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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> IJN CV achievement

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IJN CV achievement - 10/14/2004 5:33:28 PM

Rainerle

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Hi,
if asked about the single most outstanding IJN CV act I'd say Hiryu taking on 3 USN CV's at Midway and contributing 99% for Yorktown's sinking.

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Post #: 211

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 6:43:54 PM

mdiehl

Posts: 5998
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quote:

But when did that advantage evaporate?
1942?
1943?
1944?
1945?

IMHO this is not good argument...

"IMHO this is not a good argument" is non sequitur, as it does not address the material facts or offer any specific countervailing information. I believe Monty Python did a spoof on your sort of "rebuttal" once.

In answer to your question, I'd say late 1944, after the US landings on Davao. At that point the US had sufficient airbases in range of objectives to obtain air superiority, perhaps even air supremacy, along much of Japan's lines of communications. Prior to the actual conquest of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, the Japanese had the edge in land based air facilities, but the USN had sufficient striking power that a well planned, snappily executed attack could overwhelm local aerial resistence using CV based air. Still, I think the real turning point was the conclusion of the USN Marianas campaign; anything could have happened there.

quote:

I agree but even in late 1942 US poured so much men/equipment/supply into theater that this also is not good argument

I do not understand your objection. First, by late 1942 the ONLY Japanese conquered piece of ground that the US had a foothold on was Guadalcanal, and NONE of the Japanese pre-war mandates were under US control. As to "so much men" etc, I do not agree. Numerically the Japanese had the allied outnumbered in the Solomons, New Ireland, New Britain, New Guinea area. The Japanese had more CVs, BBs, CAs, and DDs in Truk and Rabaul than the USN had from Pearl Harbor to New Caledonia until 1st quarter 1943. Even then, the Allies were just getting started on pushing on the edge of the Japanese perimiter.

quote:

I am sure that by late 1942 US had much more material than Japanese in theater.

Well, on that score you are 'surely' incorrect. And that Solomosn campaign certainly had no effect on the advantageous strategic position held by the Japanese (interior supply lines).

quote:

Sure thing... but those places could have been bypassed (as many were). What Japan conquered in 1941/1942 had to be fortified new...

? Bypassed? Leo, there's no getting to Japan without going through the Marshalls, and no bombing Japan without taking Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, and no getting to the Philippines without the Palaus. The *only* Japanese conquered islands apart from Luzon that had not been fortified by the Japanese for 20 years were Guam, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and the vicinity of Rabaul. And the Japanese managed to fortify the **** out of Rabaul and Guam.

quote:

Please see above.

See what? You've made no comment that applies.

quote:

I agree but it was not me who added P-40, North Africa (and other stuff) discussion into this thread...

Which has what, precisely, to do with the Pacific Theater of Operations or your arguments about the relative merits of IJN vs USN pilots or your general notions about the alleged lack of time to train at deflection shooting?

quote:

They flew it, but they lacked time to acquaint themselves 100%.

Please define "sufficient time to train acquaint onself 100%."

quote:

If, for example, some middle ranking officer in USN flew biplanes 10x longer than his brand new Wildcat (or whatever else aircraft) then certain things he learned, practiced to perfection and loved to do in his biplane were almost unusable in new aircraft...

I really do not believe you have read much at all on the matter. You seem to have this notion that human cognition is equivalent to some sort of dumb automata, and that new skills or information can't be absored. If your only specimens were US presidents I might agree, but the data from USN combats clearly demonstrates otherwise. As I stipulated before, if you wanted to model the learning trajectory of US air units you'd want something like a viral model for information transmission.

quote:

At the end war made pilots on all sides to adjust or die really quickly...

At the war's beginning, Allied pilots made such adjustments with blazing speed. Most USN pilots had made some of the necessary adjustments, like being much better at deflection shooting than their opponents, before the US was in the war at all.

quote:

Great list and dates (I knew this of course from my books as well) but let's concentrate on most important one:

1941: Grumman F4F-3

This is what I was writing about - the aircraft was almost brand new when war started and all the USN pilots had of modern design (if you can call it) before it was Brewster. All aircraft before were biplane...

True... not biplanes of WW1 but still biplanes...

Well, your claim was that: 'the models prior to the F4F3 were so radically inferior that their flight profiles were incomparable, and that closing rates of speed in earlier models so inferior that despite decades of emphasis on deflection shooting, pilots who had flown F4Fs for more than a year were still no better on the whole at deflection shooting than their opponents.' That is a paraphrase of your argument. And your argument is flat out wrong on the basis of the performance characteristics of the F2A2, F3A1, and F4F3.

quote:

BTW, after Midway, Admiral Nimitz himself wrote in official report that Wildcat (and not Brewster) is inferior to Zero (speed, acceleration, rate of climb) and that improvements must be done immediately (although not in a way to lower the flow of existing fighters into units).

I never said the F4F was a better plane than the Zero at speed, acceleation and rate of climb. I said that the F4F drivers were sufficiently better at deflection shooting that they canceled out the general advantage that the Zero had. I also suggested that the 1.4:1 favorable to the USN kill ratio of F4Fs vs Zero seems to support my point of view. By teh way, the same report that you cite was based on Thach's assessment. In that report, USN superiority at deflection shooting is specifically mentioned as the reason for the success, to date, of the F4F vs the A6M. Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

quote:

Here we go again... yes they have trained it for 20 years but with aircraft that were 100% different than ones used in WWII. Entering combat with 200 mph or 400 mph is vast difference...

Well.. you seem not to understand the difference between IAS, ground speed, and speed relative to the target. Until you can come to grips with the fact that the single most important speed consideration in deflection shooting is the closing speed, you will not really be able to understand how training in an F2 moving at, say, 300 mph, vs a towed target moving at 180 mph, is quite similar to training in an F4 moving at 310 mph vs a towed target moving at 190 mph. Until you get it, you won't "get it."

quote:

Most pilots (all sides) were not expert at deflection shooting, that's why thousands of pilots (all sides) fly their tours but never shot down a plane, becuase they just didn't have a) shooting eye and b) hunter instincts. Of course the pilots that had those skills, became legend(foss, Yeager, campell, sakai, hartman, etc.,). Even Eric Hartman, said that strategy was to manuever the plane really close(preferably rear) before openning up.

Eric Hartmann's comments are specific to German doctrine. They did not train as intensively at deflection shooting as the USN pilots did. From Lundstrom's comments he makes it clear that the USN was rather unique in honing their pilots skills at this talent. Of course, in any situation it was desirable to have a low deflection shot (which means an approach from the enemy's six), but if your opposition isn't asleep, then being better at deflection shooting means that you can make killing shots that your enemy, not being trained at the skill, will be less likely to make.

But the proof is in the actual combat results in the Marshalls Strikes, the Coral Sea, Midway, and Solomons CV battles in which USN F4F pilots in a slower, less maneuverable aircraft, shot down more Zeroes than F4Fs were lost to Zeroes.

< Message edited by mdiehl -- 10/14/2004 4:47:37 PM >

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Post #: 212

RE: IJN CV achievement - 10/14/2004 6:56:12 PM

Bradley7735

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Hi,

I think Hiryu was about 50% the cause of Yorktown sinking. The IJN sub did her in. She would have lived if either of the two weren't involved.

bc

(in reply to Rainerle)

Post #: 213

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 6:58:51 PM

mdiehl

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As to the Brewster vs Zeke, the specs of the A6M2 are known. The specs of the F2A3 have, I think, been posted here before. The F2A-3 was slower than the A6M2. This was in large part owing to the addition of cockpit armor. Here are the specs for the F2A-2, which is the aircraft that VF2 and VF3 flew prior to transitioning to F4F-3s:

Powerplant: One Wright R-1820-40 Cyclone nine-cylinder single-row air cooled radial, rated at 1200 hp. Performance: Maximum speed of 285 mph at sea level, 323 mph at 16,500 feet. 344 mph at 26,500 feet. Cruising speed 157 mph. Landing speed 73 mph. Initial climb rate 2500 ft/min. Service ceiling 34,000 feet. Maximum range 1670 miles. Weights: 4576 pounds empty, 5942 pounds gross, 6890 pounds maximum takeoff. Dimensions: Wingspan 35 feet 0 inches, length 26 feet 0 inches, height 11 feet 8 inches, wing area 209 square feet. Armament: Four Browning 0.50-inch machine guns, two in the upper fuselage and two in the wings.

see: Maas, Jim, 1987. F2A Buffalo in Action. Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.

So, even if *you* ignore the fact that closing speed is the only part of speed that matters for deflection shooting, you still can't factually support your claim that there was a huge difference in speed between the F4F and F2 series that would have promoted mass confusion, hamfisted flying, or poor marksmanship, among pilots 'who had previously flown F2s and had only been flying F4s for about nine months.'

< Message edited by mdiehl -- 10/14/2004 4:59:40 PM >

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Post #: 214

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 8:29:19 PM

Feinder

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I'm rather surprised at the degree of "discussion" over deflection shooting, who was good at it, and how effective it was anyways.

I will say that...

Part of the reason that most US fighters were equipped with machine-guns, instead of cannons, was their rate of fire.

1. The primary targets for US fighters were enemy fighters and 1e bombers. They (for the most part), weren't shooting at larger bombers, where the punch of a cannon was much better suited to knock down larger bombers. You don't need to cannon to knock down an enemy figher, so why mount it when a MG more aptly suits your needs (consider the following).
2. Cannons themselves, and certainly their ammunition, weighed more the MGs. That means you can put more MGs and/or ammunition on your fighters. Here you get benefit of volume of fire and duration.
3. This higher ROF/volume/duration also means that the gunnery skills of your pilots don't have to as great. I am by no means saying that US pilots had inferior gunnery skills (they in-fact had much more training with live ammunition than their Axis counterparts, simply because it was more availble). But with a higher ROF, you're bound to hit something.
4. If your targets are more or less Fighters and 1e bombers, they're more agile than a level bomber, and will more likely be maneuvering. This is where the higher ROF also helps, becuase you're essentionally just throwing up a lot lead that your target can litterally fly into. Here again, ROF/volume/duration makes a difference.

The Axis fighters were tasked with destroying an ever increasing number of heavy bombers (in both theaters). To knock down a heavy bomber, it takes more than just MGs (unless you kill the soft-squishy things that fly the thing). Hense, by 1943, most Axis fighters (of both nations), had almost abandoned MGs in favor of cannons. The plus for the cannons (and their task of downing medium/heavy bombers), is that the target isn't maneuvering, so the lower ROF and marksmanship requirements aren't as crucial.

-F-

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Post #: 215

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 10:08:24 PM

caslug

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I'm sure deflection shooting training was benefit to USN pilots, but it wasn't a holy grail for USN.

"USN pilots during the interwar period prided themselves on advance attack techniques and training on high-deflection shooting. No doubt such preparation helped the great tacticians like Thach, O'Hare and Flatley...Yet the average navl aviator who saw action in the S. Pacific was far from a dead-eye marksman." - Fire in the Sky

USN(and allied) airforces shot down more jap planes in PTO for combination of reasons, deflection shooting was one, but probably not the top. Radio(allows for teamwork), doctrine(finger four formation), better planes(43 onward), radar(vectoring), better protected planes, better support(more planes available), better replacements, etc., Then add this to fact that the IJN/IJAAF were almost complete opposite, you have a combination that guarantees that allied forces(USN or otherwise) will prevail.

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Post #: 216

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 11:21:14 PM

mdiehl

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quote:

USN(and allied) airforces shot down more jap planes in PTO for combination of reasons, deflection shooting was one, but probably not the top. Radio(allows for teamwork), doctrine(finger four formation), better planes(43 onward), radar(vectoring), better protected planes, better support(more planes available), better replacements, etc., Then add this to fact that the IJN/IJAAF were almost complete opposite, you have a combination that guarantees that allied forces(USN or otherwise) will prevail.

The subject was USN CV pilots at start. With respect to their exp ratings it is important to note NOT, as everybody knows, that US aviators shot down more jap planes throughout the war but instead that from December through August 1942, USN VF pilots flying Wildcats (F4F3 and F4F4's not F6s or F4Us) in direct, head to head dogfights with IJN A6M pilots, shot down more Zeroes than the Zeroes managed to shoot down in F4Fs, despite the fact that by all accounts the Zeke was faster, a better climber, and more maneuverable at IAS less than 300 mph.

The use of the 4 plane section was also a factor. Certainly a better formation overall than the 3-plane shotai used by the Japanese. Lundstrom, however, noted (and backed it up with Japanese fighter pilots' anecdotes) that early war Japanese aviators were sufficiently well trained as teams to maintain good cohesion with the 3-plane shotai. It was only after the head to head confrontations with USN pilots that the weaker Japanese replacement pilots made manifest the inferiority of the 3-plane section.

So, with respect to the at start EXP ratings, the real results from WW2 show that the USN plane+pilot combination, in fighters, was superior to the IJN plane+pilot combination, in fighters. Since we all seem to agree that in general the IJN plane was a better dogfighter, and the F4F was slower, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that beyond reasonable doubt the at-start USN aviators should have very high exp ratings.

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Post #: 217

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/14/2004 11:58:19 PM

Drongo

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From: Melb. Oztralia
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quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
By teh way, the same report that you cite was based on Thach's assessment. In that report, USN superiority at deflection shooting is specifically mentioned as the reason for the success, to date, of the F4F vs the A6M.

What assessment from Thach are you referring to? The combat reports from the CV and TF commanders don't appear to contain any mention of deflection shooting specifically being the reason for success (and Thach contributed to the Yorktown's combat report). Did he make a seperate report that was passed on to Adm Nimitz before Nimitz sent his summary reports of the battle to Adm King in late June?

The only assesment report I've see from Thach was the one he made after returning to the states in Aug '42. Part of it read:-

"In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we have had against the Zero is not due to performance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a few of their pilots, and superior marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots.

This deficiency not only prevents our fighter from properly carrying out its mission but it has had an alarming effect on the morale of the fighter pilots in the Fleet at this time and on those who are going to be sent to the Fleet."

Was that the one you were thinking of?

quote:

Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

A little bit of conjecture there, don't you think?

The full comment from the report by Nimitz to Adm King in late June read:-

"Our F4F-4 is markedly inferior to the Japanese Zero fighter in speed, maneuverability, and climb. These characteristics must be improved, but not at the cost of reducing the present overall superiority that in the Battle of Midway enabled our carrier fighter squadrons to shoot down about 3 Zero fighters for each of our own lost. However much this superiority may exist in our splendid pilots, part at least rests in the armor, armament and leak proof tanks of our planes."

There is no doubt that Nimitz considered the durability and firepower of the F4F to be part of the reason why the USN fighters did better than their Japanese opponents at Midway. It also can be seen that he considered it vital that these attributes be maintained, regardless of whatever else was done in the efforts to address the Zeros superiorities.

However, implying that his statement translates to "we are the USN, we should expect to shoot them down in droves" may not be the correct interpretation.

(From a communique by Nimitz to King one week earlier (20th June, '42) In case you're wondering, Nimitz had reviewed all the After Action reports from the CV and TF commanders by then):

"Although the Type 0 fighters are more vulnerable than ours, the primary source of any combat successes to date by navy fighting planes has been our own expert tactics opposed to faulty enemy tactics.

Overall results have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with the improvement that must be expected in enemy tactics."

Sounds a bit more like the priority was to urgently improve the F4F's capabilities not to improve the kill ratio to something more appropriate to Americans but rather to be able survive the expected improvement in Japanese fighter tactics without suffering a "serious and potentially decisive" result.

Or am I missing an additional report somewhere that would put his comments in the correct light?

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Post #: 218

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 12:10:37 AM

mdiehl

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quote:

Was that the one you were thinking of?

Yes.

Me:

quote:

Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

Drongo:

quote:

A little bit of conjecture there, don't you think?

Yes, admittedly so. But it is correct at least insofar as comparing CinCPac with Japanese naval command. Sakai noted that many IJN field commanders for land based units were reluctant to adopt the 4-plane section even as late as (IIRC) 4thQ 1943, and were heard to make derisive remarks on the order of 'What has protective armor or a reliable radio got to do with aggressive spirit?'

quote:

The full comment from the report by Nimitz to Adm King in late June read ...

There is no doubt that Nimitz considered the durability and firepower of the F4F to be part of the reason why the USN fighters did better than their Japanese opponents at Midway. It also can be seen that he considered it vital that these attributes be maintained, regardless of whatever else was done in the efforts to address the Zeros superiorities.

Absolutely he thought that and I agree. But a pilot in a markedly inferior plane does not get opportunities to hit back very often. Bergerud is a lousy source because he relies almost exclusively on anecdotes, but one interesting one pertains to a P-38 gang-up on a very experienced Ki-43 pilot. The latter escaped by using superior maneuverability to foil the P-38 drivers' shots, but the Ki-43 driver was never in a position to hit one of the P-38s. IMO, had the USAAF trained intensively at deflection shooting, that Ki-43 pilot would not have escaped the day. Of course that's conjecture.

quote:

However, implying that his statement translates to "we are the USN, we should expect to shoot them down in droves" may not be the correct interpretation.

Non sequitur. I did not say that Nimitz statement translates to same. What I said was that a presumptive 3:1 loss ratio was displeasing to CinCPac. IMO, for reasons having to do with ethbnocentrism, pre-war expectations led to a greater degree of disappointment, given evidence to hand at the time, than makes sense. Certainly a sustained 3:1 kill ratio was wholly out of norm in comparison with losses of pilots in France in WW1, or in the Battle of Britain in WW2.

quote:

Sounds a bit more like the priority was to urgently improve the F4F's capabilities not to improve the kill ratio to something more appropriate to Americans but rather to be able survive the expected improvement in Japanese fighter tactics without suffering a "serious and potentially decisive" result.

Well, reading the priority for future work is different from reading the assessment of work to date. I agree that there was a desire to sustain good kill rates among USN pilots given the presumption that the IJN would learn from their experiences and change tactics, doctrine, or improve gunnery.

quote:

Or am I missing an additional report somewhere that would put his comments in the correct light?

No I just think we're looking at different aspects of the report.

< Message edited by mdiehl -- 10/14/2004 10:10:46 PM >

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Post #: 219

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 12:52:24 AM

caslug

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Taking a global look at the game, it doesn't model the fact that Allied pilots rotated out after their 1 or 2 tours. So it will allow many pilots that started as 75 exp on 12/7/41 able to survive(with durable&armor plane) and gain exp(flying until shotdown). This will eventually lead to more allied pilots that are very experienced than historical. This allows the allied to have higher experience average of their squadrons by 1943-44. In PBEM games you might even see allied pilots with more than 40 kills(R. Bong).

Maybe in the short run, jap pilots are too exp or allied pilots are not, I'm don't have an opinion either way. BUT in the long run(1-2 yrs), the game models the allied advantages(more durable planes, better replacement, more numeroius, better planes, etc.,) pretty well. So guess if players want to bump up USN pilot exp then it'll only be fair to rotated them out after their tours. Sure, some pilots went back for 2nd tours, but most didn't. Otherwise, you'll be creating an ahistorical situation-high exp pilots that are NEVER rotated out. Only Jap/GE pilots were in this situation, because of bad leadership on by their respecitve high command.

(in reply to mdiehl)

Post #: 220

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 1:40:53 AM

Drongo

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Drongo
Was that the one you were thinking of?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mdiehl
Yes.

That extract was taken from Thach's address to a commitee in Aug '42, almost two months after Nimitz's report to King. If the report from Nimitz that Leo cited was based on an assessment from Thach, then it couldn't have been that one in particular.

quote:

Non sequitur. I did not say that Nimitz statement translates to same.

There's that term for all seasons, again.

quote:

What I said was that a presumptive 3:1 loss ratio was displeasing to CinCPac. IMO, for reasons having to do with ethbnocentrism, pre-war expectations led to a greater degree of disappointment, given evidence to hand at the time, than makes sense.

...and you attribute this thinking as being behind Nimitz's comment. So we're back at "we are the USN, we should expect to shoot them down in droves".

quote:

Well, reading the priority for future work is different from reading the assessment of work to date.

In what we are currently discussing, the two are interlinked. His future concerns appear to stem from the analysis of "work to date" at Midway.

quote:

No I just think we're looking at different aspects of the report.

Same aspect, differing interpretations obviously. Much like your take on Thach's Aug '42 report. You interpret him as saying deflection shooting was the reason for the F4F's success. I interpret him as saying it was one of the reasons.

You say potato, I say spud.

Cheers

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Post #: 221

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 1:43:13 AM

Drongo

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quote:

ORIGINAL: caslug
Taking a global look at the game, it doesn't model the fact that Allied pilots rotated out after their 1 or 2 tours. So it will allow many pilots that started as 75 exp on 12/7/41 able to survive(with durable&armor plane) and gain exp(flying until shotdown). .

Actually, the game does rotate Allied pilots out (starting after they reach 100 missions).

Cheers

< Message edited by Drongo -- 10/14/2004 11:45:08 PM >

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Post #: 222

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 1:45:55 AM

mdiehl

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At least we don't say "freedom fries."

Thach's report was for all intents the same one delivered to Nimitz after Midway by Thach. I'll see if I can dredge up a cite from the depths of memory. As to deflection shooting, IMO "better marksmanship" equates with deflection shooting in this context unless you think there was a proclivity for Japanese pilots to just plain miss their targets in low-deflection shots from 6 o clock.

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Post #: 223

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 2:07:41 AM

mogami

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Hi, The USN has pilots rated as high as any Japanese pilot at start. The problem is not with the USN. I think the USAAF units are too low. The USN CV groups are under size at start not under rated. Of the first 4 USN CV fighter groups 1 starts in Buffaloes and the other in F4F-3 and all are undersize by at least 1/3. That is why USN CV in 1 on 1 encounters with IJN CV lose battles. Compounding this is the short range of the torpedo plane and the limited number of aircraft. USN DB that survive enemy CAP always do a good job.

< Message edited by Mogami -- 10/14/2004 7:08:38 PM >

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Post #: 224

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/15/2004 2:10:49 AM

Drongo

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quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
At least we don't say "freedom fries."

Perish the thought.

quote:

Thach's report was for all intents the same one delivered to Nimitz after Midway by Thach. I'll see if I can dredge up a cite from the depths of memory. As to deflection shooting, IMO "better marksmanship" equates with deflection shooting in this context unless you think there was a proclivity for Japanese pilots to just plain miss their targets in low-deflection shots from 6 o clock.

If you can get the cite, that'd be great.

Yes, better marksmanship would most likely equate to deflection shooting in the contect of the USN. I wasn't disagreeing with that, just that the Aug '42 report does not appear to put the emphasis on this or any one factor but rather attributes the USN's success to all those mentioned (spud).

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Post #: 225

Opinions - 10/15/2004 4:52:20 AM

herbieh

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Mdiehl,
its been an interesting thread, and your point of view comes across.
Was just wondering, how do you find the game itself,?, got far into it yet?
I personally am finding it thrilling, simply because Im striking the same problems the commanders had, and all the equipment seems (in a general way)to be acting with historical type results.
And wasn't that the aim of the game guys?

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Post #: 226

RE: Opinions - 10/15/2004 3:38:19 PM

Speedysteve

Posts: 15998
Joined: 9/11/2001
From: Reading, England
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Hi all,

Drongo - you mentioned Allied pilots rotate after 100 missions. Do they come back in at all at a later date or is it 100 missions then bye bye for the rest of the war?

(in reply to herbieh)

Post #: 227

RE: Opinions - 10/16/2004 8:59:43 AM

Drongo

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Speedy

Hi all,

Drongo - you mentioned Allied pilots rotate after 100 missions. Do they come back in at all at a later date or is it 100 missions then bye bye for the rest of the war?

Pilots that rotate out will be eligible to return anywhere from 365 days onwards (the exact date is determined by a random number - between 365 and 1365 days IIRC).

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drink more beer.

(in reply to Speedysteve)

Post #: 228

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/16/2004 11:25:30 AM

Apollo11

Posts: 24082
Joined: 6/7/2001
From: Zagreb, Croatia
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Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

But when did that advantage evaporate?
1942?
1943?
1944?
1945?

IMHO this is not good argument...

"IMHO this is not a good argument" is non sequitur, as it does not address the material facts or offer any specific countervailing information. I believe Monty Python did a spoof on your sort of "rebuttal" once.

In answer to your question, I'd say late 1944, after the US landings on Davao. At that point the US had sufficient airbases in range of objectives to obtain air superiority, perhaps even air supremacy, along much of Japan's lines of communications. Prior to the actual conquest of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, the Japanese had the edge in land based air facilities, but the USN had sufficient striking power that a well planned, snappily executed attack could overwhelm local aerial resistence using CV based air. Still, I think the real turning point was the conclusion of the USN Marianas campaign; anything could have happened there.

Now wait a minute here... you wrote that Japanese had early success because their armed forces vastly outnumbered Allies....

So I asked you when you think this advantage evaporated in the theater of operations.

Don't you think that the 1944 is wrong (historic) answer?

quote:

quote:

I agree but even in late 1942 US poured so much men/equipment/supply into theater that this also is not good argument

I do not understand your objection. First, by late 1942 the ONLY Japanese conquered piece of ground that the US had a foothold on was Guadalcanal, and NONE of the Japanese pre-war mandates were under US control. As to "so much men" etc, I do not agree. Numerically the Japanese had the allied outnumbered in the Solomons, New Ireland, New Britain, New Guinea area. The Japanese had more CVs, BBs, CAs, and DDs in Truk and Rabaul than the USN had from Pearl Harbor to New Caledonia until 1st quarter 1943. Even then, the Allies were just getting started on pushing on the edge of the Japanese perimiter.

My objection was to your original assessment of Japanese advantage at the beginning of war.

I asked you when that advantage evaporated and offered info that even by late 1942 US has poured so much material in theater that even by then it had _MORE_ than Japanese ever had.

quote:

quote:

I am sure that by late 1942 US had much more material than Japanese in theater.

Well, on that score you are 'surely' incorrect. And that Solomosn campaign certainly had no effect on the advantageous strategic position held by the Japanese (interior supply lines).

We were talking in absolute numbers (please see above).

quote:

quote:

Sure thing... but those places could have been bypassed (as many were). What Japan conquered in 1941/1942 had to be fortified new...

? Bypassed? Leo, there's no getting to Japan without going through the Marshalls, and no bombing Japan without taking Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, and no getting to the Philippines without the Palaus. The *only* Japanese conquered islands apart from Luzon that had not been fortified by the Japanese for 20 years were Guam, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and the vicinity of Rabaul. And the Japanese managed to fortify the **** out of Rabaul and Guam.

This was all in regard to claims that Japanese were inferior in everything except number at beginning of the war. If such claim was true (and it wasn't) then the US could have done "direct approach" in 1942.

But, as we know, this was not the case and Japan had to be beaten step-by-step.

So, what you wrote is, essentially, confirmation of what I wrote...

quote:

quote:

They flew it, but they lacked time to acquaint themselves 100%.

Please define "sufficient time to train acquaint onself 100%."

According to many books pilots become very good (if they survived of course) after they spend 1+ years in 1st line squadron (i.e. they were veteran experts knowing almost all about themselves and their aircraft).

quote:

quote:

If, for example, some middle ranking officer in USN flew biplanes 10x longer than his brand new Wildcat (or whatever else aircraft) then certain things he learned, practiced to perfection and loved to do in his biplane were almost unusable in new aircraft...

I really do not believe you have read much at all on the matter. You seem to have this notion that human cognition is equivalent to some sort of dumb automata, and that new skills or information can't be absored. If your only specimens were US presidents I might agree, but the data from USN combats clearly demonstrates otherwise. As I stipulated before, if you wanted to model the learning trajectory of US air units you'd want something like a viral model for information transmission.

Like I wrote in one of my previous posts I have read memoirs from:

- German WWII fighter pilots
- Japanese (IJN) WWII fighter pilots
- UK WWII fighter pilots
- Russian WWII fighter pilots (and Il-2 pilots)
- USAAF WWII fighter pilots

The one I still looking for is (are) USN fighter pilot memoirs.

quote:

quote:

At the end war made pilots on all sides to adjust or die really quickly...

At the war's beginning, Allied pilots made such adjustments with blazing speed. Most USN pilots had made some of the necessary adjustments, like being much better at deflection shooting than their opponents, before the US was in the war at all.

Then we agree - isn't this exactly what I wrote before (i.e. they adjusted or they were killed - there wasn't anything in between)?

BTW, again, this was the same for all warring sides.

quote:

quote:

Great list and dates (I knew this of course from my books as well) but let's concentrate on most important one:

1941: Grumman F4F-3

This is what I was writing about - the aircraft was almost brand new when war started and all the USN pilots had of modern design (if you can call it) before it was Brewster. All aircraft before were biplane...

True... not biplanes of WW1 but still biplanes...

Well, your claim was that: 'the models prior to the F4F3 were so radically inferior that their flight profiles were incomparable, and that closing rates of speed in earlier models so inferior that despite decades of emphasis on deflection shooting, pilots who had flown F4Fs for more than a year were still no better on the whole at deflection shooting than their opponents.' That is a paraphrase of your argument. And your argument is flat out wrong on the basis of the performance characteristics of the F2A2, F3A1, and F4F3.

C'mon... now you really overdone yourself...

If F2 or F3 were such great success stories why didn't USN just stick to them?

Do you seriously believe that F4 wasn't 10x better than F3 or F2?

quote:

quote:

BTW, after Midway, Admiral Nimitz himself wrote in official report that Wildcat (and not Brewster) is inferior to Zero (speed, acceleration, rate of climb) and that improvements must be done immediately (although not in a way to lower the flow of existing fighters into units).

I never said the F4F was a better plane than the Zero at speed, acceleation and rate of climb. I said that the F4F drivers were sufficiently better at deflection shooting that they canceled out the general advantage that the Zero had. I also suggested that the 1.4:1 favorable to the USN kill ratio of F4Fs vs Zero seems to support my point of view. By teh way, the same report that you cite was based on Thach's assessment. In that report, USN superiority at deflection shooting is specifically mentioned as the reason for the success, to date, of the F4F vs the A6M. Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

When I read that report I read that Wildcat was better package than Zero although it was inferior in performance.

quote:

quote:

Here we go again... yes they have trained it for 20 years but with aircraft that were 100% different than ones used in WWII. Entering combat with 200 mph or 400 mph is vast difference...

Well.. you seem not to understand the difference between IAS, ground speed, and speed relative to the target. Until you can come to grips with the fact that the single most important speed consideration in deflection shooting is the closing speed, you will not really be able to understand how training in an F2 moving at, say, 300 mph, vs a towed target moving at 180 mph, is quite similar to training in an F4 moving at 310 mph vs a towed target moving at 190 mph. Until you get it, you won't "get it."

ROFL

Let me tell you one thing... aircraft in general, piloting and flight simulations are my hobby for past 15+ years (in addition, of course, to great wargames like TOAW, UV, WitP, HTTR)...

Before, when I had more time, I participated a lot in on-line flying and I was, well, very very very good (in some of the flight sims I was for the long time at the top of ladder)...

BTW, did I mention that I participated in development of most good flight sims in past years (every Flanker v1.x, Flanker v2.x, Lock-On, every MS Flight sim, every MS Combat Flight sim, Jane's F/A-18, Falcon 4.0)...

So... telling me that I don't understand aircraft is, well, you know what...

As for saying "F2 moving at, say, 300 mph, vs a towed target moving at 180 mph, is quite similar to training in an F4 moving at 310 mph vs a towed target moving at 190 mph" - what can I say - you obviously have no idea what you are talking about here...

quote:

quote:

Most pilots (all sides) were not expert at deflection shooting, that's why thousands of pilots (all sides) fly their tours but never shot down a plane, becuase they just didn't have a) shooting eye and b) hunter instincts. Of course the pilots that had those skills, became legend(foss, Yeager, campell, sakai, hartman, etc.,). Even Eric Hartman, said that strategy was to manuever the plane really close(preferably rear) before openning up.

Eric Hartmann's comments are specific to German doctrine. They did not train as intensively at deflection shooting as the USN pilots did. From Lundstrom's comments he makes it clear that the USN was rather unique in honing their pilots skills at this talent. Of course, in any situation it was desirable to have a low deflection shot (which means an approach from the enemy's six), but if your opposition isn't asleep, then being better at deflection shooting means that you can make killing shots that your enemy, not being trained at the skill, will be less likely to make.

But the proof is in the actual combat results in the Marshalls Strikes, the Coral Sea, Midway, and Solomons CV battles in which USN F4F pilots in a slower, less maneuverable aircraft, shot down more Zeroes than F4Fs were lost to Zeroes.

Let's leave Hartmann out of this.

What is important in that quote "caslug" wrote is the following:

Most pilots (all sides) were not expert at deflection shooting, that's why thousands of pilots (all sides) fly their tours but never shot down a plane, becuase they just didn't have a) shooting eye and b) hunter instincts. Of course the pilots that had those skills, became legend(foss, Yeager, campell, sakai, hartman, etc.,).

This is historic reality (fighter aces and experts were very very small minority)...

Leo "Apollo11"

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(in reply to mdiehl)

Post #: 229

RE: Deflection shooting - 10/16/2004 8:36:45 PM

m10bob

Posts: 8622
Joined: 11/3/2002
From: Dismal Seepage Indiana
Status: offline

Like a bad penny..............

< Message edited by m10bob -- 10/16/2004 1:37:56 PM >

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Post #: 230

RE: Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over s... - 10/17/2004 3:55:53 AM

Bombur

Posts: 3642
Joined: 7/2/2004
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Captain Cruft

Here's a tidbit from a PBEM game I'm playing, date was early Jan 1942 ...
Day Air attack on TF, near Darwin at 36,84 

Japanese aircraft 
A6M2 Zero x 36 
G4M1 Betty x 9 

Allied aircraft 
F2A Buffalo x 11 
F4F-3 Wildcat x 15 
Wirraway x 3 

Japanese aircraft losses 
A6M2 Zero: 26 destroyed 
G4M1 Betty: 7 destroyed, 4 damaged 

Allied aircraft losses 
F2A Buffalo: 2 destroyed, 1 damaged 
F4F-3 Wildcat: 8 destroyed, 1 damaged 
Wirraway: 5 destroyed, 1 damaged 
USN fighters were from the Lex and Enterprise. IJN fighters were from 3rd Daitai with a mix of high and low exp pilots.

The actual numbers were 13 Zeros down for 1 Buffalo and 5 Wildcats. The combat replay consisted almost entirely of "USN fighters bounce IJN fighters" (boom and zoom?) resulting in either a dead Zero or, less often, "Zero evades". My guess is that the dead Zeros were those with rookie pilots whilst the evading Zeros were those with the high exp pilots.

I have to say I think the game has it about right.

-It seems that A6M2�s are quite vulnerable when escorting low flying torpedo bombers, I�m playing a Guadalcanal campaign and had A6M�s squadrons with 70-80 experience. Whe they escorted Betties in antiship attacks they got the following kill rates:

A6M vs P-39: 1:7!!!! (1x7)
A6M vs F4F: 1:2 (13x27)

While escorting Betties flying high attitude attacks they got:

A6M vs P-40E: 5:1 (11 vs 2)

(in reply to Captain Cruft)

Post #: 231