Slitherine

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Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

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ORIGINAL: madmickey


Allowing Battlecruiser to be exposed to heavy plunging fire was a good idea.

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ORIGINAL: irrelevant

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Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

To be fair, Hood was trying to close the range when she was sunk. Her weakness was recognized and Adm Holland was doing what he could to compensate. He needed a break and didn't get it.

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ORIGINAL: MengCiao

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu

I've often see the "speed is armor" quote ascribed to Fisher, but I've never seen any documentation on its context. If he was referring to the use of large cruisers against the enemy's battle line, then I'd have to say the historical precedents tend to support his idea. I don't know of any disproportionate losses we can pin on him for it.
As far as I can tell, the only reason for proposing the disappearing mounts would be to indulge the appetite for newfangled whatevers.

The losses in BCs can't be pinned on Fischer (stupid freak designs like Furious, Courageous and Glorious which wasted resources could be), but on the Admirals commanding and deploying them. As cruisers got bigger and faster, so too did BCs, as the need for speed increased size and cost passed that of BBs. Because of this, many felt them a waste unless used in the battleline. Kaboom!

Excessively reactive "powder bags" for the 12-inch and 13.5-inch ammo seems to have been the immediate cause of the ships that blew up at Jutland. HMS Tiger was hit by more big shells than any RN ship at Jutland except Warspite and she didn't blow up.

If the "powder bags" had been less reactive, then BCs might have gotten less of a bad rep...Renown and Repulse did fine in surface actions and Hood might have blown up due to her own torpedoes being hit.

Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

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a) 3 dual turrets with 20-inch guns
(b) 53,000 tons displacement
(c) 35 knots speed
(d) 10 inches belt armor

Who am I?

A hint: I would have been built, shouldn't a very serious battle take place.

F.

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Fisher was actually very enthusiastic about the submarine. Its not well known but at the start of WWI, the navy with the largest sub fleet was......Britian

Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

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ORIGINAL: madmickey

EUBanana
I saw the same stuff from BBC, calling anything from BBC a documentary is very questionable.

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ORIGINAL: madmickey

I am a Canadian and I have seen the British blame Arnhem failure on the Americans.

Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

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ORIGINAL: MengCiao

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu

I've often see the "speed is armor" quote ascribed to Fisher, but I've never seen any documentation on its context. If he was referring to the use of large cruisers against the enemy's battle line, then I'd have to say the historical precedents tend to support his idea. I don't know of any disproportionate losses we can pin on him for it.
As far as I can tell, the only reason for proposing the disappearing mounts would be to indulge the appetite for newfangled whatevers.

The losses in BCs can't be pinned on Fischer (stupid freak designs like Furious, Courageous and Glorious which wasted resources could be), but on the Admirals commanding and deploying them. As cruisers got bigger and faster, so too did BCs, as the need for speed increased size and cost passed that of BBs. Because of this, many felt them a waste unless used in the battleline. Kaboom!

Excessively reactive "powder bags" for the 12-inch and 13.5-inch ammo seems to have been the immediate cause of the ships that blew up at Jutland. HMS Tiger was hit by more big shells than any RN ship at Jutland except Warspite and she didn't blow up.

If the "powder bags" had been less reactive, then BCs might have gotten less of a bad rep...Renown and Repulse did fine in surface actions and Hood might have blown up due to her own torpedoes being hit.

My understanding of why the British BCs went up, and the Armoured Cruisers for that matter, was a combination of poor armor protection, questionable usage vs heavy units, and unsafe handling room procedures. I have read that the RN advocated both upping the ammunition carried beyond the designed capacity and stowing large quantities of charge bags loosely in the hoists and handling rooms to increase the rate of fire, both which where extremely hazardous and criminally negligent practices.

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Poor armor protection can be cited in the case of Indefatigable i suppose. By 1916 the Invincible and the virtually identical Indefatigable class battlecruisers were quite outclassed by the latest generation of German BC's which had approached proto-fast battleship status in terms of overall protection. The Brititsh ships of those two classes were the most true "battlecruisers" as far as the original concept went and were in reality, armored cruisers armed with battleship guns. Their 1904-6 armor scheme was designed not stop heavy shells if encountered but to localize the damage if struck. Again, the British never realized/expected to have such an issue with their ammunition.

The Lion and Tiger were IMO, adequately armored overall and actually withstood quite a good amount of punishment. No question the German BC's were better protected overall though theoretically the larger British guns should have compensated (and would have had their shells worked better) It certainly can be argued that without the issue of unstable and/or volitile cordite it is conceivable that all 3 BC's would have survived the battle. Certainly i believe this to be the case with Queen Mary and Invincible, both of which were struck high up either on their turret gunhouses or barbettes. Indefatiable might have been lost anyway as she was hit lower and progressive flooding might have eventually done her in same as with Warrior and Lutzow. The key difference was the propellent issue. German barbettes and gunhouses were also partially pierced in the battle but no catastrophes occured.

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ORIGINAL: steveh11Matrix

My understanding is that there were indeed poor procedures - excessive ready-use shells and bags, safety shortcuts etc - in the BC Fleet, because Beatty stressed ROF. I'm not so sure that this would have also been the case for the AC, I think this was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have no idea at all whether this emphasis continued when he became the commander of the Grand Fleet. As for the situation in May 1941, I simply don't know.

This is not 'Beatty Bashing' by the way, I believe he had flaws, but so did Jellicoe.
I feel Hipper and Scheer were both better overall, but even Scheer made a serious and potentially fatal mistake at Jutland when he turned back towards the Grand Fleet.

Still, this is getting somewhat off topic...

Steve.

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ORIGINAL: irrelevant

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Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

To be fair, Hood was trying to close the range when she was sunk. Her weakness was recognized and Adm Holland was doing what he could to compensate. He needed a break and didn't get it.

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ORIGINAL: madmickey

Why lead with the weaker force Hood instead of the Prince of Wales (assuming that it was a true BB with proper deck protection). The British knew where the German were, the German did not know where Hood and PW were, the British had cruisers with torpedo why not an intercept that will give the British an advantage using your cruiser as well in a feint
.

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ORIGINAL: steveh11Matrix

My understanding is that there were indeed poor procedures - excessive ready-use shells and bags, safety shortcuts etc - in the BC Fleet, because Beatty stressed ROF. I'm not so sure that this would have also been the case for the AC, I think this was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have no idea at all whether this emphasis continued when he became the commander of the Grand Fleet. As for the situation in May 1941, I simply don't know.

This is not 'Beatty Bashing' by the way, I believe he had flaws, but so did Jellicoe.
I feel Hipper and Scheer were both better overall, but even Scheer made a serious and potentially fatal mistake at Jutland when he turned back towards the Grand Fleet.

Still, this is getting somewhat off topic...

Steve.

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

The explosions suffered by the British were the result of a combination of unsafe ammunition practices (Doors left open between compartments and extra charges laid out...all to speed up rate of fire.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

thats actually a bit of a myth. Here's how Cambell recorded the hit on Lion. She was struck by a 12 inch shell on the juncture of the roof and front turret plate at 1600. the shell entered the gunhouse along with pieces of the turret armor and exploded, killing everyone inside the gunhouse. The left gun was damaged and was later condemned.

A fire was started but it was quickly reported extinquished. The ship's chief gunnery officer, Alexander Grant, visited the turret and spoke to one of the surviving crew members of the handling room. After a brief discussion he ordered Q magazine doors to be closed and later the order was given for the compartment to be flooded.

At 1628 the massive sheet of flame i mentioned in an earlier post was witnessed. Had the magazine not been flooded by this time.....most likely the ship would have gone Kaboom.

The above is taken from Jellicoe's memorandum. There was no mention of FJW Harvey, the officer of the turret, only that he had reported to the bridge that the turret was out of action. Harvey was indeed awarded a posthmomous VC for having ordered the magazine doors closed and the compartment flooded while mortally wounded. The actual order to flood the mags came from the Captain and were transmitted from the transmitter station.

So as you can see there is some confusion over who did what and when but one thing that was clear was that the mag was to be flooded, a sensible precaution given the turret was out of commission anyway.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Necessities of war. There were no other ships available to back up Hood and going up against a brand new BB on a 1:1 situation is not stacking the deck in your favor. PoW's unready state was highlighted by the fact that she set sail with dockyard workers still aboard!

Holland could not cross the T because he was not in position to do so when he arrived within visual range. At that point, his biggest concern was to get within the range preffered by current doctrine as well as minimizing Hood's thin deck armor to exposure.

The failure to coordinate or utilize the shaowing CA's was a flub IIRC but i'd need to brush up on the battle to offer further commentary.