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janh -> RE: Lvov Pocket exploit - Q for developers (9/24/2011 2:38:45 PM)
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Interesting discussion here. So it bascially is a question of balancing the game to give the Germans more reason to hang on, versus giving them only their historically accurate potential?
I want to point out something new for 1.05, i.e. that there is now evidence that Leningrad can be held by the Soviets. Q-Ball is playing out the 1st AAR in which Leningrad might not be lost. Let's wait and see whether his opponent Bletchley_Geek will succeed holding it. Not sure whether it will be representative for 1.05, but this at least shows that despite removing the 2:1 rule and other benefits, a good Soviet player can put up a tough fight even against another experienced player. Surely the comparison to history would work best of the German player was expert, and the Soviet start as a rookie, but even for matched players the game balance is surely in the ballpark.
As for the Kiev pocket, I always considered that to be somewhat extraordinary since it not only required Soviet mistakes, but also was more a strategic gambit since the Germans had to shift the Schwerpunkt by detaching all its armor from AGC to AGS (as we know today, one of Hitlers further mistakes). This was a huge risk on the German side, not only because the way south left a huge left flank for the column, but also because they might not get back early enough for attacking Moscow. This shift from Moscow must come have come as a big surprise to Stalin and the higher command echelons, which can be seen by the result that the retreat order from Kiev was given far too late when the Soviets finally realized what was coming down so deep behind them (I suppose having gotten this situational overview in reality is still much harder than in any game). In addition, for this enormous pocket to happen, the forces had to be staying in place. Which was surely aided by seeing that the going for AGS in the south had been slow and rough up til then, and the Soviet Southern Front was the only one largely intact, and still numerically very strong. This surely were sufficient reasons for trying to make a stand west of the Djenpr.
As such, I think a huge Kiev-like pocket in game will require a number of factors to come together, like having enough Soviet forces left, and the Soviet player making mistakes in situational assessment while the German player has to take biggers risks, for exmaple by changing his axis of advance late, quickly and surprisingly. Not sure whether one should expect this to happen commonly against a good opponent. The Lvov pocket will also deprive the Soviet player of a lot of these reasons to fight forward at all, even if he is the kind that prefers not to do a withdrawal further east.
What I wonder is, why is the German apparently run in troubles in the second half of the advance in the south, i.e. why doesn't he reach Rostov a representative number of times? Is it that a good Soviet player avoids really stupid mistakes by hindsight that historically only made this possible for the Germans? That he perhaps sends more reinforcements south than Stalin did? Could that also have to do with too little pressure to be put on AGC or AGN, or even vice versa, does the Soviet player always too easily accept that Leningrad is lost and rather send his reinforcements south?
Having the Lvov move available is neat, and is should not be completely nerved since it was surely in the realm of possibility for the Germans to pull off, perhaps with some changes and hardships in the months before, but surely not entirely impossible. It only tastes a bit "salty" since there is apparently nothing the Soviet player can do, i.e. since the German armor can rush through the gaps in the ever same, never changing fashion. Little in war is really like this, there is always "friction" to varying degrees, and sometimes due to the most unexpected, minor causes. If there were some reaction moves that would block some spearheads, or at least put up a little fight so the pocket has a certain chance to be only closed in the 2nd week, it would be a much more "plausible" course for an alternative history and more acceptable. Such reaction order later might also favor the Germans on Russian breakthroughs, and would have to tuned against the HQ support.
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