Onime No Kyo -> RE: Russians/Manchuria - Impact? (4/28/2004 7:13:31 PM)
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Hi all, I finally have some time to take a real bite out of this question. A lot of stuff has piled up, so pardon the wordiness. For some reason everybody assumes that the USSR was more powerful than it really was in the East. This is simply untrue. The Japanese had been taking potshots at the Russians for years before Khalkhin Gol, with no discernable response. The USSR was scared to death of Japanese intervention and with good cause. In fact, Zhukov was appaled by the situation when he arrived on the scene in '37 (I beleive). As long as we're talking about Zhukov, Khalkhin Gol, the "ultimate manifestation" of Soviet power in the Far East, basically revolved around armored thrusts by 2 regiments-worth of T-26s, nothing more. The T-26 was right up there in crumminess with the Chi-Ha in every aspect except (maybe) mechanical reliability. I dont recall the stats off hand, so dont lynch me, but its something like 45mm main gun, 30-35 mm front glacis, 45 km/h highway speed. On the prewar troop situation I base my perceptions on Zhukov. Thus, the supply situation was bad. What armor there was was mechanically antiquated (although well trained and quite proud of themselves), the state of the infantry was discombobulated at best. And its a safe bet that it quickly went downhill after June 22, '41. The Russians started pulling units West as early as August and September. So on Dec. 7, '41 the situation was likely as follows: poor supply, no airforce to speak of, numerous but poorly trained infantry, there hasnt been a naval presence worthy of the name in the area since 1905, and so on. The only factor where the Russians had a clear advantage was artillery. The guns were better, there were more of them, and the Russian artillery branch was one of the elite arms. But even this was poorly supplied. Someone had brought up that the Russian infantry was ill equipped. Sure, per the European standard. By Japanese standards, I think bolt-action rifles and one heavy MG per 100 men, is as a safe bet either way. So I think thats just a dead point. In regards to the Kwantung operation, I agree that it was a brilliant op. However, you guys have to remember that the only maneuver element the Russians used that is worthy of mention basically amounted to a reinforced armor corps. Sure, technologically, this looked like the wrath of god unleashed to the Japanese, but it was not all that much. So just to tie all this up. If the Japanese ever decided to start a serrious beef with the USSR, I think the fighting forces were pretty darn even. The supply side was deffinitely with the Japanese (its a long way to the Russian industrial centers), as was the aerial side. Infantry numbers are pretty even. Quality is somewhat with the Japs, so the Russians might or might not have given them a run for their money. The key point, however, is that the USSR would not have fought. They couldn't have afforded to. In 41-42, they simply could not have maintained a war on two fronts; not materially, not manpower-wise, or even psychologically. So if Japane ever moved, all pertinent areas on the map were theirs for the taking. In '45, sure, the Kwantung army was toast. But as early as 2 months before they crossed the border, most of the Russian mechanized formations concerned were still with Konev (correct me if I'm wrong) south of Berlin. So that's my two cents. Again, pardon the verbosity.
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