IMJennifer
Posts: 28
Joined: 6/4/2002 From: Rural Wisconsin, U.S.A. Status: offline
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Tuomas Seijavuori [B] If you mean "do you know by first hand experience", the answer is no, I wasn't even born then. I am replying based on what I have read in books by men who were there at the time (and what I've learnt from my grandfather and granduncles who fought both the Germans and the Soviets). Another account of the collapse of AGC is in F.W.Mellenthin's [I]Panzer Leader[/I], p.338- . Of course he too can be discredited by the same statement: he was a German (general staff) officer. I'm now wondering who's books am I supposed to believe, if the author must 1) posess first hand knowledge and 2) must not be a German commanding officer on the front at that time. Please point me to an English language source providing the other side of the story. I can read German, but it's so much slower for me than I'd rather not. To Jennifer: Who are R.D. Müller and H.-E. Volkmann and why do they know better? Is their study available in English? I am genuinely interested and would be grateful if you had the ISBN of the English edition at hand. Note that I'm not saying I believe everything German generals and staff officers say in their memoirs. Mellenthin in particular is doing a lousy job hiding his racist views about the Slavs which puts everything else he writes under some suspicion. It is difficult to deny, however, that he had a great vantage point to the military operations as they took place both in North Africa (he was Rommel's Ia) and in the Eastern front where he was the Ia of the 48th Panzer Korps. [/B][/QUOTE] Tuomas -- Müller and Volkman edited the proceedings of a symposium, it's actually a collection of presentations on the Wehrmacht by a group of historians. Unfortunately, it's only available in German -- not easy German either :( . The work is valuable because they [I]analyze[/I] bodies of evidence. For example, the weaknesses of the German command structure. The German High Command was very strong in the area of operations, but was also characterized by a certain myopia regarding personnel management, materiel and intelligence. The structure itself was flawed in that the supreme command of the armed forces was actually a parallel command structure to the supreme command of the army and had little authority over other branches (navy and air force). If you are looking for a better understanding of what actually happened, you should be happy with the operational studies you mention, just bear in mind that these were written post-war for a wider audience and all contain self-serving elements. I believe you are correct in your assessment of von Mellenthin, nevertheless he is an excellent primary source for the campaigns in which he participated. By reading a combination of primary and secondary sources, you will develop a feel for what to trust and when you uncover contradictions, you will often be able to draw the correct conclusion as to which to believe. Probably the best work on the subject is the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Intitute for Military History) [I]Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg[/I] (Germany and the Second World War), more or less the German official history of the war. It is a work of outstanding scholarship in methodology, documentation and interpretation. Oxford University Press is translating it and has published 6 of the 10 volumes thus far. Vol. IV, [I]The Attack on the Soviet Union[/I] covers the Russo-German War through 1941. Unfortunately, this 1364 page book costs USD 250 -- making it one of the more expensive books I own. :( Since Hard_Sarge will no doubt (and quite justifiably) take me to task for once again wandering so far from UV -- you can PM me for more information. Hope this helped. Jennifer
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