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mdiehl -> near misses (5/13/2004 1:09:13 AM)
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quote:
Yamato's system suffered from ineffective joins between the lower and upper armor belt. Her belt was penetrated by American air-dropped torpedoes which had warheads below her minimum designed explosive loadings. Not a very effective design for the weight.
and
(Iowa and SoDak)
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Extremely good design, though not as wide as some. The carrying of the armor belt down to the hull bottom added strength, but the rigidity of the armor plate could possibly have caused sheer of the plate away from the hull bottom. Still, a very good design.
Those quotes are the aforementioned BB comparison link via combinedfleet.com. it is to be noted that with respect to underwater protection from diving shells, Richelieu had the highest rank.
And here are the comments on the armor belt:
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Suffice it to say that I am surprised as you that Iowa has the most effective belt armor of the lot; I would have bet on Yamato any day. But Iowa's combination of an inclined belt, and a highly effective STS-steel shell plate outboard of the belt (which has just enough resistance to strip the AP cap off of an incoming shell) tips the score in her favor. Richelieu also had this same design, and very good protection as a result. Bismarck, despite the reputation of her side armor, fares very poorly in this category. From a deck armor perspective, Yamato comes out on top, followed closely again by Richelieu and Iowa.
It is to be noted that the Yamato had thicker deck armor so gets the highest overall rating. There is no point, however, on Yamato's deck, that is impenetrable to plunging fire from a USN 16" shell. And the USN 16" was more likely to both penetrate and get a full detonation when hitting a Yamato than a Japanese 18" was to penetrate and detonate wen hitting an Iowa.
And to put an end to the bullsh1t about optical rangefinding approaching the accuracy of radar ranging, there's:
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The bottom line is that, after 1943 or so, having the world's best optical fire-control systems was largely irrelevant. The night battle between Washington and Kirishima near Savo pretty much settled the point; good radar usually beats good optics in a stand-up fight. And the radar used by Washington off of Guadalcanal was not as good as the sets fitted aboard Iowa.
Then there's the fact that all radar fire-control is not created equal. Radar operating at meter or decimeter wavelengths is useful for ranging, but lacks the angular accuracy necessary for training. In practical terms, this means that a decimetric set can develop a range solution via radar, but must rely on an optical director to supply training information for the battery. This hybrid fire-control solution is, of course, limited by the quality of the optics available, and also by the visual horizon (which is closer than the radar horizon), and weather conditions. Only with the advent of 10cm and (later) 3cm wavelength sets was true 'blindfire' radar fire-control achievable, wherein the firing ship need never come into visual range of the opposing vessel. The Germans, Japanese, and Italians never developed sets of this capability (both the Japanese (despite its 10cm wavelength) and German sets were usable for fire control against a battleship-sized target only out to a range of about 27,000 yards.) The bottom line is, then, that the Allied vessels, and particularly Iowa and South Dakota, would enjoy an enormous advantage in gunfire control over their adversaries. She would have the ability to lob shells over the visual horizon, and would also perform better in complete darkness or adverse weather conditions
and of course this little factoid
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In 1945 test, an American battleship (the North Carolina) was able to maintain a constant solution even when performing back to back high-speed 450-degree turns, followed by back-to-back 100-degree turns.7 This was a much better performance than other contemporary systems, and gave U.S. battleships a major tactical advantage, in that they could both shoot and maneuver, whereas their opponents could only do one or the other.
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