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warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (9/18/2020 6:23:51 PM)
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Note Edited (19/09) further to make some aspects clearer.
Curtis Lemay is upset that I call his ‘staff study’ a Dream Axis Fanboi Scenario (DAFS). Is it fair that I label it such? Yes I think so because it is too Axis friendly, doesn't make any attempt to be reasonable in its assumptions, and that was before I learned that the move south was supposed to be the plan from September 1939.
Firstly I want to say – and this is completely my mistake – I was under the impression that the changing of Hitler’s mind, in terms of Germany pursuing a Mediterranean strategy, would have come around the time of the French defeat. I now understand that this is not what Curtis Lemay has in mind. Instead the premise is that Hitler sought to pursue a Mediterranean strategy all along – i.e. from September 1939. I have to say I should have noticed that Curtis Lemay did say “Just assume this was the German plan all along” and I must confess that had I spotted that, I would probably have just stepped out of the conversation. One only has to read Hitler Directive No.6 to know that Hitler wasn’t even thinking of conquering France in 1939 let alone a Med strategy without Italy in the war….
That anyone could imagine, as a reasonable counterfactual, that Hitler could have thought this, bearing in mind everything we know about how the war developed, is to my mind just incredible. Remember, the attack on Spain is only the first prong of a pincer in which Suez is captured following an assault on Turkey and a move through Lebanon/Syria. In 1939 such a plan would have to assume that Hitler knew that Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria would be German allies (or they would have to fight through one or more of these countries on the way!). It also seems to forget that the one thing – even as late as July 1940! – that Hitler sought to do was make peace with Britain (and importantly, he thought that achievable). Lemay has also given as a justification of this strategy, the fact that the Italians get control of the Mediterranean and this keeps them in the war longer. But in 1939 the Italians weren't even in the war.... Let's be real here, Hitler deciding to go for a Med strategy in September 1939 is a bit like the British planning for the assault on Berlin as a result of Operation Compass…. Simply, we are being asked to believe that in September 1939 on the eve of Case White, Hitler has laid out a strategic vision for how he wants the war to pan out - and that he, for some reason, believes defeating the British in the Mediterranean will be central to that victory. What experience of WWI or anything else would give him that idea? We know how the war developed, but in 1939 Hitler would have no reason to give the Mediterranean - which he couldn't access - a moments thought.
But anyway…. I had already started putting thought to paper just before I learned of my mistake and so I will continue with it anyway.
Because I totally reject the idea of Hitler's Med War idea from 1939 being even remotely likely, I am assuming that this part of the counterfactual seeks to find a reasonable date that Hitler is persuaded by his generals/admirals/air marshals to delay Barbarossa (to 1942) and attack the United Kingdom first – not through a direct attack on the UK, but via the Mediterranean - and this kicks off with Spain.
That we assume Hitler can be diverted from his Holy Grail, his Raison d’etre (Lebensraum) is a BIG leap in itself, and I think we need to keep alternate actions within reason and be ‘explainable’. Why? Well if we don’t then this counterfactual becomes nothing more than a DAFS, an alternate world where the Germans do everything right (anything that went wrong historically can just be airbrushed out) and the allies are bound to do what they did historically (no matter what new events happen). I think for this to be interesting, we need an alternate world where Hitler’s change of mind is at least rationalised and ‘believable’. Depending on your point of view, this of course is problematical because the move south involves attacking Spain - and for many that is a step too far.
Let’s be clear, as soon as Hitler moves south, we have to look at things afresh as everything changes. But that does not mean that we should simply forget about the people involved, what happened historically and why. As said, if we do, then we simply move into DAFS territory.
From everything he’s written, Lemay seems to believe that a Med first strategy would have been a war winning tactic (although I don’t believe he’s ever actually stated that) as the delay in attacking the USSR would be compensated by being closer to the oilfields of the Caucasus come the start of Barbarossa, and Britain would be evicted from the Med. (note however that in the previous discussions it seems clear that any downsides for Germany have been ignored, down played or denied).
But could it have been a war winning strategy? Well that is what this scenario is trying to explore. What should be borne in mind though is that in the summer of 1940 when Hitler is supposedly being brought around to a Med first strategy, it would be clear to everyone that this alone will not bring Britain to heel. The taking of Gibraltar will mean Malta surrenders. But the loss of Gibraltar is tempered by the gaining of the Canaries and the Azores (see comments on Portugal below). Furthermore, the British expected the Med to close in the event of war with Italy and so there is no gain there. Only the taking of Suez - and that is still some way in the future - would have a significant effect (although as said, not a fatal one as far as Britain continuing the war is concerned). The best Hitler is hoping for therefore is to weaken the British (without weakening Germany in the process) in order to have a better shot at the Soviet Union.
But before we can explore it, we need a sensible, considered agreement on how it comes about in the first place. Lemay believes that an attack on Spain could have taken place in July – almost straight after Case Red. For the attack on Spain to happen so early, Lemay thinks that everything would have been worked out before (note this is what he means by the “get-go”) but I think that is impossible. Unless one is prepared to accept a long term plan to attack the Med, then the evolution of the war precludes Spain/Gibraltar being looked at until the summer of 1940.
So let’s look closer at how Hitler’s volte face on Barbarossa being priority number 1 could have come about.
- The war starts in 1939. Hitler didn’t mean for that to happen. Success after success – Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland – meant that he got bolder and bolder but didn’t realise that Prague 1939 was the point at which he’d gone too far. So when he chose his next victim, Poland, his bluff was called - he'd crossed the Rubicon. If there is any doubt that Hitler did not expect a war over Poland, his reaction to the British ultimatum was telling, looking angrily at Ribbentrop he simply snapped “What now?”
But while war in 1939 was not what he planned for, he had sensibly taken the precaution of signing the NS Pact in August. And war – on one front - is what he got. This at least crystalised the situation. After Poland one thing was clear. The defeat of France and Britain was key – although he desperately hoped, certainly in the case of Britain, that this would be done at the negotiating table. Even as late as July 1940 he hoped/believed that Britain would give up.
If we look at the Hitler Directives these are all concentrated on war with Poland, France (and the Low Countries), Britain and Norway. There is no thought elsewhere at this stage. Mussolini decided that Italy wasn’t ready in September 1939, couldn’t honour the Pact of Steel, and remained neutral. Spain and the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Turkey, the Soviet Union, they all might as well be on the moon. There is the not insignificant question of how to defeat the mighty French army (no hindsight allowed) to think of first.
With Poland quickly dispatched, if Hitler had had his way, Germany would have gone to war with France in the autumn of 1939 but the weather came to his rescue and stopped a potential disaster. For those that believe that Spain or anywhere in the south, could, reasonably, have been in Hitler’s mind at any time before the fall of France, it is worth noting Hitler’s Directive No.6 from the 9th October 1939. The intention was for the German Army to “win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and Northern France, to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England……”. That is how much Hitler believed a successful campaign against France was possible…. Spain/Gibraltar? Really?
With the British and French plan to build up until 1941, there was nothing but naval and a small amount of air action until February, when Hitler was diverted by naval shenanigans off Norway, and fearing the British would invade, led him to order a potential move of his own in that direction. Directive (unnumbered – but let’s call 10a) was issued on the 1 March 1940 and action in Norway consumed his thinking for the entirety of April.
Case Yellow was launched on 10 May 1940. By this time there was a key change of plan, which would mean an audacious - and risky - strike through the Ardennes. But Hitler’s Directive 11 from the 14th May evidences a man more concerned with the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Dutch than anything further afield. Subsequent directives make clear that the defeat of France is the only focus except one - Directive 13 of the 24th May - saw Hitler order the Luftwaffe to “attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available” - note there is no mention that this is only to be done as part of an invasion operation. But that would have to wait as there was still plenty to be done by the Luftwaffe in France in the meantime. The Directive continued “the struggle against the English homeland will be continued after the commencement of land operations.” There would have been absolutely no time for any thoughts elsewhere at this time either as there were a number of crises, arguments, sackings and hysterics within the High Command over how the Germans should proceed following their bouncing of the Meuse.
The next two Directives were solely dedicated to the defeat of France. As can be imagined, there is still absolutely no interest in the Mediterranean at this point as everything is focussed on getting France done.
On 10th June Mussolini potentially gave a new edge to the war with his declaration of war on Britain and France. Mussolini was set on running his parallel war and Hitler, with no thoughts toward the Mediterranean, was happy for him to do so. Not that Italy was ready at that time to do anything.... Two days later Spain declared “non-belligerency” (a status not recognised by international law but one that Mussolini had adopted in September 1939 to show what support Italy could for Germany). On the 14th, the Spanish marched into Tangiers. Just as importantly given Lemay’s scenario, as Payne points out in Franco and Hitler, there was large scale admiration and hysteria for what Germany was doing to the French – and the cheer-leading was led by Franco himself. Franco had written an effusive letter to Hitler on the 3rd June but in it he put down a marker about Spain’s poor situation following the Civil War. A delegation was sent to see Hitler on the 10th but Hitler was too busy directing the war to see them until a week later. A dialogue was maintained thereafter. Note: one point I don’t believe Lemay has mentioned is that what was made clear at the end of June was that if Germany had moved on Spain (either as friends or otherwise) Portugal would not be allowed to remain unoccupied - yet more fighting and yet another drain on German resource…..
France asked for armistice terms via the Spanish embassy on the 18th June. This was signed on the 22nd June and came into effect four days later. Any thoughts of moving south after France would now, in theory, become possible, although not until Hitler had had time to revel in his victory, sightseeing in Paris for one, and handing out Field Marshal batons like they were going out of fashion for another.
It was not until the 16th July 1940 that Hitler actually issued Directive 16 that covered future action against the United Kingdom. This shows more than anything that Hitler had not been thinking strategically. Simply put, he had won a great victory in six weeks that caught him and the German High Command totally unawares. Warlimont referred to a “Morass of uncertainty”, and headquarters planning became “woolly, aimless and paralytic”. Manstein said “When the head of a state or a war machine has to ask himself “what next?” after his military operations have far exceeded his expectations…one cannot help wondering whether such a thing as a war plan ever existed on the German side”.
It is not until early July that Hitler appeared to concentrate his mind on what lay next. On the 2nd July he asked all three services to look at what would become Sea Lion. Two days later Operation Catapult had pretty much told him all he needed to know in terms of the British response to any demand for surrender, but he still hoped that they would see reason and made a half-arsed appeal on the 19th.
And so realistically it’s not until around early/mid-July that there would have been any attempt at dissuading Hitler from Sea Lion and looking south instead. We know that Hitler was never particularly sold on Sea Lion and indeed at end of July, while the Battle of Britain was in its first phase, Hitler had already asked for plans to be drawn up for an attack on the Soviet Union - the first draft of which (the Marcks Plan) was available on the 5th August 1940.
But who would persuade Hitler to move into the Med? After the series of stunning victories in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France, the Army High Command – OKH – was effectively side-lined. After the defeat of France, von Brauchitsch and Halder barely saw their Fuhrer – a handful of occasions at very most. At OKW, Keitel and Jodl were essentially Hitler lackeys – although interestingly Jodl had tried to raise the idea of a Med strategy with Hitler in January, March and June, but met with no response. Raeder, as head of the small (and after Norway, even smaller) Kriegsmarine was not someone who enjoyed the Fuhrer’s ear either. Only Goering, head of the Luftwaffe – the most Nazi of the services, and Hitler’s appointed successor - had any real clout. We know he was capable of persuading Hitler that his Luftwaffe could do what Hitler needed it to do – even when it couldn’t (Dunkirk and Stalingrad to name two). And, like his boss, he didn’t believe in Sea Lion either. Raeder did… until he saw what the army needed his navy to provide, after which he thought it was impossible. The only proponents were the army…until they saw what the navy could realistically offer…. One thing was clear; even if Sea Lion was possible, it wouldn’t happen until September. We’ll assume that invasion plans are made just in case (but could just as easily have been torn up - it's not a deal breaker here).
In real life, it was only in September 1940 that Hitler was finally persuaded that a Med strategy was the way to go (and by Med strategy we are talking about the taking of Gibraltar and not necessarily the two-pronged pincer that Lemay envisages here), but of course this assumed that Spain would join with Germany….. But back to this scenario, let’s assume that in the early weeks of July, Hitler was in two minds. He really didn’t want to launch Sea Lion as it was too much of a gamble (or indeed had cancelled it already). But what could he have done? He isn't just going to let the British sit behind the Channel and recover (his earlier Fuhrer Directives prove this).
At that time the only way to keep the pressure up was to attack Britain from the air (and the u-boats, although the numbers at this time were too small to be really effective). I think it is reasonable to assume he would have decided to allow Goering his head and proceed with his operation to smash the RAF. If Goering was right, the British would surrender. Happy days. But just in case, and in the meantime, Hitler would start thinking seriously about Spain (note I can't really think of how Hitler comes to the Med strategy way of thinking in this scenario but let's say he had a vision or something - maybe the options provided by Jodl in June - Direct assault or Long Game - got him thinking).
So what do I mean by give Goering his head? Well what did the Luftwaffe do following the defeat of France? The first phase of what became known as the Battle of Britain began on the 10th July 1940. This was the KanalKampf and involved the Luftwaffe attacking convoys in the English Channel and coastal targets. It was relatively small scale as, despite what some would believe about German capabilities, the Luftwaffe had to do two things post Case Red. Firstly they needed time to recover, rest and refit, and secondly they needed to prepare airfields. The rather quaint notion that any old piece of grass will serve as an airfield is nonsense, and there was much repair work required to existing airfields, preparation of new ones and logistics (fuel for the aircraft was quite important) needed to be brought up.
A misconception is that the Battle of Britain was part of Sea Lion. Did it happen as part of Sea Lion historically? Yes. But was it a co-ordinated operation as part of Sea-Lion? No. Would it have happened without Sea Lion? Possibly, but given Goering’s boasts about its outcome and its effects, I believe very probably.
Goering was only ever interested in sucking up to Hitler, and the best way to get in Hitler’s good books was to produce the goods. As said, Goering never believed in Sea Lion, but he did think that his Luftwaffe would destroy the RAF in weeks – indeed he actually said “just give me four days of clear weather” and Adler Tag was launched on the 13th August 1940 after reports of a high pressure front moving in. Goering believed that a successful Battle of Britain i.e. the destruction of fighter command would see the British capitulate – and thus no need for Sea Lion – which is exactly what Hitler wanted to hear.
As Cooper says in The German Army 1933-45, “The Luftwaffe, engrossed in its private war with the RAF, gave little consideration to [Sea Lion]”.
As Kesselring wrote “No definitive instructions were given about what my Air Fleet had to expect in the way of tactical assignments or what provision had been made for co-operation with the army and navy. I found this the more disheartening because, in the light of verbal instructions given me on 6 August, I could presume the air offensive which started two days later was intended to be the prelude to Sea Lion. But in the very first days of the offensive it was conducted on lines quite at variance with those instructions and never harmonised with the requirements of an invasion”.
So we know that Goering’s attempts to destroy Fighter Command, which began in earnest in mid-August, would fail – painfully and expensively so. Let’s be generous to Germany here and say that phase II of the battle is brought forward to 31st July 1940.
What about Hitler’s wooing of Franco following his Med War vision?
Well we know how that is going to go. Franco is going to present a shopping list of military hardware, foodstuffs, other resources and territory that the Germans simply can’t afford – never mind don’t want to give.
Let me say right here that I simply do not agree that Hitler would have ever considered attacking Spain (although in real life I wouldn’t have given much for Franco’s longevity had Hitler won the war!). But for the purposes of this scenario, let’s just go with it. What absolutely won’t happen is that Hitler decides to attack Spain immediately after Franco says no. Why? Well let’s be reasonable here. Hitler would desperately not want to attack his nominal ally and the man German blood has been spilt to install. He would do all he could to get Franco to change his mind as per real life. Also as per real life he would also try and get Mussolini to talk to Franco – southern European to southern European to try and get him to see sense. Even for Hitler, attacking Spain is a big thing.
But Franco knows the state his country is in having been at peace just over a year since the end of the massively destructive civil war. I think an argument could be made for these negotiations concluding towards the end of July, after which, Hitler would order army and air force units into southern France. This movement would go hand in hand with a final, ‘friendly’ offer that Franco couldn’t refuse…. But we know he will….
How long would Hitler give Goering to make good his boast and destroy Fighter Command? Given that he’s now decided on attacking Spain, I don’t think he would be prepared to wait forever. Maybe a month would be sensible? But with no end in sight, and aircraft needed for Spain, Hitler orders the battle over southern England to be wound down and for the required units to be sent south (we’ll say the logistical preparations have been going on during the fighting in the north). One can make the case that a part of the bomber force would remain in Northern France conducting 'The Blitz". Why? Well Bomber Command had attacked Berlin and we know how Hitler took that.....
So we get to late September 1940. The Luftwaffe units destined for Spain have been patched up, replenished and ready to go - albeit somewhat chastened by their experience over the south of England. If Sea Lion hadn't been cancelled in July, well it is now; the barges are sent back to the waterways of Europe... and Hitler, totally ignoring what an attack on Spain means in terms of military drain, the economics and political fall-out, prepares to order Case Sky Blue Pink With Yellow Spots aka the invasion of Spain and Portugal.
How would Spain react? Well there are a whole manner of ways - but that is for another time.
Just a word on Italy:
I don't believe Curtis Lemay really understand the Hitler/Mussolini, Germany/Italy relationship. To be fair, he doesn't want to. He wants to be able to use Italians as a war game player, exploiting the rules to the max to get the Italians to act as mere extension of Germany to Germany's benefit. But real life isn't like that.
One of Lemay’s points is that Mussolini would, from day 1, subordinate Italy and the Italian Armed forces to Hitler. He has made quite clear his belief that Hitler would have brought Italy into his plans straightaway and that, having done so, Mussolini would be happy for his forces to play a bit role in chucking the British out of the Italian lake…. He ignores that Mussolini and the Italians have their own agendas (often not the same!). It also ignores Mussolini's tortured feelings about Germany, and about the war. From Ciano's Diary:
4 September 1939: At times the Duce seems attracted to the idea of neutrality....but immediately afterwards abandons the idea. The idea of joining the Germans attracts him.
25 September: The Duce is more than ever convinced that Hitler will rue the day he brought the Russians into the heart of Europe
9 December: Fundamentally [The Duce] is still in favour of Germany
26 December: He is more and more distrustful of the Germans. For the first time he desires German defeat.
1 January: A keen pro-German feeling is reawakening in the Duce.....
Mussolini's moods changed from hour to hour, but until Italy has made a total horlicks of his parallel war - and he does become reliant on Germany for his very survival - he will be acting in Italy's interest.
Hitler believed in Mussolini but did not trust the Italians generally and certainly not with military plans. Contrary to what Lemay believes, the reality was very different to what he is proposing. As Mussolini said as justification for not telling Hitler in advance about Greece “Did they tell us about Norway? Did they tell us about the Western Front? They behaved as if we didn’t exist”. And it wasn’t just military operations either. What really set Mussolini off was Hitler’s movement of forces into Romania without advising Mussolini, despite having previously warned Mussolini against any actions in the Balkans. From Duce (Richard Collier) - Mussolini to Ciano "Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli! This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out in the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be established".
Back to the scenario, and one thing is for certain. Mussolini will not exactly be happy about the turn of events in Spain. The Mediterranean is Italy's sphere of influence and Mussolini has a decent relationship and understanding with Franco (The Italians spent far more money and lives in helping to install Franco). Suddenly, without any real warning, Germany are going to turn on Spain and, once victorious, will install a German puppet regime there. British ownership of Gibraltar is now replaced with effective German ownership.... this is not going as Mussolini thought when he entered the war. It's late summer, he has no territorial gains from the fall of France, and now one jailer in the Western Med is being swapped with another....
And so, in September 1940, with Germany about to launch operations on the Iberian Peninsular, a very put out Mussolini is all set to launch his parallel war. Hitler is quite happy for this as it provides the British with a nice diversion while Germany invade Spain, but frankly, even if Hitler is not happy, Mussolini is going to attempt to take Egypt anyway..... Again their is historical precedent for Mussolini acting against Hitler's wishes (see Greece October 1940 and the comments above).
And given the above, I think we can be pretty sure we know what Mussolini's reaction would be to being asked to provide the occupation troops for Spain and Portugal. What is Italian for FRO?
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