AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (Full Version)

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Wirraway_Ace -> AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 7:25:34 PM)

I am interested in opinions from those who generally, usually, almost always play the Allied side on various Japanese first turn strikes.

The four major variations with which I am familiar:

The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB); Land Based Air (LBA) attacks on airfields in the Philippines and Malaya
The Split - 4 CVs (usually CARDIVs 2 & 5) hit Pearl Harbor, whilst 2 CVs (often CARDIV 1) and LBA strike the Asiatic Fleet
The Asiatic Special - Full KB strikes Manila
The Singapore Noodle - Full or partial KB strike on Singapore

I am interested in the Allied perspective on these, and others you have experienced, in two domains:
Efficacy - How likely are these to inhibit Allied early and mid-term operations
Reasonableness - Could the have been reasonably conducted while achieving surprise

Thanks,
Mike



mind_messing -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 7:46:21 PM)

Singapore is a waste of time if the Allied send Force Z elsewhere. Some minor warships and merchantmen, but there are better targets elsewhere.

Manila can hurt Allied sub operations and their immediate ability to interdict landing operations.

Pearl is a nice VP haul and can mess with redeployment of Allied assets elsewhere.



BBfanboy -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Opennings (9/29/2016 7:52:02 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

I am interested in opinions from those who generally, usually, almost always play the Allied side on various Japanese first turn strikes.

The four major variations with which I am familiar:

The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB); Land Based Air (LBA) attacks on airfields in the Philippines and Malaya
The Split - 4 CVs (usually CARDIVs 2 & 5) hit Pearl Harbor, whilst 2 CVs (often CARDIV 1) and LBA strike the Asiatic Fleet
The Asiatic Special - Full KB strikes Manila
The Singapore Noodle - Full or partial KB strike on Singapore

I am interested in the Allied perspective on these, and others you have experienced, in two domains:
Efficacy - How likely are these to inhibit Allied early and mid-term operations
Reasonableness - Could the have been reasonably conducted while achieving surprise

Thanks,
Mike


I don't know enough about what Allied Intel there was on major IJN units in the northern part of the South China Sea to comment on likelihood of surprise in the Manila/Singapore scenarios. I know the Allies were aware of troop buildups and transport convoys along the Vietnam coast but they never thought the Japanese would dare to attack so they surprised themselves.

In stock, KB starts out in the Kuriles and the magic first turn move is limited to 75 hexes, IIRC, so I don't think KB could strike Singapore first turn in game.
The only reasons to go after Singapore on turn one are to support a Mersing gambit and to try catch Repulse/Prince of Wales before they can move away.

The Manila strikes would be aimed at stopping interference by subs, but with US torpedoes at 80% or 90% dud rate (except the S-boats) they need not bother. The Asiatic fleet is too weak to seriously intercede in Japanese plans if the IJN escorts the troop convoys properly. That should be the main use of the Mini-KB and their cruisers and BBs early on.

The Allies can lose everything in the far east and it will only have effect for about 9 months.

The BBs at PH are completely un-needed for the first six months or more. They are highly desirable for bombardment in support of Allied invasions from late 1942 on, but they are not completely essential there either. Ergo, the attack on PH does not give Japan a knockout blow either, beyond the first 6-9 months.

Unless you are playing one of the scenarios souped up for Japan, they simply do not have enough goodies to defend all the places they must in order to protect the resources they grab early on and the shipping to move the oil/fuel/resources.



Wirraway_Ace -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 7:52:34 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Singapore is a waste of time if the Allied send Force Z elsewhere. Some minor warships and merchantmen, but there are better targets elsewhere.

Manila can hurt Allied sub operations and their immediate ability to interdict landing operations.

Pearl is a nice VP haul and can mess with redeployment of Allied assets elsewhere.

I agree on Singers. I also cannot figure out how the KB could have gotten into position to strike Singapore and achieved surprise. Of course, the game allows you to choose the option to turn off first turn surprise, so the Singers option could be reasonable with that game setting.



Anachro -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 8:02:21 PM)

Best move I've seen is the one that ignores PI and Singers completely to strike out and take the expanded perimeter targets first (India, Burma, SoPac, northern aussie). It's hard for an Allied player to stop this fully (though certainly possible to interdict) and throws the traditional Allied strategy and logistical situation into chaos. This builds time for building up internal perimeter defenses; and Singers and PI can always be taken after, isolated as they are.

Striking the Asiatic fleet with full KB is always a good idea; as an AFB I often make extensive use of the PI subs if they are available. Their destruction can bring ease-of-mind to the early logistical efforts of a Japanese player.

Other than as a VP haul (or through luck and extensive takings on a multi-day strike), the attack on PH is insignificant and can quickly be overcome. In my experience, it hardly ever causes significant delays or hurdles in the Allied player's preparations.

EDIT

This all of course depends very much so on your plans and strategy. A risk push for the outer perimeter first might benefit from a PH strike that weakens the USN's ability to push back early on.



IdahoNYer -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 8:26:10 PM)

From the Allied side, I'd rather see the KB in the Central Pacific than hitting Manila. Having the KB hit the subs in Manila then move to assist in Malaya and the DEI will likely open up an early incursion into Ceylon/India. Not really much the Allies can do to counter a rapid exploit in this direction, especially if Singers falls early, or the focus is on isolating rather than initial taking the PI.

If the KB is off Pearl, its going to take a long time for this to get somewhere vital....and that's likely SOPAC which is a long way to bring sizeable IJA ground troops.



Mundy -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/29/2016 8:39:44 PM)

I wasn't that impressed with the Manila strike which KenchiSulla (Cannonfodder) did to me day one. For all the fury involved, I only lost a handful of subs. By 1944, I'm still swimming in them anyway.



Lokasenna -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 12:20:34 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: IdahoNYer

From the Allied side, I'd rather see the KB in the Central Pacific than hitting Manila. Having the KB hit the subs in Manila then move to assist in Malaya and the DEI will likely open up an early incursion into Ceylon/India. Not really much the Allies can do to counter a rapid exploit in this direction, especially if Singers falls early, or the focus is on isolating rather than initial taking the PI.

If the KB is off Pearl, its going to take a long time for this to get somewhere vital....and that's likely SOPAC which is a long way to bring sizeable IJA ground troops.


I actually think that the KB is overkill anywhere on the map for the first two months. It doesn't really matter where you send it so long as you're harvesting VPs. To that end, the traditional PH strike can net you a fair amount.

In my latest, I tried to immediately move the KB for industry strikes at the Seattle area and possibly for the BBs in port there, but was detected by radio SIGINT when I was a day or two out (of the DL 1/1 or 1/2 variety), and the damage I ended up causing was minimal.



desicat -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 12:34:17 AM)

Read Quitoxe's Road Less Traveled. IMHO this is the best Japanese opening available.



Gandalf -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:01:47 AM)

I wonder what the effect would be if the Japanese player could instruct his forces to specifically go after the Sub, Support and Fuel storage facilities at Pearl Harbor, rather than concentrate on the Battleships as they did. Might make an interesting "what-if" Dec 8th scenario to wipe those out at Pearl and leave the Battleships intact, since actual gameplay does not allow the Japanese player this choice.

Hmmmm? I might have to look into this, now that the idea occurred to me. Any takers to make this worthwhile? or has it been done before?



Anachro -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:12:11 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Gandalf

I wonder what the effect would be if the Japanese player could instruct his forces to specifically go after the Sub, Support and Fuel storage facilities at Pearl Harbor, rather than concentrate on the Battleships as they did. Might make an interesting "what-if" Dec 8th scenario to wipe those out at Pearl and leave the Battleships intact, since actual gameplay does not allow the Japanese player this choice.

Hmmmm? I might have to look into this, now that the idea occurred to me. Any takers to make this worthwhile? or has it been done before?


It might be interesting, but in this game engineers repair to quickly to make such attacks as meaningful as they might have been in real life. Not to mention even mods like DBB fail to slow down logistical flow in a realistic way. The result would be too negligible in my mind in terms of slowing down Allied operational tempo.



Gandalf -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:21:58 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anachro

It might be interesting, but in this game engineers repair to quickly to make such attacks as meaningful as they might have been in real life. Not to mention even mods like DBB fail to slow down logistical flow in a realistic way. The result would be too negligible in my mind in terms of slowing down Allied operational tempo.


So other macro effects would have to be "baked in/simulated" to make it work? Still might be doable if one could fiddle with the logistical flow to accompany this type of strike. I've not attempted a mod "with this particular game" so I wouldn't know yet if that is possible, I'm assuming that it is possible, since you can have scenarios with different start dates picking up at different times in the war and I assume those logistical macro settings can be adjusted accordingly in the editor



Gandalf -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:32:04 AM)

duplicate post



Canoerebel -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:43:45 AM)

My concern level about Japanese opening moves is directly related to the skill and experience level of my opponent. If I was playing a newbie, I wouldn't care how he opened the game. If I was playing Nemo (or PzH, Alfred, or quite a few others), any opening would give me ulcers.

In AE, most openings are just variants that ultimately lead to defeat for Japan, overwhelmed by Allied material superiority. But there are some players who can envision routes to possible (even likely, perhaps) Japanese auto victory. There are quite a few different ways to approach AV, and those players could use a variety of openings to launch them on the way.

If I opened a game vs. Nemo and he attacked Pearl Harbor in great strength and then moved on Canada, I'd be losing sleep at night. If he pounced all of the DEI and Oz, I'd lay awake at night. If he throttled China and India, I'd have butterflies dancing about during the evening watches.

Why do I pick on Nemo? Simply because he's a player that I know could give me fits. There are quite a few others. But, back when I was a lawyer, there was a local attorney who just worried me to death. I used to have nightmares that I would face him in court to my utter humiliation. I knew it was going to happen eventually. But the years passed and it never happened. And then he passed away too young. Nemo has disappeared from AE land, so I can invoke his memory just to make a point.

Edited to add: What happens during the first few days is relevant only if its part of a much bigger plan in which the Japanese player has a vision. Only good players with plenty of experience with the game would be able to craft an opening that blooms into well-thought-out plan that takes the game deep into '42 with that plan still unfolding.



Alfred -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:09:28 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Gandalf

quote:

ORIGINAL: Anachro

It might be interesting, but in this game engineers repair to quickly to make such attacks as meaningful as they might have been in real life. Not to mention even mods like DBB fail to slow down logistical flow in a realistic way. The result would be too negligible in my mind in terms of slowing down Allied operational tempo.


So other macro effects would have to be "baked in/simulated" to make it work? Still might be doable if one could fiddle with the logistical flow to accompany this type of strike. I've not attempted a mod "with this particular game" so I wouldn't know yet if that is possible, I'm assuming that it is possible, since you can have scenarios with different start dates picking up at different times in the war and I assume those logistical macro settings can be adjusted accordingly in the editor



Not possible. Most logistical "functions" in the game are beyond player modification.

What you want is abstracted in the game into the "Port" and "Repair Shipyard" facility level. You have only 2 ways of simulating what you want and both will give you unsatisfactory results.

(a) set Pearl Harbor's port and shipyard facilities to 100% damage on 8 Dec 1941. The repairs to the port and shipyard will be effected quite quickly and probably around 1 Jan 1942 the port will be back to 100% operation and the Allied player will have the entire fleet seaworthy plus undamaged PBY squadrons as a bonus.

(b) destroy Pearl Harbor's port facility by reducing it's SPS level and downsizing the shipyard. As the Allied player, unlike the Japanese player, can not build additional industrial levels, you would be permanently reducing pearl Harbor's capacity as a fleet depot. Allied players would usually be in a position, well before 1 June 1942, that the only decent fleet depot anywhere "near" the frontline would be Sydney, everything else being either off-map or on the American west coast. That situation not being remedied until well into 1945 if Singapore/Manila/Hong Kong are recaptured. Needless to say this would skewer the game very badly from the historical and I can't imagine any Allied player being satisfied with the arrangement.


Of course, for modders who don't care about attempting to be as faithful to overall historical considerations, the above points won't be a bother. With AE, trying to make any one game "incident" to more faithfully "replicate" the historical record tends to destroy the overall integrity of the game. Yes, AE is a game not a simulation, it cannot faithfully replicate each and every outlier historical result. It relies on abstractions to get the overall historical outcomes and "feel".

Alfred

Alfred



Gandalf -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:16:28 AM)

Thank you Alfred.

You probably saved me a ton of man-hours smashing my head against a wall.[:)]

edit> I had already started reading the AE editor manual for possibilities.



HansBolter -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 11:49:07 AM)

From my perspective it is patently unfair to an Allied player for a Japanese player to request a non-historical first turn with surprise.

It you want the benefits of surprise you take the historical path that provided an opportunity for it.

If you want to be free to hurt the Allied player on turn one in new and creative ways the cost of doing so should be the sacrifice of surprise.

Japanese players always seem to want to have their cake and it too.




LargeSlowTarget -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 12:09:14 PM)

Must...not...reply.



Encircled -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 12:40:00 PM)

Not hitting Pearl gives the Allies a lot of search aircraft.

That can be crucial if the Japanese are planning a major non-historical expansion.



HansBolter -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 1:20:25 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

Must...not...reply.



Opinions shouldn't be solicited if one isn't prepared to hear and accept them. [8D]

I do have to admire your restraint LST. [;)]



Macclan5 -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Opennings (9/30/2016 3:36:26 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy


quote:

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

I am interested in opinions from those who generally, usually, almost always play the Allied side on various Japanese first turn strikes.

The four major variations with which I am familiar:

The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB); Land Based Air (LBA) attacks on airfields in the Philippines and Malaya
The Split - 4 CVs (usually CARDIVs 2 & 5) hit Pearl Harbor, whilst 2 CVs (often CARDIV 1) and LBA strike the Asiatic Fleet
The Asiatic Special - Full KB strikes Manila
The Singapore Noodle - Full or partial KB strike on Singapore

I am interested in the Allied perspective on these, and others you have experienced, in two domains:
Efficacy - How likely are these to inhibit Allied early and mid-term operations
Reasonableness - Could the have been reasonably conducted while achieving surprise

Thanks,
Mike


I don't know enough about what Allied Intel there was on major IJN units in the northern part of the South China Sea to comment on likelihood of surprise in the Manila/Singapore scenarios. I know the Allies were aware of troop buildups and transport convoys along the Vietnam coast but they never thought the Japanese would dare to attack so they surprised themselves.

In stock, KB starts out in the Kuriles and the magic first turn move is limited to 75 hexes, IIRC, so I don't think KB could strike Singapore first turn in game.
The only reasons to go after Singapore on turn one are to support a Mersing gambit and to try catch Repulse/Prince of Wales before they can move away.

The Manila strikes would be aimed at stopping interference by subs, but with US torpedoes at 80% or 90% dud rate (except the S-boats) they need not bother. The Asiatic fleet is too weak to seriously intercede in Japanese plans if the IJN escorts the troop convoys properly. That should be the main use of the Mini-KB and their cruisers and BBs early on.

The Allies can lose everything in the far east and it will only have effect for about 9 months.

The BBs at PH are completely un-needed for the first six months or more. They are highly desirable for bombardment in support of Allied invasions from late 1942 on, but they are not completely essential there either. Ergo, the attack on PH does not give Japan a knockout blow either, beyond the first 6-9 months.

Unless you are playing one of the scenarios souped up for Japan, they simply do not have enough goodies to defend all the places they must in order to protect the resources they grab early on and the shipping to move the oil/fuel/resources.



This is an excellent synopsis.

Just to add:

The Allies had "some tidbits" and "credible intelligence" of a major attack planned by Japan.

Despite conspiracy theorists notions that the Roosevelt administration "knew definitively in advance and permitted it to draw America into the war" ~ it was not so clear cut. Intelligence rarely is.

Historian Craig Shirly in the book : Dec 1941 - 31 one days that changed America was able to put a lot together out of a series of memos from the declassified archives in the Presidential Library of FDR. The important one is an open assessment date Dec 4; but it speaks as much to Japanese propaganda in Hawaii; not an immediate and sudden attack.

Intelligence assessments generally suggested / inferred an attack was likely. None of them were specific as to where. Few were specific to when and complicated by the interpretation of the International Date Line. They were all case scenario analysis

Still that "not fully complete information" was never agreed upon and never shared across all commands in the US services let alone shared with all Allied powers (they were not Allied partners before Dec 7 ! )






szmike -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:40:59 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

From my perspective it is patently unfair to an Allied player for a Japanese player to request a non-historical first turn with surprise.

It you want the benefits of surprise you take the historical path that provided an opportunity for it.

If you want to be free to hurt the Allied player on turn one in new and creative ways the cost of doing so should be the sacrifice of surprise.

Japanese players always seem to want to have their cake and it too.




Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least.



chemkid -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 3:49:55 PM)

.



LargeSlowTarget -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:14:20 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: szmike

Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least.


Yes, in the end, no real or perceived advantage given to the JFBs in a "historic" scenario (not talking what-if mods here) will alter the ultimate outcome of the US industrial might steamrollering Japan.
But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages.

The war might as well have started with a surprise carrier raid against Manila instead of PH - enough empty ocean to the East and not enough US patrol planes to cover it to allow for a sudden appearance of KB.
However, a surprise strike against Singers would be less likely, much smaller water surface with too much civilian traffic to gibe KB much chance to remain unnoticed.
So while not entirely impossible, the details and limits of an unhistorical first turn with surprise should be discussed between opponents. Those who play the AI do not need to bother, obviously.



witpqs -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:30:13 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Encircled

Not hitting Pearl gives the Allies a lot of search aircraft.

That can be crucial if the Japanese are planning a major non-historical expansion.

In my experience this was a huge benefit to the Allies.



witpqs -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:31:55 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

From my perspective it is patently unfair to an Allied player for a Japanese player to request a non-historical first turn with surprise.

It you want the benefits of surprise you take the historical path that provided an opportunity for it.

If you want to be free to hurt the Allied player on turn one in new and creative ways the cost of doing so should be the sacrifice of surprise.

Japanese players always seem to want to have their cake and it too.



I was OK with it in a few games (one with multiple starts).



pontiouspilot -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 4:44:34 PM)

I have played 1 PBEM where my opponent opted to use Kaga, or maybe it was Akagi...a big gal anyway.... in support of 1st turn theatrics in PI. The lack of 1 CV at Pearl was hardly noticeable but the 1 extra CV in Philippines caused a lot of trouble. Many subs were damaged badly although surprisingly few sunk. Air supremacy was much enhanced. All the refugee vessels fleeing the area took much worse casualties. The temptation for me to dick around interdicting any invasions in area was gone....it was just run like hell. As I recall he dispatched Houston and Boise which is always a drag.



MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 5:16:44 PM)

As a new player who started with the Allies, I fear the ultimate surprise - The Germans bombing Pearl Harbor.

[image]local://upfiles/55056/CA991202460C4B71977177B5E6750110.jpg[/image]



US87891 -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 5:21:24 PM)

There are a couple of Rules that we use for Babes that obviate some of the extreme code things and allows for open ended opening days.

A CV TF may have a maximum of 2 CVs and 1 CVL, depending on the year. This removes the hard coded effect of the 900lb Gorilla KB. A group of 3 CV TFs will function just like the KB was intended to. On Dec. 7,given the code advantages, they will act just like the KB. Otherwise they will act historically. They will win or lose at Midway, or wherever, depending on luck, or a players acumen. It is also much more flexible. The Rule applies to both sides.

An amphib invasion TF MUST be comprised of either AK or xAK-t types. This removes the general cargo/small ship nonsense allowed by the Japanese early month’s bonus. The rule extends throughout the game period.

The manual is not a rule book. There are no rules whatever, anywhere in the manual. The manual is simply a ‘how to’. It was never intended as a rule book. One may do as one wishes. But sometimes, rules are nice.

Matt



MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 5:28:29 PM)

quote:

The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB);



Japan having struck at Pearl should have taken the Hawaiian Islands.

Bombing Pearl and then leaving is like punching someone and then turning your back to them. Taking the Islands would have been a great benefit and may have forced the American carriers into battle at a disadvantage.




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