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ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

In any possible new game successor to AE that I am involved in - there would be a submarine/ASW design driven by knowledgeble SMEs from the start of the design phase. I actually first posted on this forum to "whine" about the submarine/ASW modeling - ran smack into Ron - though we were in pretty much total agreement - probably still are [:)].

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
So, when is hte new game going to be done?[:)]

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ORIGINAL: Local Yokel
I shouldn’t have to put up with mdiehl’s barbs, and I won’t. If moderators won’t restrain this kind of inflammatory behaviour I shall respond to it as I see fit. Or find a forum for my contributions where such conduct isn't tolerated.

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ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

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ORIGINAL: Local Yokel


What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

There was a politician who made a speech one day, saying that our (US) subs were doing great in the Pacific because the Japanese were setting their depth charges at 200 feet, and our subs were nice and safe at 350 feet.

That speech made quite a stir at the time, because a politician was announcing war time information that spies could use to help kill Americans. (as far as anyone knows, that information did not make it back to the Japanese, who continued to keep their depth charges shallow.)

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

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And a quesiton for those who want the IJN to never, or nearly never, fire at escorts. If the sub is bingo fuel tomorrow, and a KV shows up, should the CO shoot at it? How about two days fuel? What parameters would you give the coders if you were doing the system analysis for them? Under what exact conditions should a sub shoot at an escort? Different for each side? (Historically, the USN began going after escorts on purpose in mid-1944. See USS Harder.) Do the players think there should be parallel code bases for the two sub fleets? (Not that this will happen.) Is the issue that they shoot at all, or is the issue that they hit escorts too often? I suspect that code is easier to alter than firing-decision code. Ecorts should be hard to hit for several reasons, primarily short waterlines, fast spins, and more lookouts per ton than merchants. But I sure don't know how to tell a coder how to tweak any of those to be "historic" (Were Canuck lookouts better than guys from Brooklyn?), let alone how to do it and not break something else--like have that I-boat use those four fish on a tanker day after tomorrow that "should have" lived if only that KV had died.

I advocated an AI sub-routine which allowed subs to be controlled by an HQ (like IRL) and the player simply picked doctrines and patrol zones and the AI did the rest. Subs were assigned to squadrons to micromanage various player desires/strategies. Might have worked.[;)]

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

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ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

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ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

1. i was reffering to 1941 not teh whole war. Though would say its also true in 42.

2. How many non troop transport convoys did the Japanese run in 41 and early 42 , the sources i read state little convoying was done ? How many escorts are there in the OOB ( if you use historical conversions and when most of the destroyers are mainly used for troop transports) .. Result = lots of task forces with very few escorts. QED. Even players who do lots of conversions and reasonable convoys are struggling with 1 escort per convoy or 2 for high priority.

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

There were fewer escorts sunk in 1942 because of several variables. There were fewer subs on patrol. The torpedoes didn't work. Many of the pre-war COs were too cautious, and were relieved, but not until they'd made a couple of patrols. None of those reasons indicates that the Japanese didn't escort convoys in 1942.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

There were fewer escorts sunk in 1942 because of several variables. There were fewer subs on patrol. The torpedoes didn't work. Many of the pre-war COs were too cautious, and were relieved, but not until they'd made a couple of patrols. None of those reasons indicates that the Japanese didn't escort convoys in 1942.

Or it could just indicate that the subs preferred shooting at the targets that mattered..., the ones carrying war material, oil, and troops. One of the big problems with statistics has always been figuring out just what the numbers actually meant.

When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras.[:)]

I'd buy that if you could provide any rational reason for that to have happened. I can think of lots of reasons why the ship-types sunk swung toward escorts as the war progessed. I can't think of any for them to go the other way.

In the anti-ship approaches I participated in, both at sea and in the trainers/simulators, escorts tended to be shot at when it was necessary to accomplish the mission, as when they were between us and the ultimate heavy. When the mission goals included surviving, they were often shot at first. But not always. I recall one scenario where the op order stated we HAD to sink a heavy merchat, heavily escorted. My CO shot at the two Krivaks on th eport-side escort, hit both, but set off a hornet's nest of ASW we barely escaped. The merchant got away. In the critique my CO (sort of) whined "I went after them because they could have hurt me." The vice-admiral in charge of the Sub Group had slipped in to observe. He stepped forward, said, "Captian, war is hell", and failed us. That was only the beginning of our "fun."

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I don't suppose you have the same charts and breakdowns for the Japanese side? Be nice to have the comparison. But thanks for posting the links.

I don't. I don't know if the IJN kept those sorts of records, or how many were incomplete due to the sub not getting home. The winer susually have better books.

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

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ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

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ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

1. i was reffering to 1941 not teh whole war. Though would say its also true in 42.

2. How many non troop transport convoys did the Japanese run in 41 and early 42 , the sources i read state little convoying was done ? How many escorts are there in the OOB ( if you use historical conversions and when most of the destroyers are mainly used for troop transports) .. Result = lots of task forces with very few escorts. QED. Even players who do lots of conversions and reasonable convoys are struggling with 1 escort per convoy or 2 for high priority.

As a data point, this link lists every ship allowed by the JANAC post-war body, by boat, by date, by class, by tonnage. Take a look at how many DD and smaller escorts were sunk. (Also CL and larger, but that's a different point.)

USN subs actually attacked few combat TFs in the war. Most of the DD and smaller vessels in those lists were ASW escorts. There are many of them.

There were fewer escorts sunk in 1942 because of several variables. There were fewer subs on patrol. The torpedoes didn't work. Many of the pre-war COs were too cautious, and were relieved, but not until they'd made a couple of patrols. None of those reasons indicates that the Japanese didn't escort convoys in 1942.

Edit: the links would help, huh?

http://www.valoratsea.com/month1.htm

http://www.valoratsea.com/JANAC.htm

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The USND DDs at Balikpapan didn't have much difficulty with target ID, but they did have trouble with basic visibility. Of course, they, like the Japanese at Savo, had the initiative, which among other things means that you know when and where the fight will develop and you can be sure that most of the targets you're seeing are hostiles. That they did not achieve much more might be a matter of shoal water or target visibility, or it may be that the USN tin cans were moving too fast. In any case, like Savo was for the Japanese, Balikpapan was a tactical victory for the USN, achieved under circumstances in many respects identical to those at Savo, and achieving the same strategic effects (didn't stop the invasion from succeeding).

The general conjecture that the Japanese were particularly better at naval combat has no merit when you look at the outcomes of actual battles. The one and only thing that the IJN possessed that was a superior torpedo system. Of course, that cost them dearly at other times, when IJN CAs were sunk by fires in their torpedo compartments. And then, that system only worked well on a couple of occasions.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste

No one is saying the US didnt target warships and troop convoys but most of the resources ships ( which are the majority sunk on the charts) had very little if any escorts and would be low risk targets as Japan has hardly any of them in RL in 41 and 42. Most players convoy everything this is a fundamental change.

"During World War II, Japanese vessels rarely traveled in convoys" Robb-Webb, Jon (2001). "Convoy". in Richard Holmes.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The general conjecture that the Japanese were particularly better at naval combat has no merit when you look at the outcomes of actual battles. The one and only thing that the IJN possessed that was a superior torpedo system. Of course, that cost them dearly at other times, when IJN CAs were sunk by fires in their torpedo compartments. And then, that system only worked well on a couple of occasions.

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ORIGINAL: dbfw190

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Probably so. And since the whole suite of EXP and Ag ratings are basically just numbers that the designers pulled out of their rear ends it'd explain why so many people see so many weird results so often. EXP and aggression ratings should be named what they are "Unresearched fudge factors."

and WITP AE should be named what it is. A Game.

:sarcasm on:
.. yeah how dare they add in EXP and aggression.. they obviously dont know a thing about making fun enjoyable historical WW2 games. They should have known exp and aggression would throw everything out of wack.
geez, what were they thinking?
:sarcasm off:

so now the game is broken due to exp and aggression?? funny
the game is fine. Sub game is challenging on both sides.. what's the matter with that?

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

Posters on this thread have been whipping themselves into a lather of indignation about how frightfully unfair it is for the Japanese crews to have such an enormous advantage in ASW due to their high experience levels. I thought it might be a good idea to take a look at the game’s actual experience figures and see whether they bear out such a charge.

As at 7 December 1941, I gauged Japanese destroyer crews’ experience as averaging out at around 70 in daytime and 67 at night. I looked at US destroyer crews based at Pearl Harbor and conservatively assessed their average experience levels at 45 daytime and 35 night time. I really couldn’t be bothered to approach this methodically; I just scanned through the ships and formed an impression. You may come up with different figures, but I suspect they won’t be far adrift from mine.

Now, applying the multipliers laid out in section 6.4.4.1 of the manual, Japanese crews in 1942 have their experience ratings reduced for ASW purposes to 67% of the usual rating. Using my assessed figures, that translates to an average daytime experience level for ASW work of 46.9%, and 44.89% for night time work.

Conversely, Allied crews receive a pre-1944 multiplier of 114% of their daytime rating and 150% of their night time rating. Applied to the average figures I assessed for the US destroyer crews these multipliers produce a daytime experience rating for ASW work of 51.3% and 52.5% at night.

Well, fancy that! The US destroyer crews apparently enjoy an ASW experience level a few percentage points better than their IJN equivalents both day and night! I suggest that before people vent their spleen on the dreadfully ahistorical ASW experience advantage enjoyed by the Japanese in the game they should first check the data to see whether the figures back up their preconceptions.

What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

Oh, and with regard to Cape Esperance, I’ve a notion the crew of USS Duncan may have had a few choice comments to make about quality of command and control, and target identification, (and perhaps accuracy too) so far as their own side was concerned. Especially target identification.

What you point out is that at game start the USN is just little a bit more than 10% better at ASW than the IJN. Does that seem realistic to you?

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ORIGINAL: Frank
No. Looking at USN abilities to hunt down German subs in the atlantic at this time, they are MUCH to good in AE.[:D]

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ORIGINAL: BShaftoe

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The general conjecture that the Japanese were particularly better at naval combat has no merit when you look at the outcomes of actual battles. The one and only thing that the IJN possessed that was a superior torpedo system. Of course, that cost them dearly at other times, when IJN CAs were sunk by fires in their torpedo compartments. And then, that system only worked well on a couple of occasions.

Having a superior system is worth nothing if you don't know how to use it. Allies had superior radars (or better said... they had radars) and they weren't able to use them effectively in the first battles of the war. So, at least in a sense, the Japanese were better at some aspects of naval combat.

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He is a troll.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: Frank
No. Looking at USN abilities to hunt down German subs in the atlantic at this time, they are MUCH to good in AE.[:D]

True. The had the equipment, but the doctrine was outdated. Of course, in the case of Japan, both doctrine and equipment were lacking and outdated... [:D]

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

My point was that the qualities typically attributed to a mythical race of supermen aren't supported by the established facts. Yes, the Type 93a was instrumental in the IJNs signal surface combat successes, but availed them nothing when they were laboring under the same constraints as the Allies were when the Allies lost night naval battles. EXP and AGG had nothing to do with it. Likewise USN torpedo tubes were truly suckbaggish in 1942, but that didn't stop them from occassionally being effective in 1942 night surface engagements.

On the whole the USN and IJN were, vis a vis quality of personnel and training with their equipment, and quality of command and control, and quality of detection systems, pretty much identical in 1942 through September, although the Japanese did have a better torpedo. By Nov 1942 US radar was giving the USN the edge. By 1943 USN radar and tracking gave the USN a substantial edge, and it helped that USN torpedoes had the bugs worked out.

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ORIGINAL: bklooste
Who cares ... its a game anythign that can be done to make a historic unequal contest more equal is a good thing.

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ORIGINAL: Mynok


Hmm...did you lose your password? [:D]