RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

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warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 10:13:41 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Skyros Tactical failings? What are you talking about. If the RN smashed the invasion and took similar losses as Crete it would be a resounding success. German heavy forces would be just as vulnerable as the RNs. The light units, DDs and cruisers would slice and dice the invasion at night. The RN was not shy about sailing into harms way and would take the losses if it meant crushing the invasion. The political blow back would be devastating for Germany and further inspire the underground movements and neutral nations to resist. This would impact Barbarossa and Marita Merkur in the Balkans. The Royal Navy would get bloodied, but they are defending there home turf and it would fUrther damage the armed forces of Germany . warspite1 Indeed Skyros - in fact more so because the RN have proper ship killers; land based and carrier based torpedo bombers and dive bombers - just ask Bismarck and Konigsberg [;)].

mind_messing -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 10:54:25 PM)
Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@] Let's find something we can agree on. 1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws. 2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained. 3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility. quote: At least, whilst not addressing the points I made, you at least seem to have taken them on board with the 5%/1% comment. The 5%/1% distinction is mine. Your original statement was that it was impossible for Sea Lion to succeed. Have you, in light of the discussions in this thread, changed your mind? quote: ORIGINAL: LoBaron quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument. Time to toss in the flag. Ah, but the invasion is NOT impossible. It REALLY isn´t. It also is not impossible that a cold glass of water starts to boil in front of you without the help of any external energy source. mm tries to make a point. Don´t you see? At least someone gets it. Possibility =/= Impossibility.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/3/2015 11:43:13 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@] Let's find something we can agree on. 1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws. 2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained. 3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility. quote: At least, whilst not addressing the points I made, you at least seem to have taken them on board with the 5%/1% comment. The 5%/1% distinction is mine. Your original statement was that it was impossible for Sea Lion to succeed. Have you, in light of the discussions in this thread, changed your mind? quote: ORIGINAL: LoBaron quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK Now we have come to argue about the definitions of phrases rather than the actual argument. Time to toss in the flag. Ah, but the invasion is NOT impossible. It REALLY isn´t. It also is not impossible that a cold glass of water starts to boil in front of you without the help of any external energy source. mm tries to make a point. Don´t you see? At least someone gets it. Possibility =/= Impossibility. warspite1 No I haven't changed my mind (see post 58). These were your numbers but sufficiently low that its not worth arguing over. As for what we can agree on, I think that is a forlorn hope - we might as well be married given the constant arguing and inability to agree [;)] 1. The German plan was poor and had several flaws. I truly do not believe this. The plan was simply pie in the sky (and I bow to the wisdom of Admiral Raeder on this. He advised Hitler he couldn't protect such a wide landing area - Hitler simply agreed for him that that is what the navy would do regardless). 2. The requirements for Sealion could have been attained? Not really. We both agree that Air Superiority is absolutely vital (and further agree that even with it, the chances of success are still hopelessly small). Were there tactics that the Luftwaffe could have employed to win the BoB? Yes, given their numerical advantage at the start, I strongly suspect so (although would probably need Goering to accidently cut his head off while shaving - and be replaced with someone with a greater tactical appreciation (and understanding of the importance of radar and what those strange looking towers were all about). Also the destruction of the BEF is possible with different decisions made - and that increases the % a bit further. But the problem is that the additional elements - that would have taken the chances to 60%-70%+ needed to have been taken years before, namely - proper landing craft, amphibious operation training, torpedo bombers, a bigger navy - or at least a navy built with this operation in mind. 3. As I agreed, in war bizarre things happen - France 1940 being pretty extreme, and with air superiority I can accept your argument that there is a possibility of success - albeit suicidally slim. But for the reasons stated in older posts I just cannot accept that the Germans could have achieved victory over the United Kingdom in 1940 if air superiority has not been won i.e a RL situation in September 1940. For it to happen, the RAF and Coastal Command would have had to decide to abandon the Channel - but then decide to abandon the beaches too (along with Bomber Command). The Royal Navy would have had to decide not to sail or they do and... well I just cannot think of a scenario where the navy simply don't destroy sufficient of the invasion force and precious barges that any that do land can achieve no more than holding out for a few days until their supplies run out. What could happen? The RN get lost in the vast expanse of the Channel and fail to find the slow moving barges, strung out like ducks at a fairground shooting range? Its not like the Germans can take different routes. All their torpedoes, guns, depth charges + anything they can get their hands on - don't work. The large minesweeping fleet miss all the mines and all the RN ships following do find them? At the same time the invasion flotilla fail to find any of the British mines. That view may be wrong - but its just not something I could begin to understand I'm afraid. Happy for you to respond and have the last word as you see fit, but I think that is me done on this subject.

pontiouspilot -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 12:06:21 AM)
Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 12:08:23 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort. warspite1 This is it - in its entirety [:D] [image]local://upfiles/28156/DC3F29C2A55E400BB3DAFE77B5E82B20.jpg[/image]

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 12:18:31 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot Can someone tell me how many of the Brit farmers in June and July had shotguns versus pitch forks! How many actual units were available? Did they have any weapons? All my reading over the years leads me to believe the actual armed and effective Brit forces were minimal. The window for the Krauts was June-July....Sept was too late without a major effort. warspite1 This is it - in its entirety [:D] [image]local://upfiles/28156/DC3F29C2A55E400BB3DAFE77B5E82B20.jpg[/image] warspite1 According to one source we have (immediately after Dunkirk) - 15 divisions (one in Northern Ireland) - One armoured division The infantry divisions were at roughly half strength (circa 11,000 men each). There were just 54 anti-tank guns, 2,300 Bren guns, 37 armoured cars 395 light tanks, 33 cruiser tanks, 72 Heavy (Infantry) tanks, 420 field guns and 163 medium and heavy guns. However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas. As I mentioned before, the best time for landing may have been June - July in terms of the opposition, but the Germans were simply not ready in terms of not only barges but also the small matter that until late June the French were still being fought (and they needed rest and refit when concluded). What do the Luftwaffe do in that situation? They can't be in two places at once.

Chickenboy -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 12:55:02 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas. Ah-HA! I knew it! Clearly we-the good 'ole US of freakin' A won the so-called "Battle of Britain" and defeated a nazi invasion apriori. When ze Germans heard that we were involved they hung it up. A little credit where credit is due please Warspite1. And rightly so that ze Germans should hang it up when they did. This guy was gonna come back after 'em. And he was kinda pissed. Here he is earnestly walking the flight line dressed inexplicably for a formal gathering. [image]local://upfiles/6968/A705A4B78992468CA79156DF52550B72.jpg[/image]

Chickenboy -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 1:05:37 AM)
On a serious note: What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then. On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television. In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then.

IronDuke_slith -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 1:25:20 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: mind_messing Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@] Let's find something we can agree on. 1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws. 2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained. 3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility. 1. The German plan was actually hopeless, poor makes it sound like it stood a chance. 2. They were simply never that close during the BOB. Conventional wisdom says they might have managed it but for the switch to City bombing, but they had largely shot their bolt before that occurred. What the Luftwaffe could do was achieve very temporary air superiority over clearly defined areas with large scale sweeps. That would not nearly have been enough. Air superiority was not the only pre-requisite. Naval superiority was another and the Germans would never have attained that...ever. 3. I disagree. Some of the German barges were being loaded and started off from ports that would require a 24 hour travel time from the start to the beach. The British would have known they were coming and swamped the channel with every aircraft they had. Machine guns would have been enough to create catastrophic havoc. As the invasion fleet (actually long lines of river barges) reached the mid channel, swarms of smaller craft from MTBs to destroyers to fishing boats with a Bren gun attached would have moved in and shot the barges out of the water. The KM would have been brushed aside. They may have got a destroyer or two but their remaining surface units would have been sunk and the invasion broken up as panicked barge crews attempted to escape. It is feasible that some isolated barges might have reached shore, but the vast majority of Germans on the beach would have washed ashore rather than waded. The friction in the hours before the dawn as tracer swept the surface and barges were raked with gunfire would have led to a complete catastrophe as crews panicked, collided with other boats, turned unilaterally for home and sank. What Germans made it ashore would have run out of ammo within 36 hours and been rounded up. What was left of the barge fleet would have limped home and been in no state to load with a second wave and supplies and return. The RN would surely have committed capital ships to the channel if the safety of the Home Islands was at stake, so what Germans made it ashore would have been isolated and easily dealt with. Sorry, but it's a fantasy. Regards, ID.

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 1:33:05 AM)
They didn't need to shoot the barges. A wake from a high speed destroyer would swamp most of the barges.

bigred -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 1:43:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 However, ammunition and supplies from the US and at home were coming in all the time and by September were appreciably greater in number in all areas. Ah-HA! I knew it! Clearly we-the good 'ole US of freakin' A won the so-called "Battle of Britain" and defeated a nazi invasion apriori. When ze Germans heard that we were involved they hung it up. A little credit where credit is due please Warspite1. And rightly so that ze Germans should hang it up when they did. This guy was gonna come back after 'em. And he was kinda pissed. Here he is earnestly walking the flight line dressed inexplicably for a formal gathering. [image]local://upfiles/6968/A705A4B78992468CA79156DF52550B72.jpg[/image] IRC Ben even fought the japs in that outfit.

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 2:31:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy On a serious note: What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then. On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television. In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then. Here's the answer to your question : http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/LL-Ship/index.html And yes , 1917 Enfield 303 rifles WERE sitting around in warehouses. I recall that there was a problem with some of those rifles in 1940 , causing a minor scandal as many of the rifles had been treated with mineral oil vice linseed oil causing their stocks to shattered when used.

Yaab -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 6:47:58 AM)
Basically, the Germans would have needed to take some English port by suprise with a huge para drop. Then rush ship convoys - xAKs with troops and heavy equipment.

Chickenboy -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 2:56:32 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Yaab Basically, the Germans would have needed to take some English port by suprise with a huge para drop. Then rush ship convoys - xAKs with troops and heavy equipment. My POV, for those few that are still paying attention to this thread, is that there are ways (such as you've identified) that the Germans might have had a better chance of success. But Sealion per se-with what they had and what they had planned-was a non-starter. Yeah, a para drop / "fast transport" surface capture of a port with subsequent 'real' (non river-barge nonsense) shipping reinforcement would have been MORE feasible. A few larger ships with neutral or friendly flags could have been mustered up to try for a reinforcement from the Atlantic as well-this would have been more difficult to defend against. But none of these things were given much credence at the time. Sealion would have gone down as a monumental German defeat and a signal British victory.

Chickenboy -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 2:58:51 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve quote: ORIGINAL: Chickenboy On a serious note: What, exactly, were we shipping over that could be of immediate use (armaments) to the British in that critical window? Our sidearms, long arms, artillery, ammunition, tanks, etc. etc. were different from your own. It's not like we had vast stores of Lee-Enfields sitting in some warehouse in Baltimore, right? I could understand food, gasoline (petrol to you lot), diesel, lubricants, and uniformly interchangeable supplies being useful, but arms and armaments weren't 'plug and play' standards back then. On a related note: There was an American series of series a few years back: Frontier house, Victorian house, Blitz house (I think) and so forth. They dealt with reality TV, but in a realistic manner. Participants were precluded from living differently than pioneers, victorian-era families and circa 1940s London families were for a period of time. The transformation and adoption of the hardships was fascinating television. In the Blitz house, the family received food aid from America. They-in real life-were choked up about the unexpected bonanza from their American cousins. It wasn't great food-I recall dehydrated eggs-but it supplemented their meager rations nicely. That gratitude has stuck with me ever since. It likely was as heartfelt on the show as it was in reality back then. Here's the answer to your question : http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/LL-Ship/index.html And yes , 1917 Enfield 303 rifles WERE sitting around in warehouses. I recall that there was a problem with some of those rifles in 1940 , causing a minor scandal as many of the rifles had been treated with mineral oil vice linseed oil causing their stocks to shattered when used. Sorry, Steve-without wading through hundreds of pages of general "Lend-Lease" information, was there some place that had the information that I was seeking in that link? Specifically, I'm interested in materials sent to the UK between July-September 1940-the period in question for the BoB and Sealion discussions.

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 4:19:51 PM)
I was referring specifically to the delivery of 200,000 rifles + ammunition on the 9th July.

Symon -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 10:00:42 PM)
They weren't .303s Stevo. In 1940 it was 500,000, In 1941, it was 120,000, all of the US Rifle, cal .30, M1917: a US mod and production of the Lee-Enfield, cal .303, P14. Roughly 2,200,000 manufactured by Remington and Winchester from 1916. It was chambered and rifled for the US .30-06 cartridge. Lend/lease weapons were specially marked so as to avoid confusion with the similar British P14 that used the .303 cartridge. US actually made 3 times more Enfield M1917s than Springfield M1903s.

wdolson -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 11:05:59 PM)
While the Germans had a very slim chance of succeeding in an invasion, I suspect if they had tried, it would have fallen apart due to logistics. During WW II, the only time amphibious operations worked was under one of two conditions: 1) The enemy was completely unprepared and they had a thin supply/reinforcement chain. 2) The enemy was completely isolated from the outside world before the invasion and the invader brought a massive naval force for support. Neither of these existed in 1940 Britain. The Germans could possibly have achieved air superiority over the Channel and southeast England, but the back door was wide open. Atlantic convoys from North America had little trouble getting through and they were bringing a constant stream of supplies and resources. The British army was in bad shape after Dunkirk and there was little they could have done if the Wehrmacht had landed in force, but the Royal Navy was around 90% strength and the Home Fleet would have been thrown into defending the island. The RN would have likely committed everything they had and damn the losses. Stukas flying in skies free of the RAF might have sunk a few ships, but every small ship with a gun would be out attacking barges. And as someone pointed out, the barges would have had to be out in the middle of the Channel at night where the RN could have operated at will. The RN would have likely held back the heavier ships to oppose the larger German ships if they had been committed. If the German large ships had been committed, the RN would have outnumbered them. Even if the RAF Fighter Command had been broken, German aircraft losses and crews would have still been high and the RAF fighter threat would not have been eliminated completely. Even a badly weakened Fighter Command could have defended the BBs when they sailed cutting apart and attack planes from the Luftwaffe outside the short radius of German fighters. German losses crossing the Channel from both natural causes and British warships would have probably been high, but lets say they manage to get a beachhead established. They now have an expeditionary force with a toehold on a large island with supply pouring in out of range of their bombers. Even if German aircraft have managed to pick off some ships, the Royal Navy is still active and cutting apart the barges on the return trip as well as sinking any supply vessels they find. The Germans don't have any specialized landing craft like the Allies did by 1942. Everything either has to be landed at a port, or via inefficient boats not intended to unload cargo over a beach. The expeditionary force would be bogged down with low supply on beaches that are heavily mined with barbed wire and other beach defenses. Bomber Command which was not involved in the battle to this point is engaged attacking the landed forces and/or the supply ships coming in. The Luftwaffe may have air superiority, but they don't have air supremacy. That would have been impossible to achieve. German fighter pilots, exhausted and depleted after a long campaign to break Fighter Command now has to cover the beaches and naval assets supporting the operation. They have poor range, so they have to cycle CAP a lot, leaving only a few fighters over the objective at a time. Bomber Command would take losses, but some would get through. The Germans might have been able to capture a port with paratroops, but the British would have likely committed what reserves they had to take it back and Bomber Command and the Royal Navy would be committed to shutting down the port. The Germans barely made any use of Tobruk after it was taken in large part because the rather weak Desert Air Force kept the port interdicted. They couldn't bring anything into Tobruk without facing long range British bombers and fighter bombers. In the fall of 1940, the British would have been able to throw a lot more air power at any port in German hands. The Allied invasions of the continent succeeded because Axis supply into the invasion zone was essentially paralyzed in the days before and after the invasion and the two largest navies in the world supported the efforts with ships specifically designed for amphibious operations. The Germans were dug in and prepared in June 1944 far better than the British were in 1940, but the Germans just didn't have the logistics for a major amphibious operation in 1940. Their invasion force in 1940 was an ad hoc effort compared to a professional operation in 1944. They barely succeeded in Norway and that was only because they had surprise on their side and neither France nor Britain were willing or able to commit large forces to stop them. Norway got a trickle of support from the Allies, but they mostly stood alone. German naval losses in that campaign were bad, they would have been significantly worse invading England. If the Germans somehow managed to get a large force ashore and supplied it adequately, Britain was doomed, but they would have had a very difficult (if not impossible) time getting the land forces ashore and supplied. There is a concept in military science of the continental power and a naval nation. In the 1940s, the two preeminent continental powers in the world were Germany and the USSR. The two top naval powers were the UK and Japan. The US was/is a weird hybrid of both (pretty much unique in history). The UK and Japan both had armies and they could be quite good, but they were at their strongest when operating along a coastline where a navy could give support. I read an analysis of Dunkirk that pointed out that because Germany was a continental power and Britain was a naval one, that operation went down the way it did. For a continental power, being backed up with your back to the sea is essentially isolation. The BEF was in the Germans' way of thinking, neutralized and isolated, to be dealt with later. For a naval power, being backed up onto water was a major opportunity. It gave the BEF a chance to escape and fight another day. The Germans didn't see it coming until it was too late. Continental powers don't tend to invest in large navies. When they put anything into navies, it's an extravagance or intended to deny the seas to a naval power. Which is pretty much what the Kriegsmarine was. When the war went badly, the Kriegsmarine surface force was holed up in port and essentially stood down. It had only a minor contribution to the war effort compared to what the army and air force did. The only place where the Kriegsmarine got any attention was building u-boats which were used to deny the free use of the Atlantic by the Royal Navy (and later USN). The Germans had no hope of ever controlling the Atlantic, all they could do was make life miserable for the RN and disrupt supply into the UK. For a continental power, their primary challenges are neighbors with land borders, so investing in armies is the wisest course. Naval powers are dependent on overseas trade for their existence, so investing in a navy to protect their trade is paramount. The RN was the premiere service in the UK before and during WW II because they recognized this. In Japan the story was a bit more complicated. In reality, the Japanese Empire would not have existed at all without a strong navy, but politically the army had a lot of power and the struggle between the two branches was at the core of most Japanese politics at the time. Ultimately the navy should have been the premiere service and the army should have been used in conjunction with the naval capabilities. Instead the army got bogged down in a land war on the continent they couldn't really win even if China was weak and internally very divided. Japan simply didn't have enough young men to garrison China. Back to the point about the BoB. The Germans had some chance of breaking RAF Fighter Command, and they had an even slimmer chance of getting a force ashore in SE England. However, their chances of supplying that force and reinforcing it with mechanized forces was slim as long as Bomber Command and the Royal Navy remained intact and supplies continued to flow into the UK from North America. All things the Germans were not terribly well equipped to stop in the summer of 1940. Bill Bill

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/4/2015 11:29:32 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Symon They weren't .303s Stevo. In 1940 it was 500,000, In 1941, it was 120,000, all of the US Rifle, cal .30, M1917: a US mod and production of the Lee-Enfield, cal .303, P14. Roughly 2,200,000 manufactured by Remington and Winchester from 1916. It was chambered and rifled for the US .30-06 cartridge. Lend/lease weapons were specially marked so as to avoid confusion with the similar British P14 that used the .303 cartridge. US actually made 3 times more Enfield M1917s than Springfield M1903s. John I don't know if they were 303 or 30-06. I wasn't there. But the report listed both types of ammo and weapons. Don't tell me. Tell the report. I'm just they guy who linked it. But I tend to believe the report myself.[:D]I don't think your that old. [:D] My feeling for why the USA would have 303 rifles in storage? The US government is the biggest pack rat on the planet. Old stuff is always turning up. In ww1 we made lots of 303 , some for England , some for Canada. But I also recall in my youth talking to two different WW1 vets who told me that They trained on 303 while in the USA. I myself own a ww2 38 s&w revolver that had been US Army , even though the weapon and caliber had never been accepted or used by the US Army (38 s&w , not to be confused with 38 special , sometimes called 38-200 , was strictly used by the British , but somehow this one missed the boat). I'd not be surprised that somewhere there was a warehouse of the weapons left over because the war ended much sooner than expected.[:)]

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 1:44:49 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: wdolson The RN would have likely held back the heavier ships to oppose the larger German ships if they had been committed. If the German large ships had been committed, the RN would have outnumbered them. .....Everything either has to be landed at a port, or via inefficient boats not intended to unload cargo over a beach. The expeditionary force would be bogged down with low supply on beaches that are heavily mined with barbed wire and other beach defenses. Bomber Command which was not involved in the battle to this point is engaged attacking the landed forces and/or the supply ships coming in. Bill warspite1 Just picking up on two points Bill, the first for context as the disparity in forces needs to be emphasised. This to dispel any notion that RN heavy units could be committed to deal with the KM heavy units or assist the cutting of the supply route. The second is to put right a factual inaccuracy - another fallacy about the BoB that sadly seems to have become "fact". 1. Larger German ships. In September 1940 this amounted to: Admiral Scheer 11-inch PB Admiral Hipper 8-inch CA Possibly 3 x 6-inch CL Home Fleet capital ships only Nelson and Rodney 16-inch BB Repulse and Hood 15-inch BC Valiant and Barham 15-inch BB Furious CV 2. Bomber Command was very much part of the BoB and the defence of the UK. And I am not talking about the attacks on Germany itself (in the context of the war, sadly a non-event in 1940). What cannot be ignored is the day and night Bomber Command attacks on German airfields (yes we did that too) and, equally important for this discussion, the "Battle of the Barges". As I previously mentioned Bomber Command had accounted for some c.10% of Barges by the time Hitler called for the postponement of the operation (214 had been lost or damaged by the 21st September). Just as worryingly for the Germans were the losses at the key invasion ports. For example, by that time Boulogne was 30% short on its Barge requirement. No doubt the fact that even light bombers contained more than one aircrew (unlike fighters) was a factor here, but nonetheless, more RAF Bomber Command personnel died during the BoB than fighter pilots. BTW, and at the risk of "embarrassing myself" [8\|] the youngest VC of the war went to an 18-year old Scot, John Hannah (during an attack against invasion shipping in Antwerp on the 15th September 1940) [&o] [image]local://upfiles/28156/EDF05919F235454BBA5A3550D86BA1ED.jpg[/image]

wdolson -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 4:11:36 AM)
Though the German focus on breaking the RAF was concentrating on Fighter Command airfields. Bomber Command had a lot of bases that were out of range of Luftwaffe fighter support and weren't bombed at all. Bomber Command was losing aircraft and crews, but their fields were largely intact and aircraft attrition was less than Fighter Command which lost a lot of planes on the ground as well as in the air. The limited range of German fighters was a huge drawback to their campaign. If they wanted to strike targets outside of SE England, the bombers had to fly unescorted through heavily defended airspace or they had to go at night which reduced their effectiveness. They had tried using Bf-110s as long range escorts, but losses against the RAF were too heavy to be practical. Against well trained, good quality fighters, Bf-110s were about as vulnerable as the bombers were. Having safe airfields to drop back to, this gave the British another advantage on the defense. Exhausted squadrons could be cycled out of the fight to rest and refit. Additionally if the invasion came the RAF could attack the beaches from bases out of range of German fighters and out of range of some of their bombers. Bill

Apollo11 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 12:26:04 PM)
Hi all, quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Apollo 11 (Leo) has a really interesting link on this subject - hopefully he will see this and provide. Sorry for small delay... I have a rather strong cold and I am rather incapacitated in past 10+ days... Robert is correct - we discussed this before - here are the links: "OT: Operation Sealion" http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=3087002 "What if Hitler had Conquered Britain?" http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=3478765 Leo "Apollo11"

Apollo11 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 12:30:59 PM)
Hi all, quote: Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974. [image]http://www.warhistoryonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/1b15decb97a7e442d17245363ff90a02_L.jpg[/image] The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert. The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping. Glossary FJ = Fallschirmjaeger (German paratroops) MTB = Motor Torpedo Boat (German equivalent, E-Boat) DD = Destroyer CA = Heavy Cruiser BB = Battleship CV = Aircraft Carrier 22nd September - morning The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield. The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified. Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais. 22nd - 23rd September The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France. The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy. 23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs. The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West. The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%. The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties. Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats. The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command. 23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it could only be done by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by. The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures. On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all. Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time. The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured. Leo "Apollo11"

Symon -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 12:51:54 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve John I don't know if they were 303 or 30-06. I wasn't there. But the report listed both types of ammo and weapons. Don't tell me. Tell the report. I'm just they guy who linked it. But I tend to believe the report myself.[:D]I don't think your that old. [:D] My feeling for why the USA would have 303 rifles in storage? The US government is the biggest pack rat on the planet. Old stuff is always turning up. In ww1 we made lots of 303 , some for England , some for Canada. But I also recall in my youth talking to two different WW1 vets who told me that They trained on 303 while in the USA. I myself own a ww2 38 s&w revolver that had been US Army , even though the weapon and caliber had never been accepted or used by the US Army (38 s&w , not to be confused with 38 special , sometimes called 38-200 , was strictly used by the British , but somehow this one missed the boat). I'd not be surprised that somewhere there was a warehouse of the weapons left over because the war ended much sooner than expected.[:)] Hi-ya Stevo. Well, I wasn't there either. As you say I'm not quite that old. You are probably right, and the US does play packrat. I do remember my first year at Bolles we had M1917s in 30-06. But whose worrying about a silly .003 cals anyway? [;)]

crsutton -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 2:55:07 PM)
I don't have to read the thread. This has been hashed over many times before. My only point is that if Adolph really thought he had a chance he would have done it. The man was not adverse to a gamble. So, the fact that he did not should put the question to rest.

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 3:54:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: crsutton I don't have to read the thread. This has been hashed over many times before. My only point is that if Adolph really thought he had a chance he would have done it. The man was not adverse to a gamble. So, the fact that he did not should put the question to rest. Yes and no. Hitler once said "on land I am a lion , at sea a coward". I've always felt he was queasy with all things naval (no pun intended) especially after the Norway invasion. I'd take him at his word. [:)]

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 3:57:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve quote: ORIGINAL: crsutton I don't have to read the thread. This has been hashed over many times before. My only point is that if Adolph really thought he had a chance he would have done it. The man was not adverse to a gamble. So, the fact that he did not should put the question to rest. Yes and no. Hitler once said "on land I am a lion , at sea a coward". I've always felt he was queasy with all things naval (no pun intended) especially after the Norway invasion. I'd take him at his word. [:)] warspite1 Are you sure you got that quote right? I thought it went something like: A.Hitler: On land I am a twat, at sea I am even twattier.....[:D]

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 4:01:16 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve quote: ORIGINAL: crsutton I don't have to read the thread. This has been hashed over many times before. My only point is that if Adolph really thought he had a chance he would have done it. The man was not adverse to a gamble. So, the fact that he did not should put the question to rest. Yes and no. Hitler once said "on land I am a lion , at sea a coward". I've always felt he was queasy with all things naval (no pun intended) especially after the Norway invasion. I'd take him at his word. [:)] warspite1 Are you sure you got that quote right? I thought it went something like: A.Hitler: On land I am a twat, at sea I am even twattier.....[:D] Obviously it lost something in translation! [:D]

AW1Steve -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 4:05:33 PM)
The point I wanted to make is, it doesn't matter what the German armed forces felt they could or could not do, Hitler wasn't happy with the idea, and that was that. Really , after 1940, Hitler was the best ally the allies could have. On a daily basis he managed to "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" from his generals. Imagine if the general staff did not have to contend with Hitler? Then again , without Hitler Germany probably would have not gone to war for a long, long time (if ever). [8\|]

warspite1 -> RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940 (1/5/2015 4:05:55 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: AW1Steve quote: ORIGINAL: crsutton I don't have to read the thread. This has been hashed over many times before. My only point is that if Adolph really thought he had a chance he would have done it. The man was not adverse to a gamble. So, the fact that he did not should put the question to rest. Yes and no. Hitler once said "on land I am a lion , at sea a coward". I've always felt he was queasy with all things naval (no pun intended) especially after the Norway invasion. I'd take him at his word. [:)] warspite1 Are you sure you got that quote right? I thought it went something like: A.Hitler: On land I am a twat, at sea I am even twattier.....[:D] Obviously it lost something in translation! [:D] warspite1 Ah yes, here it is. I have the full transcript from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag in September 1940. A.Hitler: On land I am a twat, at sea I am even twattier - and when it comes to my political views I am a 24-carrot %^&*!

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