RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (Full Version)

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AcePylut -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/25/2010 10:32:24 PM)

No one feared the battleships after the first couple of months.... everyone feared the aircraft carrier... because it held aircraft. 

Yes there is a supposed triangle of air-ground-ship... but it is all focused on doing one thing and one thing only... projecting air power.



AcePylut -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/25/2010 10:33:00 PM)

PS - I think I said it earlier...

Hit Manila.  Those 20+ subs are far more deadly then the battleships at Pearl. 



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/25/2010 10:45:38 PM)

LBA based on the Ellice Islands were used to suppress the Gilberts. The Gilberts suppressed the Marshalls. The Marshalls and Manus suppressed Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas suppressed Ulithi, Iwo Jima, and Palau. Palau and Ulithi suppressed Leyte. Leyte suppressed Luzon. Luzon suppressed Okinawa.



xj900uk -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/26/2010 10:51:28 AM)

quote:

Hit Manila. Those 20+ subs are far more deadly then the battleships at Pearl


That would be true if the US subs had decent reliable torpedo's. It is amazing that the US had just about the best subs in the world in Dec '41 but the worst fish imaginable. The Mark 14 was slow, had poor range, didn't always leave the tube and both its methods of detonation (contact primer and magnetic proximity) were very unreliable. It has been widely quoted that taking allt hings into account, the mark 14 up until the middle of '43 had a failure rate of aroudn 80%... And it was also slow and poorly ranged into the bargain, especially when compared to IJN fish.
The older S-boats, which stemmed from a WWI design in theory were slow, obsolete and limited range and in fact were scheduled for replacement by the end of '42 (although hostilities and other demands kept a lot in service until the end of '43). However they used older torpedos (again dating from a WWI design) rather than the newer, more complex and ludicrously expensive mark 14, which only had a contact detonator but was far more reliable.

quote:

This question had been subject to heated debate within the US Navy before the war. The single-CV TF was probably optimal for the 1941-42 period, while offence dominated defence. (After Eastern Solomons, it was claimed that the 10-15 nm separation between the two carriers preserved the Saratoga unhurt while the Enterprise was hit hard.) On the other hand, at Coral Sea, the US carriers initially operated in a single formation.

The fast CVTF was a pre-war development, designed for scouting, raiding, and anti-raider operations. It consisted theoretically of a carrier, two to four escorting heavy cruisers, a CLAA serving as DD squadron leader, and a destroyer squadron


That is also true, but it was a largely theoretical debate and had actually not had much practice/training in fleet exercises, certainly nothing before the late 30's and only because of teh increasingly military threat from Japan, and also the acrimonious debates about the Orange Plan, defence of the Philipines, and coudl carriers somehow make everything easier/workable.
Midway was the first time two US carriers had operated together in one TF (16, E & H), it had never ever been tried before and everyone was worried signals and commuinicatinos would be a nightmare and cause lots of accidents/problems - as it was several planes did join the wrong landing circuits which lead to delays (and a few even touching down on the wrong flightdeck) and recognition was generally poor all roudn (but not as awful as the Coral Sea).
At the Guadacanal landings, E Solomons and Santa Cruz the US carrier groups all operated independatnly of each other, funnily enough the IJN also went back to operating smaller carrier groups either in pairs or else single carriers rather than a big concentration of force (not putting all your eggs in one basket I guess)

The US fast carrier TF though at least according to pre-war thinking was still primarily for recce/search and possibly hunting down the odd merchant raider (a naval species which had flourished primiarly in WWI, and despite a few odd successes in 41-42 its day had really come and gone). Also the SBD dive bombers were trained to hit shore targets rather than enemy ships, it was only in the late 30's that this was re-focused to be primarily on enemy shipping although the training (trying to drop a practice bomb on a stationary buoy or else a slowly-towed raft marked with smoke flares) left a lot to be desired. Certainly though nobody in the US Admiralty seriously considered using aircraft to compeltely knock out the enemys battlefleet singlehanded (disable a few big battlewagons to be finished off in a surface shooting match a la Bismark perhaps, or else disable the oppositions carriers/recce planes), unlike the IJ who having learned the lessons at Taranto perhaps better than anyone else and despite some opposition from the 'big gun/decisive fleet battle' voices were streets ahead of the US in Dec '41, both in terms of training as well as deployment and end-use.
It was only when the smoke was rising from the wreckage of PH did the US Admiralty finally tear up its long-cherished battleplans and look more closely at the idea of the fast carrier TF and whehter or not it could meet the IJ on equal terms - as it so happened it most definitely could not, but it was the first step in the right direction



JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/26/2010 8:03:18 PM)

Ya know Harry, I really like your initial conditions. We normally play on 6-9 month (game time) constructed scenarios starting whenever. But we have some gamers in the group that may just want to do some sidebar campaign stuff. We have run enough Southern options that it wouldn't be hard to construct a rational mix of opening day move scenarios. Your initial conditions would make life interesting for the operational planners.



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/26/2010 11:35:03 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: JWE

Ya know Harry, I really like your initial conditions. We normally play on 6-9 month (game time) constructed scenarios starting whenever. But we have some gamers in the group that may just want to do some sidebar campaign stuff. We have run enough Southern options that it wouldn't be hard to construct a rational mix of opening day move scenarios. Your initial conditions would make life interesting for the operational planners.


That's why I'm exploring it. The guesstimated effect of attacking Pearl was calibrated based on the Political Will mechanism in Mark Herman's Empire of the Sun.



LoBaron -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/27/2010 9:57:45 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin


quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin


quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I could give a detailed analysis of why Pearl Harbor is the only game in town, but I will instead be quite succinct and limit myself to a one word analysis.

Clausewitz

He was right in 1812. He still remains right in 2010. His analysis equally applies to maritime warfare. In the Pacific conflict, maritime power IS the military means of defeating the enemy.

Alfred


In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.


Disagree.

1. You can't import the necessary raw materials using aircraft transport planes. You can't maintain the land forces, who after all are ultimately needed to hold terrain, unless you operate SLOCs.

2. Airpower in the Pacific was impossible unless you captured/maintained airfields. For that you needed boots on the ground, and how did those boots capture/maintain the base. Answer by having maritime power.

3. Most of the mobile offensive airpower was provided by carrier airpower. Again, no maritime power, no significant air projection. The PTO was not the ETO. The great distances over water limited the usefulness of air power in comparison to continental combat.

4. Air power by itself did not tactically guarantee a blockade. To say that a naval base would be untenable merely reinforces the point that maintenance of SLOC is the key. The enemy air will not be able to maintain a blockade if it itself could not be logistically maintained.

War is a combined arms operation where all three elements are required. In the PTO Clausewitz's observations apply to the maritime as that was the primus inter pares of the military forces to get the job done taking into account the geopolitical.

Alfred


Hear me out.

There was no key terrain in the theatre--no locations you needed to hold as naval bases, population centres, or for their natural resources. (Most of the island airbases were fragile and easily suppressed.) The only reason you took a landmass was to base aircraft there. That meant you could bypass most occupied islands and put a minimum of troops into the islands you did land on. Almost all the airpower was land-based. Carriers gave you two things--mobility and mass--they could generate a surge of sorties for a few days and then get out of Dodge, but you needed the land-based air to maintain long-term operational superiority. That long-term operational superiority created a blockade no naval force could challenge. And no troops could cross the water unaided. Air dominated the Pacific.

If you don't believe me, note that only the Guadalcanal operation was launched outside the range of land-based air.


Gilberts? Marianas? Leyte? Okinawa? Some may have technically been w/i range of LBA, but certainly not effective range.




Interesting discussion.

I see it the same way as Alfred though.
Key terrain or not, war in an area as huge as the Pacific is won with logistics. Logistics is the pre dominant factor for every strategic decision.
To achieve the logistical and so also the underlying strategic goals you need a naval force, not neccesarily an airforce.

Air superiority is neither self sufficient (you need logistics to create a functional airbase) nor does it win a war on its own.

When assuming that the basic ground troops for operations are present in abundance (as was the case in nearly every war, even WWII - with the exception
of the axis powers close to the end), only naval superiority enables you to move these abundant assets around.
The fact that you can dominate an area by air only, if supplied and maintained sufficiently which again implies logistics, does not make it the same strategic/logistic asset that comes with
transport ships and warships to protect those.



mike scholl 1 -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/27/2010 10:37:14 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

The limited war scenario (with Japan treating Hawaii, Alaska, and the lower 48 as off-limits, but always with the option of flipping the bit and going to total war) is very challenging for the Allies.



Not really limited enough unless you also include the Philippines. Really..., what's the difference to the average American between a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that kills a couple thousand Americans and a surprise attack on Manila that kills a couple thousand Americans? It was the "stab in the back" nature of Japan's assault that really got the US population in an uproar.





JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/27/2010 7:59:49 PM)

I'm kinda with you LoBaron.

Back when I was doing my penance, working for the Govt, I always remembered my range CO back at Sill. His office had a portrait of an English archer facing a portrait of a Milanese crossbowman. I asked once, and he said – “That’s the definition of artillery, lieutenant.” Took me a while to figure that one out.

In this modern age of acronyms and milspeak, we sometimes tend to forget where the definitions come from, and what they mean. I am going to purposely shock and insult airpower enthusiasts now, so be warned.

Airpower is nothing more than artillery on a vastly greater scale of range and vector. This 3D warfare crap is just that. Air provokes only an additional threat vector. It does not apply a fundamentally different scope of force to a target (except for an atomic bomb, from whence the Air Farce gets its arrogant, parochial attitude).

Conceptually, Air is an extension of conventional combat modalities. CAS is artillery, with long but indeterminate range and appearing from multiple threat vectors, but a good plane equates to a good 155mm so far as the target gomers are concerned. CAP equates to very long range AA, but from multiple threat vectors; VB and VT equates to very, very long range gunfire but coming from multiple threat vectors.

Air ain’t magic, no matter what the air farce wants people to believe. The Marines, Navy and Army understand these concepts very well.

So, while the game does what it wishes, one should conceptually view LBA as a very long range AA/CD capability. Similarly, CV air should be conceptually viewed as very long range AA/NavGuns,. Given that perspective (i.e., reach), then Clausewitz, Mahan, Tiberius, Belesarius, or even Xenophon or Epaminondas could understand it in their terms.

Warfare IS. It has its own dimensions and imperatives and doesn’t tuck in nicely with logic; it is illogical by definition. Concept, concept, concept – who gives a crap about the day-to-day.



LoBaron -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/27/2010 9:37:17 PM)

I agree completely JWE.

I´d like to add some thoughs though that lessen the shock factor in your definition. [;)]

Whats the difference between a tiger and a cat?
Size, power, range, zone of control, speed, ammount of food needed. [8D]

Thats the same as the difference between a Longbowman and artillery and between 155mm and a B17.

So while basically the service stays the same and its use and capabilities are limited compared to true strategic assets (like naval force or the atomic bomb)
the above differences in capability and supply requirements create both, a greater danger and influence to/on those strategic assets and a new logistic task
for them.
Thats why the air forces own imprint, in a conflict covering a huge area, is higher on a relative basis than artillery and is so easily confused with a true strategic asset.



AcePylut -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/27/2010 9:38:31 PM)

In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

That is absolutely true.... kinda funny seeing arguments against it.  After all, Rabaul and Truk were totally useful bases after they Japs lost control of the air over them.  /sarcasmbotoff


Fact is... the thing that won WW2 was airpower.  Weather that aircraft was launched from a ship or a base on the ground.... it wasn't battleships that led to victory.  It wasn't troops on the ground that was the #1 factor in victory... it was control of the airspace that led to victory.


Everyone need to step back and think for a bit about the Magic Triangle:  Air controls sea.  Sea brings men.  Men operate the airbase.

Look at that from the big picture.  What is this magic triangle trying to do?  Create air superiority... so you can have Naval superiority... so you can have ground superiority.

That pretty much makes air power the #1 thing.


Lets look at airpower in terms of CD/Arty.  I'll take the ability to drop a 155mm projectile 200nm away over the ability to drop a 155mm projectile 20 miles away (Battleships) over the ability to drop 155mm projectiles 5 miles away (ground arty) over the ability to drop 120mm projectiles 300 yards away (mortar squad).

But not only that, but I'll take the ability to *see* what is going on over a 1000 square mile range from 20k feet (search planes), vs. the ability to 'see' to the horizon (ships), vs. the ability to see from one tree line to the next.

I'll take the ability to bring that Anti-Aircraft capability to the enemy's base via air superiority vs. having that ability to bring that AA over the range of my TF's guns. 

WW2 proved one thing:  He who controls the air wins the war.

There IS, indeed, a reason we produced ~100 aircraft carriers in WW2, and not 100 Battleships.  To project airpower. 

So given that, I completely fail to see any argument that "ships" were more important than planes, or troops. 

While they were all important (Magic Triangle) and all that... it was airpower that was above the other two.



FatR -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 9:58:40 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

LBA based on the Ellice Islands were used to suppress the Gilberts. The Gilberts suppressed the Marshalls. The Marshalls and Manus suppressed Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas suppressed Ulithi, Iwo Jima, and Palau. Palau and Ulithi suppressed Leyte. Leyte suppressed Luzon. Luzon suppressed Okinawa.

Not really. At each and every stage of this advance, carrier airpower did 90+% of the work and LBA mopped up survivors and kept airfields inoperable at best. Well, except for Philippines campaign. But even there LBA did not contribute much to the initial jump to Leyte.



FatR -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 10:33:53 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: AcePylut
So given that, I completely fail to see any argument that "ships" were more important than planes, or troops. 

That's because you're looking the wrong direction, and attempt to asses the value of assets in vacuum. You're forgetting, that planes are replaceable, and ships are not. In the game of AE, the main limiting factors on airpower, past early game, where one or both sides might struggle with shortages are a)number of unrestricted squadrons and b)available airbases. Reinforcements/production are plentiful, and attrition to the point when one side is literally out of planes is highly unlikely. Japanese can did this to some of the Allied airforces in the early game, but really, the number of planes they are likely to destroy during the initial expansion amounts to about 1 month worth of Allied aircraft reinforcements in 1944. As about pilots, Allies have a lot of restricted squadrons for pilot training, so by late 1942 they probably will have several skill 60+ pilots for every available USAAF fighter and no deficit for other airforces. Japanese not nearly so much, but still enough to stockpile at least fighter pilots in all but most combat-heavy games. Allies have a deficit of level bombers and good anti-shipping planes for much of 1942, but I do not expect it to last farther.

Therefore, targeting planes is largely meaningless, except as a way of establishing local superiority for a particular operation. Early war might be exception for Japanese, and late war, when Japan cannot keep factories working, for Allies

Ships, on the other hand, are irreplaceable. The number of them you can use is limited mostly by the number of them you have, and you cannot order more of them. Therefore, every single ship you sink reduces the sum total of your opponent's naval power forever. While some categories of ships are either very numerous and nearly impossible to attrite to the point where it starts hurting your opponent (xAKs, particularly for Allies) or numerous and not that useful indivdually, so that sinking them does not achieve much (various small escorts), in general, ships, not planes serve as the bottleneck for both sides. Considering that successful night SCTF attacks in the areas of enemy air superiority are very possible, as evidenced by many AARs, this includes heavy surface combatants.








xj900uk -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 12:06:23 PM)

However, contrary to the earlier prophet of doom like Douhet, air power can not win wars on its own. True in terms of long-range artillery (the Stuka is perhaps one of the best example of long-range artillery supporting battlefield troops as defined by the principles of Blitzkrieg) it can destroy buildings, land, tactical points (such as, say, an important arterial bridge or supplyline), resources and factories even, and on a broader scale the atomic bomber can vaporise a city. However only good old-fashioned troops can occupy said opponents land and force a result.
In the Vietnam War 1964-1973 the US had far heavier and more powerful air assets deployed over the battlefield, despite some losses (mainly due to political straightjacketing) they did a hell of a lot of damage to the Viet Cong & N Vietnam, particularly in the '72 (Linebacker?) bombing offensive. Yet the US could never win.
One could also argue that the same thing is happening all over again in Afganistan. Here if anything the air war is even more one-sided, with Allied air-assets dominating the battlefield and being used as longrange artillery (mainly tactical, althuogh there has been some strategic bombing). Would you say the US & its allies is winning? The most they seem to be forcing is a very expensive and costly 'score draw'. In fact, cynics would argue that every bomb that is dropped, particularly ones that go astray and cause 'collateral damage', 'victory' seems even more remote...



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 1:45:50 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

LBA based on the Ellice Islands were used to suppress the Gilberts. The Gilberts suppressed the Marshalls. The Marshalls and Manus suppressed Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas suppressed Ulithi, Iwo Jima, and Palau. Palau and Ulithi suppressed Leyte. Leyte suppressed Luzon. Luzon suppressed Okinawa.

Not really. At each and every stage of this advance, carrier airpower did 90+% of the work and LBA mopped up survivors and kept airfields inoperable at best. Well, except for Philippines campaign. But even there LBA did not contribute much to the initial jump to Leyte.


See Mark Herman's study on this.



LoBaron -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 2:25:12 PM)

herwin and AcePylut: I think you are either stating something obvious (that certain strategic goals were possible to achieve with
air and ground troops only) or misunderstanding the point that a couple ov naval NFB (naval fanboys [:D]) were trying to make.
Personally I am a ACFB (air combat fanboy [8|]) but I am still convinced they are spot on.

No. Battleships didn´t win the war. But the airforce also did not.

AKs, APs and TKs won the war.

Whether that may be the atlantic convoys to keep Great Britain alive, the German invasion in Norway, the huge
cargo fleets to Australia, the denial of control of the Mediterranean to the Italians or Germans and so their support of the Africa campaign,
the upport of the SU.

Nothing of this could have been achieved in the air.
This is why a navy is in itself a logistic and a strategic asset and so is the dominating factor on a grand scale war that involves different continents and
a struggle of industrial powers.






AcePylut -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:10:39 PM)

No, I understand perfectly, and the point I make still holds....  that the airforce is the "#1a" thing in the Triangle....  and why?

Because all those logistic ships only travelled places where their side had Air Superiority.

Everything points to having Air Superiority, not naval superiority. 

YOu can have your 10,000 xAK's, and they aren't going to do a darned thing if they are forced to sit in port because if they leave they'll get sunk.

Because both sides learned very quickly not to send the ships where where it didn't have air superiority.


Do you see what the point is... if you want to win a war, you MUST have Air Superiority first.  First.  You don't drive a tf of 100 xAK's to a beach to supply ground troops where you don't have control of the air. 

Key to a successful invasion in WITP and WW2 went like this:
Establish Air Superiority.
Land the troops.
Unload supplies.

not..

Unload Supplies
Land troops
Establish air superiority.

That's what makes air superiority the "highest" #1 of the three (air/ship/ground) in this game.


I mean,  you can have the greatest logistical system in the world, and it doesn't mean squat if those supplies are sitting under 10,000 feet of water, which they will be if you don't have control of the air.



LoBaron -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:37:56 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

No, I understand perfectly, and the point I make still holds....  that the airforce is the "#1a" thing in the Triangle....  and why?

Because all those logistic ships only travelled places where their side had Air Superiority.

Everything points to having Air Superiority, not naval superiority. 

YOu can have your 10,000 xAK's, and they aren't going to do a darned thing if they are forced to sit in port because if they leave they'll get sunk.

Because both sides learned very quickly not to send the ships where where it didn't have air superiority.


Do you see what the point is... if you want to win a war, you MUST have Air Superiority first.  First.  You don't drive a tf of 100 xAK's to a beach to supply ground troops where you don't have control of the air. 

Key to a successful invasion in WITP and WW2 went like this:
Establish Air Superiority.
Land the troops.
Unload supplies.

not..

Unload Supplies
Land troops
Establish air superiority.

That's what makes air superiority the "highest" #1 of the three (air/ship/ground) in this game.


I mean,  you can have the greatest logistical system in the world, and it doesn't mean squat if those supplies are sitting under 10,000 feet of water, which they will be if you don't have control of the air.



Ok you really did not get it. [;)]

You are beginning 15 steps late.

Build transports ships.
Import raw materials.
Build tankers.
Import oil.
Take oil and ressources and get an industrialized nation running.
Build airplanes.
Build transport ships.
Build combat fleet to protect transports against any threat.
Load forward baseforce and troops on transport.
Unload at desired destination.
Build Port
Build AB
Supply both with transport ships.
Fly in aircraft.
Establish Air Superiority.


You start with strategy. A world war is about logistics.
The B17´s launching from England destroyed the German industry because of the Axis power´s inability to prevent the USA from mass producing them in the first,
supplying them in the second and replacing them in the third place. It did not make "poof" and suddently there were the heavy bombers... [:'(]



FatR -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:42:57 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
See Mark Herman's study on this.

The problem is... this study fails to disprove my statement. The author says things to this effect, but fails to prove his viewpoint. The fact is, the key factor in elimination of Truk was the carrier attack in February. (Not only that, this attack also indirectly ended the existence of Rabaul as an effective base, by eliminating aircraft reserves and demonstrating that it is already bypassed.) This study does not offer any evidence that Truk was anything but an empty shell of a base, with important air and naval assets already destroyed or evacuated, by the time American LBA started raiding it. The author also tries to prove his point by quoting an interrogation excerpt, which stated that Japanese evacuated Truk because they feared an air attack. Except, an air attack can be launched from carriers too, as it indeed happened, and the quote provided does not point what sort of air attack they were expecting.



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:48:44 PM)

The only key terrain in the Central and Southwest Pacific during WWII were airbases. There were no resources, population centres, ports, naval bases, or other locations that had to be captured or permanently suppressed to advance. You had to capture or permanently suppress the airbases.

To permanently suppress an airbase (or naval base) in those theatres, you had to use land based air. Carrier air was great for a surge, but didn't last. The base sites in those theatres made for brittle installations, so you could suppress them with a sustained moderate-sized air offensive. Once the Allies had wherewithal to run such an offensive from a base complex, it was only a matter of time until all the Japanese bases within range were out of operation. Mark Herman makes a point that the Japanese refused to keep defensive naval forces at a base under that kind of attack.



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:54:18 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
See Mark Herman's study on this.

The problem is... this study fails to disprove my statement. The author says things to this effect, but fails to prove his viewpoint. The fact is, the key factor in elimination of Truk was the carrier attack in February. (Not only that, this attack also indirectly ended the existence of Rabaul as an effective base, by eliminating aircraft reserves and demonstrating that it is already bypassed.) This study does not offer any evidence that Truk was anything but an empty shell of a base, with important air and naval assets already destroyed or evacuated, by the time American LBA started raiding it. The author also tries to prove his point by quoting an interrogation excerpt, which stated that Japanese evacuated Truk because they feared an air attack. Except, an air attack can be launched from carriers too, as it indeed happened, and the quote provided does not point what sort of air attack they were expecting.


The Southwest Pacific axis of advance did not make use of carriers. Even in the Central Pacific, count sorties.



LoBaron -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:57:55 PM)

Herwin sorry but its obvious what you need to sustain "a sustained moderate-sized air offensive".

Aviation fuel, spare parts, ammunition, bombs, replacement planes, runway equipment, trucks, food, medical supply, clothing,...

How do you think that came there? Air transport?



JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 3:58:20 PM)

The arguments are getting a bit circular.

No leg of the triad is paramount. Where the transport/maneuver medium is somewhat damp, the truck and leg is replaced by something that could move on the medium (ships). Where the targets are hundreds of miles apart, and guns couldn’t reach quite that far, targets were serviced by a long range ordnance delivery system (airplanes). Everything was predicated on putting a man on the ground at the objective. Each had its proper place in the spectrum of force application. The nature of the medium and the distance between objectives, required the force structure to be adjusted accordingly; longer ranged power projection systems to accommodate the distances. In the ETO, where these conditions did not obtain, air was extremely useful, but the German army fought quite efficiently in the face of Allied air superiority.

Sequencing is not particularly relevant. One should always attempt to suppress the opposing forces in order to easy the way for the ground troops to take the objective. The artillery should fire on the objective “before” the troops get there. That doesn’t make artillery “higher” than infantry. A place for everything and everything in its place according to conditions.



herwin -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 4:11:50 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Herwin sorry but its obvious what you need to sustain "a sustained moderate-sized air offensive".

Aviation fuel, spare parts, ammunition, bombs, replacement planes, runway equipment, trucks, food, medical supply, clothing,...

How do you think that came there? Air transport?


I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority.

In response to your comment: actually there were a number of air campaigns in WWII sustained by air transport.



JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 4:33:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin
My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority.

That is true, Harry. Given the nature of the operating medium, and the discontinuous nature of the objectives (time and distance), only long range force delivery systems were effective. Thus airplanes. They were the only ordnance delivery system that effectively disrupt, disperse, suppress, an objective, or provide defense against the OpFor's long range systems (kinda, sorta, premptive counterbattery, yeah?). Makes a lot of sense to say that acquisition and maintenance of air superiority over an objective was a primary operational concern in the Pacific.

Conceptually, I equate the establishment and advance of LBA bases, to the "creeping barrage" of War-I. Establish a superiority of local firepower and use it to advance the ground forces.



xj900uk -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 4:40:39 PM)

quote:

I'm not sure I understand the point you're making. My point is that the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific theatres were about the maintenance and extension of air superiority

That is actually a very valid point. The US were far more adapt at making and maintaining bases especially on the more remote & inhospitable Pacific islands, especially with their 'fighting seabees', earthmoving vehicles and pierced steel planking for laying down a runway quickly. The Japanese had nothing like this and often their 'pioneers' had to make do with pick-axes and shovels at best (and their bare hands if none were available!)



JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 5:02:32 PM)

But wouldn't it be better to think of these as integrated weapon 'systems'? An airplane ain't squat without an airbase or a carrier. A carrier is just a cruise ship and an airfield is just a parking lot without airplanes. One requires the other; so perhaps the 'tooth' and the 'tail' should be viewed as a unit, rather than separate, competing, entities.

Pardon the intrusion, I just really enjoy discussions about the nature of operations. Probably a hormonal imbalance somewhere.



xj900uk -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 5:18:36 PM)

IMO the development of island bases in the Pacific (particularly the SW Pacific) has been somewhat overlooked in recent years as attention shifts back to carriers & their capabilities.
Why was Henderson Field at Guadalcanal so heavily fought over in late '42? Because although neither side really wnated it (it was a semi-primeval, maleria-infested nightmare with enormous and vulnerable supply problems to boot), neither could they afford to cede it to the enemy. BOth sides regarded it as an 'unsinkable' aircraft carrier - witness the damage the aircraft based at Henderson (particularly in the absense of the US carriers) could do to the IJN warships and supply transports in daylight and why the IJ tried to knock it out by both shore bombardment as well as constant airial bombardment.
There has also been a lot of criticism over the IJ's failure to develop/finish the landing strip that had been marked at at Shortlands, even if just for emergency landing/refueling (for damaged planes returning after combat over Guadalcanal, no doubt it would have saved countless valuable trained pilots & aircrews). One train of thought is that it never occurred to them. A second is that they simply lacked the facilities to do so (unlike the US, who had the excellent CB's on call and prided themselves on how quickly they could develop an island base, particularly knocking up even a small airstrip where it was deemed virtually impossible for one to be built).
Also, not only the supply network and chain caused extensive problems for both sides - the US had big headaches with supply in the Pacific well into '44, not only because of the distances involved, but of the geographical problems in lack of deep water ports and harbour facilities, which took a lot longer to knock up than a small airstrip, and in their absence a total lack of small lighter craft to unload the bigger ships which were sitting offshore at anchor twiddling their thumbs waiting for a free potshot from some passing Jap sub.
There was a very interesting article written by an Aussie Quartermaster in early '44 who had been asigned to Milne Bay and charged with clearing the bottleneck of large ships sitting outside port (some had been there for literally months) waiting for assistance in unloading. The shortage of lighters and small boats was so serious (it didn't seem to effect the IJ so much as they had their excellent barges on hand) he and his colleagues had taken to employing locals (when they could catch them) to try and build native-type fishing boats to ferry supplies back and forth...



JWE -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 6:09:42 PM)

All these things are true. I'm only suggesting that people view the pieces as component parts of an integrated system; no one part more fundamentally important than another. The whole paradigm of military operations is to put a sufficient number of healthy, well armed and motivated grunts on the start line, and to provide a sufficient preponderance of firepower to ease their way over "the last 200 yards" to closure (the last 200 miles, in the Pacific context).

Building the infrastructure allows one to deploy sufficient numbers of the poor dumb ba$tard$ on the LOD. Building the infrastructure also allows deployment of the supporting firepower elements. One portion is not particularly effective without the other.

I'm a pretty serious logistics puke, but logistics without grunts are just dinner opportunities for the OpFor. And grunts without that sufficient preponderance of firepower (logistics, in support of the weapon systems) are just ducks in the gallery. Simply can't have one without the other; and each requires the other to function efficiently. No one part is fundamentally more important than another. That's my only point.

Ciao. J



Nikademus -> RE: Manila or Pearl-new paradigm? (5/28/2010 6:11:50 PM)

in other words.....its Chicken and the Egg.

[:)]



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