: The USN concentrated all available offensive power where it would prove to be the most effective. However, I must cite them (Nimitz) for diverting too many resources to the north. Those heavy cruisers could have added to the carrier TFs' AA power.
Economy of Force:
IJN: The IJN plan sent too many forces to the north. Those two additional CV/CVLs might have made a difference if they were with the 1st Air Fleet, however, they were also slower and this would have forces changes to an already complex plan.
USN: As I stated above, the USN could have sent less to the north, The forces sent didn't have any effect on the outcome up there (and they weren't expected to do much) but the cruisers especially, were better off with the carriers.
Unity of Command:
IJN: Too many commanders, the primary problem being that Yammamoto himself should not have been at sea. He was too wrapped up in radio silence to have any effect on the battle. He failed to pass on critical information to Nagume, (assuming that Nagumo had received it the way he did).
USN: There were no violations here by the USN (placing Fletcher in charge was not a unity of command problem, but rather a problem in identfying good leaders and putting them in charge while getting rid on ones that weren't up to task). When the Yorktown was put out of action Fletcher deferred to Spruance, a correct move.
Security:
IJN: Where do I start. Throught the entire war, the Japanese high command refuese to countenance even the possibility that their codes had been broken. There other lapses too like the unit that told the post office to forward its mail to Midway, Thelack of any backup pland for the failed operation "K", the subs late in getting on station, the completely fault assessment of Nagumo of the US fleets intentions and dispositions, the second most severely violated principle. By their own admission, the Japanese were caught up in what they called "victory deisese" I call it contemptive arrogance to the point of being a dangerous liability.
USN: The USN took careful measures to keep its plans from the Japanese, they never even told the Midway garrison of their fleet plans.
Surprise:
IJN: It is humorous to note that the IJN actually thought that they had the element of surprise on their side in this battle. While they probably could not suspect at that time that their codes were broken, they certainly didn't make sufficient efforts in this matter. Surprise usually coincides with security as this battle illustrated.
USN: The USN made maxium use of their intelligence efforts and effectively maximised its value as a combat multiplier. During the battle, they also waited for the Japanese first strike to go off against Midway thereby dissapating the 1st air fleet's striking power, and this bore later fruit.
Simplicity:
IJN: The IJN plan was the most complicated fleet operation conceived to date. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they failed to learn from this and subsequent plans were just as complex.
USN: THe USN plan was simple, ambush the Japanese carriers off Midway and inflict maxium damage using what Nimitz called "strong attrition tactics" which meant air strikes on the carriers.
The IJN violated 8 of the 9 principles of war, The UNS partially violated 2 (Mass and Economy of Force - and some say this was not a violation- he couldn't well ignore a threat against US soil). It was time for the IJN to sleep in the bed that they had made for themselves.
The is doesn't really matter in this discussion part:
Pakistan already has the A-bomb. They are also already an Islamic regime, although nothing like the despots in Afganistan. Their capitat says it all: Islamabad (does that mean islam is bad ![]("biggrin.gif") )
I can't see how bombing them during Ramadan is any different that Iran and Iraq bombing each other during ramadan for 8 years.
The Palestinians will always hate Israel for what it is and has. They still see the state of Israel as occupying what they think should have been their country. We won't see the end of this until the second coming of Christ.
Were you in ODS/S? Only part of the 1st AD was there (I think one Bde). That's the only AD levt if the inventory, do yoe realize that the next "great plan" is to take us to 8 active divisions
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[ October 31, 2001: Message edited by: Mike Santos ]
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Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
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