Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: johnnyvagas

While I agree that the German capture of Baku and such would not have provided much of an immediate effect on German war efforts, the loss of between 75% and 90% of oil and fuel production should have a significant and relatively immediate effect upon Soviet War Efforts -- IMHO.

quote:

Each fuel factory point will produce 500 tons of fuel per turn at the cost of 500 tons of oil.
Rumanian fuel factories will have their production halved starting from August 1943.

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Hmm..I also find it ironic that the axis was sitting on a large supply of oil the whole time in Libya. They started drilling in 1955.

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Note: Russian Refinery technology was between a third and a half as efficient as US refinery technology, and most of the fuel produced was 40-60 octane (and often as low as 20 octane). The technology the US supplied enabled the Russians to upgrade existing refineries and the refineries the US supplied were, of course, state of the art ... so the Russians were quickly able to get more fuel, and higher quality fuel, from the same amount of inputs ... double to triple as much.

[repeated from above, since Wulfgar has either not read, again, or not comprehended, again, what has been witten and/or cited]

And, of course, feel free to actually read the sources cited ... you know, the ones you have claimed don't specifically refer to Baku but which, on even the most cursory examination, actually refer specifically to Baku?

Then get a clew and stop trolling.

And look at the mini-AAR about the effects of losing Baku.

Phil

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Remember, the Soviet armed forces were about 85% leg infantry ... only 15% motorised ... and supply for leg infantry units was almost 100% by train and horse drawn waggon rather than motor vehicle.

Just like the German army it fought to a standstill.


Phil

quote:

ORIGINAL: LiquidSky



Hmm..I also find it ironic that the axis was sitting on a large supply of oil the whole time in Libya. They started drilling in 1955.

When I was younger, I worked for a guy who was a Counter-Espionage agent for the British in WW2. His job in 1944 was to track down the Americans who were selling fuel to the Germans. I forget the percentage he told me, but it was fairly high that the Bulge offensive was fuelled by American blackmarket fuel.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wulfgar

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Remember, the Soviet armed forces were about 85% leg infantry ... only 15% motorised ... and supply for leg infantry units was almost 100% by train and horse drawn waggon rather than motor vehicle.

Just like the German army it fought to a standstill.

Unfortunately it was the 15% that was motorized was the stuff that could conquer and do the damage, the leg stuff was just cannon fodder. They would have had more motorized if they could.

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

quote:

ORIGINAL: wulfgar

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Remember, the Soviet armed forces were about 85% leg infantry ... only 15% motorised ... and supply for leg infantry units was almost 100% by train and horse drawn waggon rather than motor vehicle.

Just like the German army it fought to a standstill.

Unfortunately it was the 15% that was motorized was the stuff that could conquer and do the damage, the leg stuff was just cannon fodder. They would have had more motorized if they could.

Which statement, yet again, shows your complete, utter, absolute clewlessness.

In Blitzkrieg tactics, the German Infantry divisions punched a hole in the front and the Panzer divisions then exploited ... the Russian refinement of mobile war operated pretty much the same. Those Guards Rifle Corps were largely leg infantry as well ... as you would know if you weren't completely uninformed of things military and logistical.

Really, your level of complete and utter ignorance is of the barrel bottom scraping kind. I don't think it's possible for anyone to know less about things military and WW2 than you ...

Get a clew.

Phil

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Again, Wulfgar, read the cites and the works mentioned in the Bibliographies.

The information you seek is there, if only you weren't so unwilling to look for it.

You can, of course, suspect all you want ... like you "suspected" that the sources cited, the ones you have never actually either a) read or b) been able to comprehend didn't refer to Baku when, quite specifically, on even a cursory examination, they did/do ... but the only way you will assuage your unsupported personal opinions is if you do the hard yards and actually read what you have been directed at.

So, Wulfgar, do the sources specifically mention Baku or not? And not refer to the Caucasus in general as you assert?

Did I ever mention the effects on the Germans, rather than only refer to the effects on the Russians?

Whether you like something or not, basing your opposition to it on a refusal to do even basic research, a complete failure to read carefully what has been posted and a demonstrated incapacity at basic comprehension is not the way to go.

Pity for poor Wulfgar.

Do the reading. Then you will not be so ignorant.

Phil

quote:

The Soviets historically lost 90% of Baku Oil production anyway, destroying it when threatened by German advances. Did it make a difference?

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Again, Wulfgar, read the cites and the works mentioned in the Bibliographies.

The information you seek is there, if only you weren't completely, totally and utterly unwilling to look for it.

I don't know how much plainer I can be

If you want confirmation, read the works cited.

The fact that a) you haven't bothered and/or b) haven't got the mental capacity to comprehend it if you have is sad

Indeed. I said Baku. You said, "No, you don't mean Baku" and the sources I cited "No, they don't mention Baku" when, in fact, on even the most cursory reading, they do.

But its become obvious that you aren't clewless (or not entirely), what you really are is a Troll.

Phil

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The Soviets historically lost 90% of Baku Oil production anyway, destroying it when threatened by German advances. Did it make a difference?

No.

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ORIGINAL: aspqrz

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Phil

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Whom?

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

A number of writers would, most works reside in my library. Let's examine one, shall we!

Page one (Soviet Blitzkrieg - The Battle for White Russia 1944, Walter S. Dunn Jr, 2000):

...When the heavy artillery and rockets finally quieted, the relentless air attacks intensified....Finally the rumbling of engines and the clatter of steel tracks signaled the approach of dreaded Soviet tanks...

A torrent of tanks and riflemen from four divisions of General N.I. Krylov's 5th Army stormed the German trenches along the 18 kilometer sector, about 36,000 men, or 3 men for every meter. With the shouting Red Army riflemen came two tank brigades and five assault gun regiments with over 120 tanks and 100 assault guns, double the strength of a panzer division.

Sounds kind of like what I described.

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Sophisticated? In their own way? What does that even mean?

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Zhukov's ill-advised use of anti-air searchlights to blind German defenders in his Oder bridgehead breakout? Pretty late-war and ultimately relied on brute force and overwhelming numbers to finally force his way to Seelow.

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Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943, by Joel S. A. Hayward

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xxiii, 323. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN:0-7006-0876-1.

Stopped at Stalingrad is really a campaign history of Luftflotte 4 and its part in the 1942 German summer campaign in Russia, which culminated so disastrously at Stalingrad. The major personality of the book is General (later Field Marshal) Wolfram von Richthofen, who started 1942 as the commander of Flieger Korps VIII, and from July 1942 on was the commander of Luftflotte 4; a man whose arrogance was matched only by his ability as the Luftwaffe's best field commander.

Hayward's book has two very interesting arguments. First, Hayward revives an old argument concerning the question of where the turning point of the war was. Since the late 1970's the now accepted conventional wisdom is that the German defeat at Moscow in December 1941 was really the turning point of the war. Hayward seems to challenge this, although he does it more by implication than by open argument. The second argument Hayward advances is that the Luftwaffe could have crippled Soviet oil production by launching large-scale bomber raids against Baku in the summer of 1942, when the German advance brought the major Soviet oil producing areas within bomber range. Here I think Hayward is on firmer ground. Richthofen did launch two large-scale raids on the oil refining facilities at Grozny with impressive results.

quote:

1940

For the first time in the history of the oil industry, electrical drilling of wells were introduced (Kala oilfield). The first directional turbine drilling was used in Bail (2,000 meters depth). 1941 Drilling of the deepest oil well (3,200-3,400 meters) in USSR began in ITousani region. Azerbaijan achieved its highest level of oil extraction in its history-23.3 million tons. Azerbaijani high production accounted for 71.4 percent of the entire oil extraction in the Soviet Union that year, much of which was used in the war effort. 1941-1945 Azerbaijani production falls to 11.1 million tons or 63.2 percent of all oil produced in the USSR, Drilling was interrupted because of the war as manpower was concentrated on producing arms and weapons.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wulfgar

Well here's a book.

quote:

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943, by Joel S. A. Hayward

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xxiii, 323. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN:0-7006-0876-1.

Stopped at Stalingrad is really a campaign history of Luftflotte 4 and its part in the 1942 German summer campaign in Russia, which culminated so disastrously at Stalingrad. The major personality of the book is General (later Field Marshal) Wolfram von Richthofen, who started 1942 as the commander of Flieger Korps VIII, and from July 1942 on was the commander of Luftflotte 4; a man whose arrogance was matched only by his ability as the Luftwaffe's best field commander.

Hayward's book has two very interesting arguments. First, Hayward revives an old argument concerning the question of where the turning point of the war was. Since the late 1970's the now accepted conventional wisdom is that the German defeat at Moscow in December 1941 was really the turning point of the war. Hayward seems to challenge this, although he does it more by implication than by open argument. The second argument Hayward advances is that the Luftwaffe could have crippled Soviet oil production by launching large-scale bomber raids against Baku in the summer of 1942, when the German advance brought the major Soviet oil producing areas within bomber range. Here I think Hayward is on firmer ground. Richthofen did launch two large-scale raids on the oil refining facilities at Grozny with impressive results.

http://strategypage.com/bookreviews/94.asp

I'm left wondering what the speculation on the worth of bombing Baku would be for the Luftwaffe if the Soviets themselves had already destroyed 90% Baku's oil production?

quote:

ORIGINAL: johnnyvagas

(sniped for space saving)

The long and short being I agree with some of the earlier poster’s to this thread that have indicated that based upon their own game testing experiences that the WiTE oil and Fuel production is window dressing. Perhaps this is akin to the lack of importance of Soviet Heavy Industry in WITE which has also been suggested many times on this forum. While I have not play tested the effect the loss of Ploesti has upon the Axis, as I said above, the loss of Baku, Maikop and Grozny has no noticeable effects upon the Soviets.

quote:

ORIGINAL: LiquidSky

quote:

Much like when Gudarian suggested just using the captured T-34s (and copying the design) this was turned down immediately. So far as I am aware they never used them for anything and they had captured a lot of them.

They used them for training. There is an interesting story on the bridge being captured at Kalach (Stalingrad pocket) because the Germans thought the Russian tank company that was crossing was part of their training detachment, and waved them through.

quote:

German fighter pilot schools relied on fuel. They required 60,000–80,000 short tons (54,000–73,000 t) per month. With this achieved, they claimed to be able to train 1,200 fighter, 250 ground-attack, 40 bomber, 75 jet-bomber, 64 recce and 40 night fighter pilots a month.[152] The schools demands were never met. Just 13,500 short tons (12,200 t) were delivered in July 1944, 13,400 short tons (12,200 t) in August and 6,300 short tons (5,700 t) in September.[153] There were plenty of cadets joining, but the primary schools had to be shut down in favour of running the advanced flight schools.[153] The influx of bomber pilots helped keep output high but it was not to last. By the autumn, the Luftwaffe was seeking anyone who already had basic experience in flying, so they could bypass the primary stages of flight school.[153]

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Whom?

Glantz for one.

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

A number of writers would, most works reside in my library. Let's examine one, shall we!

Page one (Soviet Blitzkrieg - The Battle for White Russia 1944, Walter S. Dunn Jr, 2000):

...When the heavy artillery and rockets finally quieted, the relentless air attacks intensified....Finally the rumbling of engines and the clatter of steel tracks signaled the approach of dreaded Soviet tanks...

A torrent of tanks and riflemen from four divisions of General N.I. Krylov's 5th Army stormed the German trenches along the 18 kilometer sector, about 36,000 men, or 3 men for every meter. With the shouting Red Army riflemen came two tank brigades and five assault gun regiments with over 120 tanks and 100 assault guns, double the strength of a panzer division.

Sounds kind of like what I described.

Sounds like a combined arms assault, actually, which is what Blitzkrieg morphed into during the war.

Of course, I presume your source has left out all of the preliminaries ...

"By 1944 the typical Soviet offensive was preceded by careful planning and deception measures, designed to concentrate forces at the designated bnreakthrough point. The attack began with a wave of reconaissance batallions that inflitrated the German defenses and seized key positions, thereby rendering the rest of the German positions untenable. This infiltration was accompanied or followed by massive, carefully orchestrated air and artillery offensives. When the whirlwinds of artillery fire shifted from the front lines to the German rear areas, infantry, heavy armour and engineers conducted the conventional assault to eliminate the centres of German resistance. As quickly as possible, senior Soviet commanders committed their mobile forces through the resulting gaps ..."

- "When Titans Clashed" David M Glantz and Johnathon House, UKansas Press, 1995, page #289

Combined Arms assault (modified Blitzkrieg) followed by motorised (armour and mechanised infantry, and some cavalry) forces. Like I said.

Glantz/House continue ... "Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

- same page

So, Glantz/House seem to be one of the sources that I suggested didn't agree with your statement.

Note: I didn't say every source did, merely that to make the statement that you did as if it was the only point of view held by eminent historians of the period and, therefore, the pure unvarnished undisputed truth (by implication), was not correct as, indeed as I have shown, and as I stated, not all historians would agree.

I think most people here understand that Glantz has a fairly good reputation as a Historian of the period and place.

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Sophisticated? In their own way? What does that even mean?

Well, as G/H notes elsewhere in WTC, they didn't copy the German model, they had their own ideas ... what they ultimately did was to use an amalgam of the Blitzkrieg and their own pre-war Deep Battle theories, and it worked well most of the time.

Most of the time.

Just like the German operations quite often, but not always, worked well.

Yes, they were prone to using brute force, to a significant degree, but not "brute force and ignorance", as the saying here in Oz goes.

And, of course, Stalin (like Hitler) could put his oar in and cause significant problems.

I would have thought that was reasonably clear, but I apologise if it wasn't.

quote:

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Zhukov's ill-advised use of anti-air searchlights to blind German defenders in his Oder bridgehead breakout? Pretty late-war and ultimately relied on brute force and overwhelming numbers to finally force his way to Seelow.

Indeed, and German plans didn't always work perfectly. And were occasionaly, with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, harebrained too.

Which doesn't change the fact that not every historian agrees with the one you cited as if it was the definitive truth, which was (and remains) my point.

I hope that that clarifies things?

Phil

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Indeed, just as I was implying in my response to Barbarossa. He was describing combined arms operations, however conducted, and that is what the early war Blitz doctrine evolved into.

I could have gone into the historiography of it, as you have so ably, but I was merely making the point that not every historian would agree with Barbarossa's overly definitive statement ...

Which, of course, is what you have pointed out in more detail than I cared to.

As for being "winner" ... I cannot speak for Barbarossa, but all I was doing was pointing out that he was mistaken, or the work he cited was not representative of the "one true way" ... if he chooses to take issue with it, that's his issue, not mine. I really don't care one way or the other.

Phil

quote:

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

quote:

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

quote:

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Then we seem to be talking at cross purposes.

You made a statement, implying that it was definitive and inarguably correct.

quote:

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

My response was, well, no, there are historians that don't agree with your statement.

quote:

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

You responded by citing one historian who, indeed, could be seen to support your statement if one looked at it the right way

I responded by citing two historians who did not support your statement.

"Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

Now, we can quibble all you want about whether "avoiding pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive" constitutes were tactically sophisticated or not, but Glantz/House seem pretty definite to me that they think it is ... YMMV.

If you have a cite from G/H that shows that they definitively agree that the Soviets were never, ever, tactically or operationally "sophisticated" (or equivalent) then, fine, I will accept that G/H agree with your conclusions.

But, as it stands, G/H do not agree with them.

You need to prove every single historian agrees with your interpretation.I just need one who doesn't ... Glantz/House.

(As a practising Historian I know enough to avoid making definitive statements such as yours ... generally speaking there is always a "revisionst" or dissenting opinion. Always. So I generally try and be quite careful of my wording when making such arguments ... and, as you note, apart from that we seem pretty damn close.

I would, personally, have gone with something like "The Soviets often used unsophisticated tactics, relying more on sheer numbers than finesse, but improved dramatically as the war went on.")

Phil