RE: Why was Patton so great? (Full Version)

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IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:41:40 AM)

quote:

Bradley changed the plan and had Patton turn at Falaise.

Even when Patton turned to close the Gap, Bradley then ordered Patton to stop.

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

So you are calling Patton a liar??

Who are you to call General Patton - a man who devoted his entire life to his country - a liar?

Patton was many things - but he believed in honesty.


When you start to accuse me of things which are not true, you have once again ended the argument. I'll finish up by posting my general thoughts on Patton so you can no longer misrepresent me.

I would refer you back some pages to the story about the massacre of the Italian POWs in Sicily, in which Patton wrote one version of his reaction in his diary, and a journalist later wrote a completely different version after witnessing his reaction. For the record, I do not believe everything Patton wrote in his diary was a fair reflection. You only have to study the Hammelburg incident. As D'Este shows, the evidence shows Patton knew that his son in law was in that camp, and yet in war as I knew it, Patton gives other reasons for the raid. He covered it up.

As for lies, I seem to remember Bradley dedicated himself to his country as well. You seem to believe he lies and Patton doesn't. And I am biased?[8|]

IronDuke
(My complete Patton post should appear at the weekend)




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:42:55 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


As history has clearly shown:

Patton was RIGHT and Ike was WRONG.

Not only did the stopping of Patton lead to lives lost taking Metz, but the sending of those supplies to Monty led to the disaster of Operation Market Garden - and MORE lives were needlessly lost.

'Nuff said.


See previous post. You are not seeing this in its proper perspective.



Either are you.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:46:30 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Bradley changed the plan and had Patton turn at Falaise.

Even when Patton turned to close the Gap, Bradley then ordered Patton to stop.

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

So you are calling Patton a liar??

Who are you to call General Patton - a man who devoted his entire life to his country - a liar?

Patton was many things - but he believed in honesty.


When you start to accuse me of things which are not true, you have once again ended the argument. I'll finish up by posting my general thoughts on Patton so you can no longer misrepresent me.

I would refer you back some pages to the story about the massacre of the Italian POWs in Sicily, in which Patton wrote one version of his reaction in his diary, and a journalist later wrote a completely different version after witnessing his reaction. For the record, I do not believe everything Patton wrote in his diary was a fair reflection. You only have to study the Hammelburg incident. As D'Este shows, the evidence shows Patton knew that his son in law was in that camp, and yet in war as I knew it, Patton gives other reasons for the raid. He covered it up.

As for lies, I seem to remember Bradley dedicated himself to his country as well. You seem to believe he lies and Patton doesn't. And I am biased?[8|]

IronDuke
(My complete Patton post should appear at the weekend)


As to the massacre:

There is debate about why it happened.

Patton wasn't lying - he was just protecting his men - at the time he didn't have the full story.

Most people keep diaries so what they write in them are their honest thoughts.

Bradley did lie and it's there for all to see - you can read different versions about the same events in his two books.


quote:

you have once again ended the argument


Leaving again?

How many times have you left the thread, only to come back again . . .

Please make up your mind. . .




IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:52:07 AM)

Kev,
I'd leave it, Mate. I'd put together your last words, reference them properly, then post and call it a day. What on earth the last ride of the Luftwaffe has to do with Patton, is anybody's guess. We're not going to get sources, just more and more unsubstantiated statements.

I just got:

quote:

If you don't know this about Patton, then this shows that you and your sources know nothing about Patton's military philosophy.

Even if I was to post a dozen sources, it would fall on deaf ears and blind eyes. . .


I ask for one source, just one, and instead get this side-step. It is clear no sources exist, so there's no common ground on which to argue. I'm running out of serious historians to quote from. And if I hear one more time that Patton could have captured Metz if there had been no Germans in there....[:D]

Cheers,
IronDuke




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:53:21 AM)

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:57:16 AM)

Ironduke:

A short time ago you promised to give us a full and complete analysis of all of Germany's so-called brilliant Blitzkrieg victories from Sept, 1939 to January, 1942.

Now that you have re-joined this thread again, we'll all be looking forward to seeing it.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:58:47 AM)

Ironduke:

This is the FOURTH TIME I have asked for this information

quote:

Charles Whiting in "The battle of the Bulge".

"Indeed, Patton with three full divisions, one of them armoured, plus overwhelming air and artillery support at his disposal, was stopped by three inferior German divisions, one of which its commander (as we have seen) didn't even wish to take beyond the German border. He wasted his men's lives because he threw them into battle hastily and without enough planning, making up his strategy from day to day. Most important was that Patton, the armoured Commander, who should have known much better attacked on a 25 mile front across countryside that favoured defending infantry on account of its many natural defensive spots. Instead of a massed armour-infantry attack on some concentrated, ole blood and guts , the supposed dashing cavalry General, slogged away like some long in the tooth hidebound first world war infantry commander."


I had asked you for two things from Whiting:

1) The references/sources that Whiting uses for the above quote; and

2) References from Whiting's book "The Battle of the Bulge" in which he praises Patton.


That you have not provided these as requested can only mean:

a) Whiting in fact uses NO sources for the above quote - which makes him a sloppy "historian" (and I use the word historian lightly).

b) That nowhere in his book does Whiting praise Patton - which only confirms the one-sided view Whiting takes towards Patton, thus confirming my view that Whiting just wants to knock Patton with one-sided and unsubstantiated claims (ie no sources cited).




***********************************************************************


Here are some readers' reviews of some of Whiting's books:

The Other Battle of the Bulge: Operation Northwind (West Wall Series) > Customer Review #1:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thoughts on Whiting

Reading the other posts about this book compels me to say a few things about the author. Charles Whiting is a popular, readable and prolific writer of WWII stories, but he is not a historian in any way, shape or form. If you have read more than one of his books you will recognize the following:

1) lack of any kind of endnotes and few footnotes: where is this material coming from?

2) quotes from interviews with the author, which are not in any way anotated at the end of the book

3) praise of the common US soldier but uniformly harsh criticism of all senior U.S. leadership, especially Eisenhower

4) comparisons with Vietnam which, while occasionally interesting (he points out that William Westmorland fought in the Huertgen Forest without learning its lessons) usually border on the ridiculous

5) plagarism from his own works, including entire chapters, some of which have not even been re-written, but simply included whole in different books

6) where are the @and*#and! maps?

This book, like his "Ardennes: The Secret War" posits that Operation Nordwind was a bigger threat than the Battle of the Bulge to the Allies because it nearly defeated the Alliance politically at a time when they had already won the war militarily. It is an interesting conjecture, but it is tainted by the half-hidden glee that Whiting seems to feel over any disaster involving American troops and particularly their leadership. Everything he writes is written through that distoring lens. In any endeavour, if you want to find fault, you will, and in war this is particularly easy. Eisenhower was an armchair warrior and a true mediocrity as a strategist, but he was a superb military politician, maybe the only man who could have kept such a contentious alliance together until final victory. He deserves credit for holding it all together.

I have read five of Whitings books and found most of them to be very entertaining, especially because he tends to focus on American disasters which naturally have not gotten much press since the war, and thus have not been written about extensively. He puts books together like a novel, and is far from a dry writer. But his scholarship would not have met the standards of my high school history teacher, much less those of a true historian. He seems to write about what interest him only, is careless with his statistics and dates, includes facts that suit his opinions, states his opinions as facts, and constantly recycles his own material. You could probably file his books under historical fiction before you could file them under history."


*****************************************8

Whiting, Charles. The Battle for Twelveland: An Account of Anglo-American Intelligence Operations Within Nazi Germany, 1939-1945. London, Leo Cooper, 1975. The Spymasters: The True Story of Anglo-American Intelligence Operations Within Nazi Germany, 1939-1945. New York: Dutton, 1976.

Constantinides says this is "a potpourri of fact and fiction, actuality and myth, assumptions, sketchy versions of certain events, contrived tie-ins, and a certain confusion." Nevertheless, the author is "sometimes so accurate as to indicate access to well-informed sources or successful combining of certain versions." There is also "a good segment on SIS's role and the basis of its intelligence successes against Germany."


*************************************

Whiting, Charles. Gehlen: Germany's Master Spy. New York: Ballantine, 1972.

NameBase: "Charles Whiting's book is somewhat sensational in tone and doesn't cite sources.... There are altogether too many exclamation points, along with direct quotes that appear to be added for effect rather than accuracy. Most of the book concerns Gehlen's career in Germany, particularly after the war, rather than his associations with U.S. intelligence."

http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/W_folder/whitf-whz.html




Error in 0 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:05:29 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke


Thank you very much. It's nice to have been mentioned in your first post! Welcome to the Matrix forums. If you like Military history and/or war games, you've found the perfect place to be. If you don't, well I think you'll still like it.

Regards,
IronDuke


I have read quite a few books on the subject, and I do have some opinion on this Patton subject. However, I am, unlike what I believe you are, not educated on the matter, so Ill just enjoy the discussion!




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:23:01 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Kev,
I'd leave it, Mate. I'd put together your last words, reference them properly, then post and call it a day. What on earth the last ride of the Luftwaffe has to do with Patton, is anybody's guess. We're not going to get sources, just more and more unsubstantiated statements.

I just got:

quote:

If you don't know this about Patton, then this shows that you and your sources know nothing about Patton's military philosophy.

Even if I was to post a dozen sources, it would fall on deaf ears and blind eyes. . .


I ask for one source, just one, and instead get this side-step. It is clear no sources exist, so there's no common ground on which to argue. I'm running out of serious historians to quote from. And if I hear one more time that Patton could have captured Metz if there had been no Germans in there....[:D]

Cheers,
IronDuke



quote:

Kev,
I'd leave it, Mate. I'd put together your last words, reference them properly, then post and call it a day. What on earth the last ride of the Luftwaffe has to do with Patton, is anybody's guess. We're not going to get sources, just more and more unsubstantiated statements.


Yes, Kev leave it. Even Ironduke sees the pointless nature of your postings, especially when they are about totally useless and wasted German operations such as "Baseplate". Even Ironduke can't put a positive spin on that operation.

Ironduke:

You should be providing more support to your shadow, "Kevinugly".

The only time you seem to value sources for Patton is when they criticize him. Then you are as giddy as a little school girl.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:25:53 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke


Thank you very much. It's nice to have been mentioned in your first post! Welcome to the Matrix forums. If you like Military history and/or war games, you've found the perfect place to be. If you don't, well I think you'll still like it.

Regards,
IronDuke


I have read quite a few books on the subject, and I do have some opinion on this Patton subject. However, I am, unlike what I believe you are, not educated on the matter, so Ill just enjoy the discussion!



Please, please, give us the wisdom of all this info you have gathered from reading "quite a few books on the subject".

I'm dying to hear it. . .




dan frick -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:36:28 AM)

I would like to reply to the guy who said that Eisenhower was only interested in golf, not running the country. This was on of Ike's ploys. When the political infighting became nasty he would golf and say I don't have time for all that stuff I just have to do what's right for America. Also he would twist arms while on the course. Ike had a great deal of political skill, one of which was the I'm just a boy from Kansas who spent his life serving his country and now these politicians who know every trick in the book are going after me because I look out for you. Both Parties wanted him to head the ticket. [:)]




Error in 0 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:47:31 AM)

vonRom
My knowlegde of WW2 history impress any of the people that I know. I can sit in a pub and tell stories and come with 'facts', and they are never disputed. This is a luxuary I have because of the fora I adress. This discussion, however, is nothing like it. Both of you have much more knowlegde than I have. But my humble impression of your differences is that while IronDuke adheres to the scientific methods that require reasonable sources for his arguments, yours are in many cases without this. If I must join a fan club, the choice is simple. However, I probably would have more fun with you over a Pint at the local pub! In fact, Ill wisely sit back in my sofa, and have a cold beer now that I in my 3. posting probably have pi**ed off a respected Matrix legion of Merit member.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:49:40 AM)

More Information Regarding Third Army's use of Combined Arms in the Ardennes


From the Official History:

The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its wounds after the disastrous fight as advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, when Model ordered the division to move south, beginning 26 December. Most of its tanks were in the repair shops, fuel was short, and some units did not leave for Bastogne until the afternoon of the 29th. This march was across the grain of the German communications net and became badly snarled in the streets of Houffalize, where Allied air attacks had caused a major traffic jam, that forced tank units to move only in small groups. It is probable that fewer than fifty tanks reached the Bastogne area in time to take part in the 30 December attack.

The appearance of this SS unit was greeted by something less than popular acclaim. The regular Army troops disliked the publicity Goebbels had lavished on the feats of the SS divisions and the old line commanders considered them insubordinate. Worse still, the 1st SS Panzer Division came into the sector next to the 14th Parachute Regiment: the SS regarded themselves-or at least were regarded-as Himmler's troops, whereas the parachute divisions were the personal creation of Goering. (It is not surprising that after the attack on the 30th the 1st SS Panzer tried to bring the officers of the 14th before a Nazi field court.) [14]

The 167th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker), ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer in the attack, was looked upon by Manteuffel and others with more favor. This was a veteran division which had distinguished itself on the Soviet front. The 167th had been refitting and training replacements from the 17th Luftwaffe Feld Division when orders reached its Hungarian casernes to entrain for the west. On 24 December the division arrived at Gerolstein on the Rhine; though some units had to detrain east of the river, Hoecker's command was at full strength when it began the march to Bastogne. A third of the division were veterans of the Russian battles, and in addition there were two hundred picked men who had been officer candidates before the December comb-out. Hoecker had no mechanized heavy weapons, however, and the division transport consisted of worn-out Italian trucks for which there were no spare parts.

The 167th and the kampfgruppe from the 1st SS Panzer (be it remembered the entire division was not present on the 30th) were supposed to be reinforced by the 14th Parachute Regiment and the 901st of the Panzer Lehr. Both of these regiments were already in the line southeast of Bastogne, but were fought-out and woefully understrength. The first plan of attack had been based on a concerted effort to drive straight through the American lines and cut the corridor between Assenois and Hompre. Just before the attack this plan was modified to make the MartelangeBastogne highway the initial objective. The line of contact on the 30th extended from Neffe south into the woods east of Marvie, then followed the forest line and the Lutrebois-Lutremange road south to Villers-laBonne-Eau. The boundary between the 167th and the 1st SS Panzer ran through Lutrebois. The 167th, lined up in the north along the BrasBastogne road, would

[14] See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).

Page 624

aim its assault at the Remonfosse sector of the highway. The 1st SS Panzer, supported on the left by the 14th Parachute Regiment, intended to sally out of Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Lutrebois, however, was captured late in the evening of the 29th by the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry. A map picked up there by the Americans showed the boundaries and dispositions of the German assault forces, but either the map legend was unspecific or the word failed to get back to higher authority for the German blow on the morning of 30 December did achieve a marked measure of tactical surprise.

The 35th Infantry Division stood directly in the path of the German attack, having gradually turned from a column of regiments to face northeast. The northernmost regiment, the 134th Infantry, had come in from reserve to capture Lutrebois at the request of CCA, 4th Armored, but it had only two battalions in the line. The 137th Infantry was deployed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and on the night of the 29th Companies K and L forced their way into the village, radioing back that they needed bazooka ammunition. (It seems likely that the Americans shared Villers with a company of German Pioneers.) In the south the 320th Infantry had become involved in a bitter fight around a farmstead out-

Page 625

side of Harlange-the German attack would pass obliquely across its front but without impact.

During the night of 29 December the tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved up along the road linking Tarchamps and Lutremange. The usable road net was very sparse in this sector. Once through Lutremange, however, the German column could deploy in two armored assault forces, one moving through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other angling northwest through Lutrebois. Before dawn the leading tank companies rumbled toward these two villages. At Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by seven tanks heavily supported by infantry. The panzers moved in close, blasting the stone houses and setting the village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message reached the command post of the 137th asking for the artillery to lay down a barrage of smoke and high explosive, but before the gunners could get a sensing the radio went dead. Only one of the 169 men inside the village got out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier had run through the rifle fire to warn the reserve company of the battalion west of Villers.

The battle in and around Lutrebois was then and remains to this day jumbled and confused. There is no coherent account from the German side and it is quite possible that the formations involved in the fight did not, for the reasons discussed earlier, cooperate as planned. The American troops who were drawn into the action found themselves in a melee which defied exact description and in which platoons and companies engaged enemy units without being aware that other American soldiers and weapons had taken the same German unit under fire. It is not surprising, then, that two or three units would claim to have destroyed what on later examination proves to have been the same enemy tank detachment and that a cumulative listing of these claims-some fifty-odd German tanks destroyed-probably gives more panzers put out of action than the 1st SS Panzer brought into the field.

It is unfortunate that the historical reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in the von Rankian sense ("exactly as it was") is impossible, for the American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit careful analysis by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division artillery, for example, simultaneously engaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west. Weyland's fighter-bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command intervened at precisely the right time to blunt the main German armored thrust and set up better targets for engagement by the ground forces. American tanks and tank destroyers cooperated to whipsaw the enemy assault units. The infantry action, as will be seen, had a decisive effect at numerous points in the battle. Two circumstances in particular would color the events of 30 December: because of CCA's earlier interest in Lutrebois, radio and wire communications between the 4th Armored and the 35th Division were unusually good in this sector; although the 35th had started the drive north without the normal attachment of a separate tank battalion, the close proximity of the veteran 4th Armored more than compensated for this lack of an organic tank-killing capability.

Page 626

Lutrebois, two and a half miles east of the German objective at Assenois, had most of its houses built along a 1,000-yard stretch of road which runs more or less east and west across an open plain and is bordered at either end by an extensive wooded rise. On the morning of the 30th the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry (Lt. Col. W. C. Wood) was deployed in and around the village: Company L was inside Lutrebois; Companies I and K had dug in during the previous evening along the road east of the village; the battalion heavy machine guns covered the road west of the village. To the right, disposed in a thin line fronting on the valley, was the d Battalion (Maj. C. F. McDannel).

About 0445-the hour is uncertain-the enemy started his move toward Lutrebois with tanks and infantry, and at the same time more infantry crossed the valley and slipped through the lines of the 2d Battalion. As the first assault force crossed the opening east of Lutrebois, the American cannoneers went into action with such effect as to stop this detachment in its tracks. The next German sortie came in a hook around the north side of Lutrebois. Company L used up all of its bazooka rounds, then was engulfed. The German grenadiers moved on along the western road but were checked there for at least an hour by the heavy machine guns. During this midmorning phase seven enemy tanks were spotted north of Lutrebois. A platoon of the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion accounted for four, two were put out of action by artillery high explosive, and one was immobilized by a mine.

News of the attack reached CCA of the 4th Armored at 0635, and General Earnest promptly turned his command

Page 627

to face east in support of the 35th Division. By 1000 General Dager was reshuffling CCB to take over the CCA positions. The first reinforcement dispatched by CCA was the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, which hurried in its half-tracks to back up the thin line of the 2d Battalion. Here the combination of fog and woods resulted in a very confused fight, but the 2d Battalion continued to hold in its position while the enemy panzer grenadiers, probably from the 2d Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer, seeped into the woods to its rear. The headquarters and heavy weapons crews of the 3d Battalion had meanwhile fallen back to the battalion command post in the Losange chateau southwest of Lutrebois. There the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion gave a hand, fighting from half-tracks and spraying the clearing around the chateau with .50-caliber slugs. After a little of this treatment the German infantry gave up and retired into the woods.

During the morning the advance guard of the 167th Volks Grenadiers, attacking in a column of battalions because of the constricted road net, crossed the Martelange-Bastogne road and reached the edge of the woods southeast of Assenois. Here the grenadiers encountered the 51st. Each German attempt to break into the open was stopped with heavy losses. General Hoecker says the lead battalion was "cut to pieces" and that the attack by the 167th was brought to nought by the Jabos and the "tree smasher" shells crashing in from the American batteries. (Hoecker could not know that the 35th Division artillery was trying out the new POZIT fuze and that his division was providing the target for one of the most

Page 627

lethal of World War II weapons.)

The main body of the 1st SS Panzer kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so before noon moving along the Lutremange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five tanks were counted in all. It took two hours to bring the fighterbombers into the fray, but they arrived just in time to cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn back the bulk of the panzers. Companies I and K still were in their foxholes along the road during the air bombing and would recall that, lacking bazookas, the green soldiers "popped off" at the tanks with their rifles and that some of the German tanks turned aside into the woods. Later the two companies came back across the valley, on orders, and jointed the defense line forming near the chateau.

Thirteen German tanks, which may have. debouched from the road before the air attack, reached the woods southwest of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored artillery observer in a cub plane spotted them and dropped a message to Company B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt. John A. Kingsley, the company commander, who had six Sherman tanks and a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed an ambush near a slight ridge that provided his own tanks with hull defilade and waited. The leading German company (or platoon), which had six panzers, happened to see Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in that direction. The first shot from Kingsley's covert put away the German commander's tank and the other tanks milled about until all had been knocked out. Six more German tanks came along and all were destroyed or disabled. In the meantime the American tank destroyers took on some accompanying assault guns, shot up three of them, and dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.

At the close of day the enemy had taken Lutrebois and Villers-la-BonneEau plus the bag of three American rifle companies, but the eastern counter-attack, like that in the west, had failed. Any future attempts to break through to Assenois and Hompre in this sector would face an alert and coordinated American defense.




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:58:59 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

vonRom
My knowlegde of WW2 history impress any of the people that I know. I can sit in a pub and tell stories and come with 'facts', and they are never disputed. This is a luxuary I have because of the fora I adress. This discussion, however, is nothing like it. Both of you have much more knowlegde than I have. But my humble impression of your differences is that while IronDuke adheres to the scientific methods that require reasonable sources for his arguments, yours are in many cases without this. If I must join a fan club, the choice is simple. However, I probably would have more fun with you over a Pint at the local pub! In fact, Ill wisely sit back in my sofa, and have a cold beer now that I in my 3. posting probably have pi**ed off a respected Matrix legion of Merit member.


JallaTryne:

I'm happy to have you join us. I like everyone here on these forums. This is all just friendly debate [:D] I would be happy to have a pint with you.

The scientific method is based upon evidence rather than belief. However, Ironduke believes Patton to be bad regardless of the evidence. And when evidence is shown him to the contrary, he just simply twists it the way he wishes it.

Ironduke has made it very clear from the outset of this thread, that he simply wants to destroy Patton's reputation. Therefore, the very basis for his argument rests on a false premise: namely, Patton wasn't very good and Ironduke will prove it.

If I don't respond to some of Ironduke's posts, it is NOT because he is right; it is only because Ironduke does not care about hearing the truth or about sources, etc.

This is NOT the Scientific Method, you speak of.

Ironduke has already decided on the conclusion and he won't let any other views get in his way. That is why discussing the issue with him is pointless. . .




freeboy -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:00:26 AM)

This has been an interestiing thread to read.. and while I do not share Iron Dukes disdain for Paton, I would like less general and more specifics.. for instance ID, ironduke, states Paton incorrectly turned into Britany, why? Third army was held up in France on orders from above, why is this seen at Avranches and later in not allowing paton to race to Luxemburg as a strategic error? Does anyone really believe Patons forces could not have easily defeated a remnant army in france, with the overwelming supplies and air power, before these same two assets where squandered in pushing slowly up the coast?

Ok Paton was criticised in Sicaly, he pushed his troops to get forward faster... again help me out here.. do not see the problem.. and in North Africa he took over a pretty directionless command and seemingly overnight had the situation righted...
I do conceed legends are always bigger than the actual men .. but is he not at least a good, competent aggressive corp commander?

Iron duke, I never saw your response, to why Monty who was slow but won... request.. feel fre to toss it in...
I finally mean no disrespect for those who disagree, I actually consider myself better educated than most History profs I knew in the Ivy league scxhool I went to, in terms of modern military histroy and weapons, and still consider myself a student not a Historian!
please help me understand youe point of view...




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:01:19 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: dan frick

I would like to reply to the guy who said that Eisenhower was only interested in golf, not running the country. This was on of Ike's ploys. When the political infighting became nasty he would golf and say I don't have time for all that stuff I just have to do what's right for America. Also he would twist arms while on the course. Ike had a great deal of political skill, one of which was the I'm just a boy from Kansas who spent his life serving his country and now these politicians who know every trick in the book are going after me because I look out for you. Both Parties wanted him to head the ticket. [:)]


I have to agree with you.

Ike takes a lot of flack as a military strategist, but his political skills were finely honed. I doubt few leaders could have done the job he did holding the coalition together.

Cheers!




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:15:21 AM)

Patton on Combined Arms

"There is still a tendency in each separate unit...to be a one- handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire...That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you...You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time..."

General George S. Patton, Jr., 8 July
1941, address to the men of the 2nd
Armored Division, The Patton
Papers, Vol. II, 1974




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:20:36 AM)

Patton and the Use of Combined Arms in France 1944

Note:

When Patton's Third Army broke out of the Normandy hedgerows, and fanned out in pursuit of the enemy, Patton's critics deride him for "leaving his flanks exposed".

Patton did nothing of the sort. He was a professional soldier. While he knew armies had to take chances in war, he also wasn't stupid either.

Patton believed in speed when pursuing a retreating enemy. He knew he had to keep up the pressure on the retreating Germans, so they wouldn't re-group. Thus, Patton pursued the Germans on the ground with his armour, while his flanks were protected by the 400 planes of Third Army's XIX Tactical Air Command. It was the job of these aircraft to attack any moving enemy forces they spotted. These planes flew hundreds and thousands of missions to cover Third Army's spectacular and unprecedented drive across France.

More information here:

From Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine 1940-43, Published by the Air University Press/Maxwell AFB 1998:

"Patton and Weyland A Model for Air-Ground Cooperation," By David Spires.

“By the summer of 1944, Allied forces had four fighter-bomber tactical air commands supporting the designated field armies in Europe; in the fall they added a fifth. Of these, the team of Third Army, commanded by Lt Gen George S. Patton, and XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), led by Brig Gen Otto P. Weyland, deserves special attention as the most spectacular Allied air-ground team of the Second World War.

The Patton-Weyland relationship arguably proved the most satisfying of all such partnerships between air and ground commanders during the conflict. It remains today a model for air-ground cooperation.” p. 147 “...The problems and frustrations encountered in North Africa led to important improvements in command, control and operations. By the time of the Normandy buildup in 1944, many of the participants involved had lived through North Africa and Sicily. They had tested doctrine under combat conditions, worked out problems, and created bonds that they brought to the northwest European campaign.” p. 148

“After waiting in the wings during the fighting in Normandy, the Third Army-XIX TAC team officially entered the battle for France on 1 August. Immediately, Weyland faced a great challenge—how to support Third Army’s blitzkrieg drive across France to the German border. Although his command grew to nine fighter-bomber groups (six P-47 groups, two P-51 groups, one reconnaissance group) totaling 400 aircraft, nothing in his own experience or the doctrinal manuals prepared Weyland for the kind of pursuit that eventually found his forces supporting operations on several fronts from the Breton Peninsula to the Mosel River. The more rapidly Patton advanced, the more difficult it became for Weyland’s airfield engineers and his communications, maintenance, and supply elements to keep pace.

Too often Weyland found himself the proverbial “fireman,” scurrying back and forth, attempting to maintain control and ensure effective operations. [endnote 11]

Weyland proved a fast learner.

The pace of advance compelled him and his staff to reassess formal tactical air doctrine. Like the army his command supported, he needed to decentralize operations and disperse his forces, far more than established doctrine suggested or the planners had expected. At one point, XIX TAC deployed four headquarters elements that controlled fighter groups based in three different areas and staging from several others. Mission priorities became reversed. Weyland declared that the “first priority was cover of the armored units” in the form of dedicated air patrols -- the same policy found so objectionable in North Africa because it prevented the concentration of airpower. [endnote 12] pp. 151-152

“General Weyland exemplified the type of practical leader who came to dominate tactical air operations in the European theater. At no time during the campaign in Europe did he pander to any formal War Department document on tactical airpower doctrine in day-to-day operations. Using doctrine as a loose guide rather than an inflexible dogma, Weyland approached each situation on its own terms.” p159




Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:41:28 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

Regards
33




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:44:57 AM)

Patton and Combined Arms at the Battle of the Bulge


MILITARY SCIENCES: Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Patton, Third Army and Operational Maneuver

Authors: Flowers, Jack D.; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY
STUDIES

Abstract: On 16 December 1944, the German Army launched an offensive in the Ardennes to split Allied forces and retake the ports of Antwerp and Liege. The German advance split the XII Army forces and left the 101st Airborne Division surrounded at Bastonge.

To relieve the encircled units in the Ardennes and defeat the German offensive, Third Army conducted an impressive counterattack into the flank of the Germans. The flexibility to turn ninety degrees during the worst winter in thirty-eight years and relieve the encircled forces stands out as one of the greatest operational maneuvers in history.

While this operation is unique, the actions of the commander and staff that planned and executed it deserve closer analysis to determine what enabled them to orchestrate this maneuver. It is especially remarkable, when taken in context, how rapidly the Army changed during the previous four years. The U.S. Army anticipating eventual war in Europe began a transformation which included drastic changes in force structure and doctrine. The primary transformation in doctrine was the revision of Field Service Regulation 100-5. The 1941 edition of 100-5 superseded a tentative version published in 1939 which was the first major revision of warfighting doctrine since 1923. It was with this manual that the Army went to war. It was also the manual used to train and teach new and reserve officers who had little experience in the study and practice of war. How important and to what extent did Patton's Third Army apply the doctrine in conducting the Battle of the Bulge?

Particularly relevant to serving officers today is to analyze the operations of Third Army in terms of doctrine that existed in 1944 and today's current doctrine. An examination of similarities and differences between the doctrines may allow development of possible conclusions on the ability of future forces to conduct decisive maneuver in....

http://www.stormingmedia.us/67/6796/A679653.html




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:49:36 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

Regards
33


Show me where his diaries were falsified or tampered with?

They would have to show missing pages, attempts of removing previous writing, etc.

To this day, after more than 50 years, after all the historians who have looked at Patton's diaries, absolutely NO accusation has been made along these lines about Patton's diaries.

That is simply not the man Patton was. . .

In addition, Patton recorded all of his thoughts in a book he wrote called "War as I Knew It", which was published shortly after the war. He also published numerous scholarly papers on a wide variety of subjects, so we know exactly what Patton thought.




Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:52:37 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

More Information Regarding Third Army's use of Combined Arms in the Ardennes


From the Official History:

snip


What does this have to do with Patton? I even did a search in this passage for his name but none was present. It's clear from the article that his subordinate commanders were well trained, able to use their initiative, and highly effective - all of which is great credit to Patton's skill at training. What is not clear from the article is any evidence that this shows Patton's operational skill, since from this section of the history it appears the entire engagement was fought without his input.

Regards
33




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:55:04 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

More Information Regarding Third Army's use of Combined Arms in the Ardennes


From the Official History:

snip


What does this have to do with Patton? I even did a search in this passage for his name but none was present. It's clear from the article that his subordinate commanders were well trained, able to use their initiative, and highly effective - all of which is great credit to Patton's skill at training. What is not clear from the article is any evidence that this shows Patton's operational skill, since from this section of the history it appears the entire engagement was fought without his input.

Regards
33


You wrote:

quote:

What does this have to do with Patton?



You have answered your own question:

quote:

It's clear from the article that his subordinate commanders were well trained, able to use their initiative, and highly effective - all of which is great credit to Patton's skill at training.




Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:57:02 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

Regards
33


Show me where his diaries were falsified or tampered with?

They would have to show missing pages, attempts of removing previous writing, etc.

To this day, after more than 50 years, after all the historians who have looked at Patton's diaries, absolutely NO accusation has been made along these lines about Patton's diaries.

That is simply not the man Patton was. . .

In addition, Patton recorded all of his thoughts in a book he wrote called "War as I Knew It", which was published shortly after the war. He also published numerous scholarly papers on a wide variety of subjects, so we know exactly what Patton thought.

No, you have set up a straw man here. You did not say "the beauty of Patton's diary" - you said "the beauty of diaries". I am simply asking if you actually believe that a diary cannot be falsified either at the time or later. I am curious though: since you clearly have read the diaries in the original, can you tell me, what was the handwriting like?

I have no evidence either way as regards Patton's diary. I do find it relevant to note that diaries by other historical figures - for instance, Haig - have been accepted as accurate and unaltered for decades, something which has recently been shown not to be the case at all.

Regards
33




Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:58:28 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

You have answered your own question.


Fair enough, it was poorly phrased.

How does a battle in which Patton had no command input, illustrate his skill at battlefield command, as opposed to his skill at training?

Regards
33




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 7:54:21 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

Regards
33


Show me where his diaries were falsified or tampered with?

They would have to show missing pages, attempts of removing previous writing, etc.

To this day, after more than 50 years, after all the historians who have looked at Patton's diaries, absolutely NO accusation has been made along these lines about Patton's diaries.

That is simply not the man Patton was. . .

In addition, Patton recorded all of his thoughts in a book he wrote called "War as I Knew It", which was published shortly after the war. He also published numerous scholarly papers on a wide variety of subjects, so we know exactly what Patton thought.

No, you have set up a straw man here. You did not say "the beauty of Patton's diary" - you said "the beauty of diaries". I am simply asking if you actually believe that a diary cannot be falsified either at the time or later. I am curious though: since you clearly have read the diaries in the original, can you tell me, what was the handwriting like?

I have no evidence either way as regards Patton's diary. I do find it relevant to note that diaries by other historical figures - for instance, Haig - have been accepted as accurate and unaltered for decades, something which has recently been shown not to be the case at all.

Regards
33


quote:

can you tell me, what was the handwriting like?


Can you show me where they were altered?


quote:

I have no evidence either way as regards Patton's diary


Then what is there to prove?




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 7:56:57 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

You have answered your own question.


Fair enough, it was poorly phrased.

How does a battle in which Patton had no command input, illustrate his skill at battlefield command, as opposed to his skill at training?

Regards
33



How does an Olympic event in which the coach has no input illustrate the coach's grasp of technique, training, discipline, and skill, when it is the athlete who performs the event?




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 7:59:16 AM)

Patton, Third Army and Combined Arms - Airpower in France 1944


Combined Arms Center
Military Review


July - August 2001

65 Operational Firepower: the Broader Stroke

by Colonel Lamar Tooke, US Army, Retired


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your first act against the enemy shouldn't be a nibble! It should demonstrate determination and have traumatic impact!

—Sir John Woodward1
Joint firepower synchronized with operational-level maneuver bites with formidable force and terrorizes the enemy. Precise, brisk, devastating operational firepower has been around only since World War II, and its place in major operations and campaigns is no less important today than at Normandy. Firepower is a fundamental tool of the operational artist, and every campaign planner needs a sense of how such devastating power can be most effective.

Following the smoothbore age, military operations changed course, and open warfare resolved in-to close encounters around fixed points. While maneuver was prominent during three of the four years of the American Civil War, the fourth was largely spent in siege operations. The Franco-Prussian War began with six weeks of maneuver, followed by a five-month siege on Paris. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was basically a single-siege operation, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 closed with 600,000 men consumed in trench warfare.

Because of this attrition form of warfare, military leaders concluded that heavier firepower was needed. In 1916 during the battle of Verdun, the Germans heaped two million rounds on French positions at the rate of 100,000 rounds an hour. While these are impressive figures and the magnitude of the barrages must have been awe-inspiring, firepower alone did not achieve an operational decision in the precursor events to World War I, nor did it during the devastating years of the war itself.2

Actions during World War I repeatedly demonstrated that a single battle was no longer sufficient to achieve victory—or—perhaps any of the strategic aims of the conflict and that firepower alone could not be decisive without a more integrated and compelling link to the entire campaign design. Overwhelming firepower may influence success in engagements and battles, but to achieve national security objectives, overall campaigns must be successful.3

The lack of integrated firepower and maneuver at the operational level during World War I compels us to look to World War II for examples of such integration. First the Germans, then the Allies, learned to integrate firepower with operational maneuver to execute broad-scope, decisive campaigns across Africa, Europe and Russia. They quickly found that operational art is more than planning and executing tactics on a grand scale. It is designing and controlling sequential, simultaneous operations across a theater that gives direction and meaning to the tactical level. In this context operational firepower also becomes more than just fire support. It is not driven by targeting at the lowest tactical levels and compiled into target sets to support coming engagements. Operational firepower is compelled by the overall campaign design and thus the operational-level tasks and priorities that must be accomplished within each phase of the campaign.4

Firepower

The term "operational firepower" refers to a commander in chief's (CINC's) application of fires to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation. Operational firepower, while a separate element of the concept of operations, must closely integrate and synchronize with the CINC's concept of maneuver. At the operational level, firepower is defined in terms of what it does rather than what it is. It does not necessarily directly equate to attrition warfare and, of necessity, plays a critical role in maneuver warfare.5

Operational maneuver and fires may occur simultaneously within a commander's battle space, at times for different but related objectives, and at other times maneuver and fires must be synchronized. Lethal operational firepower is not simply fire support writ large. It is consciously targeting and attacking targets whose destruction will significantly affect the campaign or major operation. It includes allocating joint and combined air, land, sea and space means. Based on the operational commander's vision of how the campaign will unfold, operational fire objectives are established, and targets are designated and integrated.6

Operational firepower performs three general tasks within the campaign:

Isolates the battlefield by interdiction.

Destroys critical enemy functions and facilities, eliminating or substantially degrading enemy operational-level capabilities.

Facilitates operational maneuver by suppressing enemy fires, disrupting maneuver and creating gaps in defenses.

Operational fires help achieve operational and perhaps strategic objectives while holding enemy critical functions at risk throughout the depth of the battle space. They are more than deep fires because they extend the battlefield in space and time. Existing capabilities permit acquisition and attack at increasing ranges and faster response times than ever before. Operational firepower can expose or allow attacks directly on the center of gravity and set conditions for maneuver. Through disruption, delay or by limiting critical functions, firepower can dictate the terms of future battle.7

Balancing competing "close" and "deep" demands is a critical aspect of operational command. Modern operational-level warfare involves meeting the enemy along the front while destroying forces well into enemy rear areas.8 Since World War I, lethal firepower has been a primary option in meeting warfare's many demands. Attrition has often been a priority requirement, but it should not dominate the design of a well-orchestrated campaign.

Firepower is often associated with attrition, which depends on industrial strength, cumulative effects and destroying target arrays. Overusing this method leads to routine target acquisition and repetitive repertoires to support a preponderance of firepower. While firepower is an effective means of war, it is neither self-sufficient nor a swift instrument of victory. The Vietnam experience affirms this truth: as firepower and attrition dominate operational design, maneuver seems less important; yet, without it, a decision is improbable.9

Operational Maneuver

Decisively defeating an enemy force requires dominant maneuver throughout the depth of the battle space. Dominance requires seeing activity in the battle space, moving rapidly through its depth and directing firepower to dominate the maneuver relationship. Final dominance comes through simultaneously applying firepower and controlling terrain.10

Relational maneuver creates a decisive impact on a campaign by securing operational advantages before battle or exploiting tactical success. By avoiding enemy strengths, relational maneuver attempts to incapacitate through systematic disruption rather than physical destruction. The potential advantages are disproportionate to the effort and resources involved. Facilitating maneuver with firepower can yield astounding results such as Operation Neptune to establish the Normandy lodgment or Operation Cobra to break out of the lodgment.11

How does a planner design a campaign to facilitate maneuver? Many operational-level planners are perplexed by this notion and often rely on their more familiar experiences with fire support. To better understand the maneuver-firepower connection requires a fundamental grasp of maneuver forms and historical uses of firepower.

At the operational level there are two basic forms of maneuver that support sustained land action: central maneuver using penetration, frontal attack and infiltration; and flanking maneuver using envelopment or turning movement. World War II illustrates how each form has been applied and how firepower facilitated success. For example, Operation Neptune demonstrated a frontal attack, Operation Cobra a penetration and Operation Bluecoat an envelopment.12 The more clearly defined use of a turning movement might be demonstrated by General Douglas MacArthur's avoidance of Rabaul. Finally, British Field Marshal William Slim's use of the Chindits in Burma illustrates an operational-level infiltration.13

Central maneuvers are designed to rupture enemy defenses, create assailable flanks and access rear areas. Infiltrations covertly move forces through enemy lines to reconcentrate in rear areas, whereas penetrations on a narrow front or frontal attacks on a broad front seek to overwhelm the enemy directly through the mass of combat power.14

Flanking maneuvers are designed to fall on an assailable flank, creating the conditions for encirclement or pursuit and forcing the enemy to abandon prepared defenses or fight in a direction and on terrain we choose. Preferably, such maneuvers would come from an unexpected direction, and while envelopments seek to fix enemy frontal defenses, a turn avoids these altogether.15

Maneuver and firepower should not be considered separate operations against a common foe but complementary. Firepower resources establish a mobility advantage over the enemy and ease operational maneuver. Generally this refers to several tasks: attacking deep force concentrations, blinding sensors, disrupting mobility and preparing the enemy for decisive closure. But, as in synchronizing any operational functions, there is more to consider than this simple list implies, and each form of maneuver requires its own set of considerations. Past illustrations will help, but they reflect the enemy, terrain and available resources.

Central Maneuver

Frontal assaults and penetrations require facilitating similar methods. The official US Army history of the cross-channel attack records that the "task of smashing through enemy beach defenses was to be facilitated as far as possible by naval fire and air bombardment." The Atlantic wall was expected to contain 15,000 concrete strong points, 15 coastal batteries and 300,000 defenders. A frontal assault against such defenses required heavily suppressing enemy fire, tearing gaps in the imposing defenses, isolating enemy reserves from the lodgment area, destroying German mobility and supporting the deception (Operation Fortitude).16

For three months lines of communication (LOC) in northern France were interdicted to sever transportation links to Normandy. Between 1 March and 6 June 1944 air forces cut rail traffic by 60 percent, destroying 900 locomotives, 16,000 freight cars and shooting down 1,000 Luftwaffe aircraft in May alone. All Seine River bridges from Rouen to Mantes-Gassicourt were rendered impassable. An area the size of Indiana was isolated in the northwest corner of France. German reserves were so successfully isolated that they had to walk the last 100 miles into combat. German reserves were isolated from the lodgment area, the supporting mobility network was neutralized, and the Luftwaffe had only 400 first-line aircraft operational. The stage had been masterfully set for the invasion along the Normandy coastline.17

As Operation Neptune began, the tasks of suppressing defenses and tearing selected gaps became primary concerns. The combined naval forces dedicated scores of ships to this effort. Fifty-two battleships, cruisers, destroyers and other ships supported the First US Army in the US sector. On 6 June Omaha and Utah Beaches were bombarded with naval gunfire, including 13,000 rockets, and a supporting bomber attack dropping 800 explosive tons. In the British sector, from 0300 to 0500 hours, more than 1,000 aircraft concentrated 5,000 tons of bombs on German defenses.18

During all of this there was a major effort to support deception as part of Operation Fortitude. In preliminary action to isolate reserves and debilitate German mobility, 10 percent of the bomb tonnage dropped from mid-April until D-day was directed against coastal batteries, but only one-third of that tonnage was dropped in the invasion area.19

Almost two months later Operation Cobra, designed to break out of the lodgment area, illustrated the meaning of tearing gaps in enemy defenses. The First US Army was poised to break out of the lodgment with 15 divisions in four corps. Behind it were 12 fighter-bomber groups based on the continent to support its effort. During his planning phase, General Omar Bradley said he wanted to "obliterate the German defenses along the Périers Saint-Lo highway" and use an "air attack concentrated in mass" into the open terrain beyond Saint-Lo highway.20

All Eighth US Air Force heavy bombers and fighters, Ninth US Air Force medium bombers and fighter-bombers, and the Royal Air Force 2d Tactical Air Force concentrated against a rectangular target south of the Périers-Saint-Lo highway. The target was 7,000 yards wide and 2,500 yards deep. For two hours and 25 minutes, 2,500 planes swarmed over the target, dropping 5,000 tons of explosives, napalm and white phosphorous. From 25 to 28 July, 2,926 aircraft flew almost 10,000 sorties supporting the First US Army operational objective. Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein, commander of Panzer Lehr division, was astonished by the destruction and characterized the onslaught as "Hell. . . . The planes kept coming . . . my front lines looked like a landscape on the moon, and at least 70 percent of my personnel were knocked out of action. . . . All my front-line tanks were knocked out. . . . We could do nothing but retreat. A new SS tank battalion was coming in with 60 tanks . . . [it] arrived [with] five." The destruction was so complete in the target area that it prompted discouraged Field Marshal Hans Guenther von Kluge to report, "As of this moment, the front has burst." Operational firepower facilitated First US Army's penetration three miles wide and one to three miles deep and precipitated the defeat of the German 7th Army.21

Operational-level infiltrations are somewhat unique in history; however, operations in Burma by Brigadier Orde Wingate's special force of Chindits exemplify how firepower might support such an effort. Slim, having retreated from Burma during 1941, found himself in an economy-of-force theater throughout World War II. As he began to transition to a theater offensive against Japan's 15th Imperial Army in 1944, the security of his northern flank became a major concern. Slim's objective was to secure his northern flank and prevent Japan from reinforcing its 15th Imperial Army. He used the Chindits to cut the LOC of enemy forces facing US General Joseph Stilwell on the northern front.22

Operation Thursday began on 5 March 1944. Wingate's force was to cut the Japanese LOC, prevent reinforcement of the northern front, deny Japanese use of the main rivers and cause the greatest possible confusion and damage. During March, 9,000 men and 1,350 pack mules and cattle of the British 77th and 111th Brigades were airlanded 200 miles within Japanese-held territory. Another 3,000 16th Brigade troops marched 450 miles across Burma's Naga Hills in six weeks to join the initial infiltration into an operational area formed by the Mogaung-Indaw-Bhamo triangle. A determined Wingate had achieved one of the greatest infiltrations in history "to insert himself in the guts of the enemy."23

For months the Chindits, dispersing and reconcentrating behind enemy lines in classic infiltration style, accomplished their objectives and prevented Japanese use of interior lines against Slim's main offensive effort. Operation Thursday and follow-on operations were among the largest and most successful infiltrations in history. Firepower facilitated this maneuver by isolating the operational area, suppressing Japanese firepower, supporting deception to cover the infiltration and destroying Japanese command and control capabilities.

Britain's Number 1 Air Commando and 3d Tactical Air Force received the first priority of establishing and maintaining local air superiority over the operational area. This force destroyed all Japanese air forces that could influence Chindit operations. US Strategic Air Force strikes along the Southern Front caused the Japanese to believe Lower Burma was about to be invaded from India. Consequently, Japanese reserves were not free to oppose Chindits on the Northern Front. Approximately 750 tons of munitions were delivered to facilitate infiltration of the Japanese 15th Army. Antiaircraft firetraps were also used against Japanese air forces. Allied air forces would lure the Japanese into these networks to increase attrition and prevent interference with the infiltration operations.24

Flanking Maneuver

Because envelopments and turns are similar, the general character of operational firepower that facilitates such maneuvers would take on similar patterns. In fact, many patterns are similar to those required in central maneuvers with one notable exception—protecting a flank. The US XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) supporting General George S. Patton's Third Army during mid-August 1944 demonstrated how to protect an operational flank using firepower. According to planners, "Never in military history had a ground commander entrusted the defense of a flank to tactical aircraft." The rapid maneuver during Patton's exploitation toward the Seine River line and Paris called for special emphasis ahead of the advance and especially along the vulnerable Loire valley flank.25


Alert GIs of an M-51 quad-.50 caliber battery watch as US and German planes dogfight above them.

When the original envelopment to close the Argentan pocket was not successful, Bradley authorized execution of Operation Lucky Strike's plan B, a wider envelopment to encircle German forces south of the Seine River. Patton's Third Army advanced to the Seine along three avenues, which took three corps to the Dreux-Chartres-Orleans line by 18 August. The Seine River line was forced 35 miles south of Paris within a week. Third Army made rapid progress in this effort while protecting 12th Army Group's flank along the Loire River. Beyond this protection was the XIX TAC, whose mission was to protect Third Army and thereby the entire southern wing of the invasion force.26

Brigadier General O.P. Weyland's XIX TAC had full responsibility for protecting the extensive and vulnerable southern flank along the Loire valley "to keep the Germans . . . immobile and off balance, and prevent any massing of enemy strength to oppose the Third Army."27 XIX TAC constantly patrolled the Loire valley, attacking every target related to protecting the southern wing. On 8 September the German commander of Biarritz, Brigadier General Botho Elster, agreed to surrender 20,000 troops at the Beaugencys bridge in Orleans under one condition: "Keep the `Jabo' [fighter-bombers] off my men." During this period large numbers of enemy troops attempted to surrender to low-flying aircraft for the first time in history. Patton, in his direct style, wrote a compliment to General Henry (Hap) Arnold, dated 17 August, which read, "For 250 miles I have seen the calling cards of [XIX TAC] fighter-bombers, which are bullet marks in the pavement and burned tanks and trucks in the ditches."28

Protection of the operational area's right wing and Patton's Third Army illustrates the synergistic effects of orchestrated maneuver and firepower—and the dilemma facing any foe under such circumstances. Firepower afforded protection to Third Army's flanking maneuver, which catalyzed German countermoves into positions where lethal firepower could concentrate against them.

MacArthur's turn of Rabaul illustrates equally well operational fires protecting one's flank. After the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942, Japanese penetration toward Australia and LOC into the Southwest Pacific region was disrupted, but Rabaul still dominated the region. From this major naval and air base, the Japanese could continue to threaten the LOC to Australia and New Zealand and dominate the right flank of any regional operations. Allied forces were held to the Bismarck barrier, where the Japanese effectively waged attrition warfare to dominate the approaches to Rabaul and contain Allied forces.

After one year of campaigning, Allied forces had advanced less than 200 miles in the Southwest Pacific. At that rate it would have taken 15 years to reach Japan. An approach through the Central Pacific looked more inviting as the Japanese began reinforcing Rabaul, eventually assembling 100,000 well-armed men.29

Allied gains in the Bougainville area during October and November 1943 caused the Japanese to further concentrate naval and air forces at Rabaul. Although Rabaul had been a main objective during the early stages of the Southwest Pacific campaign, it was quickly building beyond Allied capabilities to attack and capture it. Yet, the Allies had to contain forces based there. MacArthur decided to isolate and bypass Rabaul and the Japanese Seventeenth Army in the Solomons. A new plan emerged, which called for Allied forces to advance along the New Guinea coast to the Vogelkop Peninsula in 1944 with Mindanao as the subsequent objective.30

Bombs from Fifth Air Force B-25s straddle a Japanese patrol boat from a convoy headed for Rabaul, 16 February 1944. In the background (see inset) a cargo vessel receives a fatal hit while only the bow remains visible of another ship heading for the bottom. The convoy was caught off Kavieng, New Ireland.

On 12 October 1943, 350 aircraft from the US Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force began concentrating operational-level fires against Rabaul. From October through December 1943 air and naval forces pummeled Rabaul. The attempt to isolate Rabaul was continuous, and by February 1944 no Japanese warships remained at Rabaul, and no fighters opposed Allied air efforts within hundreds of miles. By the end of 1943 the Japanese had lost 3,000 aircraft in the struggle for the Solomons, one of which carried Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the regional commander and one of the original architects of Japanese naval power and the Pearl Harbor attack. His death alone was a serious loss to the Japanese. In their attempt to reinforce Rabaul, the Japanese had fallen prey to devastating firepower. A well-trained and well-equipped army was left isolated, bypassed and contained by Australian forces in an economy-of-force effort as Allied forces went westward to Wewak and ultimately the Philippines. Their right flank had been secured by prudently using operational fires to facilitate the turning movement that avoided Rabaul's imposing defenses.31

Interdicting rear and deep areas of the battle space is nothing new. It is not warfare's medium (air, sea or land) that makes the difference but the opposing forces' relative mobility and the operational tempo. The greater the mobility, the less consequential the locations of the opposing forces. Facilitating man-euver's mobility and tempo using firepower takes on meaning well beyond attrition alone.

Maneuver and firepower have rarely stood alone as decisive in and of themselves; they are inseparable and complementary. While one might dominate a particular phase of a campaign, the most beneficial effects derive from integrating operational-level maneuver and firepower relative to the enemy center of gravity. When maneuver and firepower are synergistically orchestrated to disrupt the supporting structure, unbalance command decisions and impose chaotic disorganization, disproportionate success is possible. Focusing on maneuver or firepower without the other misses the point altogether.32



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1.Admiral Sir John Woodward concerning the preparation and design of the Falklands campaign in 1982.

2.John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penquin Books, 1988), 247.

3.Strategic Studies Institute, The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1 February 1987), 37.

4.Charles O. Hammond, "Operational Fires and Unity of Command," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 30 April 1990), 1.

5.US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 31 May 1995), 5-9; Ralph G. Reece, Operational Fires (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, May 1989), 2-5.

6.Ibid.

7.FM 100-7, 5-16 and 5-21.

8.James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr and Don M. Snider, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Gulf War—Military Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 1991), 17.

9.Edward N. Luttwak, The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 92 and 167.

10.Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr. and Chief of Staff, US Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Decisive Victory_America's Power Projection Army, A White Paper, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 1994, 18.

11.Ibid., 93-108.

12.Operation Bluecoat was a British operation from Caumont, France, to get behind German forces trying to swing west to face the Americans. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Center of Military History [CMH], 1961), 289.

13.FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 7-11 and 7-12.

14.Ibid.

15.Ibid.

16.Gordon A. Harrison, US Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, DC: Office of the CMH, 1951), 137 and 193.

17.Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1951), 245 and 279; Harrison, 228-30.

18.Bradley, 255; Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 1983), 112 and 194.

19.D'Este, 194.

20.Martin Blumenson, US Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC: CMH, 1984), 207-40.

21.Ibid., 221-40 and 333; D'Este, 402.

22.Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Papermac, Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1986), 251-59; Micheal Calvert, Chindits—Long Range Penetration (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1973), 21.

23.Slim, 66-67 and 77; Calvert, 63; Frank Owen, Central Office of Information, The Campaign in Burma (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1946), 66-7.

24.Calvert, 81; Owen, 66-9.

25.O.P. Weyland, "Tactical Air Operations in Europe," Headquarters (Advanced) XIX Tactical Air Command, 19 May 1945, 14 and 48.

26.Bradley, 379; Blumenson, 567; D'Este, 412-13.

27.Weyland, 49.

28.Ibid.; Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 516; Army Air Force, Wings at War, No. 5, Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1945), 2.

29.Edward Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

30.Vincent Esposito, The West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volume II, 1900-1953 (New York, Washington and London: Praeger Publishers, 1959), 290-95.

31.Ibid.; R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 1161-62.

32.Luttwak, 108, 158-67.



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Colonel Lamar Tooke, US Army, Retired, is lead instructor, Virginia Community Policing Institute, Richmond, Virginia. He received an M.A. from Webster University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Vietnam and Germany. He served as a faculty member at the US Army War College and as director of Joint and Combined Theater Warfare within the corresponding studies program, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He has contributed several articles to Military Review on the subject of operational art.


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Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 8:19:07 AM)

Patton's Biography given in a Speech by Martin Blumenson - one of Patton's Foremost and Respected Biographers


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'The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense or the US Government.'"



USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #14

"The Many Faces of George S. Patton, Jr."

Martin Blumenson, 1971


Gen. and Mrs. Clark, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am doubly privileged this evening. It is a great privilege for me to be asked to give this 14th Annual Harmon Lecture, which honors the memory of a distinguished Air Force officer. It is a great privilege also to talk with you about Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., a distinguished Army officer. I hope that my association with the Naval War College will draw the Navy and the Marine Corps into our session here and make it a complete family affair.

I regard it as a distinct honor to have been asked to work in the Patton papers.1 I discovered there the development of a highly skilled professional and the growth of a very warm and engaging person. Quite apart from the professional concerns that George Patton documented, he left a record of a thoroughly likeable human being, a man of great charm. In addition to the pages of memoranda, speeches, instructions that he left, he wrote literally thousands of letters to his wife. They were always about himself- he was thoroughly self-centered- and they provide a marvelous account of his activities and thoughts. When he and his wife were separated, he wrote her almost every day, sometimes twice a day. The image of the man that emerges from these papers is quite different from the public image he projected. He was a devoted husband who in private was quiet and considerate and witty- yes, even funny. For example, he closed one letter to his wife with these words: "I cannot send you any kisses this evening because we had onions for dinner."

A military genius, a legend, an American folk hero, George S. Patton, Jr., captured the imagination of the world. Even now, twenty-six years after his death, he can be pictured clearly as the Army general who epitomized the fighting soldier in World War II.

He had many faces, many contrasting qualities. A noted horseman, a well-known swordsman, a competent sailor and navigator, an airplane pilot, a dedicated athlete and sportsman, he was also an amateur poet, and sixteen of his articles were published in magazines. Rough and tough, he was also thoughtful and sentimental. Unpredictable, he was at the same time dependable. He was outgoing, yet anguished. A complex and paradoxical figure, he was a man of many faces.

He is remembered best for the unique leadership he exercised. He had the ability to obtain the utmost from American troops, and some would say that he obtained more than the maximum response. Through his charisma, exemplified by a flamboyant and well-publicized image, he stimulated American troops to an aggressive desire to close with and destroy the enemy. He personified the offensive spirit, the ruthless drive, the will for victory in battle.

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized Patton's Third Army as "a fighting force that is not excelled . . by any other of equal size in the world." As the outstanding exponent of combat effectiveness, particularly with respect to the employment of armored forces, that is, the combined use of tanks, motorized infantry, and self-propelled artillery, closely supported by tactical aircraft, Patton brought the blitzkreig concept to perfection.

He is recalled mainly for his victories in World War II. He is honored for symbolizing the strength and will required to vanquish the evil of Hitler's Nazi Germany. If he was sometimes brutal in his methods, the brutality was accepted and condoned because it was that kind of war, a total war of annihilation. There was a remarkable cohesion during that war on the part of the American people, who were united to a degree rarely achieved in a nation. Emotionally involved in the struggle to eliminate totalitarianism and tyranny, Americans understood clearly the issues at stake and engaged, as Eisenhower so aptly put it, in a crusade for victory. The soldier who best represented the warlike virtues and the will to win was George Patton.

He was first and foremost a man of enormous ambition. He believed that he was fated or destined for greatness, and he worked hard to make that fate or destiny come true. As a matter of fact, he drove himself to make good, to be somebody important, to gain fame, to attain achievement, to merit recognition, to receive applause.

The initial entry he wrote in his notebook when he was a cadet at West Point read: "Do your damdest always." From time to time he added other admonitions to himself. Like this: “Always work like hell at all things and all times." In a moment of doubt he wrote: "No sacrifice is too great if by it you can attain an end. Let people talk and be damed. You do what leads to your ambition and when you get the power remember those who laughed."

How he longed for fame! "If you die not a soldier"-he meant warrior-"and having had a chance to be one I pray God to dam you George Patton. Never Never Never stop being ambitious. You have but one life. Live it to the full of glory and be willing to pay." At a time of particular anguish, he wrote: "George Patton . . . As God lives you must of your self merit and obtain such applause by your own efforts and remember that though at times of quiet this may not seem worth much, yet at the last it is the only thing and to obtain it life and happiness are small sacrifices you must do your damdest and win. Remember that is what you live for. Oh you must! You have got to do some thing! Never stop until you have gained the top or a grave."

These are terribly revealing statements. Yet he made no secret of his desire. He wrote to his father: "I know that my ambition is selfish and cold yet it is not a selfish selfishness for instead of sparing me, it makes me exert myself to the utter most to attain an end which will do neither me nor any one else any good . . . I will do my best to attain what I consider- wrongly perhaps- my destiny."

To his fiancee, he confided: "How can a man fail if he places every thing subordinate to success? ... I have got . . . to be great [and] it is in war alone that I am fitted to do any thing of importance."

To his parents shortly before his graduation from the Military Academy, he wrote: "I have got to, do you understand, got to be great. It is no foolish child dream. It is me as I ever will be . . . I would be willing to live in torture, die tomorrow if for one day I could be really great . . . I wake up at night in a cold sweat imagining that I have lived and done nothing. Perhaps I am crazy."

To his fiancee in the same tenor: "I may loose ambition and become a clerk and sit by a fire and be what the world calls happy but God forbid. I may be crazy but if with sanity comes contentment with the middle of life, may I never be sane."

With these sentiments tormenting and driving him, he exerted all his energy in the pursuit of excellence. He fought the temptation to relax, to be lazy. He was, as a matter of fact, extremely hard on himself.

The first Patton to arrive in the United States came from Scotland- although there is some mystery about him- and settled in Fredericksburg, Virginia, about the time of the American War for Independence. He married a daughter of Dr. Hugh Mercer, a friend of George Washington, and one of their sons became governor of Virginia. One of the governor's sons, George Smith Patton, the first to bear his name, was General Patton's grandfather. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, practiced law, fought in the Civil War as a colonel in command of a Confederate regiment, and died of battle wounds in 1864.

His widow went to California with her four children, and the oldest, also named George Smith Patton, the second to have this name, was the general's father. He too graduated from VMI, practiced law in California, and was a Democratic politician who ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate in 1916. A businessman, he was moderately wealthy when his son George was born, considerably so twenty-five years later. The source of his wealth was land that his wife had inherited.

Mrs. Patton, the general's mother, was a Wilson. Her father was Benjamin Davis Wilson, a remarkable man. Although General Patton believed that he resembled his Patton progenitors, he was much more like his maternal grandfather, a pioneer, trapper and Indian trader, adventurer and Indian fighter, and finally a respectable man of means. He was born in Tennessee and worked his way across the continent to southern California, where he married the daughter of a wealthy Mexican and through her gained vast landholdings. This Mrs. Wilson died, and Mr. Wilson remarried, this time an American, and she was General Patton's grandmother. One of her daughters married the second George S. Patton, and this union produced the future general.

The Patton side of the family looked upon themselves as aristocratic Virginians, and they liked to trace their heritage to George Washington. Patton always referred to him as Cousin George- and beyond that to a king of England and a king of France, even to sixteen barons who signed the Magna Charta. The Wilsons were far less romantic, far less pretentious. Practical people, they drew their eminence from B. D. Wilson's early arrival in Southern California. Wilson founded the orange industry, planted the first great vineyards, gave his name to Mt. Wilson where the observatory now stands, was elected twice to the state legislature, and was highly and widely respected.

George Patton's early years were spent in southern California, a sparsely settled region of ranches. His first love was horses, and it endured throughout his life. Many years later when Patton reminisced about his childhood, he wrote: "I remember very vividly playing at the mouth of Mission Cannon [canyon] and seeing Papa come up on a Chestnut mare . . . As he rode up on the Cannon . . . our nurse said, 'You ought to be proud to be the son of such a handsome western millionaire.' When I asked her what a millionaire was, she said- a farmer."

At the age of eleven, Patton entered a private school in nearby Pasadena. When he was 18, he went to the Virginia Military Institute, like his father and grandfather. He spent a year there and compiled a splendid record. He received no demerits.

He accepted an appointment to the Military Academy because graduation automatically gave him a Regular commission. He spent five years at West Point because he had to repeat his first year. The reason was peculiar. Officially, he was found, as they say, in mathematics. But it was his deficiency in French that generated his academic failure. It was his deficiency in French that required him to take an examination not only in French but also in math. What the connection was, I hardly understand. But apparently, if a student's work in class was acceptable, he was excused from final examinations. Although Patton's class work in mathematics gave him passing grades, his class work in French put him on the borderline. He passed the exam in French, but he failed the test in math. And so he was turned back.

He graduated in 1909, and in his class of 103 men, he stood number 46, about in the middle. He had been cadet corporal, sergeant major, and adjutant. He had won his letter in athletics by breaking a school record in the hurdles. He was on the football squad for four years, but he played so recklessly during practice scrimmages that he broke bones and twisted ankles, elbows, and shoulders. According to the yearbook, "Two broken arms bear witness to his zeal, as well as his misfortune on the football field." The only game he ever got into was against Franklin and Marshall. He was sent in as a substitute at the end of the contest, and the final whistle sounded before the teams could get off a single play.

Upon graduation, he became a Cavalry officer and soon afterward married a charming young lady from Massachusetts whose family was immensely wealthy.

In 1911, Patton was transferred from Fort Sheridan, near Chicago, to Fort Myer, Virginia, close to Washington, D.C. The benefits were enormous to an ambitious young man, and he came to know important and influential people in the Army and in politics. As he said, Washington was "nearer God than else where and the place where all people with aspirations should attempt to dwell."

He certainly had his aspirations. He studied and worked hard at his profession, and he also cultivated the right people in the nation's capital, people who could help him advance. His assignment to Fort Myer was the real beginning of his rise to fame.

While at Fort Myer, he started to participate strenuously- and he did everything exuberantly and enthusiastically- in horse shows, in horse racing, and in polo games. He explained this activity to his father-in-law as follows: "What I am doing looks like play to you but in my business it is the best sort of advertising."

The advertising paid off. He came to know Gen. Leonard Wood, the Army Chief of Staff, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and he managed to have himself selected to take part in the 1912

Olympics at Stockholm, the games that Jim Thorpe, the great Indian athlete, dominated. Patton competed in the modern pentathlon, five grueling competitions- pistol shooting, a 300-meter swim, fencing, a steeplechase, and a cross-country foot race. He finished in fifth place.

After the games, Patton traveled to Saumur, the famous French Cavalry school, and took lessons from the fencing instructor. When Patton returned to Fort Myer, he cultivated his own reputation as a swordsman, and he designed a saber that the Cavalry adopted. For a young second lieutenant, this was prominence indeed.

In the following year, Patton again traveled to Saumur and studied with the French champion, not only to improve his own fencing but also to learn how to become an instructor. Sent to the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, he took the Cavalry course and he gave instruction in the saber. His title was impressive, and he was the first in the U.S. Army to hold it: Master of the Sword. He was still only a second lieutenant.

His next assignment was Fort Bliss, Texas, and the post commander, it so happened, was Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing. Mexico was then in turmoil as the consequence of revolution, and Army troops were guarding the border to prevent depredations against American life and property.

In March 1916, when Pancho Villa and several hundred men raided Columbus, New Mexico, and killed seventeen Americans, Pershing was ordered to organize the Punitive Expedition and pursue Villa. Pershing took Patton along as an unofficial aide. Patton performed a variety of duties. He was in charge of the headquarters orderlies, he looked after the messengers, he censored newspaper correspondents' dispatches and soldiers' mail, he acted as liaison officer. But he was happy. He was where the action was.

Patton turned his service in Mexico to great advantage. In May 1916 he was one of fifteen men, and in command, traveling in three automobiles to buy corn from Mexican farmers. On a hunch, Patton led a raid on a ranch believed to belong to one of Pancho Villa's lieutenants. Three enemy soldiers were there, and when they tried to escape, Patton and his men engaged them in a lively skirmish and killed them. Patton's men strapped the bodies to the hoods of their cars, took them to headquarters for identification, and created a sensation. Villa had disappeared, there was little news about the

Punitive Expedition for the folks back home, and Patton's feat made him a national hero for about a week. Perhaps more important, his action was probably the first time the U.S. Army engaged in motorized warfare. Patton and his men had leaped directly from their machines into battle.

Although service in Mexico was monotonous, Patton observed Pershing closely and studied him assiduously. Learning how Pershing operated, how Pershing gave orders, trained his men, judged his subordinates, maintained troop morale, and carried out his command duties, Patton modeled himself on Pershing. Shortly before the Expedition returned to Texas, Patton wrote his wife as follows: "This is the last letter I shall write you from Mexico. I have learned a lot about my profession and a lot how much I love you. The first was necessary, the second was not."

When Pershing assumed command of the American Expeditionary Force and went to France, he took Patton again. Once again Patton had no well-defined job. He was in charge of the automobiles and drivers at the headquarters, he did all sorts of odd and incidental work, like having American flags painted on the staff cars, and so on.

But he was obviously a combat soldier, and Pershing offered him command of an infantry battalion. Before orders could be cut, Patton became interested in tanks. They were then unwieldy, unreliable, and unproved instruments of warfare, and there was much doubt whether they had any function and value at all on the battlefield. Against the advice of most of his friends, and after much inner anguish and debate, Patton chose to go into the newly formed U.S. Tank Corps. He was the first officer so assigned. As Patton undertook his task, he explained to his wife: "The job I have tentatively possessed my self of is huge for everything must be created and there is nothing to start with, nothing but me that is. Sometimes I wonder if I can do all there is to do but I suppose I can. I always have so far."

Mastering quickly the techniques of how to run and maintain tanks and how to use them in battle, he became the AEF's tank expert. He formed a tank school, taught and trained his tankers, and led them in combat. In the battle of St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, where he was wounded, he proved his high competence for command. He demonstrated the same qualities that would distinguish his performance in World War II. His troops were eager to move against the enemy, and they fought like veterans.

How he was wounded is an odd story. It occurred on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He was a colonel in command of the 1st Tank Brigade- two battalions of American tanks and an attached French groupement- about 250 tanks in all. The barrage opened at 2:50 AM and at 5:30, three hours later, the assault wave moved forward into a heavy fog that hung over the battlefield. As long as the ground was obscured, the tanks advanced with little difficulty. But around 10 o'clock, the mist lifted, the German fire became intense and accurate. Some American infantrymen became confused, panicky, and disorganized.

Patton had said he would stay in his command post at least an hour after the attack started. But he was impatient. He could hear the tanks, the artillery, the machine guns, and he could see little. So he started walking forward with a small party of two officers and twelve messengers carrying phones, wire, and pigeons in baskets. After walking a mile or two, the group stopped and took a break. But after several minutes, a few shells fell in and some machine gun bullets came close. Patton moved his group to the protection of a railroad cut. Some infantrymen came through, and they said they had lost their units and commanders in the fog. Patton ordered them to join him. He soon had about 100 men, and the railroad cut became crowded. So he led them back to the reverse slope of a small hill and instructed everyone to spread out and lie down. Machine gun fire then swept the crest of the hill.

Down at the base of the slope, Patton noticed several tanks. They were held up by two enormous trenches formerly held by the Germans. Some tankers had started to dig away the banks, but when the German fire came in, the tankers stopped digging and took shelter in the trenches. Patton sent several of his men down to get the tankers across the trenches and up the hill and at the Germans. But the incoming fires were too intense. He finally went down the hill himself. He immediately got the men out of the trenches and organized a coordinated effort to get the tanks across. He walked to the tanks, which were being splattered by machine gun fire, removed the shovels and picks strapped to the sides, handed men the tools, and got them working to tear down the sides of the trenches.

Meanwhile, bullets and shells continued to fall in. Some men were hit. Patton stood on the parapet in an exposed position directing the work. When he was asked to take cover, he shouted, "To hell with them-they can't hit me." He got the tanks across and sent them on their way.

Collecting his hundred men, he led them up the slope. He waved his large walking stick over his head and yelled, "Let's get them, who's with me?" Most of the men enthusiastically followed Patton. They were no more than 75 yards over the hill when a terrific and sustained burst of machine gun fire washed across the slope. Everyone flung himself to the ground.

It was probably at this moment that Patton had his vision. Nine years later he wrote, "I felt a great desire to run. I was trembling with fear when suddenly I thought of my progenitors and seemed to see them in a cloud over the German lines looking at me. I became calm at once and saying aloud, 'It is time for another Patton to die' called for volunteers and went forward to what I honestly believed to be certain death."

When the firing abated, Patton picked himself up. Waving his stick and shouting, "Let's go," he marched forward. This time only six men accompanied him. One was his orderly, Joe Angelo, from Camden, New Jersey, a skinny kid who weighed 105 pounds. As this miniature charge of the light brigade walked toward the enemy machine gun nests, Angelo noticed that the men were dropping one by one as they were hit. Finally just he and Patton were left.

"We are alone," Angelo said.

"Come on anyway," Patton said.

Why? He was armed with his walking stick and a pistol in his holster. Angelo carried a rifle. In that hail of bullets, they resembled Don Quixote and his faithful servant Sancho Panza.

Did Patton think that he and Angelo led charmed lives? They had come through at the trenches where the tanks were dug out. Was Patton unwilling to admit defeat, lose face with the men who were crawling back across the top of the hill? Was he trying to inspire them?

Was he seeking to be hit? Was he inviting the glory of death or injury on the field of battle? Was he fulfilling his destiny?

Or was it battlefield madness, that taut anger, that barely controlled rage, that overwhelming hatred that makes a man tremble with the desire to hurt those who are trying to kill him?

"Come on anyway," he said.

No more than a few seconds passed when a bullet struck and passed through his upper leg. He took a few steps, struggled to keep his balance, kept going on nerve, then fell.

Angelo helped him into a shellhole where they remained until the fires subsided. Then Patton was carried out and evacuated to a hospital.

Perhaps what he wrote to his father a month later explained why he had continued toward the German machine guns. 'An officer is paid to attack, not to direct, after the battle starts. You know I have always feared I was a coward at heart but I am beginning to doubt it. Our education is at fault in picturing death as such a terrible thing. It is nothing and very easy to get. That does not mean that I hunt for it but the fear of it does not- at least has not deterred me from doing what appeared [to be] my duty."

Patton returned to the United States with the tanks, but not long afterwards went back to the Cavalry. The reasons are interesting. The National Defense Act of 1920 placed the Tank Corps under the Infantry. Patton had argued for an independent Tank Corps. But if, in the interest of economy, the tanks had to go under one of the traditional arms, he preferred the Cavalry. For Patton intuitively understood that tanks operating with Cavalry would stress mobility, while tanks tied to the Infantry would emphasize firepower. Tanks in peacetime, he feared, as he said, "would be very much like coast artillery with a lot of machinery which never works."

Furthermore, he believed that funds made available by the Congress to the Army during years of peace would be insufficient to develop tanks and tank doctrine.

Beyond that were personal reasons. Loss of independent tank status negated Patton's standing as one of the few high-ranking and experienced officers in the corps and his hope for early promotion into general officer rank. He knew relatively few infantrymen who could help him advance in his career, whereas he was at home in the Cavalry. Furthermore, Pershing was soon to be Army Chief of Staff; not only was Pershing a friend of Patton, he was also a cavalryman and interested in seeing that Cavalry officers got ahead. In addition, since Cavalry officers were expected to be prominent horsemen, Patton would have lots of opportunity to play polo, hunt, and participate in horse shows. He and Mrs. Patton liked Washington, D.C., and Fort Myer was a Cavalry post.

Perhaps above all, the tanks were unreliable machines that required roads and gasoline and oil, tanks demanded careful planning for operational employment and logistical support. They were used in mass, as in France. Horses, on the other hand, were mobile, could go anywhere, were dependable and could live off the country. Patton expected the next war to take place in a primitive area of the world, a place without road nets and raillines, like Mexico, where a man on horseback was an individual, relatively free, able to charge the foe recklessly while waving his saber. Perhaps ultimately it was this romantic view of warfare that impelled him to return to the horses.

As it turned out, the tanks were absorbed into the Infantry and came to be regarded as accompanying guns. They lost the mobility that Patton had given them in France, and the development of armored doctrine stagnated in the United States until soldiers everywhere were astonished and shocked in 1939 by the German blitzkreig. By then, Patton was identified with the horse cavalry. Although he retained his interest in tanks and followed tank developments closely during the interwar years, he became associated with the conservative cavalrymen who advocated continued reliance on the horse and who fought mechanization and motorization. As a consequence, Patton almost missed the opportunity to participate meaningfully in World War II.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Patton served in a variety of places and completed his military education. Although his academic record at West Point was unimpressive, he was an honor graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and a distinguished graduate of the Army War College. One could say that intellectually or academically he matured rather late.

His apparently aimless assignments during the interwar years came to an end in 1940, when he was suddenly transferred to the tanks. How this came about is interesting and revealing. He was tied to the horse cavalry, but the Chief of Cavalry, for whom he worked during four years, rated him as a versatile soldier. Patton's boss wrote of him: "While he is an outstanding horseman he is also outstanding as an authority in mechanization due to his . . . experience in France with the Tank Corps and to his continued interest in the study of the subject." So he was qualified for horses and tanks both.

In 1939, Patton was a colonel and in command of Fort Myer. The functions of the post were mainly ceremonial. Every spring there was a series of drill exhibitions featuring precision horsemanship by the troops, and these attracted congressmen and other notables in the capital and thus made friends and influenced important people in favor of the Army. Fort Myer furnished escorts for funerals and occasions of state. And of course Patton, who insisted on perfection in dress and behavior, was well suited to run this kind of show. But the U.S. Army, after years of stagnation, the result of shortages of funds, was beginning to stir and to expand in size as the clouds of World War II gathered, and Patton looked longingly toward new combat units being formed and trained. No one seemed to notice him. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th Mechanized Brigade were both experimental combat units, commanded by old friends of his, Kenyon Joyce and Adna Chaffee, and Patton would have loved to go to either. I think it would have made little difference to him whether he went to the horses or to the machines. But he remained at Fort Myer.

In the spring of 1939, the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen.George C. Marshall, was about to move into Quarters 1 at Fort Myer. Work needed to be done on the house, and Patton invited Marshall to stay with him for a few days. The other members of the Patton family were away, and Patton wrote Marshall: "I can give you a room and bath and meals, and . . . I shall not treat you as a guest and shall not cramp your style in any way." Marshall accepted. Patton was excited. He wrote to his wife: "I have just consummated a pretty snappy move. General George C. Marshall is going to live at our house!!! . . . I think that once I can get my natural charm working [on him] I won't need any letters from John J. P. [Pershing] or anyone else. . . . You had better send me a check for 5,000 dollars." A day or so later he wrote to his wife that General Marshall was "just like an old shoe." Patton entertained him, flattered him, took him sailing, and Marshall paid no attention. They became good friends, but Marshall remained calm, cool, and distant.

On September first, the day World War II opened in Europe, Marshall became Chief of Staff and a four star general. Patton presented him with a set of sterling silver stars. Still nothing happened to Patton even though other officers were being moved into combat training jobs and promoted.

Marshall ignored Patton even as he searched for young and vigorous officers to fill vacancies in the expanding Army. Was Patton too old at 54? Was he too wedded to the horse cavalry? Was Marshall testing Patton's patience? Did the White House and Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt think that Patton's political connections through his wife with Republicans from Massachusetts were too close? Was Patton too flamboyant, too outspoken? Whatever the reason, Patton stayed at Fort Myer.

Finally, in the spring of 1940, several things happened. Maneuvers in Georgia and Louisiana, where Patton was an umpire, showed how far Chaffee had brought the development of American armored doctrine. With the lessons of the 1939 blitzkrieg in Poland at hand, together with the lessons of the maneuvers, Patton began to look definitely toward the ranks.

Late in June when Patton learned that his friend Chaffee was about to become chief of a newly formed Armored Force, he wrote him a letter. This letter has been lost, but Patton probably congratulated Chaffee, may have mentioned an observation from the maneuvers, and certainly invited Chaffee to stay with the Pattons whenever he was in Washington. He may have made a joking remark that he wished he were helping Chaffee, but he would not have asked directly for anything. What Patton was doing in his letter was reminding Chaffee of Patton's interest in tanks and his interest in a new and exciting challenge.

Chaffee's reply was more than Patton could have expected. Chaffee put Patton's name on the list of colonels Chaffee thought were suitable for promotion to brigadier general and for command of an armored brigade. A few days later President Roosevelt appointed Henry L. Stimson Secretary of War. Stimson was an old friend of Patton's, and Patton sent him an immediate letter of congratulations. Stimson probably wondered why a proved fire-eater like George Patton was being kept at Fort Myer and he may have mentioned this to General Marshall. The Army, now expanding rapidly after the fall of France, needed officers like Patton.

Patton was on leave in Massachusetts in July, when he read in the morning newspaper that he had been assigned to Fort Benning and the 2d Armored Division. The division commander, Charles Scott, was an old friend. Chaffee had placed Patton on the preferred list, but Scott had the vacancy and had asked for Patton. Patton's immediate reaction to the news was to write several letters of thanks. To Scott he promised he would do his "uttermost to give satisfaction." To Chaffee he promised to do his "damndest to justify your expectations." To Marshall, who had obviously approved the assignment, he sent his gratitude. Soon after arriving at Benning, Patton also wrote to Pershing. "I am quite sure that you had a lot to do with my getting this wonderful detail. Truly I appreciate it a lot and will try to be worthy of having served under you." He was on his way to fame.

He took command of an armored brigade and soon regained his position as the U.S. Army's leading tanker. He moved up to command the 2d Armored Division, then the I Armored Corps, and went into combat at the head of the Western Task Force, which sailed from the Norfolk area and landed in November 1942 on the shores of French Morocco, one of three simultaneous landings in North Africa known as Operation TORCH.

In the spring of 1943, after the disastrous American defeat at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia, Eisenhower dispatched Patton to the battlefield to take command of the II Corps. He straightened out the disorganized American units, led them to victory at El Guettar, then turned over the corps to his deputy, Omar N. Bradley. While the Tunisian campaign was in its final stages, Patton planned the invasion of Sicily. He led the Seventh Army in that invasion, and although he was supposed to have only a secondary role in the subsequent campaigning, he reached Messina ahead of Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery and thereby stole the glory.

But Sicily almost brought his career to a close, for impulsively, on two separate occasions, he slapped American soldiers in hospitals. They were in the dazed condition that was known in World War I as shell shock, in World War II as combat exhaustion. What Patton tried to do was sparked by his enormous compassion for his combat troops. He suffered deeply their wounds and injuries, he anguished over their deaths. And here were men who were letting down their magnificent buddies who were giving their utmost for their country. What Patton tried to do by the slapping and the cursing was to shake them into normality, to scare away their fright and nervousness, to get them back to their jobs. His action backfired. The incidents came to Eisenhower's attention, and he ordered Patton to apologize, not only to the soldiers he had slapped and those who had witnessed the scenes, but also to all the American troops in Sicily. Patton did so at great personal torment.

A letter he wrote in 1910, to his then future wife, curiously foreshadowed the slapping incidents. Patton was a young officer, a year out of West Point, stationed at Fort Sheridan, and he was supervising activities in the post stable. He wrote:

This afternoon I found a horse not tied and after looking up the man at the other end of the stable I cussed him and then told him to run down and tie the horse and then run back. This makes the other men laugh at him and so is an excellent punishment. The man did not understand me or thought he would dead beat so he started to walk fast. I got mad and yelled "Run dam you Run." He did but then I got to thinking that it was an insult I had put on him so I called him up before the men who had heard me swear and begged his pardon. It sounds easy to write about but was one of the hardest things I ever did.


It was no less difficult to apologize in Sicily thirty-three years later.

In the spring of 1944, Patton went to England and took command of the Third Army, scheduled to be follow-up after the D-Day invasion. The army became operational almost two months after the Normandy landings. It immediately broke into the open, swept through Brittany, drove Eastward across France, and destroyed the German defenses. Shortages of supply brought the breakout and pursuit to a halt, and a period of difficult fighting took place during the autumn. In December, when the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive, Patton made a spectacular march to relieve the paratroopers holding at Bastogne. In the spring, Patton's army drove into Germany, across the Rhine, and into Austria. At the end of the war, his forces were in Czechoslovakia. Throughout, Patton had given a magnificent performance.

Old Blood and Guts he was called, but with affection. In the thousands, Americans still say with considerable pride, "I rolled with Patton." He had an impact on his time and place that few men have exerted. He has been compared with Stonewall Jackson and with Prince Murat who commanded Napoleon's cavalry. But he was unique.

Patton died in a freak automobile accident in December 1945, at the age of 60. He was probably ready to go. He had achieved his fate, his destiny. He was famous, a hero. He had earned the recognition and applause he had sought.

During his lifetime Patton displayed many appearances, many faces, and it is sometimes difficult to know who the real person was. The best-known image is, of course, his war mask. His toughness, his profanity, his bluster and braggadocio were appurtenances he assumed in order to inspire his soldiers and, incidentally, himself. He cultivated the ferocious face because he believed that only he-men, as he often said, stimulated men to fight. Like Indian war paint, the hideous masks of primitive people, the rebel yell, the shout of paratroopers leaping from their planes, the fierce countenance helped men in battle disguise and overcome their fear of death.

Social psychologists call these reinforcing factors. They are sounds, sights, and other stimuli that start the adrenaline flowing, that spur men to action, that make them act against one of their deepest intuitive drives, the urge for self-preservation. The battlefield is an eerie place, and the emotion most prevalent is fear, the fear of disfigurement, disability, and death. One of the ways to make men act despite their fear is to cultivate the reinforcing factors that will lead them to disregard their fears.

This is what Patton did so well, and this is what the ivory-handled pistols, the oversized stars of rank, the tough, blunt, profane talk, the scowling face, the vulgar posturing were supposed to produce.

They gave his men the warrior psychology, the will to meet the enemy, the confident feeling they could defeat their opponents.

Patton dressed and looked the part. A showman and an actor, he insisted that his troops do the same. "A coward dressed as a brave man," he once wrote, "will change from cowardice" and take on the courageous qualities of the hero. He believed that the appearance would prompt the reality. And so he sought to project the appearance of the warrior in himself and to stimulate the same in his men, which, he was sure, would create the kind of behavior necessary on the battlefield. It was this aspect of his personality that the recent movie on Patton presented so well, his warrior personality, an exaggeration and a caricature of the real man.

The war trappings, the highly visible qualities that Patton put on to inspire his men in combat, covered a thoroughly professional soldier. This was another facet of his personality, another mask. Beneath the beautifully turned out figure, impeccably dressed and bemedaled- the troops in North Africa called him Gorgeous Georgie- beneath the glitter was a cold and calculating commander who had the necessary knowledge, the professional know-how to be successful at his craft.

Apart from the psychology involved in leading men, the military profession requires an immense technical competence, a knowledge of weapons and equipment, of tactics and operations, of maneuver and logistics. Hardly appreciated is the amount of time and energy that George Patton expended throughout his career to learn the intricacies of his profession. He read enormously, voraciously, in the literature of warfare and history. Not only was he conversant with the field and technical manuals of his times; he was also familiar with the pages of history.

He studied the past to discover the great historical continuities. If history is a record of events, each unique and each understandable in terms of its context, that is, its time, place, conditions, and circumstances, history is also a record of continuities, great movements that can be identified as trends, patterns, clusters, forces, and the like. It is the recognition of these long-range continuities based on habit, tradition, custom, and the nature of man that provides a glimmer of understanding the past. What fascinated Patton in his search for the common elements of man's behavior in history were the meaning and importance of generalship, the factors that produced victory or defeat in battle, the relationships of tactics and supply, maneuver and shock, weapons and will power.

He discoursed easily on such matters as scale, chain, and plate armor, German mercenaries in the Italian wars, Polish and Turkish horsemen, Arabian and Oriental military techniques, the Peninsular War, and Marshal Saxe. He was familiar with the phalanx of Greece, the legions of Rome, the columns of Napoleon, and the mass armies of World War I. He could compare the heavy cavalry of Belisarius with the modern tank, and he discovered insights into the operations of Belisarius during the sixth century that he applied to the developing doctrine of how to use tanks.

Patton was hardly an intellectual, and he would not have wished to be so regarded. He was thoughtful and contemplative, but, unlike most intellectuals, he believed that the ultimate virtue in warfare was action. Yet he often lectured his officers on the benefits of reading history. And according to his medical records, he reported on sick call more than once for treatment of conjunctivitis, an infection and inflammation of the eyes, because he had read many nights until one o'clock in the morning.

This was not casual reading, but intense study. He made copius notes, and in one instance, during the 1930s, when he read a book by Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, the acknowledged father of tank doctrine, Patton's written reactions covered seven pages of single-spaced typescript.

Patton's knowledge of and interest in history, and particularly military history, was another of his many faces, the virtue of a man of reflection who translated his knowledge into action.

Reading was hardly the only way in which Patton gained his military expertise. Training was extremely important to him. Training made men accustomed to obeying orders automatically. Training enabled the offensive team to get the jump on the adversaries. Training taught men to perform their tasks automatically. Only when soldiers were so proficient in their duties could they function under battlefield conditions.

Just as important, training by means of unit maneuvers and exercises was a method to test and experiment with doctrine. While training exercises could demonstrate and prove the soundness of doctrine, they could also be used as an opportunity to improve doctrine or methodology. When Patton commanded the tank training center in France and was preparing his troops for combat, he held a multitude of exercises and sham battles designed to test the then still rudimentary tank tactics; he also experimented with new techniques. For example, should infantry precede or follow tanks in the attack and at what distance? In Hawaii, where Patton served as a staff officer, he devised exercises to determine how troops on the march could best combat low-flying planes in the attack.

Throughout his adult life, during his thirty-five years of active duty, Patton's efficiency reports noted with remarkable consistency his enthusiastic study of and devotion to his profession. In the 1920s and 1930s, when military budgets were low and military forces small, many regular officers became discouraged. Some left, others turned to drink or gambling, many simply went through the motions of training their men. In contrast, Patton was taking his soldiering seriously. In addition to his reading and his polo playing, he invented a machine gun sled to give riflemen in the assault more direct fire support. He devised a new saddle pack to increase the range and striking power of Cavalry. He worked closely with J. Walter Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and weapons of tanks. He designed a second and better saber for the Cavalry. He drew a plan to restructure the infantry division into triangular form in order to get more maneuver and firepower out of fewer men, and he thereby anticipated the World War II type formed by Gen. Lesley McNair. Patton continually sought ways to further mobility in operations. He became an expert in amphibious landings. So that he could better understand the developing maturity of air power, he earned his pilot's license. He worked on the idea of employing the light plane for communication and liaison. All this he did before Pearl Harbor.

This dedicated attention to his profession paid off in World War II. For example, little remembered is the fact that Patton was the leading American amphibious expert in the European theater. His landings in Morocco were executed by an all-American force, the two other simultaneous invasions being conducted by Anglo-American forces. The rudimentary amphibious techniques of Operation TORCH, the first large-scale Anglo-American landings in the European theater, were immeasurably improved by the time of the next, the invasion of Sicily. This was probably the most important amphibious venture in the European arena, for it employed new communications and command methods to tie together the Army, Navy, and Air Force components, it made use of new equipment- landing craft, landing ships, the amphibious truck called the DUKW- it featured new methods of beach organization and supply, new ways of spotting targets for naval gunfire and close air support.

The invasion of Sicily was, in fact, the prototype of the subsequent invasions of southern Italy, Anzio, Normandy, and southern France. These operations made it possible to project Allied power across the water in order to bring ground and air strength directly against the enemy. Although Patton played no part in the invasions after Sicily, he set the pattern and he was consulted on all of them, officially and unofficially. Gen. John P. Lucas, the commander at Anzio, a close friend since their service with Pershing in Mexico, sought Patton out before the landings and asked his advice. Patton counseled driving inland as soon as Lucas got ashore. Lucas was unable to follow this guidance and dug in to protect his beachhead instead of driving for the Alban Hills, and his decision to do so was no small factor in his relief a month later.

Although the amphibious aspect of Patton's career, this face of his, has generally been overlooked, there is no question of his proficiency as a planner and leader of amphibious assaults. As a matter of fact, it was his willingness, his insistence, to conduct amphibious end runs in Sicily that enabled him to beat General Montgomery into Messina.

Still another example of his professional expertise was Patton's use of close support aircraft. The XIX Tactical Air Command supported Patton's Third Army throughout the European campaign, and Patton fostered the closest cooperation between both organizations. He made sure that his ground headquarters and the air headquarters were physically located close to each other. He encouraged the two staffs to work together, to eat together. He constantly applauded the efforts of the airmen and continually directed the attention of the newspaper correspondents to the importance of the air support. He fostered a close-knit feeling of mutual admiration and cooperation that was beneficial to both organizations.

During the spectacular dash of his Third Army eastward across France in August 1944, the Loire River marked the Army's right flank. Patton's ground forces were striking toward the Paris-Orleans gap, for Patton was convinced that a speedy advance would prevent the disintegrating German forces from reorganizing their defenses in France. He therefore had no desire to divert major units to protect his flank. Yet protecting the flank was essential because about 100,000 German troops were moving out of southwest France. This rather sizable group of men was trying to escape to Germany before being blocked by the projected meeting of the OVERLORD forces advancing eastward from Normandy and of the ANVIL-DRAGOON forces marching north up the Rhone valley from southern France. As the German group marched generally to the northeast, they threatened Patton's flank and supply lines.

In order to keep his Army driving, Patton turned to Gen. O. P. Weyland, who commanded the XIX TAC. He asked Weyland to patrol his right flank along the Loire River valley. Weyland obliged. He gave 24-hour coverage, using a squadron of night fighters to augment the daylight operations of his fighter-bombers. It is true that the pilots of the small artillery observation planes of a single division also flew reconnaissance, that small roving ground patrols kept the region under surveillance, and that the French Forces of the Interior added to the security. But the high-powered aircraft comprised the major instrument of flank protection.

Patton was confident that his unorthodox solution would work. The corps commander directly concerned with the Loire River boundary and the threat to the flank was less certain. When he asked Patton how much he should worry, Patton replied that it depended on how naturally nervous he was. The point is that Patton gambled and won. But only a technically proficient expert would have had the nerve and the daring to execute the concept. As for the 100,000 German troops, Patton had cut their escape route, and they marched to the Loire River and surrendered en masse.

Patton liked to give the impression that he was impulsive and offhand in his decisions. He liked to pretend that he acted instinctively. It is true that he had a sixth sense about where the enemy was and what he was up to, and his marvelous perception enabled him to deploy his forces with confident audacity. Yet underneath the sharp and boldly announced course of action was an appreciation of the solid staff work that underlay the execution and left little to chance, staff work by men he had handpicked.

His enormous technical capacity to handle large forces rested on staff work. Probably the best example of his sure hold on planning occurred in December 1944, when the German Ardennes counteroffensive drove a bulge into the First Army line. In 48 hours, Patton turned his Third Army 90 degrees to the left and started a drive that linked up with the embattled defenders of Bastogne and threatened the flank of the German bulge. The German attack was as good as contained.

According to Charles B. McDonald, distinguished Army historian, Patton's "spectacular moves in this case . . . would make Stonewall Jackson's maneuvers in the Valley campaign in Virginia, or Galheni's shift of troops in taxicabs to save Paris from the Kaiser, pale by comparison. 2

It is a well deserved tribute, but it is hardly surprising about a man who had consistently driven himself to conquer the most arduous and care-laden intricacies of maneuver.

All his campaigns indicated how professional he was. For several weeks in August 1944, he had one corps, about 60,000 men, going westward into Brittany, while three corps were moving in the opposite direction, with the heads of his columns getting farther and farther apart until almost 400 miles separated them. It took a genius to control these stampeding horses. It took a genius to suggest switching the axis of one of his corps, as he did, to start the Allied encirclement that resulted in forming the Argentan-Falaise pocket, where two German field armies were trapped. It was his solid professional skills and experience that made it possible for him to achieve the sensational success that was his.

He had no illusions about warfare. "Ever since man banded together with the laudable intention of killing his fellows," he wrote with grim humor, "war has been a dirty business." Contrary to popular belief, I suspect that Patton abhorred the chaos and disorder and destruction on the battlefield. His nature was fundamentally- and paradoxically- contemplative. He loved the individual pursuits- fishing, swimming, riding, boating, reading-and he had to push himself, to put on his war mask in order to participate in team sports- football and polo- as in war. What motivated him to the military life was the opportunity for glory, for greatness, for achievement, for fame, for applause. He believed himself unfit for any other profession.

The following statement is starkly revealing. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "war means fighting and fighting means killing." Since he was widely and well read in history, he had no hope that man would ever build a world of permanent and perpetual peace. Man's history was a record of conflict and strife, and Patton believed that the struggle and war would continue.

Extremely pragmatic, he viewed man himself, his virtue and courage, as the ultimate weapon in war. ''New weapons are useful,'' he once wrote, ''in that they add to the repertoire of killing, but, be they tank or tomahawk, weapons are only weapons after all. Wars are fought with weapons, but they are won by men."

In a lecture to his officers in 1919, he said: "We, as officers . . . are not only members of the oldest of honorable professions"- he was making a distinction- "but are also the modern representatives of the demi-gods and heroes of antiquity.

"Back of us stretches a line of men whose acts of valor, of self-sacrifice and of service have been the theme of song and story since long before recorded history began…

"In the days of chivalry- the golden age of our profession- knights- officers were noted as well for courtesy and gentleness of behavior, as for death-defying courage. . . . From their acts of courtesy and benevolence was derived the word, now pronounced as one, Gentle Man. . . . Let us be gentle. That is, courteous and considerate of the rights of others. Let us be men. That is, fearless and untiring in doing our duty as we see it.

"… our calling is most ancient and like all other old things it has amassed through the ages certain customs and traditions which decorate and ennoble it, which render beautiful the otherwise prosaic occupation of being professional men-at-arms: Killers."

Ten years earlier, in 1909, Patton had written into his cadet notebook:

"Do not regard what you do as only a preparation for doing the same thing more fully or better at some later time. Nothing is ever done twice. . There is no next time. This is of special application to war. There is but one time to win a battle or a campaign. It must be won the first time. .

"I believe that in order for a man to become a great soldier . . . it is necessary for him to be so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that when ever an occasion arises he has at hand with out effort on his part a parallel.

"To attain this end I think that it is necessary for a man to begin to read military history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject until he can grasp with out effort the most abstruce question of the science of war because he is already permeated with all its elements."

In his own life, he sought perfection whatever the task. He was never satisfied with his performance. He was always apprehensive that he would be found wanting, not quite up to the standards he demanded of himself. He always feared that he lacked the qualities to reach the goal he dreamed of gaining.

A few days after his death, the Right Reverend W. Bertrand Stevens conducted a memorial service in the Church of Our Saviour at San Gabriel, California, Patton's birthplace. He summed up the general in these words: "General Patton's life had a fullness and richness that is denied to most of us. It was not merely the variety of things he did in his lifetime (which stagger the imagination) but in the fact that he seemed to have fulfilled his destiny."

His destiny to him was always clear, and he worked hard for what he wanted. He applied his talents and aptitudes to the job to the best of his ability, even better if that is possible. He served loyally and without complaint. He was exceptionally honest and clearheaded. He tried to be fair to all. He loved beauty in all its manifestations.

In the end, what made it possible for George S. Patton, Jr., to achieve what he wished so ardently was not only his driving will power; it was also his great good fortune that his lifetime required the kind of military leadership he embodied. In this he was lucky too. Yet it was not entirely a matter of luck. When opportunity knocked, he was ready to open the door.

A man of many faces, many aspects, many qualities, George Patton was essentially a warrior. A man of action, he was also a man of culture, knowledge, and wit. A man of erudition, he found his highest calling in execution. A throwback to the Teutonic knight, the Saracen, the Crusader, he was one of America's greatest soldiers, one of the world's great captains. We were lucky to have him on our side.


1. Unless otherwise noted the quotations in this paper are from Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). The best single source for the campaigns in Europe during World War II is Charles B. MacDonald's The Mighty Endeavor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). Valuable additional sources are: George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947); Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Oblensky, 1963); and Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950).

2. The Mighty Endeavor (New York, 1969), p. 382.


Presently Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, Professor Martin Blumenson has taught at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Hofstra College, and Acadia University. From 1957 to 1967, he was Senior Historian in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. He is the author of eight books, of which the best known are: Breakout and Pursuit (1963), Anzio-The Gamble that Failed (1963), Kasserine Pass (1967), Salerno to Cassio (1969), and The Patton Papers, 1885-1940, Vol. I. (1972).




'The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense or the US Government.'"




Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 9:51:01 AM)

Ironduke:

quote:

However, if the Blitzkrieg is used to describe what the Germans did, then Patton is only halfway there. The German breakthrough battle had several distinct phases, but of the main and key crucial phases, he would not have had the skills to manage them all. If we hone the Blitzkrieg down to just two phases, Breakthrough and exploitation, then whilst Patton has some aptitude for the exploitation phase (albeit preferably under rein from above, as his attacks could spray a little, and firm direction would have been necessary) I don't see too much evidence he had the necessary operational skills to break down the door.

I think the Bulge drive and Metz etc really show that fixed defences presented him with problems he did not seek to overcome like a true Blitzkrieg exponent. In Cobra, the breakthrough phase of the battle was conducted by First Army, so he had no problems. There was no breakthrough phase in Sicily. Both places though, do provide evidence of some aptitude in the exploitation phase of the battle. I also think his general manner and conduct about the Battlefield (visiting and cajoling forward units, constantly on the move) indicate he could have driven men deep in this phase, provided someone got him through the first stage of the battle, opening a hole in the enemy line.



These statements indicate that you fail to understand what Blitzkrieg is.

What is worse, you have simply failed to understand Patton's and Third Army's actions in Europe in WW2, and have failed to grasp Patton's fundamental understanding of the use of Combined arms.

I have posted many articles in this thread (see above) detailing Patton's mastery of Combined Arms, about which you have said he only partially mastered.

Blitzkrieg - means "Lightning War"

During the 1920s, British military philosophers Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, General J.F.C. Fuller and General Martell further developed tactics of mobile warfare. They all postulated that tanks could not only seize ground by brute strength, but could also be the central factor in a new strategy of warfare. If moved rapidly enough, concentrations of tanks could smash through enemy lines and into the enemy's rear, destroying supplies and artillery positions and decreasing the enemy's will to resist. All of them found tank to be an ultimate weapon able to penetrate deep into enemy territory while followed by infantry and supported by artillery and airforce. In late 1920s and early 1930s, Charles De Gaulle, Hans von Seekt, Heinz Guderian and many others became interested in the concept of mobile warfare and tried to implement it in an organizational structure of their armies. Heinz Guderian organized Panzers into self-contained Panzer Divisions working with the close support of infantry, motorized infantry, artillery and airforce. From 1933 to 1939, Germany was on a quest to fully mechanize their army for an upcoming conflict.

You maintain that there needs to be static defenses. This line of reasoning does not follow what Blitzkrieg is.

BlitzKrieg is moving fast, exploiting your enemy's weakness and penetrating to his rear to disrupt his supply, communications, etc.

In Sicily, Patton seized the initiative, drove to Palermo, then struck east, used amphibious landings to bypass Axis defences in mountainous terrain, and captured Messina (behind the enemy).

In France, Patton and Third Army struck out across France and, with Third Army's Tactical Air Command protecting his flanks, got in behind the German forces, and helped to close the Falaise Pocket, bagging 100,000 German troops.

At the Bulge, the 4th Armoured Division, protected by the XIX Tactical Air Command, and after being in continuous action for 5 months, turned 90 degress, spearheaded the drive north in severe winter weather, travelling 150 miles in 48 hours, then, without rest, fought a determined and experienced foe in the form of the 352nd VGD, the 5th Parachute Division, and several other units, which included armour and Tank Destroyers, and then after being in combat for three days, finally broke through German defences and opened a route to relieve the 101st Airborne at Bastogne.

Patton didn't practice Blitzkrieg?

It seems you are the only person who would believe something so fundamentally wrong and at variance with the obvious evidence and published articles. . .




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