RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (Full Version)

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warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 12:54:39 AM)
Just some other little - non-aircraft - tidbits. Did you know the German navy could not provide enough sailors to man the barges? - even if they stripped the KM bare (and thus would not be available to support). The river barges (which were sufficiently low in the water such that a destroyers wake would flood them) would be at sea in the Channel for 30 hours. The plan was for two to be towed across by each tug. So that's 2-3 knots in a seaway where 5 knot currents is not uncommon (apparently - the sailors amongst you will know if that rings true). 10% of the available barges had been destroyed by bomber command at their berths in northern France.

GaryChildress -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 2:12:27 AM)
Seeing how the invasion of Norway alone was an enormous stress on the KM and Germany's amphibious ability I do sort of get the impression that any real attempt to invade England would have been a disaster. I always get a kick out of Panzer General and the scenarios where Germany invade the US. No way in a thousand years would that have happened. Except of course in the world of my War in the Pacific mod (Plan 8-8-8 from Outerspace) featuring the KM in the Pacific. [:D]

mind_messing -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 1:58:26 PM)
This discussion is going much as I expected. Let me consolidate this discussion. Air superiority was a requirement for the invasion. The Luftwaffe did not gain it, but there is the real possibility that they could have in the August-September period if they had persisted in a war of attrition rather than shifting targets to the cities. Considering the neutering of the combat effectiveness of the Luftwaffe by the higher leadership, it makes you wonder how the battle would have progressed without the interference from up on high - offensive fighter sweeps and attacks on the radar stations are what I mainly have in mind. In regards to the naval aspect of the invasion: the KM would have the following capital ships Battleships: - Bismarck (commisioned 24 August 1940, would take some effort to be combat ready for the proposed invasion in Sept) - Schleswig-Holstein - Schlesien Heavy crusiers: - Admiral Hipper - Prinz Eugen (Commisioned 1 August 1940) Plus sundry other smaller warships. Hardly overwhelming force, but enough to ensure that the RN would face some significant resistance. . Against this, they have to fight off the bulk of the Royal Navy, but the RN had no intention of commiting their capital ships to interfere with an invasion. This just leaves the crusiers and destroyers of the RN, so even the older German battleships would significantly out-gun the opposition. Considering what happened to the Prince of Wales and the Repulse a year later, I wonder of the value of the RN sending big surface combatant ships into the range of the Luftwaffe - if the losses of the RN at Crete are anything to go by, the result wouldn't be favourable to the RN. The whole point of the barges were to enable the Whermacht to get enough troops ashore that they can capture a major port and start unloading troops through that. If they'd worked well, the Germans wouldn't have needed a port. The success of Operation Sea Lion depended on three factors: 1. The Luftwaffe maintaining air superiority over south-eastern England prior and during the invasion. 2. Combined efforts of the Luftwaffe and KM limiting the damage that the RN can cause to the invasion flotilla. 3. German ground forces securing sufficent ports to enable reinforcement and resupply of the invasion force. Now, the original quote that you posted that I took issue of was this: quote: There is one positive item you can add to that depressing list - a successful Operation Sealion was simply impossible. None of those three factors were "impossible". They were unlikely to be attained, but none were absolutely unattainable. There are many examples throughout history of things claimed to be "impossible" when, in fact, they are not. Someone who reads as much history as yourself should not be making that mistake.

Miller -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 2:40:33 PM)
One problem for the Luftwaffe is they had very limited anti ship capability during that period. Yes the Stuka could be an effective ship killer, however against anything bigger than a cruiser it would struggle and the torpedo carrying He111 did not really come into the war until mid 41. Granted the RN may have been reluctant to risk BBs in the early stages of the operation, but I cannot imagine they would keep them out of harms way indefinitely whilst the fate of the entire country was in the balance.....

Skyros -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 3:21:14 PM)
Using Crete as a comparison is a little shaky. The RN will be operating from local bases with the opportunity to have air cover over their task forces which they did not have off of Crete.

msieving1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 3:29:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing In regards to the naval aspect of the invasion: the KM would have the following capital ships Battleships: - Bismarck (commisioned 24 August 1940, would take some effort to be combat ready for the proposed invasion in Sept) - Schleswig-Holstein - Schlesien Heavy crusiers: - Admiral Hipper - Prinz Eugen (Commisioned 1 August 1940) Plus sundry other smaller warships. Hardly overwhelming force, but enough to ensure that the RN would face some significant resistance. . Against this, they have to fight off the bulk of the Royal Navy, but the RN had no intention of commiting their capital ships to interfere with an invasion. This just leaves the crusiers and destroyers of the RN, so even the older German battleships would significantly out-gun the opposition. You simply can't take the commissioning date of a warship as the date the ship is ready for service. The commissioning date is the date the navy takes possession. Fitting out would be uncompleted, no systems would be tested, and the crew would be untrained. There is no possibility that Bismarck or Prinz Eugen would be available in September 1940. You did forget Admiral Scheer. That leaves two CA and two pre-dreadnought battleships as the KM "heavy units". The old battleships were obsolete in WWI, and their combat use in WWII was limited to shore bombardment where there was no possibility of interference by enemy forces. They would not out-gun the British cruisers, anymore than the Dutch Soerabaja, armed with very similar guns, out-gunned the Japanese cruisers. They would be overwhelmed by 8" and 6" fire and sunk by torpedoes. More likely, the KM would not be so desperately foolish as to commit them to combat in the English Channel. The "sundry other smaller warships" didn't amount to much. The KM would be able to inflict some losses on the RN, but it's very unlikely that they would be able to protect the troop barges and very likely that the bulk of the KM would be destroyed. It's probably an exaggeration to say that Operation Sealion in 1940 was impossible, but it's not a large exaggeration. The chance of success was low enough, and the cost of failure high enough, that no rational commander would have made the attempt.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 4:25:49 PM)
[/quote]warspite1 (in response to mind_messing) Firstly, let me clear something up. The discussion is not going as expected because you have not read what I have written. First and foremost my post states quite clearly that Sealion was an impossibility based on the attack being ordered with the historical situation being what it is (see post 9). If you want to bring in other counterfactuals e.g. Goering adopted a different plan, then fine but it would be helpful to know that. The problem with a different plan (and there is no guarantee that this would work either of course) is simply who is going to understand the need for a different plan? E.g. we know the German attack on the radar installations were a waste of time because they never realised the significance of radar or the fact that the damage could be repaired. Who is going to advise Goering of this? Secondly of course is the need for other things to change. The switch of emphasis to the airfields is always brought up as though that was the Luftwaffe’s only error. For example, Goering's use of his fighters was ridiculous. They were ordered to stick with the bombers rather than be used in the hunter role that would have made them more effective. As per the numbers presented in previous posts, although the RAF were being hit hard, they were NOT scrapping the bottom of the barrel any more - and indeed significantly less - than the Germans - who were in pretty bad shape (hence Hitler calling off the attack). It is vital to remember the historical context too. Hitler and WWII in Europe was all about Lebensraum. It is unimaginable that Hitler would have allowed the continuation of the BoB – and certainly not the launch of Sealion – if he thought there was a chance it would fail and thus put Barbarossa (his raison d’etre) in doubt. But let’s assume local air superiority is obtained. Would the invasion succeed? You have raised a number of points: - I am really surprised at the Bismarck comment. You assume that Bismarck could be combat ready for Sealion? Granted Hitler COULD have ordered her to sail (but in no way shape or form would Bismarck have been combat ready). Bismarck was a brand new ship with all the problems and niggles associated with such in terms of both machinery and a crew untrained and untested. No time for fire control tests no time for damage control tests? Does the machinery even work? Possible, but not sensible to go from the dockyard to battle.... - I mentioned Admiral Scheer previously - although did not bother mentioning the pre-dreadnoughts. By all means add them to the OOB if you think it helps but please don't place them in the battleship category!! - Where do you get the idea that the RN would not commit the capital ships? If the operation goes as expected then there is simply no need. But if by some miracle the operation was more troublesome the RN would have held back nothing. Or do you really suggest that with the country at stake - the RN would not be committed? The RN was committed with little or no air cover in Norway, France, Greece, Crete, the Mediterranean etc etc. But you suggest the senior service would not be pressed into action if the fate of the country was in the balance? - Regardless of how the invasion was going, if the KM were going to send out their remaining surface vessels the RN would welcome the chance to finish off the surface fleet with capital ships and torpedo bombers. - I am afraid you continue to miss the point re the inability of the Luftwaffe at that stage of the war to hurt the RN sufficiently to stop them making mincemeat of the river barges. Please look at Norway, Dunkirk - largely STATIONARY destroyers (or operating in confined spaces) how few were sunk? The small craft carving up the river barges would not be stationary. Also once the MTB's, destroyers, cruisers and whatever other craft can be mustered are in amongst the river barges, exactly how are the Luftwaffe going to attack those ships without taking out their own vessels? - And you have not answered any of the points about how the 2-3 knot barges, in the water for 30 hours, are going to get to England, are going to un-load in good order, are going to be able to re-supply on such a large front. Have you seen the German plans for how the river barges were supposed to off-load their cargo?? - D-Day was 2-years in the planning and had one overall HQ for all services with full co-operation between each. There was no such HQ for Sealion. During the "planning" conferences half the time the Luftwaffe - totally key to the operation - were not even present. Raeder did not agree with the broad front landing - but at a conference the KM did not even attend, Hitler agreed with the army that that would be the plan..... Neither Goering nor Raeder believed it stood an earthly. Plans had not stated before July. For such a complex operation, relying on total inter-service co-operation at all times, there was actually very little in evidence of any. So if the invasion were attempted in September (with the historical BoB to date) then it would have been a total and utter disaster for the Germans – that is the only outcome. But as said such an operations was realistically impossible as Hitler would have cancelled as he did in real life - to allow for Barbarossa in 1941. IF the Germans had air superiority (and for this to be achieved you need to remove Goering and give the Germans hindsight) then there would be spectacularly small chance of success – and then only provided everything went right for the Germans and wrong for the British for a two week period. EDIT: Noted Miller, Skyros and msieving1 have made some of these points already.

Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 5:15:58 PM)
Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien ... [:D] c'mon they were not that crazy [:D] And the RN would had of course committed to battle; they might had avoided sending their latest ships; but they had a lot of old battleships, cruisers + hundreds of minor vessels that would had been more than enough to take on the Kriegsmarine, with heavy losses if the Luftwaffe was in support; but losses they could sustain having so big fleet. Moreover, 30 hours of crossing means they cannot avoid night time; and there won't be any Luftwaffe support then

Ralzakark -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 5:59:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing Considering the neutering of the combat effectiveness of the Luftwaffe by the higher leadership, it makes you wonder how the battle would have progressed without the interference from up on high - offensive fighter sweeps and attacks on the radar stations are what I mainly have in mind. The effect of the Luftwaffe’s leadership on the battle is often overstated. Many poor decisions were made due to faulty intelligence rather than incompetence. The Germans never fully understood either the nature of their opponent or the sort of battle they were fighting. Much of this was due to strategic blunders. The political leadership of the Third Reich did not advise the Luftwaffe to consider Britain as a possible adversary until 18 months before the battle. In contrast to Luftwaffe intelligence on France and Poland there was little appreciation of potential British targets or military capability. This was not helped by the low status given to intelligence work in the German armed forces as a whole. The effect of this on the attacks on radar sites is well known. Radar’s importance was not appreciated and the sites could have been hit much harder. But it was lack of understanding of its importance at the time which led to this. The Luftwaffe could not read account of the battle after the event and adjust its targeting accordingly. Critically the Germans also underestimated the number of new fighters the RAF was receiving and did not realise just how much German air crews were over-claiming by, leading them to constantly believe that Fighter command was on its knees. The Germans always fought the battle as if they were constantly on the verge of winning it, and some new tactical novelty would allow them to finally triumph. The under-estimation of production is well known. The 16 July 1940 report by 5th Abteilung estimated that Britain could produce 180-300 fighters per month, all of which were believed to be inferior to the Bf 109 and 110, and that this figure would decline due to the effects of air attack and lack of raw materials. The actual average was about 450-500 per month. Over-claiming is endemic in air warfare and the Luftwaffe was no exception, over-claiming by 300-400% in the critical August to September period. For example on 20 August the Luftwaffe believed it had shot down 644 planes in the period 12-19 August. The actual figure was 141. Both these factors led to huge difficulties. At one point Kesselring maintained that Fighter Command had been destroyed, while Sperrle claimed it had 1,000 aircraft. Trying to produce a coherent strategy when senior commanders had such widely diverging views was obviously very problematic. These problems were both long standing and systemic. For the Luftwaffe high command to have made better decisions in 1940 it would have had to go back in time to gather better intelligence, and to significantly change German military culture to give much greater emphasis on and importance to intelligence work as a whole. Its leaders had to fight the battle with what information they had, and as the battle progressed that information became increasingly divorced from reality.

Yaab -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 6:42:51 PM)
Who knew NSDAP had a plan to invade the UK. Imagine Martin Bormann leading a massive Parteitag rally in Stonehenge at night. Goosebumps!

Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 7:27:08 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Yaab Who knew NSDAP had a plan to invade the UK. Imagine Martin Bormann leading a massive Parteitag rally in Stonehenge at night. Goosebumps! This just reminds me of: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OKgHUrKZiXA [:D]

mind_messing -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 9:33:11 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 IF the Germans had air superiority (and for this to be achieved you need to remove Goering and give the Germans hindsight) then there would be spectacularly small chance of success – and then only provided everything went right for the Germans and wrong for the British for a two week period. That's what you should have said at the start.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 11:23:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 IF the Germans had air superiority (and for this to be achieved you need to remove Goering and give the Germans hindsight) then there would be spectacularly small chance of success – and then only provided everything went right for the Germans and wrong for the British for a two week period. That's what you should have said at the start. warspite1 Why? I said Sealion was impossible and then, in post 9, confirmed the basis of that comment. My position was clear. The study posted assumed a RL BoB up to the point of invasion and you commented upon that - I naturally assumed we were talking about the same thing (although when you were contesting whether the Germans had air superiority and I queried what you were talking about, either one of us could have sought clarification from the other at that point).

zuluhour -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/2/2015 11:26:43 PM)
2c AH never intended to invade. It was a last ditch ruse to get a treaty with England

Orm -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 12:23:11 PM)
I am not sure I understand the premise for this any longer. I thought that the question was that during the war, was there any point were Germany could have launched a successful invasion of England. And my answer to that is that it would have been impossible. No chance whatsoever. But if the question is rather a "what if" Germany had done this or that instead then it becomes a rather speculative question. And very hard to analyse since that would have altered the actions from the Allies as well. Edit: That is why we have games. [:)]

pontiouspilot -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 4:08:21 PM)
My view is that in late June or early July 1940 if the Germans had rushed a smallish shock force of Amphibs and paras the Brits might not have had enough pitch forks to fight them off. After Dunkirk my recollection is that there was 1 poorly trained and equipped Cndn division in so called fighting form. Such a force could have taken wide swaths only opposed by Home Gds allowing heavy forces to find their way in due course. The Germans could control enough air space over the Channel to slowly move heavier reinforcements in....yes casualties would be high. This may not have captured a determined defence of London but I'm not so sure the will for this would have materialized.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 4:30:52 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot My view is that in late June or early July 1940 if the Germans had rushed a smallish shock force of Amphibs and paras the Brits might not have had enough pitch forks to fight them off. After Dunkirk my recollection is that there was 1 poorly trained and equipped Cndn division in so called fighting form. Such a force could have taken wide swaths only opposed by Home Gds allowing heavy forces to find their way in due course. The Germans could control enough air space over the Channel to slowly move heavier reinforcements in....yes casualties would be high. This may not have captured a determined defence of London but I'm not so sure the will for this would have materialized. warspite1 I think you underestimate the number of divisions in the UK at the time and the number of tanks available. Yes, they were very short on heavy weapons - especially artillery, but your post suggests there is one division in the whole of the UK plus the Home Guard. The problems with getting ANY troops to the English coast remains - both for the initial troops and the reinforcements. How many river barges were ready in June or July. The earliest date the Germans believed they would be ready was September. How small is this smallish force you are thinking of and what would they be tasked with doing - without heavy weapons or transport (assuming they actually got ashore)?

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 4:56:24 PM)
Just one point to put this more into perspective. Crete has been mentioned as an example of how the RN would have been destroyed by the Luftwaffe (even IF superiority in the skies had been achieved – which it wasn’t). So let’s stick with Crete. For the defence of Crete the Royal Navy had no air cover. There was one occasion during the campaign when the Germans sought to reinforce their paratroopers by sea. Remember, the Luftwaffe: - Have air superiority - They are better placed to attack ships by May 1941 than they were a year earlier So what happened? The German troops, consisting of just over 2,300 men + heavy weapons and ammunition, were transported in 25 small cargo steamers – travelling at 4 knots. They were escorted by an Italian destroyer. The force was intercepted at night and annihilated by three British cruisers and three destroyers. NO German reinforcements landed at Crete by sea during the battle. This was with total Luftwaffe air superiority.

Orm -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 5:05:11 PM)
quote: The German troops, consisting of just over 2,300 men + heavy weapons and ammunition, were transported in 25 small cargo steamers – travelling at 4 knots. They were escorted by an Italian destroyer. The force was intercepted at night and annihilated by three British cruisers and three destroyers. NO German reinforcements landed at Crete by sea during the battle. This was with total Luftwaffe air superiority. Does anyone know why this force didn't get escorted by a heavier surface escort?

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 5:15:03 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: The German troops, consisting of just over 2,300 men + heavy weapons and ammunition, were transported in 25 small cargo steamers – travelling at 4 knots. They were escorted by an Italian destroyer. The force was intercepted at night and annihilated by three British cruisers and three destroyers. NO German reinforcements landed at Crete by sea during the battle. This was with total Luftwaffe air superiority. Does anyone know why this force didn't get escorted by a heavier surface escort? warspite1 Actually I think the escort was just a torpedo boat - not a destroyer. They probably thought they needed nothing else as they had air superiority [;)]

Orm -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 5:20:45 PM)
quote: This may not have captured a determined defence of London but I'm not so sure the will for this would have materialized. I am pretty sure that, after the successful evacuation of Dunkirk, the morale was high enough in Great Britain to fight long and hard against a German invasion. Especially with Sir Winston Churchill as Prime Minister to boast the fighting spirit. I can just imagine what the reaction would have been had he talked to the nation about the invasion in progress. I rather suspect that the German force that made it to the shore would have been demoralized. Troops that had been sea sick for hours abandoned on a foreign coast and that suffered heavy losses. There they try to recover and reorganize while under fire from enemy destroyers and cruisers. Trying to find out where they were supposed to be and where to go. And they were promised German air superiority over the invasion beach but now they discover that RAF concentrate their divisions over the beachhead and it actually seems like the British have air superiority. No, I do not give much for the fighting spirit of those few who made it to the shore.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 6:40:21 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Orm quote: The German troops, consisting of just over 2,300 men + heavy weapons and ammunition, were transported in 25 small cargo steamers – travelling at 4 knots. They were escorted by an Italian destroyer. The force was intercepted at night and annihilated by three British cruisers and three destroyers. NO German reinforcements landed at Crete by sea during the battle. This was with total Luftwaffe air superiority. Does anyone know why this force didn't get escorted by a heavier surface escort? warspite1 Further to my earlier "light-hearted" answer, it appears that that may have been closer to the truth than I realised! According to Italian sources, the Germans did not believe an escort was necessary as the Luftwaffe would sink any ship that dared to sail close to the island. The Germans only requested a unit to assist navigation rather than an escort. As it happened, the Italians did not have a strong presence on the Aegean anyway.

mind_messing -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 8:05:10 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 IF the Germans had air superiority (and for this to be achieved you need to remove Goering and give the Germans hindsight) then there would be spectacularly small chance of success – and then only provided everything went right for the Germans and wrong for the British for a two week period. That's what you should have said at the start. warspite1 Why? I said Sealion was impossible and then, in post 9, confirmed the basis of that comment. My position was clear. The study posted assumed a RL BoB up to the point of invasion and you commented upon that - I naturally assumed we were talking about the same thing (although when you were contesting whether the Germans had air superiority and I queried what you were talking about, either one of us could have sought clarification from the other at that point). quote: ORIGINAL: Orm I am not sure I understand the premise for this any longer. I thought that the question was that during the war, was there any point were Germany could have launched a successful invasion of England. And my answer to that is that it would have been impossible. No chance whatsoever. But if the question is rather a "what if" Germany had done this or that instead then it becomes a rather speculative question. And very hard to analyse since that would have altered the actions from the Allies as well. Edit: That is why we have games. [:)] My issue is with people saying it was "impossible". That simply isn't true. Operation Sea Lion could have succeeded, but only if the German plan worked flawlessly and the British made a severe hash of the defence. That makes Sea Lion unlikely to succeed. Not impossible. I hope this makes the distinction clear. There were many who said that crossing the Alps with elephants was impossible, and history is replete with plenty of other examples of the impossible suddenly becoming possible. quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Just one point to put this more into perspective. Crete has been mentioned as an example of how the RN would have been destroyed by the Luftwaffe (even IF superiority in the skies had been achieved – which it wasn’t). So let’s stick with Crete. For the defence of Crete the Royal Navy had no air cover. There was one occasion during the campaign when the Germans sought to reinforce their paratroopers by sea. Remember, the Luftwaffe: - Have air superiority - They are better placed to attack ships by May 1941 than they were a year earlier So what happened? RN losses during the battle of Crete: Crusiers - Gloucester - Fiji - Calcutta Plus four destroyers. HMS Formidable, Barham, and Valiant all damaged by air attack. HMAS Perth, HMS Orion and sundry others also damaged. That's some pretty significant losses, even if it is over a longer time period.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 8:52:45 PM)
1. You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that for Sealion to succeed the Germans would need air superiority. is that right? Without air superiority Sealion is a failure - with it - assuming everything goes right for the Germans and wrong for the British, there is a slim chance, a very slim, chance of success. Of course things can go wrong in war, but there is simply too much, too many variables that the Germans need to overcome for the operation to be other than a graveyard for so many German servicemen. The sheer number of jobs the exhausted and depleted Luftwaffe pilots are being asked to do - units are already running low on morale, numbers and experience. How does the Luftwaffe actually do everything it is tasked with? There was little by way of naval support available. As has already been said, the wake from a destroyer alone would sink the barges, so low in the water were they. The barges could not be manned fully with naval personnel The barges were mostly towed by tugs (2 per tug) - take out the tug and those barges are dead in the water waiting for destruction. The Germans could not afford losses amongst the barges - they were needed for subsequent waves and re-supply. The weather The time taken to get to England ensures night attacks cannot be avoided - there is no Luftwaffe protection at this point The inability of the Luftwaffe to hurt the RN sufficiently given the weapons available By September American supplies (to re-equip the British Army) had already begun. It was not just a case of getting across the channel. 2. Re the losses and damage incurred by the RN off Crete, yes this is well known - and losses and damage during Sealion could be heavy, very heavy. But the Royal Navy - our senior service - spent the entire war putting themselves in harm's way - with the entire future of the country at stake they would have done the same in the autumn of 1940.

Orm -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 9:02:00 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing My issue is with people saying it was "impossible". That simply isn't true. Operation Sea Lion could have succeeded, but only if the German plan worked flawlessly and the British made a severe hash of the defence. That makes Sea Lion unlikely to succeed. Not impossible. I hope this makes the distinction clear. There were many who said that crossing the Alps with elephants was impossible, and history is replete with plenty of other examples of the impossible suddenly becoming possible. Could you give me a percentage figure on what "unlikely" is to you so I better understand what number we argue about.

mind_messing -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 9:10:41 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 1. You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that for Sealion to succeed the Germans would need air superiority. is that right? ... I've maintained throughout that air superiority is an absolute necessity for Sea Lion to succeed. quote: Without air superiority Sealion is a failure - with it - assuming everything goes right for the Germans and wrong for the British, there is a slim chance, a very slim, chance of success. Of course things can go wrong in war, but there is simply too much, too many variables that the Germans need to overcome for the operation to be other than a graveyard for so many German servicemen. ... Then there is at last something we agree on! You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that Sea Lion was "impossible". Is that right? quote: 2. Re the losses and damage incurred by the RN off Crete, yes this is well known - and losses and damage during Sealion could be heavy, very heavy. But the Royal Navy - our senior service - spent the entire war putting themselves in harm's way - with the entire future of the country at stake they would have done the same in the autumn of 1940. And what does this add to the discussion exactly? Some propaganda poster esque paragraph about the nobility of the Royal Navy does not take away from the fact that they had several capital ships sunk and even more damaged in operations off Crete - operations conducted when the Luftwaffe had air supremacy. We're all aware you've got a thing for the RN, but to try to defend their obvious tatical failings like this is, frankly, embarrassing for you. quote: ORIGINAL: Orm Could you give me a percentage figure on what "unlikely" is to you so I better understand what number we argue about. 5% mark. Without air superiority, you're probably hovering around at the 1%.

JeffroK -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 9:16:48 PM)
Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument. Time to toss in the flag.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 9:53:16 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 1. You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that for Sealion to succeed the Germans would need air superiority. is that right? ... I've maintained throughout that air superiority is an absolute necessity for Sea Lion to succeed. quote: Without air superiority Sealion is a failure - with it - assuming everything goes right for the Germans and wrong for the British, there is a slim chance, a very slim, chance of success. Of course things can go wrong in war, but there is simply too much, too many variables that the Germans need to overcome for the operation to be other than a graveyard for so many German servicemen. ... Then there is at last something we agree on! You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that Sea Lion was "impossible". Is that right? quote: 2. Re the losses and damage incurred by the RN off Crete, yes this is well known - and losses and damage during Sealion could be heavy, very heavy. But the Royal Navy - our senior service - spent the entire war putting themselves in harm's way - with the entire future of the country at stake they would have done the same in the autumn of 1940. And what does this add to the discussion exactly? Some propaganda poster esque paragraph about the nobility of the Royal Navy does not take away from the fact that they had several capital ships sunk and even more damaged in operations off Crete - operations conducted when the Luftwaffe had air supremacy. We're all aware you've got a thing for the RN, but to try to defend their obvious tatical failings like this is, frankly, embarrassing for you. quote: ORIGINAL: Orm Could you give me a percentage figure on what "unlikely" is to you so I better understand what number we argue about. 5% mark. Without air superiority, you're probably hovering around at the 1%. warspite1 quote: mind_messing I've maintained throughout that air superiority is an absolute necessity for Sea Lion to succeed. quote: mind_messing Without air superiority, you're probably hovering around at the 1%. Okay so is it 1% or is it an absolute necessity for Sealion to succeed? quote: You seem to have back-tracked on your earlier point I.e. that Sea Lion was "impossible". Is that right? You know I haven't I do not know how many times I can refer back to earlier posts - but one last time to hopefully get through: 1. Sealion is launched in September against the back drop of real life events. Sealion will fail 100%. 2. Sealion is launched with the local air superiority for the Germans that Hitler demanded. Sealion has a slim chance of success and for that to happen everything needs to go right for the Germans and wrong for the British. I cannot make myself any clearer. quote: And what does this add to the discussion exactly? Some propaganda poster esque paragraph about the nobility of the Royal Navy does not take away from the fact that they had several capital ships sunk and even more damaged in operations off Crete - operations conducted when the Luftwaffe had air supremacy. We're all aware you've got a thing for the RN, but to try to defend their obvious tatical failings like this is, frankly, embarrassing for you. We have debated strongly previously on many issues but things have always been civil between us. But you obviously feel the need for this nonsense. A real shame, hot on the heels of "you've seen Battle of Britain too many times" there is now this. Let me be crystal clear: - The point of that statement is that in previous posts you have indicated that the RN will not fully commit capital ships at a time when there is an invasion of the UK going on. Like not having air superiority will be enough to keep RN ships in port. The point I am politely making is that this view is as childish as your assumption that Bismarck would have been combat ready in September 1940. This is not propaganda - this is what happened in Norway, France, Greece, Crete, Malta, South China Sea etc and can therefore be taken as a given (whatever you may say to the contrary). - What is most interesting though is that you accuse me of spouting nonsense (fact actually) to avoid the fact that the RN suffered casualties off Crete. a) Firstly, far from hiding anything I AGREED with you on the losses (and you forgot HMS Warspite by the way) and admitted that the losses during Sealion would be heavy, very heavy. So you saying I am trying to cover something up that I have readily agreed to - and expounded upon is er.... really rather silly b) If we are talking covering up - why won't you address ANY points I have made about the plan - a plan so ridiculous that Raeder and Goering both knew was going to fail? You bang on quite embarrassingly about adding pre-dreadnought class "battleships" and the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen (not to mention the Scharnhorsts under repair), you totally ignore the stats given about the state of the Luftwaffe and the RAF by September 1940 and the lack of weaponry that the Luftwaffe has in its armoury in September 1940 to kill the quantity of shipping required to allow Sealion to succeed? And if we are going down the embarrassing route, how many RN capital ships were sunk off Crete? At least, whilst not addressing the points I made, you at least seem to have taken them on board with the 5%/1% comment. But a real shame you had to resort to snotty comments in getting there [:(]

Skyros -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 10:01:21 PM)
Tactical failings? What are you talking about. If the RN smashed the invasion and took similar losses as Crete it would be a resounding success. German heavy forces would be just as vulnerable as the RNs. The light units, DDs and cruisers would slice and dice the invasion at night. The RN was not shy about sailing into harms way and would take the losses if it meant crushing the invasion. The political blow back would be devastating for Germany and further inspire the underground movements and neutral nations to resist. This would impact Barbarossa and Marita Merkur in the Balkans. The Royal Navy would get bloodied, but they are defending there home turf and it would fUrther damage the armed forces of Germany .

LoBaron -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 10:07:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument. Time to toss in the flag. Ah, but the invasion is NOT impossible. It REALLY isn´t. It also is not impossible that a cold glass of water starts to boil in front of you without the help of any external energy source. mm tries to make a point. Don´t you see?

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