quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady

quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy




The Glen wasn´t there to find targets for subs, that´s how it´s used in the game but this is not at all comparable to what it was capable in real life. Glens weren´t used on naval search.

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

Frankly your posts are interesting but completelyn unconvincing. Virtually every example you posted includes the words "reconoitered (follow by) "name of an Allied port".

quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

Yes they were (used for Naval Search) as I posted above evidance of this can be found in the TROM's.

Frankly your posts are interesting but completelyn unconvincing. Virtually every example you posted includes the words "reconoitered (follow by) "name of an Allied port".

Read the TROMs, their are other examples their of them using the Glens to look for ships at sea.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dili

It was emplyed in naval search, besides it doesn't have a big range.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Yes..., and B-17's pioneered the art of "skip bombing"! Would you like to see 200 of them headed towards KB at 100 feet? [8|]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
So you are playing against an incompetent boob (or the AI, which is the same thing). That is hardly "historical" evidence. I stand by my original statement. Japanese ASW was poorly trained and equipped, and is way over-rated in the game.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

You can't always compare historical to your game. Historically, more than half the Allied subs were placed in defensive positions in 42 (or in positions that rarely saw enemy ships. Your opponent may be ignoring a sub ring around Pearl and focusing them near high traffic areas. I'm not saying the game has it correct, or incorrect. But, there's a large difference in results if you have 50+ more subs in convoy lanes than loitering around the Aleutians, PH, WC and OZ.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dili

It was emplyed in naval search, besides it doesn't have a big range.

Yes..., and B-17's pioneered the art of "skip bombing"! Would you like to see 200 of them headed towards KB at 100 feet? [8|]

quote:

but last 4 or 5 sub-pages of this thread somehow reminds me argument of the famous argument clinic

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Scholl is correct. Indeed the basic problem with the whole "why force someone to achieve historical results" is this. Historically, Japan was mobilized (to the extent it could be) for a war for which it had well developed operational plans, numerical superiority, and prepositioned assets. The Japanese player is therefore in a position, using hindsight, to not only achieve more than the Japanese, but to use assets to which the Japanese, by doctrine and training, never had even the slightest access.

The counterargument that the Allies benfit from hindsight is false, because the Allies aren't given the assets with which to do anything different from that which they historically attempted. Indeed, the Allies, judging by AARs, don't seem even to have their historical capabilities at any point during the war.

Probably the root cause of the problem goes back to the entire concept of EXP, carried over from the original Gary Grigsby's War in the Pacific. It's an index that DOMINATES combat results, but it's not tied to anything real. It is simply presupposed that Japanese skippers and crews, aircrews, and ground units, were much better at warfare by training and doctrine than their allied opponents. That is a manifest error. The correct position is that the Allies were in fact by training, doctrine, and firepower, on the whole much more effective (and should have HIGHER not lower EXPs across the board) than the Japanese, but were hindered by being caught unmobilized, and with few prepositioned assets and a developed logistical base to effectively resist the Japanese. Early war Japanese successes were primarily a consequence of bringing superior numbers or, in the case of Malaya, well prepared and suddenly implemented battle plans, to the engagements against isolated enemy positions. Every time they ran into resistence that they could not overrun or isolate, they got hurt bad.

quote:

Japanese surface naval units had drilled and practiced under much more realistic conditions than Allied Navies did before the war.

quote:

ORIGINAL: HHI

Submarines and ASW

What I have found (Allies vs. japanese A/I) is that Japanese ASW capability has noticeably increased around April 1944, to the point that I withdrew all submarines from the waters near Japan, after loosing three boats in one day, all to e patrol boats. I do not really have a problem with this. However, I do have a problem with a number of areas.

As suggested by Spence, the I-class submarine has a lot of problems, none of which are represented in the uber boats modeled in A/E. The most obvious is the limited diving depth of only 200 feet. This does not permit the submarine to get under the "thermal layer" in the warm water of the Pacific. For those of you who do not know of this effect, it is a boundary layer of high density water (because it is cold) through which sonar cannot effectively penetrate. US submarines had a diving depth of 350 feet, later, 400 feet, which allowed them to get under the thermals. In addition to the limited diving depth, the I-class boats were very large, making them a first-rate target for sonar. In addition, the Long Lance torpedo, though a marvelous weapon, was not a wakeless torpedo, leading escorts to the launch point. It also had a long dive time and limited maneuverability. In short, the I-class was not a very good submarine and a particularly poor commerce raider. The I-class should be ASW fodder.

The RO's are a little different. From RO-33 on, they have a diving depth of 250 feet. Getting under the thermals at 250 feet is a bit iffy, but might be possible anywhere but the South Pacific. Since the Japanese submarine effort is won or lost in the Coral Sea, they probably aren't any better off than the I-class.

Most of these game problems are related to the overwhelming emphasis placed on experience, of which the Japanese are modeled as very experienced (particularly at night) and the US ships are modeled as being manned by seaman seconds fresh out of Great Lakes. We are told (by the JFB's, obviously) that the Japanese had a prewar emphasis on night surface battle. This is particularly noticeable with the performance of the pre-war battleships, which are helpless against anything the Japanese send out, four battleships are easily defeated by a heavy cruiser and a couple of destroyers. Now, I don't know specifically how much night training the ships of the Battleforce received, but I doubt that it was none. The US Navy was a haven during the Great Depression and the best of these people went to the Battleforce. Crewmen were not sent to another ship every three years. They stayed on the same ship. Gunnery was highly emphasized, with annual competitions which were taken very seriously. These ships had a lot of problems, but crew experience was not one of them and neither was gunnery. This experience is simply a means of achieving play balance in the game and has very little to do with reality. In my opinion, the "historical' selection should get a historical representation.

A good example of this experience imbalance is seen when Yamato becomes available. At roughly the same time, Washington becomes available. Now, the captain of the Washington was a dedicated proponent of radar fire control. Obviously, the radar fire control team doesn't care whether it is night or day. But, Yamato comes in with night experience about 30 points higher than Washington. Where did they get all that experience. IRL, Kirishima was to learn how good Washington was at night.

US ships gain combat experience only through action, Japanese ships are launched with it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: jackyo123

Here is a quote from Morison - the 'Marianas' volume of his official history of the USN, WW2 - re: Albacore's attack on Taiho during the Battle of the Phillipine Sea:

"...three Japanese destroyers began depth-charging us - and not very methodically. Their sub chasing and ASW was just plain bad"

These were first class destroyers - and they were inept. Now imagine the poor slobs who were manning the SC's and the PB's - these guys are just way way too good, *in balance against the US skippers*.

That's the main thrust of my initial post - subs are deadly in this game. If thats a deisgn decision, then fine - but the allied player gets the worst of it, since, AHISTORICALLY, the Jap player gets a 'boost' to his ASW forces (i.e - they perform BETTER than their historical counterparts) and the US player gets no boost, and possibly even a penalty, through artificially deflated captain scores.

I have noticed a slight increase in us asw performance in one of my games that is now in '43. I've finally got 65+ skippers in all my DE's, and they are prosecuting - and hitting - more subs. But the key # for ASW prosecution seems to be aggressiveness, and thats where the Jap skippers are  more effective than their us brethren.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

but last 4 or 5 sub-pages of this thread somehow reminds me argument of the famous argument clinic

No, it doesn't.

[;)]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

Posters on this thread have been whipping themselves into a lather of indignation about how frightfully unfair it is for the Japanese crews to have such an enormous advantage in ASW due to their high experience levels. I thought it might be a good idea to take a look at the game’s actual experience figures and see whether they bear out such a charge.

As at 7 December 1941, I gauged Japanese destroyer crews’ experience as averaging out at around 70 in daytime and 67 at night. I looked at US destroyer crews based at Pearl Harbor and conservatively assessed their average experience levels at 45 daytime and 35 night time. I really couldn’t be bothered to approach this methodically; I just scanned through the ships and formed an impression. You may come up with different figures, but I suspect they won’t be far adrift from mine.

Now, applying the multipliers laid out in section 6.4.4.1 of the manual, Japanese crews in 1942 have their experience ratings reduced for ASW purposes to 67% of the usual rating. Using my assessed figures, that translates to an average daytime experience level for ASW work of 46.9%, and 44.89% for night time work.

Conversely, Allied crews receive a pre-1944 multiplier of 114% of their daytime rating and 150% of their night time rating. Applied to the average figures I assessed for the US destroyer crews these multipliers produce a daytime experience rating for ASW work of 51.3% and 52.5% at night.

Well, fancy that! The US destroyer crews apparently enjoy an ASW experience level a few percentage points better than their IJN equivalents both day and night! I suggest that before people vent their spleen on the dreadfully ahistorical ASW experience advantage enjoyed by the Japanese in the game they should first check the data to see whether the figures back up their preconceptions.

What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

Oh, and with regard to Cape Esperance, I’ve a notion the crew of USS Duncan may have had a few choice comments to make about quality of command and control, and target identification, (and perhaps accuracy too) so far as their own side was concerned. Especially target identification.