Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob

In spite of orders to disperse the very air force Mac had fought so hard to assemble..he had them tightly parked,wingtip to wingtip, at Clark Field,

You mean.....MacArthur was down on the airfield marshalling the planes into their parking positions....?

Fred

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I am trying to learn about the Pacific theatre - and to that end I have read as much as I can on this in the last few years, and also frequent this site to
further that knowledge - as there is a wealth of knowledge here.

quote:

warspite1
I did not question whether it made any difference to the outcome of the Battle for the Philippines, why did you add that?.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I am trying to learn about the Pacific theatre - and to that end I have read as much as I can on this in the last few years, and also frequent this site to
further that knowledge - as there is a wealth of knowledge here.

Having looked for a response (as you write) without getting it you should appreciate a straightforward one rather than complain....

quote:

warspite1
I did not question whether it made any difference to the outcome of the Battle for the Philippines, why did you add that?.

Because it is relevant. Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

Fred

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob
The Filipinos deemed themselves "Americans" for the most part, BEFORE the war, and they loved MacArthur.
God only knows how they might have fared if Mac had deployed (or even USED) his planes once they knew the war had started..

One of my relatives married a Guamanian lady whose uncle was murdered by the Japanese over the hiding of the American sailor "Tweed".
A movie was made about his adventures, and contrary to the movie, the Guamanian s continued to hide him, as they too felt themselves "Americans", but in reality they thought Tweed a coward for not surrendering himself while many Guamanian s were tortured or murdered for hiding him.
To this day, many in the Pacific, (especially Hawaiians)feel all "outsiders" are "howlies", (foreigners) who only came for what they can, (perceived colonialism).
This is the view a future president took when he moved to Hawaii from where he lived, in Indonesia, (the old DEI we are discussing...true haters of anything smacking of colonialism....
To their credit, the Filipinos never felt this way as they remembered the U.S. as the military who freed them from an oppressive Spanish government.
**This comment is NOT meant to be a political slant, merely an expression of how folks in the Pacific were motivated,(or not) to fight an armed invader..as an invader, or a "liberator"..

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

If the Indonesians hadn't driven the Dutch out after the war, they would probably still be there. They had no plans to set the DEI free after the war.

Bill

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Why do you say that wdolson? Given what happened to all other colonial empires post war - either by force or by sensible management by the colonial power - I can see no possible scenario whereby the NEI would not have broken free of their Dutch rulers.

For the Dutch to remain as colonial masters of modern-day Indonesia would have meant the population - and it is a huge one - remaining completely apathetic to what was going on all around them in Malaysia/Singapore, Vietnam, India, The Philippines, Burma, Sri Lanka..... not to mention just about every corner of Africa.

As soon as the natives began to stir, the Dutch - even if they were tempted initially to refuse to let go - would have been pariahs if they maintained colonial rule by what would surely require ever increasing force.

Sorry but that comment makes no sense to me.

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

quote:

ORIGINAL: m10bob
The Filipinos deemed themselves "Americans" for the most part, BEFORE the war, and they loved MacArthur.
God only knows how they might have fared if Mac had deployed (or even USED) his planes once they knew the war had started..

One of my relatives married a Guamanian lady whose uncle was murdered by the Japanese over the hiding of the American sailor "Tweed".
A movie was made about his adventures, and contrary to the movie, the Guamanian s continued to hide him, as they too felt themselves "Americans", but in reality they thought Tweed a coward for not surrendering himself while many Guamanian s were tortured or murdered for hiding him.
To this day, many in the Pacific, (especially Hawaiians)feel all "outsiders" are "howlies", (foreigners) who only came for what they can, (perceived colonialism).
This is the view a future president took when he moved to Hawaii from where he lived, in Indonesia, (the old DEI we are discussing...true haters of anything smacking of colonialism....
To their credit, the Filipinos never felt this way as they remembered the U.S. as the military who freed them from an oppressive Spanish government.
**This comment is NOT meant to be a political slant, merely an expression of how folks in the Pacific were motivated,(or not) to fight an armed invader..as an invader, or a "liberator"..

Let's steer clear of discussions about the views of the sitting president. That is modern politics.

Bill

quote:

LOL...Well...until I can find a CREDIBLE source declaring otherwise...I might picture just that...a beer in one hand...swagger stick in the other, (for pointing)...

Ya' gotta know...THIS forum in particular has hundreds of credible historian types so we might all expect our "notes" to be checked and double checked..
Some of us have even been around to create some military history of our own..
Welcome to this fantastic group of friends..we look forward to your continued contributions.....

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Why would I appreciate such arrogant, dismissive toss as you choose to respond with?

And you choose to mention that something is irrelevant even though I never even mentioned it?? Thanks for that. Just so you know, further to your quest to write a book on MacArthur, Bristol City didn't win the Football League trophy for the 4th time today.

Good day.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Why would I appreciate such arrogant, dismissive toss as you choose to respond with?

And you choose to mention that something is irrelevant even though I never even mentioned it?? Thanks for that. Just so you know, further to your quest to write a book on MacArthur, Bristol City didn't win the Football League trophy for the 4th time today.

Good day.

Relevant - not irrelevant. There isn't a difference? Oh, well, my English....

Fred

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

If the Indonesians hadn't driven the Dutch out after the war, they would probably still be there. They had no plans to set the DEI free after the war.

Bill

warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Why do you say that wdolson? Given what happened to all other colonial empires post war - either by force or by sensible management by the colonial power - I can see no possible scenario whereby the NEI would not have broken free of their Dutch rulers.

For the Dutch to remain as colonial masters of modern-day Indonesia would have meant the population - and it is a huge one - remaining completely apathetic to what was going on all around them in Malaysia/Singapore, Vietnam, India, The Philippines, Burma, Sri Lanka..... not to mention just about every corner of Africa.

As soon as the natives began to stir, the Dutch - even if they were tempted initially to refuse to let go - would have been pariahs if they maintained colonial rule by what would surely require ever increasing force.

Sorry but that comment makes no sense to me.

The Indonesians did drive out the Dutch. I didn't say there was any realistic scenario where the Indonesians didn't fight for their independence as soon as the war was over. I was trying to make the point that the idea of Indonesian independence was once sided until the Dutch realized that they couldn't hold on with military might. They initially tried to squash the rebellion like they had many times before.

Philippine independence was a two sided idea with no open conflict. The US went along with the idea of an independent Philippines. The US was actually pushing it to some degree. In the 1930s the US was freeing many of its possessions (at least the more recently acquired ones) in an attempt to get the Japanese out of China without looking like hypocrites.

Anti-colonialism was sweeping the world around that time. Pretty much all the European colonial masters were having troubles in at least some of their colonies if not all.

Bill

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

What was the name of the plan in which the successful defense of the Philippines was considered to hinge on a retreat into Bataan? My reading of the period is
quite limited, and my memory of what little I've read is littered with the refuse of the countless other trivial but interesting topics I find myself drawn to
nibble at as an anthropologist. Hell I can barely remember how many chromosomes human beings have!

That said, I seem to recall that, it was the standing doctrine within War Plan Orange (the one for a war against Japan right?) to hightail it into Bataan and await
relief. This had been the standing "plan" for some 15 or 20 years right? And yet, what do we find when we load up turn 1 of WiTPAE? The disposition of U.S. forces,
not to mention the infrastructural preparations arrayed (which I have no reason to conclude are anything except nearly perfectly historically accurate) are
clearly NOT suited for a last stand in Bataan. No railway into Bataan? No significant level of infrastructure, and troops dispersed in some silly fashion all
around Luzon, not to mention the rest of the islands.

I have no idea who was responsible for that apparently egregious breach between "the plan" as it was written down on paper the preparations in the actual Island
and the obviously widespread knowledge in both the American military and the general public that war with Japan was a definite possibility in the near future.

As MacArthur was the supreme commander of that whole show, it seems worth considering that this lack of carrying out the sensible preparations that War Plan Orange
would seem to call for was primarily his responsbility. If that is the case, then whether or not the US air units were or were not in the air seems, as Leandros
has argued, to have been largely irrelevant to how the Battle of the Philippines actually played out.

quote:

The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938

quote:

Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity."
. . .

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal theater of operations, into six sectors and provided a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defense of each sector were made by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary.

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations, to withdraw supplies into Bataan, and to establish there a supply base capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 31,000 men for a period of six months. The supplies required for this purpose were designated the defense reserves, and except for ammunition most of these had already reached the Philippines. Some were already on Bataan, but the greatest portion by far was stored in the Manila area, which was as yet without adequate protection from air attack. Since these supplies would have to be moved to Corregidor and Bataan in the event of war, WPO-3 stipulated that the Filipino-American defenders would fight a delaying action to keep the roads open long enough to carry out this phase of the operation.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

You seem to be saying that - whether through breakdown or some other reason - if MacArthur fell short in providing leadership and carrying out the pre-arranged
plan for the bombers on the Philippines, it doesn't matter because the Philippines were as good as lost anyway. Why does he get a free pass on dereliction of duty
(if that is what it was)?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Hmmm. Well I guess I don't understand then, as it was my recollection that it had been recognized for decades that the only reasonable hope of holding out in the
PH was to retreat to Bataan. A quick search reveals, this Decision to Withdraw to Bataan document, which
apparently reports on,,,,

quote:

The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938

quote:

Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance
to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops,
had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts,
the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay
. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the
control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity."

quote:

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal theater of operations, into six sectors and provided a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defense of each sector were made
by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the
sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary.

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations, to withdraw supplies
into Bataan, and to establish there a supply base capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 31,000 men for a period of six months. The supplies
required for this purpose were designated the defense reserves, and except for ammunition most of these had already reached the Philippines. Some were already
on Bataan, but the greatest portion by far was stored in the Manila area, which was as yet without adequate protection from air attack. Since these supplies would
have to be moved to Corregidor and Bataan in the event of war, WPO-3 stipulated that the Filipino-American defenders would fight a delaying action to keep the
roads open long enough to carry out this phase of the operation.

quote:

What I gather from this is that, it had long been recognized that, if the fight was going badly, a retreat to Bataan was the place to make a final stand. Given
that, I would have thought that preparations to carry out that "final stand" would be well advanced by December 1941.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

quote:

ORIGINAL: robinsa

Slightly OT but..

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

This was unnecessary and a good way to ruin a perfectly civil discussion. That being said, it's easy to take an unintended tone when writing in a foreign language. Something that wouldn't sound as harsh or bad when said in your own language can come across as very rude when said in another language. I don't know whether that's the case here tho.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

quote:

ORIGINAL: robinsa

Slightly OT but..

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Take it as a free gift from me to further your knowledge.

This was unnecessary and a good way to ruin a perfectly civil discussion. That being said, it's easy to take an unintended tone when writing in a foreign language. Something that wouldn't sound as harsh or bad when said in your own language can come across as very rude when said in another language. I don't know whether that's the case here tho.

Point taken, Robinsa........Warspite:....do you read me....apologies!

Fred

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Interesting stuff Leandros. My naive view of it is this:

1. For years a withdrawal to Bataan was considered an integral part of any war plan for the area.
2. Even in the most recent version of "the plan," to defend everywhere, a withdrawal to Bataan was regarded as the fall-back, last-ditch resort.
3. In real history, the concept of defending "everywhere" proved to be impossible and a full scale withdrawal to Bataan was implemented.
4. As you point out, the number of people in the peninsula once that withdrawal was complete far exceeded the available supplies.
5. Rationing was necessarily imposed, and eventually the garrison surrendered because they were quite simply running out of supplies, and in the final week, subjected to withering bombardment and ferocious assualt.

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable, but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Interesting stuff Leandros. My naive view of it is this:

1. For years a withdrawal to Bataan was considered an integral part of any war plan for the area.
2. Even in the most recent version of "the plan," to defend everywhere, a withdrawal to Bataan was regarded as the fall-back, last-ditch resort.
3. In real history, the concept of defending "everywhere" proved to be impossible and a full scale withdrawal to Bataan was implemented.
4. As you point out, the number of people in the peninsula once that withdrawal was complete far exceeded the available supplies.
5. Rationing was necessarily imposed, and eventually the garrison surrendered because they were quite simply running out of supplies, and in the final week, subjected to withering bombardment and ferocious assault.

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable, but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Also, while the PLAN was there, the operational ability was not. Defensive infrastructure was still being built. The local army was still getting organized, let alone trained or equipped. Stockpiles were a dream. Maps, geological surveys, and other information was almost unheard of.

quote:

The heroism of the defenders is it seems unquestionable…

quote:

…but the foresight of the administrators and leaders (whoever they might have been) in the months if not years preceding the war strike me as being negligent at best.

quote:

If Bataan was recognized as the last ditch place from which to deny the enemy "the best port in the Far East" and prolong the fight until relief might arrive, then why, oh why, was Bataan not 100% prepared with ample supplies, fuel, and defensive preparations?

quote:

I don't know what role MacArthur played in the failure to properly prepare Bataan for the eventuality of it serving as a last ditch defensive position, but it seems to me that as the supreme commander of the area, it was ultimately his responsibility from the time he took command until the time he ran away to Australia.

quote:

Maybe I'm wrong to assume that a well-prepared Bataan would have held out any longer or ultimately made any difference; what is it Napoleon is supposed to have said "there is no fortress that cannot be breached with enough money?" But what if Bataan had held out for 6 months instead of only 3? What if it had held out for 9!

quote:

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Consider this – only three months after the surrender of Corregidor, on August 7th, the US started a powerful offensive in the Solomons. At that time the great potential of the forces in The Philippines, 100.000 men, many already blooded in battle, was lost.

Fred

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Also, while the PLAN was there, the operational ability was not. Defensive infrastructure was still being built. The local army was still getting
organized, let alone trained or equipped. Stockpiles were a dream. Maps, geological surveys, and other information was almost unheard of.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Yaab

A very interesting discussion, though it veered somewhat off-topic.

It seems to me that the greatest asset of the Dutch in the Pacific is the Dutch merchant navy and subs. You get very little in terms of Dutch devices, aircraft, pilots and supply, so there is no point in saving them from Java - let Java be their last stand. But the navy is definitely worth preserving.

One more thing, the Dutch mines are produced until 12/1942. Where would they be produced historically - UK or USA?