RE: OPSEC (Full Version)

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Wirraway_Ace -> RE: OPSEC (7/2/2010 9:19:37 PM)

Changing the thread subject title so it is not so obvious to Nemo's opponent what is being discussed.  Of course, with Nemo, he was probably planning on using it as part of psychological ops.



wpurdom -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 12:18:57 AM)

I have to feel that you must be engaging in a little psyops with your readers in bringing up an Indian invasion, or indeed any strategy that didn't plan on at least neutralizing Sumatra by the end of '42. And I Have a hard time seeing that happening with the India option though I haven't tried to come up with detailed estimates of time and motion requirements. (This analysis is based upon equal players which isn't present in this game).

India

Sure, you might be able to roll up India, but what happens in the meantime. Although one might profit from an invasion of Ceylon, to cut off/conquer Empire supplies, there seems little point in invading the sub-continent unless one is going to conquer the whole subcontinent - otherwise you just strengthen your opponent. If you bring too little force to deal with a reinforced India, you find yourself fighting the Battle of Sian in India. If you're not neutralizing southern Sumatra as a potential offensive base before hand, it seems to me that you would have to be prepared to conquer Northwest Australia and be prepared to hold it for the duration of the conquest of India and time to return the Indian Army into the Pacific. Given your positioning in the theater, the IJ player would have to defend against at least 3 very threatening lines of attack simulataneously - conquest of the Marianas outside of Saipan and air-connective islands to the Marshalls, conquest of Hokaido and S. Sakhalin as mutually supportive bases, and of course, NW Australia. Given the previous fighting, the IJ player almost has to defend with air/CV forces without either substantial surface force attrition or CV trapping with surface forces, which herwin did repeatedly in his game and can easily happen if tied to predictable presence near islands, ports and places where your opponent can obtain air parity. Further, if you break up your CV force the USN can get decisive local superiority and seize mutually supportive bases while winning any CV conflict. If the IJN concentrates, how do they defend against a sudden swoop like Q-ball did in the DEI or you did in the Marshalls.

Australia

Similar considerations would, I think, apply to an attempted conquest of Australia. If you get into the part of Australia which triggers reinforcements, you need to conquer the whole thing, or you would regret the battle of attrition. And it would seem like you would need to tie down KB in support to avoid reinforcements that would bog you down into a losing land battle of attrition.

Normal play
It seems to me a more pedestrian line of play would do better for Japan - seize the rest of the DEI and the other areas you need, then come back and isolate Palemb so that there are no mutually supporting bases, then at least neutralize the airfield. Prepare land defenses and be ready to counterattack. Hopefully the USN tries to do something with their cut-off forces in Sumatra in a way that is logistically hard to support and you can counterattack. But if the USN fails to overcommit early in a way that allows a riposte, I think the IJ player has long term problems, and has bad troubles in 1944.



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 1:30:08 AM)

Wirraway Ace,

Now do I look like the sneaky sort of player who would do such a thing? You're the second person to point the OPSEC issues of the post title out but the first who actually took the initiative to change it... without even asking *chuckle*. I may not engage in PSYOPS in email anymore but if he wants to read a forum thread title and draw the wrong conclusions from it then I'm not averse to helping misdirect him a little ;-).... but now I'm foiled, foiled by my own readers [:D]


As to his current situation....
India: No, not at all. At this point in time I think an invasion of India with the aim of capturing all of it ( I don't think there's all that much point going for India unless you are going to make a good effort at taking all of it ) makes use of his main strengths ( a strong IJA), minimises the impact of his current weaknesses ( his loss of 40% of his battleline ), solves the Burmese problem in its entirety rather rapidly and creates a medium-term solution for the destruction of China. I think it can do this without risking additional loss in China and can use manoeuvrist approaches along a subsidiary axis to neutralise southern Sumatra all while using this offensive to create the defensive perimeter Japan needs for defence in 1943. I think it would also allow the phasing of operations by the IJN and previously allocated assets to the Pacific theatre so as to achieve the front line trace he should have been going for all along.

All in all I think that India isn't actually an over-reach. Again it is the sort of thing I do which goes against the conventional wisdom and looks ueber-risky but when you bore down into the details it actually minimises risks and maximises the effect of my most over-matching assets. It just mightn't be obvious initially.



So, here's the assumptions and the plan I'd undertake... I'm assuming he is ready to invade now and could be at Sumatra by the end of March 42 with 5,000 AV ( the SRA plus a few odds and ends ).

1. Massive cull of the Chinese front, accepting an inability to advance further in order to remove forces committed to the front line which are in excess of purely defensive requirements. At Changsha alone that would allow him to free 3,500 AV. In the very south of the country A minimum of another 500 AV could be freed. Keep the artillery in China and bombard every turn in order to: a) use up Chinese supplies and b ) kill 200 Chinese Infantry Squads per month - the extent of their replacements.

2. Committment of the IJAAF to a massive two week bombing campaign of the CHinese front, starting with rear echelon bases and working back towards the front ( maximising the effect of surprise to allow the raids which are most likely to be intercepted to be those which will have the least fatigued escorts ). Targets will be RESOURCES and the aim is to prevent supply production for the Chinese Army.

3. It should take roughly 3 months for the IJA forces from China to march to and through Burma and into position ready to cross the jungle into India. So, that's 4,000 AV from China + 1,000 AV already facing Burma = 5,000 AV available to cross into India in 3 months from today ( so they are ready June 15th ).


So, what can we make happen in those 3 months to support this?

4. Immediate invasion of Java in 2/52 time. With 4,000+ AV in the SRA the IJA can invade Java and the southern DEI all at the same time and commit 1000 AV to each invasion whilst maintaining a floating reserve of 1,000 AV. So, they invade at the end of March 1942. By mid-April Java, Kendari, AMbon and Makassar should all have fallen. Recon would, at this point, show me the buildup around Cocos and once Soerabaja etc fell I'd clear that nest out with carrier raids. Since none of the 2nd wave invasions would be on heavily defended targets I wouldn't present the stationary, unloading TFs that the RN battlegroups are designed to prey off and am quite confident that the RN would either have to retreat to Capetown, Oz or Ceylon and wouldn't materially intervene in the 2nd wave of invasions in support of DEI operations.

5. 2nd wave invasions then occur and are focussed not on Sumatra but on Padang, Port Hedland, Horn Island, the Cocos Islands and Eggano. The capture of these bases provides the cheapest way possible to isolate both Darwin and Southern Sumatra from Allied supply and reinforcement convoys. It will also mean that IF the Allies do want to reinforce/resupply the southern DEI, Darwin or Sumatra they'll need their CVs along. This will draw USN CVs out of position for the IJN's 2nd phase of action ( 1st phase is the taking of the southern DEI, 3rd phase is the invasion of south-eastern India ). By the end of the 2nd wave of reinforcements Southern Sumatra is isolated as is Darwin and there is NO way for the overwhelming numbers of the Allied armies to retake those bases overland as either they are utterly unreachable or the supply lines simply won't hold up. Retaking those bases will require a committment of naval forces - and that means a delay in recapture until the end of 1942 at the earliest ( which is fine by me ).

6. So, by mid-April Java and the Southern DEI or fully taken and lots of IJAAF and IJNAF flights are occurring over Southern Sumatra. Since I wouldn't be planning on needing the Palembang OIL I'd commence an REFINERY and RESOURCE bombing campaign at this point using my recently captured bases. The end result would be to rob Southern Sumatra of the 1,000 tons of supplies it makes per day. OIL could continue being made and stored ready for me to ship it to Japan once Palembang falls ( near the end of 1942 ). This plan would, effectively, not cost me a single ton of Palembang's OIL produced since 7th December 1941 and would play into my late-war strategy by giving an unexpanded Japanese industrial base a huge increase in reserves. Plus, for the rest of the war Palembang's OIL would be surplus to requirements and thus go directly into that reserve and be stockpiled in order to make the Allied end-game as difficult as possible. Long-term planning is key and often, as shown above, allows one to turn what seems disastrous into an opportunity - once a little discipline is exercised and you accept short and medium-term weaknesses in order to achieve long-term benefits.

7. In the beginning of May the objectives in Java will have been taken and the neutralisation of China and Southern Sumatra will be well under way. The phasing and choice of objectives will minimise the necessary garrisons, freeing the maximum number of SRA troops for further action. Assume 5,000 AV were committed and 1,000 AV are for garrison duty that leaves 4,000 AV for further action. I would then take those 4,000 AV and land then south of Calcutta with a view to taking the Indian bases just north of Burma and, ideally, |Calcutta and its environs. The Allied inability to reinforce Sumatra now also is recognised as an inability to pull troops out of there and into India... but it is too late for the Allied commander at this stage. At the same time the IJA troops from China are actively pushing north through Burma. When they reach the jungle to cross into India they find the bases to their north held by other IJA formations and thus the lack of supply which normally crucifies the movement north from Burma into India doesn't occur and the IJA forces from China etc make good progress into India.

8. At this point in time I'd fight a relatively conventional ground war through India with some 9,000 AV - which I believe should be sufficient to take it given the 5,000 AV trapped in Sumatra.


9. Once the IJA was landed in Southern India the need for major battlegroups in the region would be removed and I'd remove the IJN from action, transition it into the Marshalls whilst completing the forming up of the 500+ AV Mike has shown he can commit to the Aleutians ( they are currently there in this game - I think it is a waste but I have to make a plan based on his position, not on what I would actually have done up until now ). I would make a show of force in the Marshalls, fixing attention there , running recon etc etc etc. The aims would be to focus attention on the Marshalls and encourage the basing of Allied SC TFs into Rabaul, Suva and PH - 2nd echelon bases from which they can run into the Marshalls, fight their actions and then retire back to safety.

Meanwhile the IJN would shut down all search missions, radars etc and transition into the north pacific, meeting up with the 500 AV from the Aleutians + LOTS of support troops ( AAA, CD guns, Base Forces, HQs etc as well as hundreds of crated IJAAF and IJNAF fighters and bombers ).


10. Pearl Harbour gets hit again with the full might of KB. A single strike aims to catch shipping being repaired and planes on the ground. Once that's done the invasion TF hoves into view and begins unloading on the islands around PH itself, uncrating fighters and bombers and setting up a Netty Nest which will remove Hawaii's utility to the Allies. The Pearl Harbour operation could happen by the end of June. It would only take that long to occur because the IJN is more needed to support the Indian invasion.

11. Very boring, conventional but necessary recaptures of Wake, Marcus, Midway and the Marshalls carried out over the rest of the year.


At no point does this require a meeting engagement with the RN or USN battlefleets. In face it seeks to draw them into range away from their own bases and under cover of KB - which should crush any Allied fleet under such circumstances in 1942.


This might all seem like a lot - E.g invading Java and the whole southern DEI at the same time and then expanding out to Horn Island, Port Hedland, Eggano and Cocos Islands but ask yourself how many troops you normally put on those 4 bases normally? Not a hell of a lot, right? Well, just because it is deep in enemy territory doesn't make it difficult to take. What makes it difficult to take are enemy defences. If they aren't there then it is easy meat.


Basically India requires one "short haul" invasion and then the rest of any Indian operation just relies on IJA troops marching overland - something they can do quite easily no matter the state of the IJN. PH - Well I'm banking on the initial strike to achieve surprise and hit the BBs and CAs in port. I think that's a reasonably good bet to take given the situation Mike is currently in. I am confident that an initial surprise strike combined with some deceptive footwork by the invasion TFs would let me hit SC TFs with KB whilst dodging them with my own transport TFs. I've done such footwork before and it has always worked pretty well so I think it should work again now.

KB is required to mount 3 significant combat operations ( Java + neutralising Cocos, India and PH ) but I think it has the strength to do that. It will be pretty spent then but by the time those ops are done it would be transititioning to a slower pace anyways so that's acceptable.


Down the line the idea would, obviously, be to land at Benkoenen sometime near the end of 1942 once the Allies are out of supplies and starving and march through Sumatra destroying those Allied forces. If destroyed they would only came back into action in mid-44 which suits me fine too.


That's only a sketch and there's lot of grey areas which I've considered but can't put down since I don't have 10 hours to outline an ops plan. If I was in Mike's situation that is roughly what I'd do over the next 6 months ( 9 months including the Marshalls reduction ) in order to create a situation I'd want for 1943.



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 1:47:38 AM)

As to the whole thing about equal players etc... While I'd hesitate to say I'm a good player ( I would agree I'm good strategically but I utterly suck at naval combat and carrier battles. I would also say I think for myself and don't just go with the conventional wisdom as so many do ) I would suggest that Mike is around the average for the forum from what I've seen. I think putting him down as a bad player ( as some here are doing ) is a disservice.

I think I've gotten him on the ropes here but amn't sure if he realises that yet. With that said I think that what we are talking about isn't "good" or "bad" play per se but, rather, conventional vs innovative play. I think that if Mike played others on the forum he'd create just the sort of AARs we see with Canoerebel, Cuttlefish etc in which two very conventional players play eachother and find themselves well-matched because both sides think very much alike. I mean how many AARs would you find in which a player who can't capture a major strategic target ( in this case Palembang ) truly believes their analysis leads them to decide that an even larger deeper strike at an even larger strategic target ( in this case India ) is the best answer? VERY few. Mostly what we see is either a doomed to failure attempt to take the first target or an acceptance of defeat along that axis and the assumption of the defensive role ( which isn't necessary ).

So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.

I think that if you look at one of my longest-running games you could see Damian initially thought many of my ops were utter craziness but, after a while, starting analysing options deeply and properly, not accepting conventional wisdom as the arbiter of whether something was possible or not and became very good at figuring out what I might do and preparing against it. The end result was that I could still move forward in spite of various inferiorities but the days of rapid strikes into the enemy rear and leap-frogging operations was over. In common parlance did he become a better player? Well, in common parlance that's what people would say. What I would say though is that he just learnt to really analyse things without preconceptions and simply began having a wider range of operations to choose from and, as such, can now end up choosing ops which will surprise and catch his opponents unprepared.


So, I think labelling Mike as a poor player or whatever isn't really fair and I'd ask it to cease please. It isn't my intention for an AAR to become something nasty for any player to read after the game is concluded. He is ( and I strongly believe this ) very much representative of the calibre of the forum in terms of play and is pretty conventional in his planning. I think it is just his misfortune to run into someone who is significantly less conventional and it is taking him time to adjust. The Javan operation will show how well he is adjusting... I am assuming he will adjust somewhat and so am changing my means of interacting with his forces a little so as to minimise the impact of some of those adjustements he might be making.



Alfred -> RE: Sumatra - Stay Forever! (7/3/2010 2:35:35 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Ketza

Well if my opinion is deemed as "defeatest" its because this particular player in my humble opinion has been defeated and the fat lady is on her way to the stage. [:)] I do however have great respect for players such as Alfred and Nemo and look forward to reading thier opinions and theories concerning this great game. So why do I feel he is beaten?

He really has not shown the ability so far in this game to compete with Nemo and honestly it does not appear that will change. He will have to overcome some serious hurdles that would challenge even the most experienced player. Losing the Marshalls in early 1942 and having a very potent allied force in Sumatra/Java through 1942? Its a nightmare. Throw in the fact his surface units have taken a hard hit and the problems are compounded.

His aces up his sleeve are of course KB, LBA and a very effective ground force. Surely he could push where the allies arent but if he does so two very dangerous thorns in his side continue to grow. One of those thorns will allow the staging of 4E bombers into the heart of the SRA. Nemo is already planning an offensive in China as well.

I am really looking forward to seeing what these plans are for potentially getting him out of this mess. Maybe I will learn a few things along the way.




True, one does have to distinguish between the player and Japan. I do agree that if Japan adopts a conventional approach to the problem set by Nemo, I would expect his opponent to suffer a staggering defeat. What I maintain is that a player of Nemo's skill and imagination, given the Japanese position would have quite good prospects.

A few observations concerning some points made by various posters.

(1) I certainly have not said that it would be OK for Palembang to remain Allied until the end. The game however is only around March 1942. Provided Japan maintains progress elsewhere, Palembang remaining in Allied hands can be tolerated because there is more than one possible strategy for victory. In my estimate Japan has at least 6-9 months, probably more depending on how well she quarantines the bacillus Palembang.

(2) I have on purpose referred to southern Sumatra whereas most posters appear to view the whole of Sumatra. There as some very significant differences between the south and the north, primarily in terms of terrain, facilities and geography. These differences can be used to both assist in quarantining southern Sumatra and moving onto other vulnerable "boxes".

(3) Nemo has considerably strengthened southern Sumatra. However, based on the information he has provided, which everyone appears to have accepted at face value, I think he has started to overstretch the capacity of southern Sumatra to sustain Allied operations. Apparently there are some 5000 AV + 800 aircraft + the entire British and Dutch navies. To this total I suspect one has to add a substantial number of independent LCUs which do not have an AV (eg flak units, engineers etc) and therefore are not captured by the disclosed 5000 AV. So why do I think the limit of sustainability may have been reached?

(a) Palembang can only generate 900 supplies daily. To keep its refineries fully occupied and thus maintaining a daily production of 1080 supplies, it needs to draw in oil from Djambi. That is a potential weak point.

(b) 5000 AV alone represents about 13-15 division equivalents. As a common rule of thumb, each Allied division consumes about 50 supply tons daily. Thus even at rest, this Allied land force is consuming 650-750 supply tons daily. This is without taking into account the consumption of all those non AV units.

(c) Assume that all the 800 aircraft present in southern Sumatra are fighters. If on average only 50% are put on CAP, then that is another 133 supply tons consumed daily (400 * 1/3). But of course they are not all fighters. On offensive missions, non level bombers consume 1 supply ton per plane, level bombers consume at the rate of (Max Load/1000). Hence an 8 plane squadron of B-17Es consumes a minimum of 48 tons, 8xLB-30 Liberators will consume 64 tons.

(d) There are no suitable ports on southern Sumatra to rearm the capital ships. Nothing above 15000 tons can sail up river to Palembang for refueling. Even if tenders and naval support squads have been sent to southern Sumatra to increase the capacity of the local ports to service the fleet, there will not be sufficient supply available after the needs of the army and airforce have been met. The on paper very impressive fleet which has been assembled is essentially a one shot fleet (a bit like the Soviet Cold War navy, but I digress). There are ways a Japanese player can take advantage of this.

(e) I keep on hearing about Allied 4E (implied operating out of southern Sumatra) but have people really considered the logistics. Besides the consumption of supplies which are touched upon in (c) above there is the question of having suitable airbases. It is not possible to deal with 4E entirely separate from the rest of the Allied airforce.
(e)(i) So we go back to there being 800 aircraft present. If they were all single engine fighters, then an aggregate of 16 airfield levels is required to avoid overstacking penalties. The more 2E and 4E planes there are, the greater pressure on airfield levels there is. Sure the presence of Air HQs alleviates the pressure to a certain degree, but that assistance is limited. Furthermore, if we consider only the southern Sumatran airfields (Djambi, Palembang, Prahoemoeli, Osthaven and Benkoelen) they have only an aggregate of 10 levels. Nemo has not mentioned it but in view of his comments regarding the building of fortifications, the logical course of action is that he has been building forts, not airbases (or ports for that matter - see point (d) above)
(e)(ii) A great number of the air units stationed in southern Sumatra must be the Dutch airforce and the British 223 and 224 Groups initially located in Malaya. These are small units most comprised of only 9-12 aircraft. So many units add to the difficulties of avoiding administrative overstacking. Currently many are probably on training, thereby reducing the administrative pressure, but once the "balloon goes up" and they become active it will be very difficult to avoid administrative overstacking even with Air HQs being present
(e)(iii) Then there is the question of having large enough bases for the 4E to operate from without penalties. The largest airbase on southern Sumatra is Palembang's level 4. That is too small for efficient B-17 operation, the result being smaller raids. Added to this is the limited Allied 4E replacement rate in 1942 and one can see only pin **** 4E strikes from southern Sumatra.

(4) Some have suggested that Japan will need to deploy most of its assests to keep Palembang subdues. Well the fact is that currently there are no Japanese assets used to suppress southern Sumatra and the Allied force there is not active. That state of affairs can be largely maintained if Japan controls the SLOCs, and the necessary Japanese forces to achieve that are much less once the overall quarantining plan is completed.

(5) I reiterate Japan has oodles of unused assets tucked away in Manchukuo.

I reiterate, a conventional Japanese approach should result in a staggering defeat. There are however several enticing possibilities open to Japan. Whether or not his opponent will be creative is something yet to be ascertained.

Alfred



Nemo121 -> Sumatran Tar Babies (7/3/2010 3:11:57 AM)

Interesting post Alfred... I will post some more detail about Southern Sumatra later to clarify some of it - almost 3am here so time for bed -... Suffice it to address the following points:

1. The RN TFs ( well, anything bigger than a CL ) are very much a one shot deal... They are to go in, disrupt the invasion fleet and force it out of the invasion hex and then act as a magnet for IJNAF raids such that my fighters can slaughter KB's strike groups. On Day 2 the RN TFs will pretty much begin to egress the area, except for lighter units which will stay to fight... and die. I do have ARs, ADs, AGs and AEs in the area to provide enough support for light and medium units ( CLs ) to operate continuously in the Southern Sumatran region. CAs and BBs will have to move a long way for replenishment though but that's OK, I never envisioned the RN battleline living to survive the battle for Oosthaven.


2. Airfields: I have 2 Level 5 airfields ( Palembang and Oosthaven ) and a Level 7 airfield ( Lahat ), in addition to a Level 2 just east of Lahat called Praboeloelih and a Level 1 at Benkoenen ( for local CAP of unloading ships ). Basically I budgeted for 1,000 planes. I traded Level 6 forts at Palembang and Oosthaven for these airfields and think the investment will prove worthwhile. Basically the plan is that when the invasion comes I will base 200 fighters at either Palembang or Oosthaven ( assuming he invades one of them ) and then base the bombers ( with suitable defensive CAP ) at Lahat. PBYs will base at Benkoenen ( and have enough HQ support to fly with torpedoes from there ) while the Level 2 airbase at Praboeloelih will be used to base my British torpedo bombers ( Swordfish etc ). I will rotate fighters into and out of Lahat as losses require replacement and rebuilding of the squadrons contributing to the 200 fighter CAP over Oosthaven or Palembang. I don't expect the 1,000 planes to survive for more than 4 days but that's all I will need. At the end of 4 days the invasion TFs will be either sent into disarray or will have landed pretty much all of their troops.

Overstacking - This WILL occur but I'm making it work for me by ensuring my bomber streams don't fully commit on any given day. If only half the bombers fly due to admin issues only 50% of them can be shot down if something goes wrong... It all adds up to artificially increase the longevity of my force by limiting total committment on any given day. I don't personally think that the in-game model of this is that accurate but if that's its in-game impact then I'm not going to quibble, I'm just going to try to figure out if there's any possible up-side for me.

B17s.. I built Lahat to Level 7 purely as a B-17 base ( well, that and just to act as my reserve and reconstitution nexus ). Some of that role is going to be taken by the Cocos Islands now as I've made some preps to prepare it for that role.


3. I don't consider Southern Sumatra to be more than a minor nuisance to the Japanese in terms of B-17 bases. On ther other hand if he leaves Southern Sumatra in my hands then I'll crucify him with Beaufighters at 100 feet and rapid counter-invasions/ surface raiding TFs all the way to Formosa and Badeldoab. That's the real threat. Even if I could fully supply those 4-engined bombers ( not entirely certain ) they just don't do enough damage to be decisive.


4. Manchukuo forces... He has committed a lot of them to China actually... but with that said they could be at the ocean ports within 2 weeks and at PH or Java 2 weeks after that if he wanted. His entire strategic posture can be entirely redirected within the month if he wishes.



Yes, as you say, we'll see if he, to paraphrase Wellington, comes in the same old way or tries something indirect. I'm betting ( and somewhat subtly influencing him ) that he'll go for Java and Sumatra in that order and come in pretty conventionally. My plan is designed to defeat that sort of intervention. If he comes in with a few extraordinary ( in the Soviet doctrinal sense of the word ) wrinkles / force allocations then things will get much more fluid and my losses will rise and my impact on his operations decrease. Either way though I'm confident of utterly gutting the IJN if I choose to bring it into combat and gutting the IJN battleline of most of its BBs and CAs pretty much guarantees the cessation of any future invasions - well, it does when one faces a conventional player. Personally I think one could still invade India with a covering force of nothing but DDs, CLs and CVs but BBs and CAs do give a greater sense of comfort to such planning.



P.s. Supplies: I've been robbing Sumatra of supplies to supply Darwin and the southern DEI bases ( which now have about 150,000 tons supply between the 3 of them ) but am about to bring about 100,000 tons of supplies into Southern Sumatra as I finish my transition from a delaying/facility destruction force designed to force the committment of the IJN battleline to unfavourable combat to a stance in which I intend to hold all of Southern Sumatra and attempt the de facto destruction of the SRA as an offensive force.

I've also begun salting a few ships away for counter-invasions if he gets stuck in Southern Sumatra.



jay102 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 6:37:07 AM)

Nice work Nemo. This AAR is very innovative and entertaining. I guess every IJ player read this will really consider a quick capture of Palembang to avoid this dilemma.[8|]

I read your "Striking from Heaven" in old WitP days, very impressive play[&o]. Maybe you should start a IJ campaign in AE again, the Allied is just too easy for you to fully utilize your strategical capacity. Come on bring us more.[:D]



modrow -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 8:55:38 AM)

Nemo,

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.


You really overestimate the value of innovation. There's two aspects I would like to mention briefly:

a) you mess up your opponent's OODA loop. The above quote illustrates it nicely: by "crazy" ops you expand the possibilities you opponent tends to consider, and if you get him to comment to himself "I did not see that coming" that just reinforces the effect.
So you just outperform him. As a matter of fact, your forum personality will already start that process - whoever plays you will be convinced that he has to factor in innovation, so he will start to try to preempt, which gives you a first advantage.

Conventional, but cold analytical gameplay will take away that advantage. On the contrary, it can even be advantageous because it speeds up your OODA cycle.

b) I do not think one should focus on how to counter an operation and the need to be fully prepared for it (as a matter of fact, for any future opponent of yours to derive from the above statement that one should prepare for everything when playing against you may be the start of his downfall). This would cause the operational level to dictate the gameplay, which it should not. Rather, invest your thoughts to develop a relevant strategy to realize your defined national goal, and define what is necessary to realize that strategy. If you do that correctly, what needs to be prepared will become evident.

If an innovative operation is not strategically relevant, it should be encouraged, not encountered.

If it is strategically relevant and you are not prepared for a response, this may indicate that your strategic planning was deficient and should be improved.

What I am willing to admit though is that a lot of the "conventional" approaches we see in our games are not based on a sound strategic analysis. However, the reason why they fail is not that they are "conventional" in contrast to "innovative", but that the required level of strategic analysis is difficult to achieve. E.g. I would be interested in the "innovative" aspects of jrcar's and tony's game as described in their AAR, which I would consider to be rather analytical, methodical and -not at all meant in a depreciative way- conventional.

As always just my 2 cts

Hartwig



bklooste -> The bright side (7/3/2010 9:43:49 AM)

I dont think Resources is the crux of the problem oil is. Without oil you wont be able to run heavy industry without which you wont be able to build enough planes to even provide a pittiful resitance in the air.

IN terms of Vps and options a major assault on Australia will secure Resources and VPs.

And since Palembang cant be shut down since its a flak trap the 4E will wreak havock in early 43.  

Prob best option is to take Australia , and use KB to recapture the Marshals .  Your opponent is still gone though since  you can shut down  Truk and singapore can be taken early if he does not keep a big garrison there.. Not mention some nasty bulges in his shipping space..



LoBaron -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 10:51:01 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

As to the whole thing about equal players etc... While I'd hesitate to say I'm a good player ( I would agree I'm good strategically but I utterly suck at naval combat and carrier battles. I would also say I think for myself and don't just go with the conventional wisdom as so many do ) I would suggest that Mike is around the average for the forum from what I've seen. I think putting him down as a bad player ( as some here are doing ) is a disservice.

I think I've gotten him on the ropes here but amn't sure if he realises that yet. With that said I think that what we are talking about isn't "good" or "bad" play per se but, rather, conventional vs innovative play. I think that if Mike played others on the forum he'd create just the sort of AARs we see with Canoerebel, Cuttlefish etc in which two very conventional players play eachother and find themselves well-matched because both sides think very much alike. I mean how many AARs would you find in which a player who can't capture a major strategic target ( in this case Palembang ) truly believes their analysis leads them to decide that an even larger deeper strike at an even larger strategic target ( in this case India ) is the best answer? VERY few. Mostly what we see is either a doomed to failure attempt to take the first target or an acceptance of defeat along that axis and the assumption of the defensive role ( which isn't necessary ).

So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.

I think that if you look at one of my longest-running games you could see Damian initially thought many of my ops were utter craziness but, after a while, starting analysing options deeply and properly, not accepting conventional wisdom as the arbiter of whether something was possible or not and became very good at figuring out what I might do and preparing against it. The end result was that I could still move forward in spite of various inferiorities but the days of rapid strikes into the enemy rear and leap-frogging operations was over. In common parlance did he become a better player? Well, in common parlance that's what people would say. What I would say though is that he just learnt to really analyse things without preconceptions and simply began having a wider range of operations to choose from and, as such, can now end up choosing ops which will surprise and catch his opponents unprepared.


So, I think labelling Mike as a poor player or whatever isn't really fair and I'd ask it to cease please. It isn't my intention for an AAR to become something nasty for any player to read after the game is concluded. He is ( and I strongly believe this ) very much representative of the calibre of the forum in terms of play and is pretty conventional in his planning. I think it is just his misfortune to run into someone who is significantly less conventional and it is taking him time to adjust. The Javan operation will show how well he is adjusting... I am assuming he will adjust somewhat and so am changing my means of interacting with his forces a little so as to minimise the impact of some of those adjustements he might be making.



To distinguish between conventional and unconventional style of play is purely superficial in my opinion.

There are two main interactions between two players on a strategic level: Initiative and adaption.
How the result looks like and how you adapt to an opponent who has grabbed the initiative (by adapt I generally mean to find ways to take the initiative away again,
and initiative naturally does not always mean staging an offensive), or how you use the initiative to profit from it is mostly a two way decision:
Apply the pressure in another area than the currently focused on (gamewise) or change the balance of power in the area in focus (either by numbers, by changing
tactics, by producing new threats in this area, or by pulling out of the area in focus).

Neither of those strategies is more conventional than the other. Theres only good or bad strategies depending on the situation, and a good or bad execution of this strategy.

Grabbing or holding targets that serve a purpose (either because of the target itself or the benefits of owning the target to your further progress) is never unconventional.
Defining unconventional as performing an action out of the usual timeline would be defining every strategy which includes the element of surprize for execution as unconventional
and this streches the term a bit far.
Defining unconventional as an method of deception, which again serves the element of surprize is in the same league.
And defining unconventional operations as executing a strategy that serves no other purpose than being unconventional is simply a bad strategy.

This is why I have a hard time understanding discussions that include conventional and it counterpart.

And for the same reason I would definitely not rate you an unconventional player.
You are creative, know of the advantages of obtaining and keeping the initiative, and adapt fast to elements of surprize or flaws in your strategy.
Backed up by a notable ammount of confidence and experience this makes you a very dangerous opponent. Even more dangerous to a player who does not
adapt to this style of play to again get into a position from where he could obtain the initiative.
Because of the same reason I think that Mike is a player with real potential. He came up with a decision how to best adapt to your strategy and it is a very interesting one.




Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 12:47:31 PM)

jay102, well we'll have to see. I'm thinking of giving AE a break and moving on but I suppose that once EA for AE comes out ( I've been tapping away at it for a short while, in some areas I've made major changes, in others, very minor changes. The production model, for example, is already pretty good.) I might try a Japanese game just to see what is possible and refine the design.


Hartwig, LoBaron,
I think we're talking with slightly different terms and probably agree more than we disagree... I often use innovative and extraordinary and unconventional to be the same thing. Basically what I'm getting at is a play style which enter the strategic analysis with no preconceptions and looks at everything with no assumptions. To do that is innovative and unconventional ( if you look at the AARs here you can see very, very few people go into an assessment without preconceptions ) and leads to "extraordinary" ( in soviet doctrinal terms as opposed to English vernacular terms ) operations.

Am I in favour of doing something because others don't? No but I am in favour of doing whatever an unbiased analysis shows as being preferable and oftentimes that will result in doing something the opponent will have discounted without properly examining it.

A real-world example of this would be the use of torpedoes at PH or going through the Ardennes in 1940, or Epaminondas vs the Spartans or Granicus or Issus. Hell, while it wouldn't apply to the first phase of Kadesh I think you could argue that it would apply to Rameses II's committment of follow-on forces in the second phase of Kadesh.


As to the need to prepare to counter every possible operation... I can see what you're driving at Hartwig but I think you're forgetting that the preparation for an operation does not necessarily mean physical committment of troops, planes and ships in-game. I certainly evaluate EVERY possible option my opponents can take ( recently I bolstered the defences at San Francisco a little to protect against a deep KB strike on San Francisco ) and don't consider it wasted effort.

However when I say prepping for a possible enemy operation I don't necessarily mean committing troops. I mean acknowledging the operation migth happen and evaluating its impact on your strategic plans. If it doesn't impact on your plans then your "prep" might simply be:
a) acknowledge that the operation is possible
b) assess the impact of the operation's success on my strategic plans
c) If this is negligible then don't commit anything to prevent the operation and let it happen if it happens.

Obviously that's a very bland, black and white example and in reality I usually try to find a way to turn an operation the enemy might plan to my favour but if I go into that level of detail the clarity of the argument will be lost.

Mostly though by evaluating all possible operations I seek to avoid being over-encumbered in the Orient and Decide portions of the OODA loop. Instead I'm pre-oriented and pretty much have previously decided on my reaction and maximal force committment. I usually haven't thought about it in great detail but I'll have a general idea about what I'd do... and that's enough.

So, I think the exact opposite of what you're worried about, Hartwig, is what actually happens.


As to encouraging operations which are strategically irrelevant - Certainly but to encourage a bad operation you first have to be open0minded enough to actually see it as being possible ( that's where a lot of people fall down ).


bklooste,
I never play for VP. Playing for VP in a game in which a DD sunk gets as many VP as 10 Tabbies crashing on landing is a rather laughable concept. No, bringing VP into play leads to clouding strategic thinking IMO. Each to their own of course.


LoBaron,
Sorry, I have to disagree with you. "innovative" operations which one's opponent never really foresaw are precisely the sorts of things to cause incorrect adaptation and win the initiative.But I think the bottom line problem is I've been rather loose with the terms.

Innovation, unconventionality etc all refers to being willing to go where the rational analysis without preconceptions takes you. A lot of people say they do that but they really don't.

quote:

He came up with a decision how to best adapt to your strategy and it is a very interesting one.


Hmm, I'm not sure about this... Unless he has posted something to his AAR about it I must say that I don't see any major strategic shift on his part. There have been some tactical and operational shifts - most of which have served tactical and operational goals but actually hurt his strategic situation- but I haven't seen anything strategic. Maybe he has explained it all on his AAR though but I thought he hadn't posted there in many, many weeks. Someone should go there and ask him. It'd probably be interesting for you guys to see what you can make of the two different viewpoints.

Couple of ground rules.
1. I've been open with him that I'm shipping troops into Southern Sumatra so you can feel free to say I've fortified that and shipped troops in.

2. I haven't mentioned anything to him about Java and the Southern DEI so probably best to play dumb on that score.

3. From what I can see he has no idea the RN is in the DEI region. As far as he knows he hasn't seen an RN ship in about 6 weeks.

4. Marshalls. I've been open with him about my committment there - as it served my purposes to do so - so you can feel free to talk about how the Marshalls, Marcus, Wake, Midway axis really hampers his advance into the Pacific.

5. He knows about the Northern China attempt to advance ( and his forces weathered that storm ) so you can feel free to talk about the CHina theatre openly. He can see my moves now and should already be sweating just how to apportion his forces from the south in order to rescue the centre and north. He can't know that supplies have pretty much stopped my advance - for now... I have supplies shipping into Burma. But, basically, feel free to be open about China in your discussions with him.


So, basically, please play dumb about Java and the Southern DEI but apart from that feel free to chat openly with him using insight from this AAR thread. I will ask not to post anything about my "what I'd do if I were Mike" plan though. That might just be a bit too helpful to him ;-). Basically though you can relax about FOW except insofar as it applies to Java/DEI as that's crucial info I'm playing close to my chest.





vettim89 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 2:44:28 PM)

Great discussion here as always.

I find the use of terms here very interesting. I read conventional/unconventional, crazy/exceptional, etc. I think what it all comes down to is how far from the historical model the players drift. So if the conventional Allied approach is to defend the SRA with the weak forces that are already present then the conventional Japanese approach would be to seize these objections with a small but well trained IJA force in a lightning fast succession of invasions.

Of note, with the exception of the number of aircraft (and corresponding Av support/HQ), the troops being committed to Sumatra are those that historically were sent to Malaya as reinforcements; so in essence Nemo has taken the historical forces available to him and more prudently deployed them in more defensible terrain. If the IJA were to bring the overwhelming forces available to him (say from Manchuria), Nemo will only have lost what historically was lost in defense of SE Asia just in a different locale. What Nemo has done here is refused to be bound by historical convention and opting to not do what his opponent would deem as the most likely course of action.

That last statement is the key. The most successful players are those that are able to discern their opponents' intentions and undo the opponents' strategy by refusing to "play along". When it comes down to it, every strategic plan is based not only on one's own capabilities but also on how one expects his opponent to react to the actions requisite to the plan. Also, the OODA cycle comes into play as how quickly one discerns his opponent’s intentions and modifies his own approach is also key to being successful. As Nemo just pointed out, if you introduce a variable into your opponents OODA thinking that he has already considered and dealt with as he deems appropriate, you have not really seized the initiative. If however, you introduce a variable your opponent had not considered, then you have disrupted his OODA cycle and depending how quickly he reacts, may be able to seize the initiative. I think the example of Damian's play is an excellent illustration of this. As Damian became more "comfortable" with Nemo's playing style, he became a better opponent for Nemo. Not that he was a poor player before but, to state the obvious, Nemo's style of play is likely more challenging than most.

Lastly, I think a factor that has not been brought up is risk. We use the terms bold, unconventional, crazy, and aggressive vs. timid, conventional, sane, and conservative. What those mean to each of us is different but I think a lot of it comes down to how accepting of risk each of us are in our play style. Some are willing to make bold moves that have the potential to be disastrous if things go wrong but game changing if they go well. Others never make a move without there being a high chance of success. Neither approach is wrong. What is important is that you recognize both your play style and your opponent’s.



Alfred -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 3:16:31 PM)

Nemo121,

If your opponent had kept his AAR up to date, thereby disclosing (a) how much intel he had, and (b) what his current plans were, I probably would have posted something along the lines of my posts #379 and #382. To give him encouragement, subject to how much he knew of your southern Sumatran dispositions, I also probably would have engaged in a number crunching exercise along the lines of my post #395. Now however, following your post #401, it seems that if I post over there anything along those lines, I will be tipping him off. Well I suppose it is his loss for not keeping up to date his AAR.

Regarding the commentary made by others on the term "conventional". On this forum I employ it along the lines of meaning "stereotypical", "unthinking" and most particularly "frontal assault". Too many players, confronted with the size of the Allied force on southern Sumatra, would simply then approach the solution as being based on bringing more Japanese assets directly against Palembang. In other words join the meatgrinder and just add more. The "unconventional" approach is to see how to turn the Allied strength into a weakness.

Alfred



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 3:36:27 PM)

Alfred,

Personally I think you should feel free to post whatever you want to his AAR... He knows Sumatra is reinforced so I think you could post a number crunching exercise for "the DEI" and that wouldn't tip him off to anything. All I want to avoid is someone basically saying "Well, there's nothing in Java" through comission or omission. But I think discussion about there being massive reinforcement of the DEI is perfectly valid IMO.

I think a few posts just to make sure he's not going to come into Sumatra blindly would probably be helpful actually in making him recheck his planning assumptions and perhaps see things a bit more objectively. A game which ends with the destruction of the IJN at Oosthaven due to a lack of recon would be somewhat disappointing to me and I'd not like that to happen.


Vettim,
VERY good post. You actually managed to summarise about 3 of my posts very succinctly in your 3rd paragraph and stated what I was trying to say much more clearly than I managed. Thanks [:)]


P.s. By the way I'd like to state how gratifying it is to see so many different posters posting. Interesting discussions like this are why I write the AAR so, thanks guys, this is what motivates me to keep going.



Capt. Harlock -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 9:40:13 PM)

quote:

10. Pearl Harbour gets hit again with the full might of KB. A single strike aims to catch shipping being repaired and planes on the ground. Once that's done the invasion TF hoves into view and begins unloading on the islands around PH itself, uncrating fighters and bombers and setting up a Netty Nest which will remove Hawaii's utility to the Allies. The Pearl Harbour operation could happen by the end of June.


This strikes me as a classic high-risk operation. Yes, it could work, and yes, it would reap great rewards. But by the end of June the Americans can have rather powerful air assets in place. The KB's air-strike could take severe losses from fighters and AAA. B-17's and B-24's (historically available at Pearl in early June) could raid the surrounding islands, destroying more Netties than a Japanese player would care to lose. (My thinking is that one large airbase can suppress at least two and possibly three small ones.) Given the considerable losses of aircraft that the Japanese have already suffered, and the air assets necessary for successful invasions of both India and the DEI, this could end up breaking the back of the Japanese air arm.



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/3/2010 10:03:46 PM)

Historically, historically, historically.

Surely it is utterly irrelevant how many B17s were there in June 1942 in real life. What matters is what is there in June in-game... If you go around not doing things because historically a given unit was at that base at a given time you're going to cripple your planning. Your opponent won't be following historical schedules.



bklooste -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 6:42:54 AM)

Historical is meaningless except as a means to fool your oponent into thinking you are following a histroical line and then divert at a critical moment, .

In Chess against all but Grand Master opponents its better to have a slightly inferior position and play your game rather than one your opponent knows well.


quote:


This strikes me as a classic high-risk operation. Yes, it could work, and yes, it would reap great rewards. But by the end of June the Americans can have rather powerful air assets in place. The KB's air-strike could take severe losses from fighters and AAA. B-17's and B-24's (historically available at Pearl in early June) could raid the surrounding islands, destroying more Netties than a Japanese player would care to lose. (My thinking is that one large airbase can suppress at least two and possibly three small ones.) Given the considerable losses of aircraft that the Japanese have already suffered, and the air assets necessary for successful invasions of both India and the DEI, this could end up breaking the back of the Japanese air arm.


KBs best pilots are gone anyway he has taken so many losses ..

Taking Hawaii will cost you LBA , troops ( you could loose 1-2 Divs) and KB pilots

You gain  , you can sink any damaged ships and a number of ships in port , you can attrition US air frames. More important Nemo probably has good assets in the Marshals (AA , inf reg , base forces , tanks and engineers)  by taking Hawaii you basically cut it off  this helps regains strategic intiaitive .  He cant be strong in Hawaii and the Marshals so my guess is Hawaii is weaker in which case its probably easier to take Hawaii apart from Oahu and then the Marshals.

A bad allied player will probably react reinforce/resupply PH and try to take Hawaii back ASAP , a good player will ignore it  leave Oahu as a flak trap and move south and supply via Fiji /Oz .  So any Japanese plan for Hawaii must handle these alternatives .

re B17s in Hawaii the KB will destory a few on the ground and its better having them in Hawaii then bombing your oil and loading convoys in  Borneo ....

Ben



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 2:19:56 PM)

I thought it would be useful to give a much clearer outline of just what is present in Southern Sumatra to help people understand my dispostions... Two key things to understand before considering these dispositions:

1. He can't get anything larger than a CA up the river to Palembang. If he wants BBs covering his invasion he MUST land at Oosthaven or Benkoenen.

2. He can't invade Benkoenen until either Java falls OR he moves his entire invasion TF north from Singapore past northern Sumatra ( which I still hold ), past Burma and that island off its coast ( which I've just forgotten the name of and which hosts naval search planes ) and then down the western coast of Sumatra... If he tries that I'll see him in plenty of time to move my reserve.


Oosthaven:
Port: 3
Airfield: 5
Forts: 5 ( 37% of the way to Level 6 forts ).
AV: 2,479
Guns: 1,238
Engineers: 439
Aviation Support 364
Support: Required 4040. Has 4,213

HQs: ABDA, Commandement Marine, KNIL Army, MLD.

Infantry: 6th Australian Division ( 469 AV, 70 Exp ), 18th British Division ( 429 AV, 42 Exp, 92% prep for Oosthaven - which isn't bad given that only some 96 days have passed since the beginning of the game. Basically I began prepping these units for Oosthaven with 5 days of game-start when the initial germs of this plan came together.), 8th Oz Division ( 403 AV, 53 Exp, 84% prep ).

48th GUrka, 63rd Indian Bdes, 1st and 2nd KNIL Regiments, Barisan Regiment, many KNIL Bns. Pretty much all of these are in the high 80s and low 90s of preparation and have Exp of 40 since they haven't seen any action.


CD Defences:
28 x 6" Mk V/ VII guns + 6 x 75mm CD guns.


Artillery and anti-tank guns ( many of which will fire to oppose any landings ):

2 lb ATG: 177
47mm ATG: 36
75mm arty: 48
3" mortar: 101
80mm mortar: 89
18 lber: 16
25 lber: 225
60 lber: 12
3.7" Mountain Gun: 5
4.5" arty: 10

So, overall, about 213 anti-tank guns, 190 mortars and about 294 medium guns, 10 guns over 100mm calibre and 12 super-heavy guns ( the 60 lbers ).


AAA:
40mm Bofors: 233
75mm: 10
3.7" AAA: 156


So, as you can see I went with very strong CD defences at Oosthaven because I figured Palembang would be much more likely to be hit by enemy bombers if he came directly at Sumatra before invading Java ( it is so much closer ) and because he can bring CAs and BBs to Oosthaven when he cannot do so handily to Palembang.


Palembang:

Port 4, Airfield 5, Forts 5 ( 8% of the way to 6 ), 110 mines

AV: 1,195, Aviation Support 216 ( about 50 AV is on the way from Palembang to bring this to over 250 ). Engineers 231.

HQs: Malaya, III Indian Corps, AHQ Far East.

Divisions:
11th Indian: 372 AV, 46% Experience and 78% Preparation.
9th Indian - 289 AV, 46% Exp, 88% Prep

Bdes: 44th, 45th and 46th India + SSVF Bde: All only about 20% Exp but Prep 96 to 99% so soon they'll reach 100% and boost their Experience to 50 by the middle of next month.

5 additional Bns.


Artillery: This is pretty weak since I don't need lots of arty to impale large shipping here....
3 " mortar: 70
2lbr ATG: 40
18 Lber: 29
25 lber: 30
3.7" Mountain Guns: 16
75mm CD GUNS: 8


AAA:
40mm: 169
3.7" AAA: 155

In the last month when he launched bomber raids against Palembang before all of the 3.7" guns were fully ready each raid was suffering between 50 to 66% loss rates. So, if he hits with Oosthaven or Palembang with bombers I expect them to destroy about 50% of each raid with just FlAK alone or force the bombers up so high they achieve nothing.


Lahat:
AV 1,008. Engineers: 213. Airfield 7, Forts Level 2.

HQ: 223rd and 224th RAF Groups - 1 of which is moving to Benkoenen to provide torpedo reloads for PBYs basing there.

7th Australian Division ( Reserve formation prepping for Benkoenen but held centrally to reinforce Palembang if they land there. Can move to Palembang within 3 days if necessary.)

Multiple Bns and a couple of Armoured Bdes: I'm counting anything which isn't a Stuart or Matilda as an armoured car. Using that as a benchmark the armoured forces of my reserve comprise 207 armoured cars and 139 Stuart Is.


Benkoenen:
Basically only has 150 AV, 34 engineers, Level 2 forts ( building rapidly though as I just freed an engineer Bn to help out at Benkoenen and it just arrived yesterday ). Benkoenen is weakly held since:
a) I have 1,000 AV 3 to 4 days away and
b) he can't really invade it until he takes Java and if he does take Java I'll just shift the 7th Oz Division to Benkoenen.




Wirraway_Ace -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 3:10:12 PM)

Nemo,

You have cited on multiple occasions the old Soviet constructs of Strategic, Operational and Tactical objectives and their interrelationship (subordination of operational to strategic and tactical to operational).  This brings back a certain intellectual nostalgia for these constructs, which I always found elegantly simple—even after translation to English.  Have you ever read the actual source documents?  My exposure has always been to translations and extensive (I suspect) interpretations.

I am also very intrigued by the interrelationship between your strategic objectives.  The capture of the Marshalls while building Fortress Southern-Sumatra strikes me as a chess-players “fork” as much as a purely military scheme.

Care to bare your soul a little and describe your background for those who don’t know you well?



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 4:38:50 PM)

Ah, to paraphrase Sun Bin: He who doesn't know himself or the enemy will lose, he who knows the enemy will win 50% of the time, he who, in addition, also knows himself will win 100% of the time... So, do I know myself and am I happy to give away my secrets to those who may not discern them for themselves? Yeah, sure ;-)


Soviet doctrine: No, I was never exposed to the source documents per se as I don't speak or read russian. What I mostly read was very good unbiased analysis at 1 remove from those primary documents. When the US Army puts its mind to it it can turn out very good analyses of doctrinal development in other countries and, before 9/11, one could get access to huge swathes of stuff which is now not at all so easily available.

Anyways, I'd say Glantz, House, Simpkin ( a bit before the time of House and Glantz but very good and very "British" ) were ones I read found were very reliable sources. As you say many sources interpret Soviet doctrine through Western eyes and, as such, mangle it horribly rendering their "translation" unworthy of reading. Apart from that I was fortunate enough to be involved in a few projects about a decade ago which led to interesting interactions with people who may or may not have been from no such agency and the British and US Armies - particularly some SF guys who were involved as "advisors" to various nations in Africa and had to "advise" Western-friendly troops on how to counter the Soviet-era tactics of their opposition. Real-world examples are always illuminating.

All such conversations would, obviously, have only been on publicly-available data obviously. As anyone who has had contact with anyone like that knows those are some very serious and genuine people and they'll cut you down in a heartbeat if you do anything untoward, as they should. Still, when you are talking about doctrinal issues from 70 to 30 years ago having to stay clear of anything which isn't publicly available isn't too difficult.



Chess-players forks... Hmm, it wasn't visualised as such but I think that chess boils strategy down to its essentials and one of the acmes of strategy is to give your opponent only losing choices. A fork in chess is just a very basic, obvious and powerful example of that.



In terms of gaming: I played chess when I was younger but it was difficult to find frequent high level opponents in Ireland once I left our equivalent of High School so I gave it up then. If I was American or British I'd have joined the army then. As it was the fact that the Irish Army wasn't going to see action meant I wasn't interested in joining and I'm not about to join a foreign army. So, since being an infantry officer was out of the question I went into medicine. A bit of a volte face but such is life.

I only started wargaming in my early 20s when I no longer played chess and first PBEMed about 10 years ago ( I only twice played paper wargames... I'm from the computer generation ;-) ). I got involved with SSI through complaining about inaccuracy in a few of their games ( I'm such a grog-nerd ;-) ) and went on to be Historical Consultant to a couple of their WW2 simulations and am happy to say that within the limits available those games were more accurate on release than they would otherwise have been. Later I got involved with Panzer Elite from Wings Simulations - which was really groundbreaking at the time in terms of graphics and scope - and was involved with a group which helped improve its historicity a lot prior to release. I don't think it was properly supported on release unfortunately. Since then I've been involved with quite a few wargames or warsims but I don't really test anymore... I think I can be of more benefit in terms of analysing the system and giving some input there. Why? Simple, I don't have the patience for testing but I'm pretty good at systems analysis and seeing how disparate things fit together to cause unanticipated consequences.

Later I was probably most involved with Combat Mission and alpha and beta tested that and that's where I first AARed. Over time though the developers there began running the forums as their own little fiefdom allowing bullying by posters they liked and punishing those they didn't and allowing political statements they agreed with while punishing those they didn't. Since they were rather right-wing that left a lot of Europeans feeling very hard done by. I don't care what anyone's beliefs are but I do think that EVERYONE must be treated the same. Either both viewpoints are allowed to post or none are. You can't favour either side. So, since I was young and thought that they might see the "error of their ways" I spoke up, often, and got banned ;-). One reason I like the Matrix forums so much is that the admins DO let people post no matter what their belief and will treat both sides equally if they go overboard.

Anyways, CM was when I first realised I was somewhat good at tactical wargaming. At one stage I had a 120+ game unbeaten run and I began being approached by people asking me to give them tips etc. In the end I had a hidden website which was accessible by a small cadre of people who were interested in really learning tactics etc and that's how I drifted into being interested in AARs which had teaching and 360 degree critique as part of their foundation - which directly led to this AAR.

Being involved in "teaching" as it were with CM and having a bit of a reputation for following Soviet doctrine led to a lot of challenges by serving officers and I ended up playing a lot of US, Canadian and British Captains, Majors and a few Lieutenant Colonels --- which was extremely interesting. Several times we specifically had maps of German terrain made in order to fight doctrinal battles over. Sure Shermans vs Pz IVs isn't the same as M1s vs T80s but doctrinal play doesn't depend on the tank types involved so such matchups still have value. The basic conclusion I took was that the US and Allies would have slaughtered the Warsaw Pact along large portions of the front where only secondary efforts were made but that where the main efforts went in the Soviets WOULD have achieved breakthroughs. Once the battles had degenerated into generalised meeting engagements as the dislocated NATO line re-arranged I think NATO would have won many tactical victories but would have lost the main operational ones, leading to a strategic requirement to retreat westward and out of Germany. Eventually NATO would have had to use nukes.

Anyways, that doctrinal application then led to being asked to serve as a doctrinal proxy for the Soviets for a US Armoured Major's thesis on the use of off-the-shelf wargames for officer training. He was a tough, tough opponent but in the end we shared the spoils 1 win and 1 draw each but, more importantly, validated the ability to replicate the doctrines in-game ( he was using US 1980s, I went with 80s Soviet ). He sent me his thesis afterwards and it does look like the use of CM was pretty much validated for training and was able to show doctrine.

After that I began playing WiTP and that vampire has taken most of my gaming time until now. Recently I began to jones for a tactical fix again and began doing rather intensive research for a project which I think will interest a lot of people here. Nothing will be see the light of day for a year ( at least ) though but I think it'd interest people here.


Why Soviet doctrine? Simple, I always thought German doctrine was very good tactically but wasn't so sure about it operationally. I think American doctrine basically aped the Germans after WW2 and eventually culminated in AirLand Battle which was a means of ensuring every sub-unit manoeuvred for best position but I was just never convinced that it would lead to the overall unit achieving the best exchange rate etc. So, then I looked at the Soviets and saw in their lack of tactical nicety a greater purpose. I'd also point out that Tukhachevsky never advocated them rolling forward like robots irrespective of enemies on the flanks etc - that ended up happening as a result of the Purges in 38 etc. Tukhachevsky was more than happy for them to react to local events when absolutely necessary but was still very much focussed on the need to subjugate the tactical to the operational to the strategic etc.


In terms of profession: Well, psychiatry. Mostly general adult, recently a bit of psychiatry of addiction ( heroin, cocaine all that sort of fun stuff ) and now a nice job teaching undergraduate medical students for a year. My main areas of interest in psychiatry are PTSD and mental health informatics ( using computers to improve mental health etc )


Hmm, I kind of wrote stream of consciousness there so I'm not sure if that's what you were looking for. If it wasn't feel free to ask again and I'll try better next time. Bottom line though - just an amateur and never a day in uniform but having a good grasp of military history etc does come in useful for the PTSD. You'd be surprised just how much a guy will open up when he mentions mouseholing, sees you nod and goes "Do you know what that means?" followed by an explanation of mouseholing for gaining entry to a house etc... I had that exact situation happen with an Irish-American ex US Army engineer who was in Fallujah and only opened up to me when he realised I had some idea what he was talking about and he didn't have to stop his flow of feelings every 10 seconds to explain a term etc.



Wirraway_Ace -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 5:12:43 PM)

Nemo, thanks for the background.  I would have guessed prior-service and a PHD in psychology vs the MD in psychiatry, although training and scopes of practice may be very different in the UK.  However, you had referred to psychiatry before, so that was not a surprise.

Who was the U.S. Army major I wonder?  I served with many tasked with emulating Soviet doctrine at the NTC and the JRTC during the 90s.






Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 5:24:49 PM)

Psychiatric training in Ireland and the UK is very different than in the US. In the US I think you do a 3 year residency. In Ireland and the UK after 3 years you just MIGHT be clearing the first hurdle of your specialisation... That thought of someone with just 3 years under their belt independently treating people is scary to me. Then again things are much more intense in the US and the need to get out and earning money to pay off college loans puts a different skew on things.



Nemo121 -> RE: OPSEC (7/4/2010 5:58:30 PM)

So, I saw some 80+ ships in Truk and thought I'd try to sneak some BBs in to bombard, setting their bombard distance to be 34,000 feet when the largest CD guns Japan has on the island have a maximum range of 32,000. I was hoping for a couple of lucky hits on the damaged CVEs Japan has in port at Truk. In all I was sending in 4 old BBs and 7 DDs as a bombardment force and 2 CA, 1 CL and 16 DD as SC TFs to kill any ships guarding the coast. My plan was to run them out 4 hexes from Ponape under LRCAP from some 250 fighters based at Ponape. If they weren't spotted then I was going to send them in to bombard. If they were spotted I'd probably just retreat back to Ponape, use the CAs to set up an SC TF to defend Ponape while sending the 4 BB, the CL and about 16 DDs to the Cocos Islands via Port Moresby and Darwin. That would give me 10 BBs, 1 CA, about 12 CLs ( some of them damaged though ) and about 45 DDs at the Cocos Islands which, I think, should be enough to really rip the IJN apart if they make for Oosthaven.

Anyways the Japanese search planes spotted them and launched some Betty raids escorted by Zeroes. 4 Zeroes and a total of 14 Betties sortied. My LRCAP shot down 14 Bettys and 2 Zeroes, the other two only being damaged. My CAP ( comprising P40Bs, P39Ds and P400s ) suffered two planes damaged enough to leave the fight. So, 16:0 in A2A today. That's another Daitai of Netties wrecked.

Elsewhere nothing much happened. My subs made multiple attacks on IJN DDs near Singapore and Singkawang but achieved no hits. The IJN is definitely gathering in force though, I think the invasion should arrive around the beginning of April and I think it might actually come in at Palembang - I have prepped a Division at Oosthaven for Palembang and I think now might be the time to send it. It is in Strategic Mode so should be there within a couple of days.



Capt. Harlock -> Fight for Hawaii (7/4/2010 8:41:31 PM)

quote:

Historically, historically, historically.

Surely it is utterly irrelevant how many B17s were there in June 1942 in real life.


The minor point being that it's not "gamey".

The *major* point being that two types of 4E's instead of just one means a bigger stream of replacements, which is the key factor in a battle of air attrition.

P.S. Congrats on wrecking another Daitai of Betties -- and that means the suppression of the airfields on Oahu just got even harder.



Nemo121 -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/4/2010 8:43:39 PM)

Harlock, Sorry you've lost me.... "Gamey"... Could you explain, I actually can't figure out what you are implying. I can't understand if you're saying something is gamey or not gamey and if so what it is you're applying that to.



Capt. Harlock -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/5/2010 9:22:16 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Harlock, Sorry you've lost me.... "Gamey"... Could you explain, I actually can't figure out what you are implying. I can't understand if you're saying something is gamey or not gamey and if so what it is you're applying that to.


If my research is correct, Liberators were not used in sustained combat operations in the Pacific theater until November 1942. A Japan fanboy might have protested that the use of Liberators beginning in late June, in a decisive engagement, was therefore unrealistic. (Not that you would have paid any attention to such hypothetical person.)

Incidentally, what's your assessment on being able to keep the Oahu airfields open, should your opponent try to create Nettie airfields within range? I imagine you yourself might be able to do it, given your skill at allocating sufficient (i.e. massive) resources to your operations. But it seems to me that it would be important to achieve strategic surprise, which your opponent cannot now do, since you thought of the plan in the first place.



Nemo121 -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/6/2010 12:12:30 AM)

Well, neither did Japan build 300 Zeroes per month in early 1942... In any case if people want to play a game in which no unit is used before it was used in real life and to be limited to the roles it was used to in real life then that's fine. I prefer to explore the "what ifs". So, yeah, I wouldn't be much bothered by someone commenting about LB-30 usage If they're in-game then feel free to deploy them is pretty much my motto.


Oahu:
1. Well, firstly it isn't a matter of keeping the airfields open or not... One shouldn't have major problems keeping the airfields open given the limited number of lightish IJA bombers the IJAAF can deploy against Oahu.

2. Any Japanese player who wastes Netties against the FlAK of Oahu is wasting a scarce asset. Better to lose the light bombers ( Sonia, Lillys etc ) than torpedo-carriers like Netties.

3. I think the way one closes Oahu is simply by sweeping the air of USAAF fighters and then bombing from high altitude. You don't need to keep Oahu airfield closed, you just need to remove the fighters and make it impossible for the USAAF to struggle for air supremacy without "creating" 200+ fighters there on a given day ( and the slow rate of repair will guarantee you you can fight them in dribs and drabs if that's done ). Over time perhaps the supplies will fall so low the US player can't even create the fighters anymore but the key is that all you really need with Oahu is:
a) to prevent his bombers from Oahu closing your airbases in conjunction with a USN counter-offensive.
b) prevent his fighters gaining air supremacy over Oahu as a prelude to his "creation" of bombers at Oahu to strike at your bases.

If you can keep Oahu suppressed ( which is not nearly the same as closing the airfield ) such that your Netties and the IJN can face off against any US counter-attack without interference from US land-based air then you'll do just fine. You don't actually have to destroy stuff to render it useless. This is one of those cases where destruction simply isn't worth the cost but suppression most definitely is.


As to Oahu needing lots of resources etc... No, I think you could do it with 300 AV right now, which is less than he is committing to clearing the Kuriles. Also while suffiicient often means massive it doesn't always. Sometimes a massive force is the minimum needed, at other times the minimum needed is far less. I am always concerned with using the minimum force possible so as to let me run as many operations in parallel as possible ( in order to stretch the enemy physically and psychologically ) so I wouldn't like people to think one must always commit everything to every battle. One should commit the minimum possible consistent with assured victory. If that's 2 DDs and a CL then fine, if that's all of KB, 10 BBs and 12 divisions of troops then so be it. The key is that you commit enough to succeed.

One caveat is that if you don't actually have to run other ops at the same time then one can push additional resources into a given operation in order to turn the force correlation even more in your favour and achieve disproportionate kill ratios as per Lanchester.

But basically - always try to do stuff with the least force possible and then when you're running all the ops you want you can go around and commit uncommitted assets in order to achieve greater overmatches.



bklooste -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/6/2010 10:43:48 AM)

Yes you dont need to shut down Oahu airfields , that is far too expensive . Just sweep and bomb it to oblivion if he has lots of aircraft  their( using Salies/Helens) . It will be more of an attritional fight though you can close it down for a short period if you need in the long term too much flak and too high repair rate.

I dont think Oahu is takable since they changed the CD routines and from the AV multipliers Undercovergeek got. Im amazed at all these people who send 5-7 divs there , thats just crazy your not going to get surprise anyway and they need to be there for a long time while you get ready. You can take all of the islands except for Oahu with 2 Divs and begin sieging it ( using Netties against resupply convoys) , blowing up the repair yards and any ships there and attritioning planes at the airfield.  Then depending on your oponennt you can move teh divs there for Oahu If needed and use barges & small expendable ship for the invasion not your high value transports.  Owning Hawaii achieves 90% of the objectives of the whole island the main issue is its easier for him to ocunter attack but who really wants to defend Oahu in mid 43 anyway ?



FatR -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/6/2010 11:21:57 AM)

The big problem with sieging Oahu is the ability of Allies to replenish their airgroups, as long as they have supply... Unless bombarding with Yamatos/Nagatos from extreme range (beyond that of CD guns) proves to be at least somewhat effective, the aifield will be very hard to shut down.

EDIT: And an airfield that isn't shut down will pose major problems for resupplying Japanese own garrizons on neighboring islands. Allied might well try not putting up CAP, instead relying on flak to get a superior rate of attrition and launch only naval strikies.



Capt. Harlock -> RE: Fight for Hawaii (7/6/2010 8:24:13 PM)

quote:

Yes you dont need to shut down Oahu airfields , that is far too expensive . Just sweep and bomb it to oblivion if he has lots of aircraft their( using Salies/Helens)


The point being that you can't sweep and bomb to oblivion if your own airfields have been devastated by hordes of 4E's. (Which can be transferred directly from the west coast without having to be uncrated and assembled.)

One other thought: it isn't just the USAAF fighters that need to be dealt with. What about USN and USMC Wildcat squadrons?



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