Telemecus -> RE: 2x3+ 038-41 Snow Axis Op Red Sack (5/7/2020 11:14:26 PM)
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T038-T041 Snow North: Operation Red Sack The greatest Soviet concentration of Soviet forces surprisingly enough is in the far north defending Cherepovets. Our blizzard South commander TunganNinja suggests this as the place to concentrate for an offensive in the snow. quote:
TunganNinja, Former Axis South Commander TunganNinja I am not comfortable with the main line of resistance in the north primarily because I am not comfortable assuming we will win a points victory if it happens, thats nice but otherwise I would like as much forest buffer as possible up to the Swampline of Cherepovets west of it Cherepovets is optional touching Rybinsk reseviour [image]local://upfiles/53894/F27E2A0623E145C4A58DEB1F492C02FF.jpg[/image] quote:
Xhoel, Axis North and Air Commander The plan is good however: 1) I don't have enough units on the northern side to make the push to close the pocket and have no Finnish reserves at hand. The terrain here is also very bad (heavy woods) so any advance will be meager if the Soviets commit resources to hold the line. This is my main concern. 2) The push from the south is doable if enough Infantry is provided, which is needed to hold the captured ground after the initial advance. 3) I can provide air assets for the southern thrust, but the decision if we will commit to the operation needs to be taken soon, so I can start moving units around. 4) The plan relies heavily on taking the objectives (cutting both rail lines) in the first week of operations. Should that go sideways we will be in a difficult position. ... I am afraid it is a bit too ambitious quote:
Telemecus, Axis Supreme Commander destroying lots of Soviet guards units would be a big gain... the terrain combined with the weather just means it is very unlikely we can get substantial pockets in the north ...However I would say not to abandon the idea but consider it as a contingency. We will have at least a corps of mobile units for local encirclements and opportunites - and if we see cracks opening up we can rail in lots more. Most of our mobile units are still wintering in rear cities so we have flexibility in where they are railed to. Judging by other games what I think what is more likely to happen is that easier ground in the centre and south will start to open up and the Soviet side will be forced to transfer units there from the North. This will mean either those units can be encircled in more favourable ground in the centre or south - or less dense lines in the North become open to encirclement. quote:
TunganNinja, Former Axis South Commander The reason why I believe Operation Red Sack should be conducted during the snow turns, is precicely because the ice levels are in our favour. Let me explain: The shortest southern path for interdicting the most northern rail is 8 hexes - almost entirely light woods and swamps. Undoubtedly if a layer of defense is present along the way it will eat up considerable movement points. However, with the ice levels being at maximum the swamps pose less of a hindrance to mobile units, and the rivers are entirely absent of movement penalties. Indeed, it is true that we would incur movement penalties from the snow, but as it applies for all units, having iced-out swamps mitigates the movement penalty for motorized units and gives us a relative advantage. Furthermore, snow movement penalties would ensure a sluggish response from Soviet units, hampering their attacks on our spearheads and slowing withdraws from exposed frontage on the line. Therefore, if there was a time for a Cherepovets offensive, it would be most ideal before any thawing takes place. I concur that the operation carries risk, but not considerable risk. What's more, the potential benefits are greater than the potential penalties. At worst case scenario, our mobile forces become bogged down, but not before the Soviets retreat, granting us shorter lines for long term positioning. Total success would allow us to pocket the entire front, but even if we were only able to pocket the southern half of the front (which I find is very reasonable with cut rail) I would define the operation as cost-effective. It should take Turn 37 and Turn 38 to rail in earmarked units. Reaching the northern railway is entirely dependent on having sufficient infantry and armour in position, for a mobile formation's HQBU by the end of turn 38. This is because I predict it would take approximately 2 turns to cut the northernmost rail, and 3 turns to guarantee eventual encirclement. Therefore, the earliest possible commencement of the operation would still force us to make moves during the last snow turn, opening ourselves up to Soviet counterattacks before mud. The pocketed units would most likely annoy us until the first clear turns. As for the infantry advancing on the north edge,a quick advance on the northern section of that front may not be required, precisely because of its isolation. Still, with low fort levels present meager gains along Lake Onega may be worthwhile. In fact, the low fort levels in the entire sector suggest that the Soviets are not prepared for an incursion designed to cut the rail. quote:
Telemecus, Axis Supreme Commander On the point of operation red sack I still need to do the numbers on what could be railed - although we have until my turn to check on that i think. To summarise what i think the argument for red sack is, basically we do have to advance on the north at some time, and now is "least worst" time to do it. There is some merit in the argument. My only concern is whether we have enough potential to make any serious encirclements with what we could rail up right now at all. At best we could only rail up three or four fully refitted/ToE mobile units to the north a turn, and many still need to be refitted. And with much of the front held by Finnish units we do nto have a wealth of other units in the area to use. But let me have a deeper look. quote:
TunganNinja, Former Axis South Commander My argument for Red Sack is less about land gain, and more on disrupting Soviet counters and manpower. Yes, it does knock out two birds with one stone; the intention is to cripple a high-quality portion of the Red Army in the snow so that they are off balance throughout the Summer. I agree that the operation would be decided on our ability to muster available forces. I would feel confident with about the strength of a Panzer Army or 8 counters, and also a corps of crack infantry to make the breach. IIRC, since the last snow turn is on Turn 41, and I expect it to take 2 turns to interdict the rail, and 1 more turn to follow up and encircle, then our forces would need to be assembled by the end of Turn 38 for an attack on Turns 39-41. I agree that it's cutting the timetable very close with low margin of error. I assume a likelihood of success based on an understanding that they seem to lack defense in depth in the area, and are preoccupied with defense of a possible attack in other sectors. Because we are so far forward in the Center and South, if I were them I would also lower the priority around Cherepovets. Therefore, I argue that the primary enemy would be the terrain, though once the rail is interdicted, the terrain will hamper the Soviets more. This is because they have to migrate up to 20 hexes in a northward direction, within forests and swamps, and during mud turns to escape encirclement.
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