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IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/16/2004 2:05:58 AM)
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Ironduke:
You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:
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Von Rom
With all due respect, but by including that entire quote (most of which does not belong to Whiting) you are giving the reader (who does not own D'Este's book) the FALSE impression that the entire quote belongs to Whiting. If you intented to refer to only the BOLD portion of that quote, you should have informed the reader that that portion, and that portion only, belongs to Whiting.
This is more frustration for me, Von Rom, and I think evidence for why this whole debate has turned sour. Anyone who read the thread this quote was taken from will know you've missed a crucial part of what I said out.
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For those without access to this work, Mr Whiting's words (which Mr D'Este does not contradict but rather presents as evidence), are in bold in the following section quoted verbatim from pg 634 (Harper Collins 1996 paperback edition):
I tell people Whiting's words are in bold, I write it in bold, and now you tell me I was attempting to give a false impression????? The truth is staring all thread users in the face, and you still insist on saying the complete opposite is true!
I said:
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It also shows he agreed with it.
You said:
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No, it does not mean D'Este agreed with Whiting's quote. It means he has presented Patton's critics' point of view.
Von Rom, you have a phrase you use fairly frequently, I've used it in the section below.
When historians write books, they take the evidence and form an opinion. They then marshall the evidence to prove their opinion. (This isn't as evident on websites). When they quote, they do for one of two reasons and two reasons only. Firstly, they quote it to knock it down. Such as D'Este did to your Patton uncovered website in "Decision in Normandy". They quote and then they say "ah, but what this guy hasn't taken into account is..."
The other occasion is when they use someone else's words to describe or highlight something, because they agree with it, and know that the point has been made elsewhere, and by quoting rather than just restating the point, they give it extra weight because they prove other historians agree with them. Alternatively, it may be something outside their sphere of influence and they quote it because the historian is a recognised leader in that field. Did you not know this?
In this case, Whiting's reputation doesn't outshine D'Este, so he has quoted because he agrees with him. D'Este is writing a history, it is an interpretive history where he doesn't just tell you what Patton did, but why he did it, and whether it was any good. He would not quote something unless he either wanted to agree with it, or disagree with it. It is a reasonable assumption that he agrees with Whiting's quote because he did not qualify it in any way whatsoever.
I said:
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I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.
You said:
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That is because you and others have been doing a fine job doing that all on your own. And at times unfairly.
Von Rom, another frustrating literary device. Refusing to admit something because of a reason like this is silly. Tell us what you feel, it will improve your impact in this thread if you show your view is balanced. I've tried as the list above shows.
I said:
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How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?
You said:
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You have Whiting's book "Battle of the Bulge". Post some quotes from that book where Whiting praises Patton.
I have two quotes, although not from Whiting, they were made in this thread:
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Do I have to find everything for you?
Do some reading. . .
and
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And no I am not doing any investigation.
Pretty frustrating isn't it? I can vouch for this.
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While you're at it, could you post the reference Whiting uses for that quote you posted a while back about Patton encountering only 3 poor German units when he attacked at the Bulge?
Why would he reference it? Patton said of the three units he took: "Bradley, my best three divisions are 4th Armoured, the 80th and the 26th." Patton's own words.
The units in 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions Corp were 5th Parachute (which wasn't actually a parachute division anymore as it had been destroyed in Normandy and rebuilt from surplus Luftwaffe ground crew) and 79th Volksgrenadier which certainly wasn't rebuilt from veterans because the previous 79th was destroyed (1 man living to tell the tale). It was formed from the 586th Volksgrenadiers. The sources are Nafziger and Mitcham. The same people I used to illustrate the 352nd contained no combat veterans.
Some of these units actually performed creditably despite their various deficiencies.
I said:
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My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.
You said:
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As to the 352nd debate:
If you become frustrated when someone else does not share your point of view, then I think you may need to step back for a few minutes and take a few deep breaths. Not everyone in life is going to agree with your opinions.
I did not pursue the 352nd debate simply because I felt it to be an unfair line of debate.
Why?
Because you latch onto things; often small things, which really do not matter in the larger picture.
In other words: You fail to place things into perspective.
Understand?
Frankly no. This is just frustration for me. Unable to admit you are wrong, you decide instead to change the whole line of argument on the point (which remember originally started because you claimed the unit was made up of combat veterans - without naming a single source to illustrate this). Why is it unfair if I ask you to prove an assertion you make?
Not everyone will agree with my opinion, but the make up of the 352 is a matter of fact, not opinion. If you refuse to accept my facts, how can we believe you would ever accept any argument of mine, no matter how overwhelming, well referenced and incisive? Other forum readers will have to decide whether
this answer of yours is fair, whether it means you now concede the point about 352 but can not admit it, or whether you are right, and I am failing to put things into perspective. I freely admit I don't understand how we get from an argument over a German VG division into one about perspective. It's simple enough to me, you either stand by your comment it was a formation of veterans, or you don't?
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Anyone, if they have made up their mind to do so, can easily rip apart ANY action or any general, if they choose to do so.
Nonsense. Some campaigns stand the test of time. Some battles are so brilliant (for historians, not those who fought them) that they can not be undermined. Try finding someone who thinks Napoleon messed up at Austerlitz and got lucky. Try finding someone who thinks Lee fought a poor battle at Chancellorsville.
While you're at it, (because it will be relevant later) try finding someone who criticises the German victory in the west in 1940. Or rather, try finding some one else, as you've posted your thoughts as to why it was lucky. All Leaders can be criticised as few have perfect careers, but not all actions can be criticised, far from it
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It is clearly evident that this is what you have chosen to do with Patton.
However, I try to balance that view by considering ALL the evidence.
If so, how come you're yet to post any evidence as to Patton's weaknesses?????
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You, however, have chosen to destroy Patton by focusing ONLY on the critics' points while totally ignoring the valid explanations, or even bothering to understand Patton.
I understand him, it's why I have reservations about him.
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It's called having perspective.
The debate over the 352nd is just one example of that approach of yours.
I insist that facts used to support arguments are correct, or at least as correct as we can know. If this is an approach you don't like, I can't help that.
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Let's look at the Ardennes for a moment:
The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions. It had the benefit of the knowledge of 5 years' of proven German fighting experience; it was led by experienced officers; it still had good morale. Finally, it had the benefit of the surprise attack. Granted, it wasn't the best German unit. But it certainly wasn't a rag-tag bunch of misfits, either.
[&:]You make it easy for me some times. Once again, unreferenced, we have the story about the 352.
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The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions.
For the benefit of the forum, I will once more demolish this with references.
Nafziger "The German order of battle: Infantry in World War II" Page 310.
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Formed as part of the 32nd wave on 21 September 1944. from the 581st Volksgrenadier Division (32nd wave).
If any other forum user has this book, I'd appreciate it if you'd confirm my quote for Von Rom. Likewise for the others.
Samuel Mitcham "Hitler's Legions: German Army order of battle: World War II"
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It was reconstituted as a separate division in August [1944] and was rebuilt as a Volksgrenadier unit in the Schleswig-Holstein area of Germany"
In case you're thinking, well he doesn't say it didn't have combat veterans, Mitcham has this to say about the neighbouring 353rd Division.
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Cadres from the veteran 328th Infantry division were used to form this division in October 1943.
So, Mr Mitcham knows and tells us when veterans were involved in a division's creation, and doesn't say anything when they weren't.
Ah, I hear you cry, maybe the 581st had veterans in it? So I looked up the 581st.
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Created in the 32nd mobilisation wave, the 581st Grenadier was not allowed to complete it's training.
Probably not....
Finally, Charles B MacDonald. "The Battle of the Bulge". I remember you stating you used reviews to help you decide whether to read something. Here's one: "Mr MacDonald...unarguably knows it all and gets it right."
He said:
"Reconstructed almost from scratch with a great influx of Luftwaffe and Navy replacements to a strength of 13000. The division was poorly trained and lacked experienced offices."
Now, I can't force you to admit you are wrong, I can however post all the information I have and invite other forum readers to make up their own mind.
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Hitler committed a large proportion of all the tank, aircraft and weapon production from 1944 to this Ardennes Offensive. There were 250,000 Germans attacking, by surprise, an ill-prepared American position.
The relevance of this to Patton? None of the ill-prepared troops belonged to him. The vast majority of these 250 000 Germans didn't stand in his way as he set off the Bulge either.
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In contrast, the Americans, whom they were attacking, were there resting, and were relatively inexperienced and unprepared.
None of who'm belonged to Patton or were used by Patton. His troops were experienced as per his own words.
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The three divisions from Third Army (many men had some experience, but many were also inexperienced)
Patton thought them his best. 4th Armoured and 80th Inf arrived in Normandy in early August and fought across France, into Lorraine etc. 26th arrived in Early Sept and went into action in early October fighting in october and November before joining the battle in the Ardennes. You can say replacements may have been inexperienced, but the majority had seen combat, in some cases a good deal of combat.
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had to disengage from the enemy, turn 90 degrees north, travel 100 miles in 48 hours in terrible winter weather and on icy roads and, without the benefit of sleep, hot food or rest, they had to fight an enemy that was prepared to fight, and knew how to fight.
A magnificent achievement by the men of third Army. One of the better achievements of western Allied arms in Europe during World War II. I've previously said Patton was an exellent Logistician and knew how to motivate men. Even if it was Koch (?) who thought the Germans likely to attack in the north, Patton deserves credit for ordering plans be made on the strength of Koch's hunch. I don't accept he was some form of operational Genius, though, having achieved this miracle of manouvre, he fought a poor battle when the shooting started.
The only part of your quote that I'd argue is in error is the last bit. Some of the men facing Patton didn't know how to fight. Elsewhere in the Bulge facing Hodges, there were Germans who still knew how to fight well, less so in front of Patton's drive on Bastogne.
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I think this tends to even things out a bit.
In terms of the Bulge, less so for Patton, because some of the things you cite didn't apply to him, but to elsewhere in the Bulge.
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Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties in some tough fighting during the Battle of the Bulge. Clearly, someone was firing back at them [;)]
Undoubtedley, they fought for several weeks.
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As I previously mentioned, you present only one tiny side of the picture - with the 352nd being only one example of this - and then twist it into some sort of conclusion as to Patton's command abilities.
You will search high and low to find one little speck that you will twist to suit your conclusions, yet ignore a mountain of evidence that gives you a more balanced view of an action or an event.
You will present a mountain of evidence that is often wrong, (eg 352) is usually not relevant (EG most of the stuff about the bulge), and comes from poor sources (Patton fansites and that book about Corporate leadership for example).
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Metz is another excellent example:
You, along with most of the critics jump on Patton's bloody battles here to show he was a poor general.
What you and Whiting conveniently leave out of the picture, is the fact that Patton was stopped outside of Metz because he ran out of gas. He was then denied gas and proper supplies for THREE MONTHS, so he was unable to maneuver around Metz.
His limited supplies meant severely restricting Third Army's use of ammo, artillery shells, food, gas, etc, which all had a detrimental effect on his performance at Metz. In addition, the weather was lousy. This lousy weather meant limited air support. This lousy weather also caused 18,000 cases of trench foot, flu, etc which helped to reduce Third Army's effectiveness.
The fact that he was denied gas meant that the Germans could then re-group and then man positions in the heavily fortified Metz fortifications.
Denying gas to Third Army was almost bordering on the criminal, since what Patton could have captured at little cost (Metz), he now had to take by assault (with infantry), costing soldiers their lives.
So you see, when placed in perspective, the situation at Metz, rather than indicating poor generalship on Patton's part, instead indicates poor generalship and decision-making on the part of the Allied High Command.
But most critics, such as yourself, leave this type of explanation out when looking at Metz.
I was hoping we could get onto Metz at some point. Firstly, lets see exactly what you are saying: The story goes that Patton could have taken Metz easily had he been given the gas to reach it when it was undefended in late August and early September.
This I freely concede, had Patton arrived outside it with no Germans inside it, he would have inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans.
The story continues that Patton was then forced to fight in poor weather, against strong defences, with no gas.
All very true, apart from the the very first bit "Patton was then forced to fight".
What the Patton homepage ignores about this battle is that it was completely unnecessary. Think of this. You're facing tough fortified positions, you've limited ammo and gas, the weather is so poor, your soldiers have trenchfoot in massive numbers. The weather is so poor, it's hard for your infantry to move, much less vehicles, and air cover is restricted.
Military commonsense dictates you stop. It doesn't insist you plough forward throwing unit after unit into a grim attritional battle without the necessary support to get the job done. Some thoughts from Carlo D'Este's excellent biography of Patton(the one point on which we all seem to agree) will serve to illustrate the point.
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Patton's years of study ought to have convinced him of the folly of siege warfare in the hostile environment of a place like Lorraine, which he knew well from first hand experience in 1918. Between his frustration at third army's dilemma and his insistence that he could win the war single handed if given the means, the attacks on Fortress Metz went forward. Yet he seemed reluctant to accept the fact that the great pursuit had ended and he now faced circumstances of "Too little gas and too many Germans, not enough ammo and more than enough rain." Patton's later claims that in Lorraine he had held them by the nose and kicked them in the rear end rang hollow.
In other words, no Military Commander should have fought in Lorraine in those circumstances. It made no military common sense, yet Patton chose to fight anyway, not least because as D'Este points out
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Patton wanted to present Metz to Marshall as a trophy during his impending visit to third army.
He wasn't being ordered to attack, Bradley ordered him to halt them. "For God's sake, George, lay off."
Yet after stopping them (after this plea from Bradley), he later restarted them throwing green units into the fray this time, using the excuse that they needed blooding. All green units have to be introduced into combat. But the wise commander does it, where possible, in circumstances that are favourable, as no unit learns anything getting slaughtered. These attacks were unnecessary, the conditions were (as you point out, Von Rom) dreadful, so why on earth did he mount the attacks in the first place??? He wasn't ordered to.
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I could go on and on about example after example. But I fear it would be of no use, since you are absolutely determined to drive a stake into Patton's memory.
If your examples are all like this, then I would not post them either, as it does your case no good.
Respect and regards,
IronDuke
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