RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (Full Version)

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ny59giants -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/25/2009 8:47:26 PM)

The AI will usually pick the most experienced pilots to fly your missions. As they slowly get killed off the less experienced ones will move into their place. Its a win/win situation for you. I'm just learning how to play the "dark side" and learning how to get extra pilots into my daitai is a valuable skill.



Canoerebel -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/25/2009 9:22:52 PM)

The presence of Karafueto Brigade at Shikuka probably makes a surprise attack during winter a no-go - it would be tough or impossible to take that base quickly if at all, and even if you did take Toyohara your position would be isolated and the Japs could heavily reinforce.

Better to try for a March 1 invasion (after winter condiitions end) if you can pull things together by then, and I'd do everything withiin my power to try (the sooner the better for surprise/Jap prep reasons). I would concentrate on the two Sikhalin bases on some or most of the lightly held Kuriles; leave Paramushiro for later, because you're probably better off having the troops you'd need to take it on Sikhalin instead.

It is paramount that you not do anything to lead your opponent to have any inkling you might head that way. The Allies can readily handle the current defenses, but this operation is predicated on surprise and lack of defensive preparation; if the Japs make it a tough operation, you're probably better off going elsehwere.

If the defensese by March 1 consist of a mixed brigade or two, and you come with eight or ten divisions, you can see who'll win the battle.

Onnekotan Jima's airbase can be built quickly, so that would give you some "protection."

IIRC, Kiska, the western-most Aleutians base, can be built to level seven or higher. Don't built it now, but in tandem with your other landings send more engineers ashore to max the build rate.

Keep up alot of activity, some of it wtih real teeth, around Pago Pago to throw your opponent off. Wouldn't be bad to choose another diversion target (far, far, far way from NoPac) to give the Japs something to worry about.



wneumann -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/26/2009 5:57:17 AM)

quote:

The presence of Karafueto Brigade at Shikuka probably makes a surprise attack during winter a no-go - it would be tough or impossible to take that base quickly if at all, and even if you did take Toyohara your position would be isolated and the Japs could heavily reinforce.

Better to try for a March 1 invasion (after winter condiitions end) if you can pull things together by then, and I'd do everything withiin my power to try (the sooner the better for surprise/Jap prep reasons). I would concentrate on the two Sikhalin bases on some or most of the lightly held Kuriles; leave Paramushiro for later, because you're probably better off having the troops you'd need to take it on Sikhalin instead.

It is paramount that you not do anything to lead your opponent to have any inkling you might head that way. The Allies can readily handle the current defenses, but this operation is predicated on surprise and lack of defensive preparation; if the Japs make it a tough operation, you're probably better off going elsehwere.

If the defensese by March 1 consist of a mixed brigade or two, and you come with eight or ten divisions, you can see who'll win the battle.


The March invasion date is much more doable. There's an awful lot of stuff I need to move up north before this even gets off the ground. No less than 20 transport convoys already re-routed or in process of being formed and loaded. Much of the forces I have available for use in a northern operation have to be retrieved from other theaters and in several cases moving these units from the far south to the far north (along with the matter of routing empty transports there to pick them up). I'm now going through a massive re-organization of the Allied transport fleet - combing through what ships are where and where they are in relation to where needed and dispatching them accordingly.

quote:

Onnekotan Jima's airbase can be built quickly, so that would give you some "protection."

IIRC, Kiska, the western-most Aleutians base, can be built to level seven or higher. Don't built it now, but in tandem with your other landings send more engineers ashore to max the build rate.

Keep up alot of activity, some of it wtih real teeth, around Pago Pago to throw your opponent off. Wouldn't be bad to choose another diversion target (far, far, far way from NoPac) to give the Japs something to worry about.


Kiska is partially built up now, though not sufficient to use as the main jumping off point. I do have bases already built up at Amchitka and Adak (Adak in particular being quite large) - these two bases are the ones I am projecting to use.

In general, I'm keeping activity in the North Pacific at a consistant level with what has been going on through the last few months. Adak has been a departure point for U.S. subs operating off the Japanese home islands. Also the nuisance air raids on Paramushiro from Adak. All fairly low level activity. My opinion is maintaining the recent status quo in the north (continuing present activity at its current level) without visibly increasing or decreasing anything will keep the Japanese with a comfortable "look and feel".

A diversionary attack somewhere in the DEI is certainly on my radar and appears to be a desirable option. Moving forces around for that has also begun - the LCU core of this force so far being three Australian divisions (6th, 7th, 9th). I'm now kicking off a ground operation in NE Australia to take Portland Roads and eliminate the Jap foothold in that part of the country - U.S. 40th Division and some Australian units from this force would be freed for the DEI following successful capture of Portland Roads base.

Also looking at some of the Allied LCU's now at Tennant Creek facing the 27 Jap LCU's in Daly Waters. Pillager is very unlikely to start moving Jap forces farther southward in this area, so I'm not seeing that as a concern. Launching an Allied ground offensive north from Tennant Creek against 27 Jap LCU's is going to produce the same quagmire I now have at Pago Pago - not so much a question of confidance in my forces, just that there may be better things to do with them. Taking a reasonably strong defensive stance at Tennant Creek is a more feasible option while at the same time transferring LCU's from this area for employment in the DEI, this can also be done relatively quietly.

I'm not set at this point on a definite location to attack in the DEI. Still need to take a detailed look at Japanese defenses and LCU deployments. Also there's the matter of Allied LCU's that can be brought into this. How much there is in the way of available British naval forces is also an issue, particularly the absence of carriers.

One possibility that may be a little intriguing is Timor and its immediate area. Yes, it is remote from the oil centers but it has at least one point in its favor - once airfield(s) on and/or around Timor are captured and operational, it would be possible to fly 4E bombers and longer range fighters (P-38's, P-47's, maybe others) directly from Tennant Waters into airfields on Timor, leap-frogging Darwin in the process. Moving Allied planes into captured bases in the DEI via transfer by air would be quicker and more secure than transporting them from Perth or India aboard relatively unprotected AK's (especially given the complete absence of British carriers to provide cover). Also, Allied LBA here would be valuable if not vital in expanding the Allies' presence farther into the DEI while at the same time isolating 30+ Jap LCU's in NW Australia.




Alfred -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/26/2009 6:39:42 AM)

wneumann,

Before proceeding to elaborate in detail alternate tactics and strategy for your consideration, a few preliminary words are necessary to provide context.

Firstly, this is a mod of which I have no detailed knowledge.  Consequently my comments are somewhat circumspect.  I will try to identify my assumptions so that you can adapt them to the specifics of the mod and your preferences.

Secondly, in order to determine appropriate future Allied activity, it is necessary to properly assess and analyse what has occured to date.  At times the following analysis may be considered to be too critical of Allied actions.  That would be a too harsh interpretation of my comments because even though I think the Allies have made several poor choices in 1943, these errors are predominantly the result of omission, not of commision.  A decisive Allied victory remains achievable.

Thirdly, for an Allied victory, what is required is essentially a more sophisticated approach.  Basically, Allied victory will result when Japanese logistics are overwhelmed.  This can be accomplished without the need for the total destruction of Japanese industry in the Home Islands.

[A]  FACTORS WHICH EXPLAIN ALLIED FAILURE TO DATE

(A1)  The Japanese operate on interior lines.

Against a competent Japanese opponent, it is impossible for the Allies to win if they essentailly operate on a single axis.  This Japanese advantage has been significantly enhanced by the ponderous nature of Allied operations in 1943.

(A2)  Failure to properly conduct and assess intel.

Raw data on Japanese LCUs has been very competently collected and recorded.  Unfortunately the assessment of this raw data has not been of the same calibre.  For example, for months, Allied troops have not advanced north from Tennant Creek to Daly Waters due to the fear engendered by the presence of 2 and a half Japanese infantry divisions supported by some other 20-25 enemy LCUs of limited combat value.  This is an excellent demonstration of making poor use of raw data.

The key to benefiting from collecting this raw data is in assessing the Assault Value ("Ass Val").  Accordingly, the unadjusted Ass Val defending Daly Waters is about 900 Ass Val ( I assume that in this mod, a full Japanese infantry division has about 350 Ass Val).  As you would know, the unadjusted Ass Val is then modified by various factors, one of the most important being well fed.  Because Allied planning consistently fails to take into account measures to reduce the enemy's adjusted Ass Val to below that of the initial unadjusted level, Japanese strength is consistently exaggerated and Allied strength underestimated - a process which feeds the passive Allied zeitgeist.  See section (B3) below for suggestions as to how to reduce the Daly Waters Ass Val.

The care and diligence expended in collecting raw data on enemy LCUs has not been similarly extended to enemy air and naval assets.  Only limited air/naval data is collected, no systemic attempt is made to collect quality data eg last general known location of individual capital ships, or air units.  This results in creating an attack force which is too strong/weak for its objective task.  For example there may be no need to cover an Allied invasion of Timor with carrier aire because there may be no significant torpedo carrying planes in the area to oppose an invasion fleet.

(A3)  Inefficient Allied LCU deployments.

The Japanese are conducting offensive operations in only 2 areas viz., Samoa and China.  Everywhere else their deployments and actions demonstrate that they have gone onto the strategic defensive.  When combined with the permanent stationing of the KB in Samoan waters, other than an opportunistic paradrop on an ungarrisoned base or invading Savaii whilst it remains short on supplies (hence reducing the adjusted ASS Val of the allied garrison), the enemy lacks the capability to invade/invest Allied bases.  Consequently too many Allied are wasted on static defence of bases behing the frontlines.

Consider the following application of efficient versus inefficient deployment of LCUs.  In Burma, the Japanese have 3 infantry divisions, 1 tank regiment and approximately 30 sundry LCUs of limited combat value.  The aggregate unadjusted Ass Val in Burma (excluding any theatre reserves stationed in Malaya or Siam) is probably in the vicinity of 1600.  In India, away from the frontline, conservatively there are some 13 infantry divisions, 14 infantry brigades, 2 AFV brigades and 7 AFV regiments available to constitute an Allied Field Army (say, the 14th has a nice ring to it[:D]) for operations in Burma.  This Allied Field Army would have about 6130 unadjusted Ass Val.  See section (B4) below for more detailed comments regarding Burma.

(A4)  No Allied Field Army.

Without having several Allied armies in the field advancing to engage and maintain continuous contact with the enemy, an Allied victory is impossible.  You cannot adequately attrite the enemy without engageing in locked combat out in the field.  Japanese logistics cannot be overwhelmed unless field armies create frontlines.  You need field armies to probe for enemy weaknesses which otherwise are not discernable or exploitable.  It is not even necessary for an Allied field army to have a higher Ass Val than its opponent as over time there are other means to reduce the enemy's adjusted Ass Val without engaging in frontal infantry charges which which one's own army.

(A5)  Unimaginative Allied tactics/strategy.

I do not recall a single instance of an Allied maskirovka operation.  These can act as a significant force multiplier.

Allied air operations over Burma and northern Australia keep hitting the same targets, in the process wasting ordnance and ignoring more valuable targets.  You don't have to hit an airfield every day in order to keep it suppressed.

The full arsenal of Allied weapon systems (eg PTs, barges, offensive minelaying) are not used.  Paradoxically, the Allies often find themselves outmuscled locally.

Allied land and naval forces eschew maneouvre or rapier thrusts in favour of ponderous, slow frontal approaches on narrow fronts.

[B]  CURRENT ALLIED OPPORTUNITIES

(B1)  Cape Yorke Peninsula

According to your disclosed intel, there are no significant enemy garrisons (with a major Ass Val) at either Portland Roads or Thursday Island.  Against what appears to be a weak enemy garrison at Portland Roads, you have assembled a huge force (akin to using a 16" gun to shoot at an ant) which, unless I am mistaken, has not even yet commenced to march north from Coen even though the units are already more than 50% prepped (which figure will increase during the march to engage).  The size of this eventual field army is such, that even if all the units were still only 0% prepped when they arrived at Portland Roads, the enemy garrison is too weak to expel them.

Of greater importance is that other than some throwaway lines about making some noise over Port Moresby, or the capture of Portland Roads then allows the Tennant Creek force to move north to Daly Waters (which is an erroneous assessment), you have no concrete plans as to how to exploit in a timely manner the capture of Portland Roads.  This strongly suggests a further slow, ponderous operation will ensue.

With regard to Cape Yorke, I suggest the following actions be investigated:

(i)  commence the march from Coen to Portland Roads immediately
(ii)  immediately send (preferably by air hop) all the unemployed transport aircraft currently at Penhryn Island, to join the 128 already at Townsville
(iii)  immediately start the embarkation from Hilo, Kona and Penhryn Island of the 3 Para Battalions and 1 Para Regiment located at these bases, to transportation to Australia and set their preparation to attack Thursday Island.  Once in Australia, due to aircraft range, they and their air transports may have to be moved closer to the frontlines
(iv)  once Portland Roads airbase is under Allied control, transfer from Tennant Creek one unit of Lightnings (there will remain other long range fighter units at Tennant Creek able to reach Darwin) to conduct sweeps of Port Moresby, also transfer other shorter range RAAF fighters to both interdict enemy air resupply of Thursday Island and LRCAP TFs in the Torres Strait (eg a sea invasion)
(v)  with fighter sweeps against Port Moresby/Thursday to gain local air superiority, even unescorted bombers can be sent to crater the enemy airfields thereby grounding Bettys/Kates/Vals
(vi)  the para drop  (and amphibious landing) on Thursday Island should be aimed to occur no later than February 1944

(B2)  Kimberleys

No significant enemy garrison.....

(sorry have run out of time for today, I will continue this in the next 24 hours)

Alfred



Feinder -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/26/2009 3:27:46 PM)

quote:

(A2)  Failure to properly conduct and assess intel.

Raw data on Japanese LCUs has been very competently collected and recorded.  Unfortunately the assessment of this raw data has not been of the same calibre.  For example, for months, Allied troops have not advanced north from Tennant Creek to Daly Waters due to the fear engendered by the presence of 2 and a half Japanese infantry divisions supported by some other 20-25 enemy LCUs of limited combat value.  This is an excellent demonstration of making poor use of raw data.

The key to benefiting from collecting this raw data is in assessing the Assault Value ("Ass Val").  Accordingly, the unadjusted Ass Val defending Daly Waters is about 900 Ass Val ( I assume that in this mod, a full Japanese infantry division has about 350 Ass Val).  As you would know, the unadjusted Ass Val is then modified by various factors, one of the most important being well fed.  Because Allied planning consistently fails to take into account measures to reduce the enemy's adjusted Ass Val to below that of the initial unadjusted level, Japanese strength is consistently exaggerated and Allied strength underestimated - a process which feeds the passive Allied zeitgeist.  See section (B3) below for suggestions as to how to reduce the Daly Waters Ass Val.

The care and diligence expended in collecting raw data on enemy LCUs has not been similarly extended to enemy air and naval assets.  Only limited air/naval data is collected, no systemic attempt is made to collect quality data eg last general known location of individual capital ships, or air units.  This results in creating an attack force which is too strong/weak for its objective task.  For example there may be no need to cover an Allied invasion of Timor with carrier aire because there may be no significant torpedo carrying planes in the area to oppose an invasion fleet.


I don't know which specific scenario of CHS he's playing but:

1.  The real problem with attacking Daly Waters from the South (as Allies), is supply.  If he knows there are at least 2x full-strength Divs + over 20x other units (my guess would be 4x Div(+) strength); this is a major force to try to overcome.  You can send 16x Allied Divisions vs. this IJA blob, and the issue is less about firepower, as it is getting your 16x Divs to draw ample supply for an attack.

If you send less troop, you won't have enough firepower.  If you send more troops, you lack supply and your extra toops are much less effective.

Even with a full compliment of Corps/Army/Theather HQs, the supply situation from Tennet Creek remains critical.

Esp if you bring air-support to hammer Daly Waters (from Tennet Creek), your bombers chew supplies that your assault troops need.  Even flying supplies forward via C-47s, simply can't pull enough supplies.

Also a remark on the estimate of an IJA Division - In CHS the -base- AV of an IJA Div is 435.  Also, the base AV of most Allied Divs (including USA), is about 325.  For the Allied Divs, that 325 actually gets bumped down a bit more, because of the abyssmal quality of the 41/42 squads that make them up, and the anemic replacement rate of the better 43/44 squads (in 1944, 70% of my front-line Divisions are still stuck with the 42 squads, because the replacement rates of 43/44 squads is so low they can't be out-fitted with the newer squads).

Two MAJOR pet-peeves of mine are the over-gun of IJA Divisions (or perhaps the huge under-gun of Allied divsions); and the bonkered supply move rules.  I've heard that the supply draw rules are being fixed, and -really- hope the LCU OBs are being over-haulded as well.

-F-



wneumann -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/26/2009 7:55:39 PM)

FYI: This game is being played using CHS scenario 158.

A discussion of some of the factors...

(A1) The Japanese operate on interior lines. Absolutely, positively true.

(A2) Conducting and assessing intel: As stated, collecting raw intel data is one thing, using it is another. To obtain the most accurate and widest possible scope of information, one needs to begin the process of collecting raw intel even when there is no possibility of exploiting an opponent's deployments or moves based on it.

In the case of Daly Waters, it is one thing to know there are 27 Jap LCU's in the hex (with identities of most of them) and a smashed up airfield. As seen on Upolu, a collection of small Japanese LCU hiding behind level 9 fortifications can stop five U.S. divisions dead in their tracks, errors in conducting my amphibious ops not withstanding.

There are two Jap divisions plus a number of smaller combat LCU's in Daly Waters, almost certain to be holed up behind the same level 9 fortifications as the "boys" I'm facing on Upolu. Three Australian divisions (not bad ones but not the cream of the crop either) with a bunch of smaller Allied combat LCU's vs the collection of Jap units behind fortifications in Daly Waters is a mismatch. Supply is actually not the issue here.

The boys have started marching on Portland Roads. Attacking Thursday Island is not in my plans - in our game as it is going now, taking it does no more for the Allied situation as letting the Japs keep it does for theirs.

RE: Intel on naval and air ops. I've mentioned no intel data on Japanese naval ops because there has been none. I don't know about other mods of WitP, but Sigint information on opposing naval ops in CHS is non-existent. The distances between U.S. and Japanese forward bases (12-15 hexes or more) resulting from the placement of the Pillager's Japanese outer perimeter makes U.S. LBA recon an impossibility except in very limited instances. I can (and do) fly naval search but unless Pillager sails the Jap fleet into no-man's land, there is nothing to see. Once in a while, information on a specific Japanese ship movement from a submarine contact appears - but often this is like a single dot on a blank sheet of paper, one dot with nothing else to connect it with.

There is a limited amount of information available on Japanese air ops, much of it in front line areas from AAR's, also from contacts between submarines and Jap planes on naval search/ASW missions. Plus tracking Jap recon flights. It's all good but nowhere near a complete picture as well as it being a rapidly shifting one. Intel on enemy air units is useable only in situations where freshly-obtained information can be exploited quickly, this information becoming unreliable within a short time (often within several days).


(A3): I don't see the KB at Suva as a permanent deployment. Though I could like seeing the KB right where they are.

Re: Burma... The three most difficult things about advancing ground troops overland through or into Burma - supply, supply, and supply. There are two fairly good British divisions and some British artillery and tanks, but the rest are all Indians. There was a reason in real life these guys didn't start advancing until 1945 (or almost then).

Many of the Allied weapons that haven't been used, haven't been used for a reason... PT's, barges, and ML's are relatively short range equipment - they don't work well when sent across 12-15 hexes of open sea, even if they aren't sunk well before they reach their objective. Likewise, there's not much you can do with LBA if there is nothing within range of it and little or no place to move it to get it within range of anything. This is a dilemma I'm facing practically all over the game map.

(A5): From Port Moresby all the way around the Jap perimeter in the Pacific to Wake, the Jap positions in Daly Waters, marching into Burma from India... these are all frontal attacks under the current situation. Slamming head on into a wall offers little chance at an Allied tactical victory at the point of attack let alone a strategic victory at the end of the day.

Hole up two Japanese divisions in a level 9 fortification and you'll need 15-20 Allied ones to root them out. It's not a criticism of the WitP game system, it's the way it is.

There are two very good points behind Canoerebel's idea of an offensive in the north. (1) hit 'em where they ain't, and (2) hit 'em where you're gonna seriously threaten something. Perhaps (3) will happen as well - the Japs will have to shift their forces, leading to opportunities for (4) more Allied attacks elsewhere.

(A6) 20-20 Hindsight: This phenomenon is common to every war game and has a very great impact on play in WitP. Hindsight being a very difficult thing to tweak out from a game design.

Any competent Japanese player with knowledge of the history is not going to repeat the Japanese mistakes. If Japanese players were required to repeat the Jap's historical mistakes in WitP, there would be no point in playing the Japanese. Sure, the Allied player can avoid their historical mistakes as well, but this doesn't even begin to approach the historical mistakes a competant Japanese player can correct.

Good planning of early conquests by a skillful Japanese player and a sense of the geography can create an almost continuous impenetrable wall as an outer perimeter.

A Japanese player in WitP that successfully avoids all the pitfalls and holds out through 1945 deserves the kudos for his knowlege and understanding of the history, as well as the skill to overturn it.

Historical Allied material advantages in 1943 and later as they exist in WitP are often not sufficient to counter the results of hindsight applied by a good Japanese player using the material advantages held by the Japanese in 1941-42. Historical numbers and quality of Allied forces in 1941-42 basically "handcuffs" an Allied player largely into historical events (or something very close to it) during this period - while at the same time the Japanese player is free to pursue alternate history. It's not that the Japanese player in WitP has anything the Japs didn't have historically, it's that hindsight greatly enhances the Japanese in applying their available strategic options.

It's more of an Allied handicap rather than a Japanese advantage.

Short of changing WitP to make it completely ahistorical, it remains the nature of this game. Something all Allied players picking up the game have to take into account. Also has the effect of keeping it from being too easy for the Allies.


(A7) Jap LCU transfers from Manchuria: If there's no need to worry about the Russians*... The Kwantung Army went south for the winter and they moved south big time. All ten Mongol Cavalry divisions, artillery, flak, a base force or two. Almost all of them into the Pacific, to four-star tropical resorts with level 9 fortifications. That's what PP's are for. I'd call Stalin and complain but he's not picking up the phone.

* provided you don't remove too much and the Japanese force level up there triggers a Russian entry.



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/14/43 (5/27/2009 4:06:19 AM)

Summary of Operations 12/14/43

U.S. transport convoys in the Central and South Pacific areas enroute from the West Coast are being combed for LCU's and other assets that may be useful for Operation Bulldog rather than continuing to their original destination. A total of approx 20-25 new or re-routed transport convoys have been diverted completely or in part to Operation Bulldog - re-routed convoys delivering their cargo to North Pacific bases, new convoys either loading cargo in bases where they're being formed or empty ships being dispatched to other bases to pick up LCU's or other cargo earmarked for use in Operation Bulldog. Additional transport TF's for Operation Bulldog are being formed as ships become available and also as more LCU's or other cargo for employment in Operation Bulldog is identified and new TF's formed to load them on the spot or go pick them up.

North Pacific: Jap recon flight over Attu Is. Otherwise quiet.


Central Pacific: Jap air patrol activity remains quiet near Kwajalein, at Truk, and Canton Is area. U.S. subs off Japanese home islands report light Jap air patrols.

SS Barb intercepts another Jap transport convoy south of Tokyo. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack at 67,47

Japanese Ships
TK Kotai Maru, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
AK Tekkai Maru
PC Ch 26
PC Ch 24
PC Ch 20
PC Ch 19
PC Ch 15
PC Shonan Maru #6

Allied Ships
SS Barb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26 Japanese ships detected at anchor in Kwajalein base, no report of Jap ships in Truk.
176 ships detected in port at Tokyo.
F-5A recon over Canton Is reports 9 aircraft, 15 Jap LCU's.


Pago Pago, Day 89 of the Fiasco: Weather forecast for Pago Pago area is precipitation. No reported naval activity in the area this game turn.

LST-481 confirmed sunk off Penhryn Is during ship damage adjustment phase. A total of approx 15 ships damaged in the last Pago Pago operation have reached Penhryn, all but perhaps one or two salvageable.

A task force reached Penhryn with a group of fresh DD's, these DD's rotated into U.S. Carrier Main Force TF's replacing DD's with light system damage most in need of refit. 15 DD's (in all) needing refit were rotated out of Carrier Force TF's and are departing Penhryn along with CVL Langley (system damage 34) for shipyards at Pearl and/or the U.S. West Coast.

Current status of Pago Pago base - runway damage 40, airfield service damage 80, port damage 2.
Current status of Savaii base - runway damage 99, airfield service damage 100, port damage 9 (no change).

Supply air transport continues between Penhryn and Pago Pago, 10-11K supply now on hand at Pago Pago and slowly increasing. Japs now intercepting supply transport flights - small number of damaged planes, none destroyed.

Jap recon flight over Pago Pago. Also LBA air strikes on base facilities at Pago Pago and Savaii, several ground attack air strikes against U.S. LCU's on Upolu. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Pago Pago , at 96,113

Japanese aircraft
Ki-46-III Dinah x 1

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-46-III Dinah: 1 damaged

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Pago Pago , at 96,113

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 16
A6M5 Zeke x 156
N1K1-J George x 9
J1N1-S Irving x 15
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 39
Ki-45 KAIb Nick x 36
Ki-61-Ib Tony x 10

Allied aircraft
no flights

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M3 Zero: 4 damaged
A6M5 Zeke: 19 damaged
N1K1-J George: 1 damaged
J1N1-S Irving: 7 damaged
Ki-43-IIa Oscar: 11 damaged
Ki-45 KAIb Nick: 6 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F6F Hellcat: 3 destroyed
P-47C Thunderbolt: 2 destroyed
F4U-1 Corsair: 2 destroyed

Allied ground losses:
174 casualties reported
Vehicles lost 2

Airbase hits 2
Airbase supply hits 2
Runway hits 94

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
18 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
13 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
9 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
10 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
10 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
10 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
9 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x J1N1-S Irving bombing at 2000 feet
4 x N1K1-J George bombing at 2000 feet
9 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
6 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
4 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
4 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
4 x J1N1-S Irving bombing at 2000 feet
3 x N1K1-J George bombing at 2000 feet
4 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
4 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x J1N1-S Irving bombing at 2000 feet
2 x N1K1-J George bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
2 x J1N1-S Irving bombing at 2000 feet
2 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
2 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Savaii , at 95,112

Japanese aircraft
D4Y Judy x 39

Japanese aircraft losses
D4Y Judy: 4 damaged

Allied ground losses:
10 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Airbase hits 1
Airbase supply hits 2
Runway hits 21

Aircraft Attacking:
9 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
9 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
5 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
4 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 37th US Division, at 95,113 (Upolu)

Japanese aircraft
B6N2 Jill x 57
Ki-49 Helen x 19
Ki-48-II Lily x 34

No Japanese losses

Allied ground losses:
258 casualties reported
Guns lost 5

Aircraft Attacking:
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
7 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
2 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
2 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 1st Marine Division, at 95,113 (Upolu)

Japanese aircraft
B6N2 Jill x 49
Ki-49 Helen x 15
Ki-48-II Lily x 13

No Japanese losses

Allied ground losses:
133 casualties reported
Guns lost 2
Vehicles lost 2

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
9 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
9 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
13 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
11 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
8 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Japanese ground forces on Upolu bombard U.S. LCU's. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Upolu

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 3464 troops, 72 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 637
41st, 42nd, 51st, 53rd & 61st Naval Gd; Sasebo 7 SNLF, 51 Independent Mixed Brigade (-), 9 & 11 Independent Mixed Rgts,
Arshan Garrison Rgt, 7 Field Artillery Brigade,140 IJN Base Force, 127 IJNAF Base Force (-), 5 AF Construction Bn (-),
9 AF Construction Bn, 24 Aviation Unit, 2 Aviation Rgt, 10 Special Base Force (-)

Defending force 61570 troops, 213 guns, 28 vehicles, Assault Value = 1221
1st Cavalry, Americal, 32nd, 37th & 1st Marine Divisions, HQ I Amphibious Corps

Allied ground losses:
172 casualties reported
Guns lost 1
Vehicles lost 2



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/14/43 (5/27/2009 4:38:38 AM)

Summary of Operations 12/14/43 - continued

South Pacific: Sigint report entry for 12/14 indicates Jap 28 Aviation Unit located at Suva, this unit a new LCU in the Japanese OOB.


Australia: No reported air or ground combat.

Allied LCU's for the Portland Roads operation now moving northwards overland from Cooktown. Most of the available air transport squadrons in Australia have been based in Townsville flying as much supply as possible into Coen to support ground combat once Allied LCU's reach Portland Roads. Air support for the Portland Roads operation has gathered mainly in Townsville and ready to support ground operations as the LCU's approach Cooktown.

Catalina I recon over Port Moresby reports N1K fighters on CAP, 7 Jap LCU's. This area has been very quiet in terms of Jap activity - virtually no spotted or detected Jap air or sea movement for some time at either Port Moresby or Portland Roads. Jap base at Thursday Island also quiet. Short-term plans are to keep it quiet as Allied LCU's make their northward overland movement (which may take a while given distances and available road network in this area).

Detected status of Jap base in Daly Waters - airfield damage 79, 27 Jap LCU's.
Hudson I recon over Darwin reporting fighters on CAP, one Jap TF (-1 from last report), 7 Jap LCU's (-1 from last report).
Hudson I recon over Exmouth reports 5 Jap LCU's.


DEI: SS Snook in several night actions against Japanese ships off Palembang. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack at 23,54

Japanese Ships
TK Clemente Maru
PC Ch 13
PC Ch 1
PC Takunan Maru #10
PG Shinko Maru #2
PG Santo Maru
PG Seikai Maru
DD Hiyodori
DD Kasasagi
DD Asakaze
DD Arashi
DD Shiranuhi
DD Oyashio

Allied Ships
SS Snook

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASW attack at 23,54

Japanese Ships
PC Ch 13
PC Ch 1
PC Takunan Maru #10
PG Shinko Maru #2
PG Santo Maru
PG Seikai Maru
DD Hiyodori
DD Kasasagi
DD Asakaze
DD Arashi
DD Shiranuhi
DD Oyashio
AO Shiriya

Allied Ships
SS Snook, hits 4 (system damage 14, float 29, no fire)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


India/Burma: No reported ground or air combat.

F-5C recon over Rangoon reporting airfield damage 14, no Jap TF's (-3 from last report), 1 ship in port, 519 aircraft (224 fighters, 50 bombers), heavy industry 57(136).

CW-22 Falcon recon over Mandalay reports 9 Jap LCU's.


China: Jap recon flights over Chungking, Kweiyang. AAR's of latest Jap air strikes in China follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 96th Chinese Corps, at 42,33 (SE of Chungking)

Japanese aircraft
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 20

No Japanese losses

Allied ground losses:
15 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Aircraft Attacking:
20 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 95th Chinese Corps, at 44,31 (N of Chungking)

Japanese aircraft
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 22

No Japanese losses

Aircraft Attacking:
22 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jap ground bombardment attacks continue at Tuyun and near Chungking. Latest AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Tuyun

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 271878 troops, 1094 guns, 240 vehicles, Assault Value = 5496
3rd, 6th, 13th, 22nd, 29th, 34th, 36th, 40th, 41st, 60th, 65th, 104th, 110th & 116th Infantry Divisions; 3rd Tank Division;
1 Independent Brigade; 1 Yobi Ebi Rgt; 2, 8, 19, 20,& 27 Engineer Rgts; 2 Mountain Gun Rgt, 2 RF Gun Bn, 6 & 15 FA Rgts,
13 & 15 Tank Rgts, HQ 23rd Army

Defending force 39559 troops, 5 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 1059
37th, 46th, 60th, 62nd, 64th, 74th, 79th & 99th Chinese Corps; 71st Chinese Division;
27th Chinese Guerilla Corps; HQ 1st, 2nd, 16th & 20th Group Armies

Allied ground losses:
118 casualties reported

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at 42,33 (SE of Chungking)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 868 troops, 36 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 962
32nd & 47th Infantry Divisions, 1 Mortar Bn
Defending force 34642 troops, 126 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 972
21st, 23rd, 63rd, 75th, 86th & 96th Chinese Corps



Alfred -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/27/2009 5:12:17 AM)

I had not concluded my post #1204 which will make clearer my observations.  Accordingly, the last 2 posts have commented on a presentation not yet completed.  Here I will briefly comment on them.

Feinder, firstly, thanks for the update on base Ass Val in CHS.  It doesn't invalidate my point but it does reduce somewhat the margin for error worked in by myself for the Allies (see subsequent post on continuation of my presentation).  Secondly, we will have to agree to disagree that 4+ enemy divs (or equivalent) await at Daly Waters, but again this does not invalidate my substantive point.  Thirdly, I agree entirely that in the Northern Territory supply is an overriding consideration (again wait for my next instalment).  The move to Daly Waters can be seen as a Verdun where stalemate can be broken by the flanking move in the Kimberleys (which was the next issue I had reached to address in my last post).  Also most of the Allied infantry to move north from Tennant Creek is retricted command thus their deployment options are limited.  Personally I would never have had so many Allied resources located there, but with little time available for reployments the question is how to use them.  Fourthly, even with the supply/firepower dilema up there, there are still tactical ways to extract value - the entire Allied stack does not have to simultaneously engage in combat.

Wneumann, you will see a great deal more depth to my outline when you read the rest when posted.  A few brief replies now however.

1.  Whilst the Japanese remain competitive/hold upper hand in Samoa, the KB will remain close by.  If the Allied CVs are moved away before Upolu is captured, the KB may also leave to shadow the Allied CVs because then, Japanese air and land forces will suffice to destroy the Allied units on both Upolu and Savaii.

2.  Again you refer to only 3 Australian divisions at Tennant Creek as being inadequate for an advance.  In doing so you make the same mistake.  Your Ass Val a Tennant Creek is much greater than that provided by 3 divisions.

3.  You are wrong about Thursday Island.  If there will definitely be no further Allied advance ever on this axis, then its value to the allies is limited but not zero.  OTOH, a further advance on this axis is greatly improved by Allied possession of Thursday Island.  Here are some benefits:

(a)  Allied fighters on both Thursday Island and Portland Roads can LRCAP TFs transiting the Coral Sea and Torres Strait.  This improves Allied logistics immeasurably for an advance along the Timor/Sulawesi/Ambon axis.
(b)  Thursday Island is the same distance from Port Moresby as is Portland Roads.  As you have made some noises about conducting air operations against Port Moresby, why would you not obtain the extra advantage of gaining a second airbase in range?
(c)  Thursday island is further north than any other airbase in SWPac.  Its possession brings more enemy territory (north coast of New Guinea, SLOCs between Palau and Truk etc) into play for the Allies.
(d)  You claim to have plenty of unemployed Allied LBA.  Are not (a), (b) and (c) ways to address this problem, for which to date you have not come up with a solution?
(e)  Where else but on Thursday Island do you envisage you can use your American paras on a paradrop in the next 6 months?  Para units are to be used on para drops, not frittered away on Monte Casino type endeavours.
(f)  Post Portland Roads, you can launch the Thursday Island operation much quicker than any other operation using those troops.
(g)  With both Portland Roads and Thursday Island in Allied hands and Allied air superiority over Port Moresby, an Allied amphibious operation against Port Moresby without the use of Allied CVs becomes feasible.

4.  You are simply incorrect to state that 15-20 Allied divs are required to root out 2 enemy divs sheltering under level 9 fortifications.  Read AARs to see how often much smaller Allied forces will suffice to get the job done.  Remember, there are ways to get the enemy adjusted Ass Val down.

5.  Sure, Burma presents supply difficulties and yet it must be a miracle everytime an Allied player successfully pushes through Burma.

6.  You do have opportunities to maneouvre.  Strategically you are not left solely with frontal attacks everywhere.  My concluding presentation will make this clearer, but for now let me just point out some opportunities:

(a)  The Japanese forward defence at Daly Waters can be outflanked by an Allied thrust against its base at Darwin via the Kimberleys
(b)  The Solomons/Fiji quadrant can be outflanked via Allied capture of Port Moresby thence Milne Bay (is it Gili Gili in this mod?).  With both Portland Roads and Thursday Island under Allied control, a Port Moresby operation is not as daunting as you believe.
(c)  There are opportunities to create 2-3 strong Allied columns to outflank by land Japanese strongholds in Burma
(d)  With the right preparations and proper use of intel, amphibious operations along the coasts of Burma, Malaya and Sumatra can outflank and unhinge the entire enemy position

7.  I will address the North Pacific operation in more detail in my next post.  It is not such a clear cut operation as I suspect you seem to believe in.  AARs bear out that it is not a lay down misere.

8.  Your comments regarding sea and air intel are too simplistic.  What is your estimate of enemy capital ships available for duty and how many are likely to be in shipyards/ports repairing damage or upgrading?  Does your opponent repair ships locally or does he send them back to the Home Islands for repairs?  Does he use IJA LBA on naval search/ASW?  These are just some of the considerations you should be dealing with to gain a feel for enemy dispositions.

Alfred



Alfred -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/13/43 (5/27/2009 12:41:53 PM)

(continuing on from post #1206)

(B2)  Kimberleys

Allied control of the 4 bases in the Kimberleys (Exmouth, Broome, Derby, Wyndham) allows for future offensive operations against Darwin/Aru Island, or Timor/Sulewesi axes.  It outflanks the Japanese at Daly Waters by interdicting enemy SLOCs.  With only limited enemy air power in the region (I include Koepang if it has Bettys) and no significant enemy Ass Val garrisons, the 3 AIF divs (6, 7 and 9 divs plus surplus garrison bdes from New Zealand) together with RN CVs should suffice for this Commonwealth campaign.  Also you will be able to transport supply by sea to the Kimberleys, thereby greatly alleviating Allied supply bottlenecks (eg no need for 4E to consume supplies at Tennant Creek).

Suggested immediate actions to take are:

(i)  set 6, 7 and 9 divs AIF located at Perth, Colombo and Melbourne to prep for Exmouth.  The assembly point to be Perth for sea and land assets (of course appropriate av support, engrs etc would also be collected)

(ii)  sail ASAP from Colombo the transport convoy with RN escorts

(iii)  Allied garrisons for the 4 bases can be obtained from the surplus 5 NZ bdes in Auckland and Christchurch.  If these units arrive in Perth in time to join the AIF divs they can partake in the initial Exmouth landing, otherwise they provide a follow up reserve

(iv)  once Exmouth is captured, then capture the other 3 bases in turn.  As long as Daly Waters and Upolu remain the focus of the enemy defences, it doesn't matter if your Kimberley strategy becomes obvious

(v)  from Broome, even Allied med bombers can strike at Darwin's infrastructure (destroy its resource centres if they exist in this mod)

(B3)  Australian Northern Territory

The unidentified Allied units located 1 hex to the NW and NE of Tennant Creek now serve no purpose because the enemy will not march south from Daly Waters.  These units together with everything (except Gull Force) located at Tennant Creek, should immediately march north to invest Daly Waters.  Doing so will result in an Allied Field Army (called I Aust Army) of approximately 1620 Ass Val.  This army would be far too strong to (a) be pushed out of Daly Waters, (b) allow for rotation of individual units back to Tennant Creek for rebuilding, (c) inhibit the enemy from withdrawing Daly Waters units to bolster its defences elsewhere (eg the Kimberleys, Darwin, Aru etc), and (d) with the sizeable quantity of Allied artillery in this army, you will be able to wear down the enemy adjusted Ass Val by rotating your artillery bombardment amongst your units.

Suggested actions are:

(i)  immediately march north from Tennant Creek all units (except Gull Force and av sup needed to operate the air base) - no need to wait for all units to be 100% prepped for Daly Waters

(ii)  the daily bombing of the airfield at Daly Waters wastes Allied ordnance.  If runway damage is say 80, what is the point of inflicting another 70-100+ hits the next day.  Only bomb the airfield when it is about to become operational, otherwise start CAS operations to start reducing the enemy Ass Val

(iii)  further to point (ii), if the fortification level at Daly Waters is less than level 9 (the only possible excuse for wasting ordnance on a daily airfield attack), then the enemy will not progress far in building up the forts because I am not advocating a total cessation of airfield attacks.  If the fortification level is already at 9, then there is no excuse for wasting the ordnance.

(iv)  4E operations against Darwin should be regularly rotated against Darwin's port (to both impede unloading of supplies/LCUs and gain naval intel which can assist the Kimberley campaign), airfield (to suppress the stationed 600-1000 aircraft) and if Darwin has any resource centres in this mod, bomb them to make the enemy (at Darwin and ulimately Daly Waters) more dependent on imported supply to both feed himself and to rebuild the facilities (NB your opponent always repairs his bombed Heavy Industry at Rangoon)

(v)  any remaining P-38 units at Tennant Creek are better employed sweeping Darwin rather than escorting the 4E

(B4)  Burma

No British base base on Ceylon or India should have a garrison stronger than an infantry brigade.  Resizing garrisons to this criterion provides a field army already identified in (A3) of post #1206 (together with many support troops, art, engrs etc) which can maneouvre in Burma.

In addition to the creation of this Field Army, RAF operations in Burma must become more sophisticated and efficient.  This entails the total destruction of Burmese Heavy Industry, Resource and Oil Centres located at Rangoon and anywhere else they are located in this mod.  Your opponent must be forced to survive on imported supplies.  Particularly note that he has a track record of expending valuable supply to repair his Rangoon Heavy Industry and Resource Centres.  In Burma, the RAF can ultimately ensure the enemy adjusted Ass Val is critically weakened by imposing an aerial blockade.

Specific suggestions are:

(i) from Ledo move the surplus bde into Mytkyina, whose garrison will be able to hold the base but not push back your unit.  The intention is to fix in place the enemy Reserve Tank Rgt and prevent it from escaping the Allied trap

(ii) move sufficient Chinese units currently on the Burma Road (plus Yenen (sp?) and Kunming) to fix in place the enemy 33 Div/B located at Lashio

(iii)  collect from Dimapur a div (of course after it has been relieved by a bde from the interior), from Kohima 2 bdes, from Imphal 2 bdes + HQ Corps, from Imphal outpost 1 bde to move along the trails to Mandalay.  Excluding supporting art/engrs etc, this column will amount to about 900 Ass Val and be opposed by a Mandalay garrison of about 150 Ass Val.  Even behind level 9 forts, this garrison particularly if it is made to starve, will not suffice to indefinitely hold the base.  Due to the length of time required to travers the trails, the column should commence the march even if the units are 0% prepped to Mandalay.

(iv)  any Heavy Industry, Resource/Oil centres located in Mandalay (in this mod) must be totally destroyed by the RAF (in rotation with airfield and CAS) because the cost to repair will deny supply to 33 Div/C

(v)  fly into Akyab Av Support plus a garrison bde.  You want to have short range fighter cover from Akyab.  Spitfires are far better employed on sweeps/CAP/LRCAP/escorts than on their current CAS operations

(vi)  a garrison plus engrs can be flown onto Ramree Island to develop its airfield.  This helps to outflank the enemy in Burma (see point vii below).  It also helps to have Akyab and Ramree Island as mutually supporting front line Allied bases, both of which can also employ short range RAF aiircraft on offensive tasks.

(vii)  a second column (with both Army and Corps HQs, and attendant support troops) of the Field Army can be assemble at Akyab for a move on Magwe.  This column will need to be considerably stronger than the advance on Mandalay because (a) the Magwe garrison is about 400 Ass Val, (b) it can be more easily reinforced from the theatre reserve, and (c) you threaten the entire Japanese position in Burma.  This column will also benefit greatly from Allied airbases at Akyab and Ramree Island as only LBA will be available to LRCAP Allied (S)LOCs (remember the RN CVs will be involved in the Kimberley campaign - see section B2 above).

(viii)  to increase enemy air fatigue and lower morale at Rangoon, RAF operations against Rangoon should include, from different bases:
*  am, concentrated fighter sweeps
*  am, follow up bombers (with or without escorts) on city strategic bombing as their primary mission
*  pm, bombers flying as their secondary mission (ie their primary mission is naval attack but as enemy TF movement will be relatively limited, they will often default to their secondary mission) airfield and port attack

(ix)  move into Imphal the Indian Para Bde (currently located at Calcutta) togetheer with the requisite transport aircraft.  This unit can be para dropped as appropriate to support either the Mandalay or Magwe columns (or any other target of opportunity)

(x)  a theatre reserve column can be built around the remaining HQ Corps.  This reserve can be used for amphibious operations (eg Moulmein) when the RN CVs return (probably April 1944) or to reinforce the land columns.

(B5)  Samoa

Actually....

(sorry folks, have run out of time again - will continue in next 24 hours)

Alfred



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/27/2009 9:20:59 PM)

Summary of Operations 12/15/43

North Pacific: U.S. bombers raid Paramushiro. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Paramushiro Jima , at 82,33

Japanese aircraft
A6M2-N Rufe x 14
A6M5 Zeke x 6

Allied aircraft
B-17E Fortress x 15
PB4Y Liberator x 12
B-24D Liberator x 12

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2-N Rufe: 3 damaged
A6M5 Zeke: 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
B-17E Fortress: 8 damaged
PB4Y Liberator: 2 damaged
B-24D Liberator: 1 damaged

Japanese ground losses:
9 casualties reported

Airbase hits 2
Runway hits 22

Aircraft Attacking:
9 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 10000 feet
3 x B-24D Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
6 x PB4Y Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
4 x B-24D Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 10000 feet
3 x PB4Y Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
3 x PB4Y Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 10000 feet
3 x B-24D Liberator bombing at 10000 feet
2 x B-24D Liberator bombing at 10000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Detected status of Jap base in Paramushiro - 1 Jap TF, airfield damage 10, 15 aircraft (7 fighters), 3 Jap LCU's.


Central Pacific: No reports of Jap air patrol activity continue near Kwajalein and Canton Is area. Contacts with Jap air patrols reported by U.S. subs operating at various points off the Japanese home islands - planes sighted include G5N Liz, Ki-46 Dinah, Ki-48 Lily, Ki-49 Helen, E13A1 floatplanes.

34 Japanese ships detected in Kwajalein base, no report on ship at anchor in Truk. 181 ships detected in port at Tokyo.

PBM Mariner patrol spots unidentified Jap sub ENE of Canton Is - possible destination Palmyra.
F-5A recon over Canton Is reports 10 aircraft, 15 Jap LCU's.


Pago Pago, Day 90 of the Fiasco: Weather forecast for Pago Pago area remains precipitation. No reported naval activity in the area again this game turn.

Current status of Pago Pago base - Current base status display of Pago Pago follows end of this report. Landing an Aviation Rgt on Pago Pago should more than alleviate the shortages of both general and aviation support LCU elements.

Current status of Savaii base - runway damage 99, airfield service damage 100, port damage 9 (no change).

Jap recon flight over Pago Pago. Jap LBA attack on Savaii base facilities, no Jap air attacks on Pago Pago or against U.S. LCU's on Upolu. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Pago Pago , at 96,113

Japanese aircraft
Ki-46-III Dinah x 1

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-46-III Dinah: 1 damaged

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Savaii , at 95,112

Japanese aircraft
D4Y Judy x 43

Japanese aircraft losses
D4Y Judy: 8 damaged

Allied ground losses:
18 casualties reported

Airbase hits 2
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 23

Aircraft Attacking:
9 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
12 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
6 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
4 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jap ground forces continue bombardment attacks on Upolu. Latest AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Upolu

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 3464 troops, 72 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 655
41st, 42nd, 51st, 53rd & 61st Naval Gd; Sasebo 7 SNLF, 51 Independent Mixed Brigade (-), 9 & 11 Independent Mixed Rgts,
Arshan Garrison Rgt, 7 Field Artillery Brigade, 140 IJN Base Force, 127 IJNAF Base Force (-), 5 AF Construction Bn (-),
9 AF Construction Bn, 24 Aviation Unit, 2 Aviation Rgt, 10 Special Base Force (-)

Defending force 61588 troops, 207 guns, 27 vehicles, Assault Value = 1242
1st Cavalry, Americal, 32nd, 37th & 1st Marine Divisions, HQ I Amphibious Corps

Allied ground losses:
73 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[image]local://upfiles/18646/DAEB1DA034BD477C9274A99864D9B0BC.jpg[/image]



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/27/2009 9:47:54 PM)

Summary of Operations 12/15/43 - continued

Australia: USAAF bombers strike Jap airfield at Darwin. AAR's follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Darwin , at 36,84

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 19
A6M5 Zeke x 111
Ki-44-IIb Tojo x 49
Ki-61-Ib Tony x 47

Allied aircraft
Hudson I x 4
P-38J Lightning x 174
B-17E Fortress x 50
B-24J Liberator x 86

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M3 Zero: 4 destroyed, 9 damaged
A6M5 Zeke: 17 destroyed, 77 damaged
Ki-44-IIb Tojo: 43 destroyed
Ki-61-Ib Tony: 37 destroyed
L3Y Tina: 6 destroyed
Ki-49 Helen: 1 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
Hudson I: 1 damaged
P-38J Lightning: 56 destroyed, 62 damaged
B-17E Fortress: 14 damaged
B-24J Liberator: 30 damaged

Japanese ground losses:
154 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Airbase hits 24
Airbase supply hits 15
Runway hits 76

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
9 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
4 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
4 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
6 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
6 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
4 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
4 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
2 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
2 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
2 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet
3 x B-24J Liberator bombing at 12000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hudson I recon over Darwin reporting one Jap TF (10 ships), airfield damage 61, 366 aircraft (159 fighters, 14 bombers), 7 Jap LCU's.

SS Hoe now on patrol off Darwin torpedoes Jap AP. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack at 35,83

Japanese Ships
AP Yamakuni Maru, Torpedo hits 1
AP Ueizuru Maru
PC Sonan Maru #6
MSW Shintohoku Maru
MSW Choun Maru #6

Allied Ships
SS Hoe

Japanese ground losses: (somebody had an LCU aboard)
27 casualties reported

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Alllied recon flights over Exmouth and Port Moresby report no detected activity or change in Jap forces.


DEI: SS Snook entering Malacca Straits off Singapore (returning to base after damage vs Jap surface ASW off Palembang) reports multiple contacts with Jap aircraft - G4M Betty, Ki-48 Lily, Ki-49 Helen, E13A1 floatplanes. British sub Rover on patrol off Georgetown near the opposite end of the Straits has not encountered Jap planes.


India/Burma: USAAF and Chinese AF fighters launch ground attack strikes against Jap LCU's in Magwe. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 55th Division, at 31,29

Allied aircraft
A-36A Apache x 24

Allied aircraft losses
A-36A Apache: 10 damaged

Japanese ground losses:
16 casualties reported

Aircraft Attacking:
24 x A-36A Apache attacking at 100 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 145th IJA Base Force, at 31,29

Allied aircraft
P-40N Warhawk x 142

Allied aircraft losses
P-40N Warhawk: 23 damaged

Japanese ground losses:
151 casualties reported
Guns lost 3

Aircraft Attacking:
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
10 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet
12 x P-40N Warhawk attacking at 100 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Detected status of Jap base at Magwe - airfield damage 26, 8 Jap LCU's.
CW-22 Falcon recon over Mandalay reports 9 Jap LCU's.
Hudson I recon over Meiktila reporting 3 Jap LCU's (no LCU's had been detected in Meiktila in my report and situation map from two game turns ago).

F-5C recon over Rangoon reports no Jap TF's, 2 ships in port (+1 from last report), airfield damage 25, 523 aircraft (237 fighters, 35 bombers), 12 Jap LCU's, heavy industry 58(135).


China: Jap recon flights over Tuyun, Chungking, Kweiyang. No reported Jap air attacks.

Jap ground forces at Tuyun launch offensive, ground bombardment continues SE of Chungking. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Tuyun

Japanese Deliberate attack (attack reinforced this game turn by 64th Division)

Attacking force 290647 troops, 1100 guns, 400 vehicles, Assault Value = 5914
3rd, 6th, 13th, 22nd, 29th, 34th, 36th, 40th, 41st, 60th, 64th, 65th, 104th, 110th & 116th Infantry Divisions; 3rd Tank Division;
1 Independent Brigade; 1 Yobi Ebi Rgt; 2, 8, 19, 20,& 27 Engineer Rgts; 2 Mountain Gun Rgt, 2 RF Gun Bn, 6 & 15 FA Rgts,
13 & 15 Tank Rgts, HQ 23rd Army

Defending force 39879 troops, 12 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 1083
37th, 46th, 60th, 62nd, 64th, 74th, 79th & 99th Chinese Corps; 71st Chinese Division;
27th Chinese Guerilla Corps; HQ 1st, 2nd, 16th & 20th Group Armies

Japanese max assault: 5472 - adjusted assault: 5924
Allied max defense: 1046 - adjusted defense: 2339
Japanese assault odds: 2 to 1 (fort level 5)
Japanese Assault reduces fortifications to 4

Japanese ground losses:
3958 casualties reported
Guns lost 44
Vehicles lost 6

Allied ground losses:
2470 casualties reported
Guns lost 7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at 42,33

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 868 troops, 36 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 1289
32nd & 47th Infantry Divisions, 1 Mortar Bn
Defending force 34659 troops, 126 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 971
21st, 23rd, 63rd, 75th, 86th & 96th Chinese Corps



ny59giants -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/27/2009 10:46:52 PM)

How many of your 245 fighters at Pago Pago are operational??

If you cannot get in the Aviation Rgt by APs, consider using transport planes, patrol planes, or Fast Transports.
Or all of the above!! [:D]



Alfred -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/28/2009 6:14:31 AM)

(continuing on from post #1210)

(B5)  Samoa

Actually, the current Allied position here is not too bad.  The inherent Allied strength here, properly employed, will quickly change perceptions of Allied weakness/Japanese strength.  Once Pago Pago's airfield remains operational for a week, local enemy air superiority will be neutralised.  CAS flown from both Pago Pago and Savaii will steadily reduce the adjusted enemy Ass Val on Upolu and then lead to its Allied capture by the 8 available divs already located in Samoa (the 5 currently on Upolu plus 1 surplus from Savaii and 2 surplus from Pago).  Wallis Island then becomes very vulnerable and the KB turns from the hunter to the hunted, thus it would withdraw from the theatre.

Specific suggestions are:

(i)  to maximize USN CV TF flexibility and carrier air sorties, daily use 30 knot SC TF from Penhryn Island to sink Japnese pickets positioned east of Pago Pago [also see points (iii) and (iv) below]

(ii)  you have 200 PTs in the pools.  I assume that there are also some barges (LCVP etc) in the pools.  Both PTs and barges should be created at Penhryn Island (your current supply depot) and sailed to operate at both Savaii (12 PTs) and Pago Pago (24 PTs plus the barges).  The PTs at Savaii (formed up into 2 TFs) will provide some protection against enemy naval bombardment or counter invasion.  The Pago Pago PTs and barges will provide point defence, escort the barges on supply runs to Savaii (only 2 hexes away) and launch offensive interdictions at Upolu [see points (vi) and (vii) below]

(iii)  Every day, single AK cargo TFs need to be formed at Penhryn Island and despatched daily to Pago Pago with 400 cargo points (NB fuel will also need to be periodically shipped in by AKs, not TKs, to support PT/barge operations).  These daily single ship cargo TFs will:
*  act as blockade runners and be more difficult to be spotted
*  if spotted, draw bomber attacks which otherwise would keep the Pago Pago airfield suppressed
*  of great importance is that with only 400 cargo points, they should unload and turnaround within 24 hours, again minimizing their exposure to attack
*  not require USN CV escorts, thus allowing for more effective use of the carriers
*  daily sailings from Penhryn Island will help flush out the location of enemy MSW picket ships which can then be destroyed by hunter killer SC TF [see point (i) above]

(iv)  Freed from the need to escort slow moving cargo TFs, fast 30 knot CV TF can be positioned east of Pago Pago to LRCAP and ambush enemy air raids (NB Savaii is usually hit by Kates/Vals flying from Wallis Island with no fighter escorts).  For best results, you will:
*  maintain station for only 24 hours, basically engaging in shoot and scoot tactics
*  time arrival for when KB is low on available sorties/leaving for replenishment
*  vary your CV TFs approach to station from due east (ie Penhryn Island), due north and due north west (Savaii area)
*  run the CV TFs in silent mode with no naval search/ASW operations.  This will maximise the number of fighters available to provide both fleet CAP and ambush LRCAP  [see point (v) below]
*  position subs to interdict the KB from likely launch positions against your CVs

(v)  The 4E on Penhryn Island should cease flying cargo to Pago Pago (that task is best left to AKs).  Instead of of providing a daily air lift of about 300 cargo points, your 4E are better employed fully on Naval Search, even if flown at high altitude.  Doing so will help raise the DL of enemy picket ships and track the whereabouts of the KB, making the environment safer for USN CV operations.  Alternatively, the 4E can be placed on Naval Attack (again if necessary according to your HRs on high altitude)

(vi)  the Japanese SLOC to Upolu must be interdicted.  Until the Pago Pago airfield becomes operational, use subs to mine Upolu

(vii)  subject to your HRs (if necessary make the two offensive PT TFs auto disband upon return to Pago Pago), you should strive to maintain 24 PTs (organised into 4 PT TFs of 6 boats each) operating out of Pago Pago.  Losses to this fleet being replenished from PTs sailed from Penhryn Island.  Of these 4 x PT TFs, two would remain on station to provide point defence, one would be used to escort the barges on their supply run to Savaii.  The last TF would daily travel the 1 hex distance to the west to attack enemy AKs unloading at Upolu and perhaps also draw away some enemy air attacks

(B6)  Feinder is absolutely correct (and I note from post #1211 it is your intention too) in advocating the sending of an Aviation Regiment to Pago Pago.  If has to be transported in by AKs, you should strive to load up the ships with troops only and up to a maximum of 400 load points only.  This will expedite the unloading at Pago Pago.

[C]  DON'T PANIC

The Allied position remains inherently very soundly based to achieve a decisive victory.  Due to the point spread and time lost by being too passive, controlled aggression throughout multiple theatres is required to make up for lost opportunities.  You cannot abandon Samoa, particularly as a defeat there for either side has major consequences.

As you are about to move into 1944, consider the following factors.

(C1)  Too many Japanese eggs in the one basket

Your opponent...

(to be continued/concluded in next 24 hours)

Alfred



Alfred -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/30/2009 9:46:57 AM)

(continuing on from post #1214)

(C1)  Too many Japanese eggs in the one basket

Your opponent has stripped the Pacific of air units and regularly maintains 600-700 aircraft on Upolu.  This is far in excess of the 50 x airfield level and partly explains why more than 1/3 are continuously damaged (a similar stroy applies to the mega concentrations at Rangoon and Darwin).  With so many damaged Japanese aircraft, when the Allies do gain air superiority it will be too late for the enemy to successfully evacuate their air units.  Consequently when the Allies capture Upolu, 400-600 aircraft will probably be destroyed and many air units banished from reappearing for a year.  Japanese air power in the Pacific will be shattered allowing for a considerable acceleration of Allied offensive operations in the Pacific.

(C2)  The KB is not a fleet in being

The KB is tied down to Samoa for as long as the Allied threat to capture Upolu and resupply its units remains.  The KB therefore lacks freedom of both movement and the ability to choose its targets.  Without those two attributes, an inferior fleet (which the KB will surely be categorised as 1944 progresses and more Essex carriers and Allied CVEs are commissioned) is not a major threat and lacks the potential threat projection of a true fleet in being.

(C3)  A bridge too far

A March 1944 Allied invasion of Sakhalin Island smells too much of panic.  Whilst it would be reasonable to prepare some contingency planning for a March 1944 Sakhalin invasion, viewed from a mid December 1943 perspective, such an operation appears more likely to lose the war for the Allies than to win it.  Consider the following:

(i)  The capture of the bases on Sakhalin does not per se guarantee an Allied victory.  The acquisition of the Sakhalin base points is not decisive.  Allied ownership of the Sakhalin airfields does not per se guarantee Allied air superiority over Sakhalin, let alone over the Home Islands.  There are many circumstances which can turn Sakhalin into a giant Allied POW camp.

(ii)  Sakhalin lies deep in enemy territory.  Currently, there is a zero possibility of establishing secure Allied SLOCs to Sakhalin by March 1944.  This means that a March 1944 invasion fleet, and each subsequent resupply convoy, must be escorted by a large CV fleet.  Unless the Samoan campaing has concluded with a complete Allied success by mid February 1944 (or an additional 6-8 Essex class CVs are scheduled to arrive within 60 days), there will be insufficient Allied CVs to cover the invasion and the resupply convoys.  If you think running the logistics gauntlet from Penhryn Island to Pago Pago has been tough, think again.  That gauntlet will be like playing in the minor leagues by comparison to running the Sakhalin gauntlet.

(iii)  Irrespective of whether th invasion fleet sets sail from Attu or Kiska Islands, it will be discovered long before it reaches Sakhalin and subjected to sustained enemy attack.  Also the enemy will have the capcity to quickly reinforce its bases on both Sakhalin and the Kuriles.  Thus even if your opponent still maintains only threadbare garrisons on Sakhalin and its approaches by 1 March 1944 (and a competent opponent should be eyeing a possible Allied approach along the north Pacific axis from 1944 onwards), that does not guarantee that either the garrisons will not be augmented before disembarkation or a withering counter invasion will not ensue.  Nor should you think that large enemy reinforcements will be necessary.  Check to see the terrain of the Kuriles in this mod.  Often, in other mods, enemy garrisons on those bases sit behind level 9 forts, on mountainous atolls.  That is a very unfriendly adjusted Ass Val to greet you.

(iv)  One poster has recommended a Sakhalin invasion, largely based on his own success.  Before you uncritically accept that proposition, bear in mind these significant differences between the two games,
*  it was a different mod, different air combat characteristics etc
*  in response to the emerging strategic environment his Japanese opponent played very poorly
*  the Allies invaded both Hokkaido and Sakhalin in the same operation and were very luck to escape from Hokkaido and were even more lucky to hang onto Sakhalin even though they were greatly assisted by a poor enemy response
*  an enemy weakness is only a weakness if you are in position to exploit it.  In that game the Allies were able to combine attacking the Home Islands from three different directions (Sakhalin, the Bonin Islands, China) and from multiple airfields.  It was therefore difficult for the Japanese to counter the long term Allied threat of strategic bombing (combined with Allied capture of VPs elsewhere)
*  the Allies had already weakened the Japanese, much more than you will have done so, by having (a) an Allied Field Army steamrolling through Burma, (b) a Chinese Field Army capturing Hanoi and Haiphong thereby sucking in enemy theatre reserves which otherwise could have been used in Burma, (c) destroying enemy assets in the Aleutians, (d) invading Sumatra and Malaya etc.  In short he had already significantly attrited the enemy before and whilst he was consolidating his Sakhalin position
*  he had not suffered your CVE losses

(v)  As at mid December 1943, throughout NoPac/CenPac/SoPac/West Coast, you can probably muster some 3500 unadjusted Ass Val.  By mid April 1944 (ie some 6 weeks after the projected invasion) you will gain approximately another 2000 unadjusted Ass Val.  That entire force might suffice to conquer all of Sakhalin and the necessary bases in the Kuriles to safeguard the SLOC (without whose capture, the USN CVs lose their strategic maneouvrebility).  But will you have the lift capacity to transport the invading army plus support (eg Seabees, Av Support etc), cratered air units and supply.  How much sealift will be necessary to sustain the strategic air campaign against the Hoem Islands, a campaign which being based out of only 2 airfields will be very vulnerable to enemy airfield suppression.

(vi)  If in the next 6-8 weeks you
*  sink most of the KB (whilst not incurring similar CV losses)
*  destroy the enemy air force currently operating out of Uplou and Wallis Island
*  make significant progress in Burma and Australia
*  intel shows Sakhalin remains "weakly" garrisoned and reinforcements from the theatre reserve are lacking
*  successfully concentrate the widely dispersed LCUs (and reposition and reduce the Allied Pacific garrisons)

then clearly the odds for a successful March 1944 Sakhalin operation improve to 50-50.  Bear in mind that the cost for mounting such an operation will be a predominantly inactive Allied approach along the various Pacific axes throughout most of 1944 with no certainty that the potential benefits of Sakhalin can actually be explointed by the Allies

(vii)  If you want to see how an excellent Japanese player can derail an Allied northern invasion strategy, read AmiralLaurent's excellent AAR v Pompack

(C4)  Patience young grasshoper

Provided you don't use any Atomic Bombs, you will gain a decisive victory if you achieve a 2:1 VP result before August 1945.  Sure, you don't have time to dawdle (still being far behind on the VP count) but nor do you have to engage in speculative adventures.  Controlled aggression on several fronts applying continuous pressure on the enemy logistics until it breaks, can still deliver a decisive Allied victory.  Remember an enemy weakness is not a weakness unless it can and is exploited.


And herein ends the presentation mad over several posts and we await the incoming barrage.

Alfred



vettim89 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/30/2009 1:30:52 PM)

I have to agree with a lot of what Alfred has said here. I am certainly an admirer of Canoerebels's bold move to talk Salkalin Island in late 1943 but I think this is a case of "Don't try this at home kids". The strategic situation in that game was different than yours. John 3 had driven much deeper into the SoPac. While that created problems for the Alied player in terms of SLOC, it also meant he had much more of his force projected forward. Lastly, the Japanese player, as Alfred has pointed out, failed to see the threat for what it really was and did not respond appropriately.

The Japanese war machine is still very powerful at this point but it is brittle. You must view the situation as the RL Allied commanders did: bypass large concentrations of Japanese troops heavily dug in and well supplied. If you effectively cut off these troops they will become fixed in place. Your opponent has done well but as Allied foce grows in 1944, he should find himself with many of his units in the wrong place with little ability to move them where he needs them. The troops at Daly Waters will become irrelevant if you are moving on the Marianas. Your strength should be growing to irresistable levels in the next 180 days. If you hang in there you should be able to unhinge your enemies defenses not by destrying units head on but by cutting them off and letting them rot on the vine.

As an example in my current game, I bypassed both Kwajalein and Maeolap as they both had garrisons over 30 k strong. My opponent was very good at building forts and making sure both these bases were well supplied. After nearly a year of being isolated what started as a stack of 9 units at 33 K is now four units at 10 k. Let them starve.

Lastly, I agree with Alfred that Burma is an unexploited front. You have viewed it as what you cannot do - dislodge the Japanese, instead of what it can do - attrit the Japanese airpower. You need to engage your opponent on as many fronts as possible. Make him burn supply, make him burn airframaes and more importantly pilots, and make him worry about what you are doing vs the opposite.



Canoerebel -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/30/2009 2:13:09 PM)

Alfred and Vettim are wrong (I say respectfully) unless the Mod I played (Big B) has a totally different air model than the Mod you're playing.  In Big B, the Allies can assert total air superiority in 1944 using Corsairs, Hellcats, P-38Js, P-38Ls, and then P-47Ds.  If that isn't the case in your Mod, they may be right.  If the Allies can assert air superiority, then they are wrong for these reasons:

1.  By 1944 the Allied player who has fallen way behind or way off schedule must begin a strategic bombing campaign that hits the Home Islands or the big DEI bases.  It really hurts the Japs, gives the Allies alot of points, and tends to refocus the battle close to the HI so that the Allies can make much better progress elsewhere.  Your emphasis has to be taking big strategic bombing bases (Sikhalin Island, Luzon, Taiwan, Georgetown, Kuala Lumpur, and some others) rather than putting your emphasis on fighting for regional superiority somewhere more remote. 

2.  If you do stick with a Sikhalin campaign (as opposed to Tawain, Luzon, etc.), by the 1944 the Allies are so much stronger than the Japs that your sea lanes between Sikhalin and the Aleutians are easily defendable (especially if you've also taken Onnekotan Jima).  The Allied navy and long-range fighters make re-supply secure.

3.  In the Big B mod, the Japs couldn't touch Toyohara and Sikhalin's airbases.  I had Cosairs and P-38s and some Hellcats (and later P-47s) plus big compliments of 4EB.  Those are BIG bases that you can load up with powerful fighters.  How can the Japs take on 50 Corsairs and 50 P-38Ls with some Hellcats thrown in?

4.  Your game is different from mine, but in good ways too.  My invasion occurred in late 1943 and left me gasping for supplies and fuel, crippling my fleet for months.  My garrison of Sikhalin was weak, too, due to invasion and artice conditions.  By spring 1944, though, I had so many new carriers that Sikhalin was a bastion.  My opponent could have attacked (and should have) but doing so would have been suicidal.

5.  IF the Sikhalin bases remain lightly defended and undergo an invasion by a massed Allied amphibious force, and if you are able to keep strategic surprise, the Japs are done.  They won't be able to dislodge 5-10 Allied divisions supported by big concentrations of LBA and the Allied fleet nearby.  And you'll be in effective range of Hokkaido and northern Honshu for strategic bombing to commence.

6.  Your objective need not be Sikhalin.  You can choose others (Taiwan, Luzon, mid-Malaya).  But the kind of operation needed to get you in position to take the war to the enemy's heartland must be massive and surprise will either be critical or important depending on where you go and when. But I think Sikhalin Island is the easiest since it's on a flank subject to counterattack from only one direction (south), close to friendly territory (the Aleutians), and usually relatively lightly defended.




vettim89 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/30/2009 2:34:23 PM)

Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. Dan, I again agree that your Sakhalin Operation was brilliant but John helped a lot by not committing until it was too late. I didn't say it wasn't a good idea I said it was risky and could end the war for the Allies vice the Japanese. AT the point of your Sakhalin invasion, there was a huge Japanese Army still in SE Oz. There was another one battling for its life in Malaya. In this game those forces are not likewise engaged. In other words, Wneumann's opponent has a much larger strategic reserve to counter a move on Sakhalin. Add in the fact that the Manchuko garrison has been reduced and there is a lot of Japanese firepower that can be brought to bear that you did not have to worry about.



Nemo121 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 6:58:41 PM)

COuple of points here:

1. The Allied situation in this game is actually excellent BUT the Allies need to leave timidity at the door and move forward boldly thinking more about opportunities than risks. Sure ( to pick an example ) moving 6,000 AV into Burma from India leaves open the possibility of a riposte by the Japanese BUT if you use those 6,000 AV properly ( e.g. all those LBA you talk about not having targets for ) the Japanese should have their hands so full that any riposte is easily handled.


2. I wouldn't view Canoerebel's taking of Sakhalin as anything to emulate. Taking Sakhalin is good but as Canoerebel himself says when he took it it wasn't as a result of a plan --- really it was the end result of the failure of his plans to land elsewhere combined with a need to land "somewhere". Sakhalin turned out to be that "somewhere". As such when he landed it was without the logistical support needed to make his landing secure and without the strategic support/context to make his landing immediately decisive.

Its a good example of opportunism but better to try to emulate it in a planned, fully supported manner than to emulate its utter opportunism... especially when your opponent doesn't seem to have made the myriad of massive strategic errors that JOhn3rd made in the run-up to Sakhalin.


Overall better I think, by far, to follow Alfred's advice.  I would modify it only by saying that you also need to inject a bit more risk-taking and attempt to put the enemy on the back foot. When an enemy is on the back foot they are much less likely to actually try to counter-attack and so your rear areas are much safer than mere statistical analysis would suggest.


Why follow Alfred's advice vs that of others? Well others often suggest that one "invade x" or "attack y" or "use b to sink c ". That's all nice but it rarely represents either:
a) strategically relevant advice--- usually it is tactical or, at best, operationally relevant --- and this game is won on the strategic level, not the operational level.
c) internally consistent and cohesive advice.... Alfred's comments are always cogent and cohesive and, as such, superior to any uni-facetted advice.


Obviously you can take any advice you want but if I were you I'd take the best advice available ( plus a little bit more aggressiveness... I have been able to push back superior Japanese forces by combining my ground assaults with massive aerial attacks on the crucial day. I think that same matching would yield you benefits. 2 divisions + odds and sods should be easily overcome... If you're worried about supplies then close the airfield, march the troops up to it and bring AKs in with supplies. Let them offload for a couple of days --- this will give your divisions allt he supplies they need --- and then hit the 2 x IJA divisions with 2 days of ground attacks by every bomber you have. Then attack. End result, no more IJA divisions.

I did this in a game and retook the northern Australian bases in spite of the terrible supply situation. I think I lost about 6 AKs in total for all of the northern bases ( i used tank formations to get to them cross-country ). In the end I took the bases and cut off over a dozen IJA divisions ( 3,500 or so AV ) in the Australian hinterland as my opponent never conceptualised the separation of ground forces from their supply as an operational ploy.


Obviously though you should do whatever you want... but some of the advice carries a better chance of success than some of the rest.



vettim89 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 7:45:36 PM)

I am such a yes man, but I have to agree with Nemo this time. AAR's are great for eliciting advice but sometimes the advice is not relevant. It is easy for all of us to look at a situation in a game by the details provided by the AAR writer and say, "This is very similiar to this point in my game". While there may be simulariteis in many games, no two games are alike. I have received a lot of good advice in my AAR but some of it was irrelevant. That's not to say the poster didn't have a good idea but that I did not have the capabilites to follow that advice be that because of supply concerns or where my units where deployed or my opponents current dispositions. So take what we offer with a grain of salt as none of us knows exactly the situation in your game.

So the advice I would offer is this:

1. You need to seize the Strategic Initiative. I think you have become so bogged down in the tactical problems in Samoa and elsewhere that you have developed some tunnel vision.

2. Go where they ain't (sorry for the colloquialism). Your opponent cannot be strong everywhere. Probe for weakness and hit him hard where he cannot respond. Unhinge his defenses and put him into scramble mode.

3. Stay within yourself. Do a little self analysis. Figure out what you are comfortable with and aggressively pursue that strategy. There are many bold and audacious WiTP players. They know how to push the game to its limits. There ability to accomplish amazing fetes is not just good game play but an outgrowth of their personality. I am more of tortoise personality - slow and steady wins the day. While that has maybe made my offensive proceed slower than it should, every time my opponent has tried to blunt an offensive operation he has been pushed away with ease (with the possible exception of Tarawa in early 1943 which was bloody and hung by a thread there for a while). That said, a lttle well planned boldness can really throw your opponent especially if you have got him accustomed to a conservative play style.

4. The one piece of specific advice. In my game I routed the Japanese from Oz by doing this. I moved Australia Command and a couple of Army commands to Alice Springs with lots of Av support. This creates about as big of a supply sink as you can get that deep in the Outback. By this time you should have quite a few C-47/Dakota units available to you. Use those to move supply from Alice Springs to Tennant Creek. Then move out from there. Additional transports can be moved into Tennant Creek to lift supply to your units as they approach Daly Waters. It worked for me and it MAY work for you too.



cantona2 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 8:18:31 PM)

RE Alfred's comments on TI a few posts up:

Id go for it and then a quick landing on Merauke as well. That will give you three airbases in the area to bring the fight to the Japs in NG. The airbases in the area, Coen, Cairns, Cooktown, can all be developed to host 4 engine bombers that can provide long range hitting power.



Nemo121 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 9:08:03 PM)

Vettim, good point re: knowing oneself and playing according to one's own percepts. On the other hand I think that even the most cautious player might seize a few of the lower hanging fruits out there if they look up once from their tortoiseshell ;-)

Sure you mightn't leap from Kodiak Bay to Sakhalin Island in 2 months like me but maybe, just maybe, you might, if you lift your head from the tactical problem of fortifying Kodiak Bay against invasion make it halfway to Sakhalin once you realise there were opportunities your unifocal obsession of defending against attack caused you to be unaware of....

But, yeah, be true to yourself otherwise you're just gonna really mess up.... The corollary to that is that if you risk largely for an opportunity and it gets rewarded then maybe who YOU are becomes less risk-averse over the next few months of game time and before you know it who YOU are IS someone who leaps through the first line of defences and into the enemy rear ;-). Its worth considering.



wneumann -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 9:22:52 PM)

Gosh.... lots of comments and ideas posted the last several days. Appreciate all of them.

I'm reviewing everyone's posts now. What I may do from here is go through this one subject or area at a time, put together a summary of everyone's remarks on a specific topic along with hard data from the game, situation maps, etc that are relevent to the subject, answer questions, throw in my own conclusions or remarks, etc...




Nemo121 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 9:25:09 PM)

I think that'd be a good idea. With good game data I think people could come up with better ideas.

FWIW, if you want, I'd be willing to have a look at the situation and feed back to the forum.... Your opponent should be ok with you receiving specific advice prior to this though of course.



wneumann -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (5/31/2009 11:56:35 PM)

The Air Situation

quote:

Alfred: (C1) Too Many Japanese eggs in One Basket

Your opponent has stripped the Pacific of air units and regularly maintains 600-700 aircraft on Upolu. This is far in excess of the 50 x airfield level and partly explains why more than 1/3 are continuously damaged (a similar stroy applies to the mega concentrations at Rangoon and Darwin). With so many damaged Japanese aircraft, when the Allies do gain air superiority it will be too late for the enemy to successfully evacuate their air units. Consequently when the Allies capture Upolu, 400-600 aircraft will probably be destroyed and many air units banished from reappearing for a year. Japanese air power in the Pacific will be shattered allowing for a considerable acceleration of Allied offensive operations in the Pacific.

A couple statements supporting and/or adding to Alfred's remarks follow.

(a) Daily aircraft numbers I've posted in Allied air recon reports over Darwin and Rangoon have also shown Pillager maintaining 600-700 aircraft or more in those two locations as well. These numbers plus what Alfred states above for Upolu suggests Pillager has concentrated the bulk of Japanese LBA in four places - (1) Samoa, (2) Darwin, (3) Rangoon, and (4) China. This of course excludes smaller Jap air components in the Japanese home islands and several other locations (DEI, Formosa, Port Moresby, etc) on training activities or observed in reported contacts between U.S. subs and Jap planes on naval search/ASW missions.

(b) Japanese air forces in China are basically those which started the game there and have remained at a fairly constant level since. Pillager does not appear to have either reinforced the Jap air force in China or removed air units from China in significant numbers to other theatres.

(c) The bad news about concentrations of Jap air forces at Samoa, Darwin and Rangoon is that Allied air forces are engaging Japanese LBA "en masse". The good news is that attrition of Japanese LBA by Allied air forces is also carried out "en masse". Numbers of operational Jap planes and total number of Japanese planes at Rangoon and Darwin have been slowly declining with each Allied raid on these bases - while it is possible Pillager may be reinforcing Samoa from Darwin and/or Rangoon, it might also be possible that some attrition of Japanese LBA may be in at least its early stages.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Air Operations question:

I've been sending fighter escorts on Allied 4E bombing raids against Rangoon and Darwin more with the intent of engaging and destroying Japanese CAP fighters than actually escorting the bombers (though the first intention does serve the last). A question here might be whether using fighters as escorts for 4E bombers or sending fighter sweeps over Rangoon and Darwin (either with or without a separate bombing mission) is the more efficient practice in terms of engaging Japanese fighters?

I may have answered my own question below. If not, chime in.

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quote:

Alfred: (B3) Australian Northern Territory

(ii) the daily bombing of the airfield at Daly Waters wastes Allied ordnance. If runway damage is say 80, what is the point of inflicting another 70-100+ hits the next day. Only bomb the airfield when it is about to become operational, otherwise start CAS operations to start reducing the enemy Ass Val

(iii) if the fortification level at Daly Waters is less than level 9 (the only possible excuse for wasting ordnance on a daily airfield attack), then the enemy will not progress far in building up the forts because I am not advocating a total cessation of airfield attacks. If the fortification level is already at 9, then there is no excuse for wasting the ordnance.

(iv) 4E operations against Darwin should be regularly rotated against Darwin's port (to both impede unloading of supplies/LCUs and gain naval intel which can assist the Kimberley campaign), airfield (to suppress the stationed 600-1000 aircraft) and if Darwin has any resource centres in this mod, bomb them to make the enemy (at Darwin and ulimately Daly Waters) more dependent on imported supply to both feed himself and to rebuild the facilities (NB your opponent always repairs his bombed Heavy Industry at Rangoon)

(v) any remaining P-38 units at Tennant Creek are better employed sweeping Darwin rather than escorting the 4E


What I'm covering here is points in this part of Alfred's post specific to air operations in NW Australia.

(ii) I see your point on airfield strikes against Daly Waters. Ground attack strikes by Allied 2E bombers and fighter-bombers against Daly Waters (except as stated when necessary to keep the airfield from becoming operational) would likely be equally or more effective in inflicting Jap LCU casualties. Also, the excess airfield damage over 100 from airfield bombing doesn't consume Japanese supply (the excess damage never being counted for repair).

(iii) I have no available information on Jap fortification level at Daly Waters.

(iv) On bombing Darwin...

Daily air recon over Darwin has been showing infrequent Jap naval/shipping activity. Very few TF's have been spotted or detected in Darwin base hex, usually no ships at anchor in Darwin port. Any Japanese TF detected in Darwin are rather small and usually there long enough to load/unload, then leave. An occasional port strike against Darwin could be useful if or when daily air recon is not providing adequate information on this kind of activity, to attack detected Jap ships loading/unloading in Darwin, or for yet to be identified other purposes.

Which begs the question.... Where is the Japanese supply coming from in NW Australia? I did a check and there are no resource centers in any of the Japanese occupied bases in NW Australia (Darwin, Katherine, Daly Waters, Broome, Darby, Wyndham). Pillager has 30+ Jap LCU's in NW Australia, bunches of planes based in Darwin, and only an occasional Jap TF visiting Darwin.

I am considering detaching the P-38 escort from my 4E bomber strikes over Darwin. The 4E bomber strikes can be rotated between airfield strikes in Darwin and assisting with ground attack strikes against Daly Waters (point ii above). 4E bomber strikes in NW Australia should likely be directed at targets creating damage and/or casualties that maximizes Jap supply point consumption.

(v) P-38 fighters can be re-directed on sweeps over Darwin to continue inflicting Jap LBA casualties.

quote:

Alfred: (B4) Burma

... RAF operations in Burma must become more sophisticated and efficient. This entails the total destruction of Burmese Heavy Industry, Resource and Oil Centres located at Rangoon and anywhere else they are located in this mod. Your opponent must be forced to survive on imported supplies. Particularly note that he has a track record of expending valuable supply to repair his Rangoon Heavy Industry and Resource Centres. In Burma, the RAF can ultimately ensure the enemy adjusted Ass Val is critically weakened by imposing an aerial blockade.

(iv) any Heavy Industry, Resource/Oil centres located in Mandalay (in this mod) must be totally destroyed by the RAF (in rotation with airfield and CAS) because the cost to repair will deny supply to 33 Div/C.

(viii) to increase enemy air fatigue and lower morale at Rangoon, RAF operations against Rangoon should include, from different bases:
* am, concentrated fighter sweeps
* am, follow up bombers (with or without escorts) on city strategic bombing as their primary mission
* pm, bombers flying as their secondary mission (ie their primary mission is naval attack but as enemy TF movement will be relatively limited, they will often default to their secondary mission) airfield and port attack.

Again, I'm covering here only those portions of Alfred's post relating to air operations.

Only Rangoon has a Heavy Industry center. Resource centers are located at Mandalay, Magwe, Meiktila, Rangoon and Moulmein. For purposes of this discussion I am omitting Oil production centers as they do not (by themselves) generate supply points.

As with Darwin, I'm also considering detaching fighter escorts from 4E bomber strikes for employment on separate missions.

I am considering re-directing both 4E and 2E bomber strikes in Burma to attack primarily Resource centers, and to initially concentrate on eliminating the smaller Resource production centers at Mandalay, Magwe and Meiktila. These three Resource centers are the primary "in-house" supply source to Japanese occupied bases in the interior areas of Burma. Destruction of Resource centers at Mandalay, Magwe, and Meiktila would force Japanese bases in the interior to begin drawing supply from stocks in Rangoon (supply either locally produced in Rangoon or brought in from outside Burma).

Once Resource centers in Mandalay, Magwe and Meiktila are suppressed, 4E bombing attacks can be then be directed back against Rangoon with emphasis again on Resource production. Attacks on the Resource center in Moulmein can be done along with attacks on Rangoon.

If bombing attacks on Resource production are successful, Heavy industry facilities in Rangoon will become "starved" for Resource points and stop production even though they have sufficient Oil available. At this point, all generation of supply points in Burma is stopped.

As with Darwin, fighters currently escorting 4E bombers over Rangoon would be re-directed to fighter sweep missions.

Other fighters and fighter-bombers in the India/Burma theatre will continue with ground attack strikes against Jap LCU targets, mainly at Jap bases in interior areas of Burma and against Jap LCU's detected moving between bases.


The thrust of air campaigns over Burma and NW Australia appear to be leaning towards a "War against Supply", other damage along the way happily accepted as collateral.

Lots more to cover......



Nemo121 -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/15/43 (6/1/2009 2:07:02 AM)

The most effective way to kill Japanese fighters is to SWEEP. Run multiple sweeps per day. 3 x sweeps of 100 x P-51s are more effective than 1 x sweep of 300 P-51s due to the manner in which damaged airframes are pulled out of the fight on subsequent sweeps and pilot fatigue is modelled.

Ideally you would be looking for 3 to 4 sweeps by fighters followed by massive bomber raids. The goal would be to use the fighter sweeps to remove the enemy fighters and then have your bombers come in to obliterate the 50%+ of his fighters and bombers which are grounded due to damage and airfield overloading.

Even if you lose 1:1 on the sweeps you can get 2 or 3:1 exchange rates if the bomber attacks are heavy enough.

There are many problems with the combat model in WiTP but basically if you imagine normal combat operations as comprising a U shaped curve with a large top of the U at which the forces of the two sides are at relative equilibrium then the WiTP combat model is very much V shaped with a very small point of equilibrium and very steep cliffs ( as opposed to gentle slopes ) of dysequilibrium on either side.

The trick is that when you recognise this you realise that so long as you get on the cliffside favourable to your forces your outcomes can be massively out of proportion to your superiority. It seems to me that you are fighting a lot of battles at ( roughly ) equilibrium instead of fighting 2 or 3 major campaigns in which you concentrate such as to create favourable dysequilibrium. The end result of this is that you are stalemated in a lot of places instead of moving swiftly ahead in a few critical areas.

That's enough for now until you finish your analysis.



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/16/43 (6/1/2009 4:40:43 AM)

Summary of Operations 12/16/43

North Pacific: All sectors quiet.


Central Pacific: H8K Emily air patrols reported by U.S. subs near Kwajalein and the Canton Is area. Subs operating off the Japanese home islands report light Jap air activity. No reported contacts between U.S. submarines and Japanese surface ships or ASW.

19 Japanese ships detected at anchor in Kwajalein base. 183 ships detected in port at Tokyo.
Sigint report entry for 12/16 indicates Jap 12 Independent Mixed Rgt located at Eniewetok. 12 Rgt is a new LCU in the Japanese OOB.
F-5A recon over Canton Is reports 5 aircraft, 15 Jap LCU's.


Pago Pago, Day 91 of the Fiasco: Weather forecast for Pago Pago area is continued precipitation. No reported naval activity in the area this game turn.

Transport TF's forming at Penhryn Is and loading for a sortie to Pago Pago. This coming operation will transport an Aviation Rgt plus a yet to be determined quantity of supply to Pago Pago base - no plans to send transports this time to either Savaii or Upolu.

Unidentified Jap submarine spotted by PBY naval search patrol NNE of Penhryn (hex 107,108) - moving on SE heading. ASW TF's being formed at Penhryn and Jarvis Is to track and engage this contact.

Current status of Pago Pago base - runway damage 51, airfield service damage 91, port damage 2. Current supply on hand - 10K.
Current status of Savaii base - runway damage 99, airfield service damage 100, port damage 9 (no change).

All but one of the 15-20 damaged transports and landing craft surviving Jap LBA air attacks in the last transport mission to Pago Pago have now returned to Penhryn Is. The last remaining ship (TK Gulfbelle - 44 system damage) is due to reach Penhryn on 12/17. Many of the damaged ships have already completed emergency flood and/or fire damage repair and departed Penhryn to complete repairs in U.S. West Coast shipyards.

Jap recon flight over Pago Pago. Jap LBA air attacks on base facilities at both Pago Pago and Savaii, also ground attack strikes against U.S. LCU's on Upolu. AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Pago Pago , at 96,113

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 21
A6M5 Zeke x 164
N1K1-J George x 6
J1N1-S Irving x 12
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 35
Ki-45 KAIb Nick x 34
Ki-61-Ib Tony x 16

Allied aircraft
no flights

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M3 Zero: 2 damaged
A6M5 Zeke: 2 destroyed, 46 damaged
Ki-43-IIa Oscar: 9 damaged
Ki-45 KAIb Nick: 5 damaged
Ki-61-Ib Tony: 5 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F6F Hellcat: 5 destroyed
F4U-1 Corsair: 3 destroyed
PBM Mariner: 1 destroyed
P-47C Thunderbolt: 3 destroyed

Allied ground losses:
280 casualties reported
Guns lost 1
Vehicles lost 2

Airbase hits 2
Airbase supply hits 2
Runway hits 83

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
18 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
7 x Ki-61-Ib Tony bombing at 2000 feet
12 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
12 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
12 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
11 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
10 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
10 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
9 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
11 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
9 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
4 x Ki-61-Ib Tony bombing at 2000 feet
6 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
5 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
4 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
4 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-61-Ib Tony bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-45 KAIb Nick bombing at 2000 feet
2 x Ki-61-Ib Tony bombing at 2000 feet
3 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
3 x A6M3 Zero bombing at 2000 feet
2 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
2 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Pago Pago , at 96,113

Japanese aircraft
P1Y Frances x 177

Allied aircraft
no flights

Japanese aircraft losses
P1Y Frances: 3 destroyed, 31 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
P-47C Thunderbolt: 1 destroyed
F6F Hellcat: 3 destroyed
F4U-1 Corsair: 2 destroyed

Allied ground losses:
154 casualties reported
Guns lost 1
Vehicles lost 1

Airbase hits 3
Airbase supply hits 2
Runway hits 39

Aircraft Attacking:
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
9 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
5 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
8 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
7 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
6 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
4 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
2 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
2 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
3 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
2 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet
2 x P1Y Frances bombing at 15000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Savaii , at 95,112

Japanese aircraft
D4Y Judy x 25
B6N2 Jill x 24

Japanese aircraft losses
D4Y Judy: 1 damaged

Allied ground losses:
47 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Runway hits 37

Aircraft Attacking:
13 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
12 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet
6 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Savaii , at 95,112

Japanese aircraft
D4Y Judy x 41

Japanese aircraft losses
D4Y Judy: 3 damaged

Runway hits 18

Aircraft Attacking:
9 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
11 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
5 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
4 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet
3 x D4Y Judy bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 32nd US Division, at 95,113

Japanese aircraft
B6N2 Jill x 78
Ki-49 Helen x 18
Ki-48-II Lily x 29

No Japanese losses

Allied ground losses:
266 casualties reported
Guns lost 3
Vehicles lost 1

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
9 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
13 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
11 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
11 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
4 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 32nd US Division, at 95,113

Japanese aircraft
A6M5 Zeke x 6
B6N2 Jill x 11
G4M2 Betty x 5

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M5 Zeke: 1 damaged

Allied ground losses:
23 casualties reported

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x G4M2 Betty bombing at 6000 feet
6 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
11 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 37th US Division, at 95,113

Japanese aircraft
B6N2 Jill x 17
Ki-49 Helen x 9
Ki-48-II Lily x 9

No Japanese losses

Allied ground losses:
38 casualties reported
Guns lost 2

Aircraft Attacking:
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
6 x Ki-49 Helen bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
3 x Ki-48-II Lily bombing at 6000 feet
2 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
3 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
4 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet
2 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 16000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 37th US Division, at 95,113

Japanese aircraft
A6M5 Zeke x 3
B6N2 Jill x 6
G4M2 Betty x 3

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M5 Zeke: 2 damaged

Allied ground losses:
9 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

Aircraft Attacking:
3 x G4M2 Betty bombing at 6000 feet
3 x A6M5 Zeke bombing at 2000 feet
6 x B6N2 Jill bombing at 6000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jap ground forces bombard U.S. troops on Upolu. AAR follows.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Upolu

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 3464 troops, 72 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 672
41st, 42nd, 51st, 53rd & 61st Naval Gd; Sasebo 7 SNLF, 51 Independent Mixed Brigade (-), 9 & 11 Independent Mixed Rgts,
Arshan Garrison Rgt, 7 Field Artillery Brigade, 140 IJN Base Force, 127 IJNAF Base Force (-), 5 AF Construction Bn (-),
9 AF Construction Bn, 24 Aviation Unit, 2 Aviation Rgt, 10 Special Base Force (-)

Defending force 61243 troops, 191 guns, 23 vehicles, Assault Value = 1256
1st Cavalry, Americal, 32nd, 37th & 1st Marine Divisions, HQ I Amphibious Corps

Allied ground losses:
166 casualties reported



wneumann -> Summary of Operations 12/16/43 (6/1/2009 4:58:53 AM)

Summary of Operations 12/16/43 - continued

South Pacific: SS Paddle at Rabaul reporting contacts with Ki-48 Lily & Ki-49 Helen air patrols.


Australia: No reported ground or air combat this game turn. Allied ground forces continue overland movement northward towards Portland Roads.

Sigint report entry for 12/16 indicates Jap 6 Light AA Bn now located in Daly Waters. Previous location of this unit was Tsitsihar on 6/20/43. Another Jap LCU transferred out of Manchuria.

Hudson I recon over Darwin reporting fighters on CAP, no Jap TF (-1 from last report), airfield damage 45, 331 aircraft (139 fighters, 19 bombers), 7 Jap LCU's.

Allied recon flights over Port Moresby and Exmouth both reporting no detected activity or change in Jap forces.


DEI: Sigint report entry for 12/16 indicating Jap 43 Construction Bn now at Soerabaja. Previous location of this unit was in Darwin on 10/2/43.


India/Burma: No reported air or ground combat this game turn.

Detected status of Jap base in Rangoon - 1 Jap TF, one ship disbanded in port, airfield damage 22, 520 aircraft (225 fighters, 41 bombers), 12 Jap LCU's, heavy industry 59(134).

CW-22 Falcon recon over Mandalay reports 9 Jap LCU's.
Hudson I recon over Meiktila reports 4 Jap LCU's.


China: Jap recon flights over Tuyun, Chungking, Kweiyang. AAR's of latest Jap air strikes in China follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 23rd Chinese Corps, at 42,33 (SE of Chungking)

Japanese aircraft
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 20

No Japanese losses


Allied ground losses:
72 casualties reported

Aircraft Attacking:
20 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on 95th Chinese Corps, at 44,31 (N of Chungking)

Japanese aircraft
Ki-43-IIa Oscar x 22

No Japanese losses


Allied ground losses:
69 casualties reported

Aircraft Attacking:
22 x Ki-43-IIa Oscar bombing at 2000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Japanese ground forces at Tuyun and near Chungking continue bombardment attacks. Latest AAR's follow.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at Tuyun

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 282161 troops, 1103 guns, 240 vehicles, Assault Value = 5540
3rd, 6th, 13th, 22nd, 29th, 34th, 36th, 40th, 41st, 58th, 60th, 64th, 65th, 104th, 110th & 116th Infantry Divisions;
3rd Tank Division; 1 Independent Brigade; 1 Yobi Ebi Rgt, 2, 8, 19, 20,& 27 Engineer Rgts; 2 Mountain Gun Rgt,
2 RF Gun Bn, 6 & 15 FA Rgts, 13 & 15 Tank Rgts, HQ 23rd Army

Defending force 37321 troops, 1 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 969
37th, 46th, 60th, 62nd, 64th, 74th, 79th & 99th Chinese Corps; 71st Chinese Division;
27th Chinese Guerilla Corps; HQ 1st, 2nd, 16th & 20th Group Armies

Allied ground losses:
100 casualties reported

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground combat at 42,33 (SE of Chungking)

Japanese Bombardment attack

Attacking force 860 troops, 35 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 1290
32nd & 47th Infantry Divisions, 1 Mortar Bn
Defending force 34708 troops, 124 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 970
21st, 23rd, 63rd, 75th, 86th & 96th Chinese Corps

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



ny59giants -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/16/43 (6/1/2009 2:21:44 PM)

quote:

Transport TF's forming at Penhryn Is and loading for a sortie to Pago Pago. This coming operation will transport an Aviation Rgt plus a yet to be determined quantity of supply to Pago Pago base - no plans to send transports this time to either Savaii or Upolu.


If you think you can, I would think about pulling out some of your squadrons of fighters to get rebuilt. They are not doing you any good there as long as he has air superiority over the base. I would imagine that most of the planes are damaged and until your airfield service damage goes down, they will not repair.



wneumann -> RE: Summary of Operations 12/16/43 (6/2/2009 11:27:14 PM)

More Air Stuff

quote:

ny59giants: How many of your 245 fighters at Pago Pago are operational??

See the display at the end of this post - this is the status of U.S. planes on Pago Pago airfield as of 12/18/43*.

quote:

ny59giants: If you cannot get in the Aviation Rgt by APs, consider using transport planes, patrol planes, or Fast Transports.

Given my findings below, the only available means of transporting the Aviation Rgt to Pago Pago is by sea - in fact TF's with the Aviation Rgt and supply departed Penhryn for Pago Pago on 12/18*.

* I haven't posted this game turn in here yet.

The distance by air between Penrhyn and Pago Pago is 15 hexes - beyond maximum range of C-47/C-46 transports and PBY/PBM patrol planes. The only existing planes in the U.S. inventory capable of reaching Pago Pago from Penhryn are Liberator variants (PB4Y's, B-24D/J's, LB-30's) and these planes have only the capability of carrying supply. This fact pretty much eliminates any possibility of getting the Aviation Rgt into Pago Pago by air. I had looked at doing this earlier and would have attempted it had the planes to do this been available.

quote:

ny59giants: If you think you can, I would think about pulling out some of your squadrons of fighters to get rebuilt. They are not doing you any good there as long as he has air superiority over the base. I would imagine that most of the planes are damaged and until your airfield service damage goes down, they will not repair.

As far as most planes being damaged, the display below pretty much speaks for itself.

I see three possible options for dealing with the fighter squadrons now on Pago Pago.

(1) Fly out undamaged fighter planes from Pago Pago (air transfer them to Penhryn) as they become repaired at Pago Pago base, re-assemble the squadrons at Penhryn as individual planes of the squadrons become operational on Pago Pago and can fly off from there. It could work. The only question I would have to this method is that some of the fighter squadrons now appear to have more pilots than planes.

(2) Transport them out by sea. Not my first choice. There's the (very high) risk of loading them onto an AK and then the AK sinking from a Jap air strike.

(3) Leave them on Pago Pago. Yes, the planes are free target practice for Jap LBA. However, with an Aviation Rgt and sufficient supply on Pago Pago and airfield facilities on Pago Pago operational, I do have a second force of U.S. fighter squadrons (now) available on Penhryn that can transfer onto Pago Pago by air and immediately begin CAP over the base. CAP over Pago Pago from this second group of fighter squadrons could provide cover for the squadrons now on Pago Pago as they repair planes and return to operational status. I'm currently leaning toward this option.

[image]local://upfiles/18646/5DA8BF38238D465D8D042AA8F66BDE09.jpg[/image]



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