RE: Why was Patton so great? (Full Version)

All Forums >> [General] >> General Discussion



Message

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 10:06:58 AM)

Note: If you own the DVD of the movie "Patton" you will notice that the movie has some special features on the disc. One of these special features is a narration of Patton's life while the movie is playing. The person doing the narrating is Charles M. Province. He wrote the following about Patton's Blitzkrieg style.


Blitzkrieg - American Style


Third Army's battle record began on August 1st, 1944 at 1200 hours. That was when the Third Army was officially operational as a combat army.

In nine months and eight days of fighting, the Third Army compiled a great record. Not only did the Third Army astonish the world, but it's deeds, in terms of statistics, challenged the imagination. The Third Army gave a new meaning to fluid warfare. The Third had only one general order from Patton; "Seek out the enemy, trap him, and destroy him."

The Germans never knew what to expect from Patton. His methods of operation were very different from British General Montgomery and the more conventional American generals. Patton's Third Army tore open the German lines of defense and trapped thousands of German soldiers. Most of them were either killed or they surrendered.

The history of the Third Army is a story of constant attack. They drove on in fair weather or foul, across favorable terrain or across mud, ice, and snow.

The soldiers in the Third Army knew the value of teamwork. Aircraft and artillery teamed with infantry and armor to a perfection that amazed not only the enemy but other Allied Armies. The XIX Tactical Air Command's bombing and air cover, coupled with the Artillery's timed, precision barrages, wrecked all enemy hopes to profit by American inexperience.

The Third Army was an army on wheels. Thousands of trucks driven by soldiers who called themselves the Red Ball Express carried tons of supplies to the army to keep it fighting and on the move. The Red Ball Express also set up special convoys that carried nothing but gasoline just to keep Patton's tanks rolling toward Germany.

One of the Third Army's greatest assets was American ingenuity. American soldiers were creating new instruments of war on the spot to overcome new problems encountered day after day.

Third Army had an excellent command structure. Each level of command had a special job and each did the best job they could. The planners who told the soldiers what to do also made every effort to help them do it.

Of course, a war cannot be won without hard fighting and personal courage. The Third Army had more than its share of courageous front-line fighting men; infantry, tankers, tank destroyers, engineers, all of them were soldiers who met every new challenge with courage and endless endurance.

Not all soldiers were part of combat teams, though. Many important jobs were done by administrative soldiers. It was these soldiers who backed up the front-line soldier, making sure he had the tools he needed to fight; food, weapons, ammunition, gasoline, and clothing. As General Patton once said, "No matter how small your job might seem, it's important in the vast scheme of things. Every job is important."

It was this type of teamwork which enabled each single squad to capture and hold a piece of ground taken from the enemy.

In terms of speed of advance, in amount of ground liberated or captured, and in terms of losses inflicted upon a powerful enemy there was never before anything like the Third Army's lightning quick sweep across France.



Breakout



After Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges' First Army punched a hole in the German defenses at a French town called St. Lo, the Third Army began roaring through the hole with their Sherman tanks. They began an attacking advance that moved in every direction on the compass; north, south, east, and west, all at the same time. There was no stopping them once they got started.

They went east toward Le Mans, south and southwest through Laval, west toward Brest, and north toward St. Malo.

Third Army was not a defensive army. General Patton didn't believe in defensive tactics, he believed in attacking. He often told his soldiers, "When in doubt, attack." They knew that to defeat the Germans, they had to be on the offensive at all times. Like a boxer, they understood that once you got your opponent on the ropes, you had to keep at him until he went down. You couldn't let up and give him a chance to rest.

The soldiers of the Third Army took the fight to the enemy. They swept over the Brittany Peninsula before the enemy knew what was happening. Two tank columns of the Sixth Armored Division, commanded by Major General R.W. Grow, forced the Germans to withdraw into the fortified ports of St. Malo, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Brest.

Threatened with a severed supply line where it narrowed to a ten mile wide strip at Avranches, the soldiers of the Third Army delivered those needed supplies despite nightly air attacks. At the same time they repulsed a vicious German counter-attack at Mortain.

Facing complete encirclement, the Germans quickly withdrew to the east. Although the Third Army had almost surrounded the German Seventh Army, they were not allowed to close a gap that existed between the towns of Argentan and Falaise. They were told to wait and let General Bernard L. Montgomery close the gap with his British Second Army.

Montgomery moved too slowly. He failed to close the gap until almost a week later. Because of this the Germans were able to continue their retreat from this pocket and they managed to save a large portion of their armor. They did, however, suffer a great loss of men and materials.

This Argentan-Falaise Pocket later became a very controversial issue. Many people claimed that the Third Army could have closed the gap themselves and they could have destroyed the complete German Seventh Army. If this had happened, the war might have been won much sooner than it was.

The Germans desperately raced toward the Seine River while being chased by the Third Army's spearhead units. Fearing a second encirclement west of the Seine River, the Germans fought to save their dwindling escape routes. All during their escape, they were hit with a never ending barrage of air and artillery bombardment which took a fearful toll of their lives and material.



In Pursuit



With their fast moving armored columns racing toward Paris and to the northeast of the French capital, the Third Army had to give up control of the XV Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Wade H. Haislip. Along with the Corps, the Third Army relinquished the Corps area to command of First Army. Always on the move, the Third Army continued to advance to the south, southeast, and southwest of Paris while continuing to fight.

The enemy was under continuous attack by both the Third Army's infantry and tank forces and Brigadier General O.P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers. At this point, the enemy lost all hope of regaining the initiative.

The speed of the Third Army's advance forced the Germans to break into a hap-hazard, hasty retreat. The Third Army gave the Germans no time to occupy any natural defense lines or strong-points. It just kept punching it's way toward victory.

The German's retreat continued until only the Moselle River and the German built Siegfried Line lay between the Third Army and German soil. As the month of August drew near to a close, there was much evidence that the Third would have to actually slow down it's advance so that the other Allied armies could catch up with them.

Amazingly, despite shattered communications and huge losses, the Germans had not collapsed. They remained to be good soldiers and hard fighting professionals.


http://www.pattonhq.com/textfiles/thirdhst.html



Kevinugly -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:35:20 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

More Information Regarding Third Army's use of Combined Arms in the Ardennes


From the Official History:

The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its wounds after the disastrous fight as advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, when Model ordered the division to move south, beginning 26 December. Most of its tanks were in the repair shops, fuel was short, and some units did not leave for Bastogne until the afternoon of the 29th. This march was across the grain of the German communications net and became badly snarled in the streets of Houffalize, where Allied air attacks had caused a major traffic jam, that forced tank units to move only in small groups. It is probable that fewer than fifty tanks reached the Bastogne area in time to take part in the 30 December attack.

The appearance of this SS unit was greeted by something less than popular acclaim. The regular Army troops disliked the publicity Goebbels had lavished on the feats of the SS divisions and the old line commanders considered them insubordinate. Worse still, the 1st SS Panzer Division came into the sector next to the 14th Parachute Regiment: the SS regarded themselves-or at least were regarded-as Himmler's troops, whereas the parachute divisions were the personal creation of Goering. (It is not surprising that after the attack on the 30th the 1st SS Panzer tried to bring the officers of the 14th before a Nazi field court.) [14]

The 167th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker), ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer in the attack, was looked upon by Manteuffel and others with more favor. This was a veteran division which had distinguished itself on the Soviet front. The 167th had been refitting and training replacements from the 17th Luftwaffe Feld Division when orders reached its Hungarian casernes to entrain for the west. On 24 December the division arrived at Gerolstein on the Rhine; though some units had to detrain east of the river, Hoecker's command was at full strength when it began the march to Bastogne. A third of the division were veterans of the Russian battles, and in addition there were two hundred picked men who had been officer candidates before the December comb-out. Hoecker had no mechanized heavy weapons, however, and the division transport consisted of worn-out Italian trucks for which there were no spare parts.

The 167th and the kampfgruppe from the 1st SS Panzer (be it remembered the entire division was not present on the 30th) were supposed to be reinforced by the 14th Parachute Regiment and the 901st of the Panzer Lehr. Both of these regiments were already in the line southeast of Bastogne, but were fought-out and woefully understrength. The first plan of attack had been based on a concerted effort to drive straight through the American lines and cut the corridor between Assenois and Hompre. Just before the attack this plan was modified to make the MartelangeBastogne highway the initial objective. The line of contact on the 30th extended from Neffe south into the woods east of Marvie, then followed the forest line and the Lutrebois-Lutremange road south to Villers-laBonne-Eau. The boundary between the 167th and the 1st SS Panzer ran through Lutrebois. The 167th, lined up in the north along the BrasBastogne road, would

[14] See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).

Page 624

aim its assault at the Remonfosse sector of the highway. The 1st SS Panzer, supported on the left by the 14th Parachute Regiment, intended to sally out of Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Lutrebois, however, was captured late in the evening of the 29th by the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry. A map picked up there by the Americans showed the boundaries and dispositions of the German assault forces, but either the map legend was unspecific or the word failed to get back to higher authority for the German blow on the morning of 30 December did achieve a marked measure of tactical surprise.

The 35th Infantry Division stood directly in the path of the German attack, having gradually turned from a column of regiments to face northeast. The northernmost regiment, the 134th Infantry, had come in from reserve to capture Lutrebois at the request of CCA, 4th Armored, but it had only two battalions in the line. The 137th Infantry was deployed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and on the night of the 29th Companies K and L forced their way into the village, radioing back that they needed bazooka ammunition. (It seems likely that the Americans shared Villers with a company of German Pioneers.) In the south the 320th Infantry had become involved in a bitter fight around a farmstead out-

Page 625

side of Harlange-the German attack would pass obliquely across its front but without impact.

During the night of 29 December the tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved up along the road linking Tarchamps and Lutremange. The usable road net was very sparse in this sector. Once through Lutremange, however, the German column could deploy in two armored assault forces, one moving through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other angling northwest through Lutrebois. Before dawn the leading tank companies rumbled toward these two villages. At Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by seven tanks heavily supported by infantry. The panzers moved in close, blasting the stone houses and setting the village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message reached the command post of the 137th asking for the artillery to lay down a barrage of smoke and high explosive, but before the gunners could get a sensing the radio went dead. Only one of the 169 men inside the village got out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier had run through the rifle fire to warn the reserve company of the battalion west of Villers.

The battle in and around Lutrebois was then and remains to this day jumbled and confused. There is no coherent account from the German side and it is quite possible that the formations involved in the fight did not, for the reasons discussed earlier, cooperate as planned. The American troops who were drawn into the action found themselves in a melee which defied exact description and in which platoons and companies engaged enemy units without being aware that other American soldiers and weapons had taken the same German unit under fire. It is not surprising, then, that two or three units would claim to have destroyed what on later examination proves to have been the same enemy tank detachment and that a cumulative listing of these claims-some fifty-odd German tanks destroyed-probably gives more panzers put out of action than the 1st SS Panzer brought into the field.

It is unfortunate that the historical reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in the von Rankian sense ("exactly as it was") is impossible, for the American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit careful analysis by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division artillery, for example, simultaneously engaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west. Weyland's fighter-bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command intervened at precisely the right time to blunt the main German armored thrust and set up better targets for engagement by the ground forces. American tanks and tank destroyers cooperated to whipsaw the enemy assault units. The infantry action, as will be seen, had a decisive effect at numerous points in the battle. Two circumstances in particular would color the events of 30 December: because of CCA's earlier interest in Lutrebois, radio and wire communications between the 4th Armored and the 35th Division were unusually good in this sector; although the 35th had started the drive north without the normal attachment of a separate tank battalion, the close proximity of the veteran 4th Armored more than compensated for this lack of an organic tank-killing capability.

Page 626

Lutrebois, two and a half miles east of the German objective at Assenois, had most of its houses built along a 1,000-yard stretch of road which runs more or less east and west across an open plain and is bordered at either end by an extensive wooded rise. On the morning of the 30th the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry (Lt. Col. W. C. Wood) was deployed in and around the village: Company L was inside Lutrebois; Companies I and K had dug in during the previous evening along the road east of the village; the battalion heavy machine guns covered the road west of the village. To the right, disposed in a thin line fronting on the valley, was the d Battalion (Maj. C. F. McDannel).

About 0445-the hour is uncertain-the enemy started his move toward Lutrebois with tanks and infantry, and at the same time more infantry crossed the valley and slipped through the lines of the 2d Battalion. As the first assault force crossed the opening east of Lutrebois, the American cannoneers went into action with such effect as to stop this detachment in its tracks. The next German sortie came in a hook around the north side of Lutrebois. Company L used up all of its bazooka rounds, then was engulfed. The German grenadiers moved on along the western road but were checked there for at least an hour by the heavy machine guns. During this midmorning phase seven enemy tanks were spotted north of Lutrebois. A platoon of the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion accounted for four, two were put out of action by artillery high explosive, and one was immobilized by a mine.

News of the attack reached CCA of the 4th Armored at 0635, and General Earnest promptly turned his command

Page 627

to face east in support of the 35th Division. By 1000 General Dager was reshuffling CCB to take over the CCA positions. The first reinforcement dispatched by CCA was the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, which hurried in its half-tracks to back up the thin line of the 2d Battalion. Here the combination of fog and woods resulted in a very confused fight, but the 2d Battalion continued to hold in its position while the enemy panzer grenadiers, probably from the 2d Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer, seeped into the woods to its rear. The headquarters and heavy weapons crews of the 3d Battalion had meanwhile fallen back to the battalion command post in the Losange chateau southwest of Lutrebois. There the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion gave a hand, fighting from half-tracks and spraying the clearing around the chateau with .50-caliber slugs. After a little of this treatment the German infantry gave up and retired into the woods.

During the morning the advance guard of the 167th Volks Grenadiers, attacking in a column of battalions because of the constricted road net, crossed the Martelange-Bastogne road and reached the edge of the woods southeast of Assenois. Here the grenadiers encountered the 51st. Each German attempt to break into the open was stopped with heavy losses. General Hoecker says the lead battalion was "cut to pieces" and that the attack by the 167th was brought to nought by the Jabos and the "tree smasher" shells crashing in from the American batteries. (Hoecker could not know that the 35th Division artillery was trying out the new POZIT fuze and that his division was providing the target for one of the most

Page 627

lethal of World War II weapons.)

The main body of the 1st SS Panzer kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so before noon moving along the Lutremange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five tanks were counted in all. It took two hours to bring the fighterbombers into the fray, but they arrived just in time to cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn back the bulk of the panzers. Companies I and K still were in their foxholes along the road during the air bombing and would recall that, lacking bazookas, the green soldiers "popped off" at the tanks with their rifles and that some of the German tanks turned aside into the woods. Later the two companies came back across the valley, on orders, and jointed the defense line forming near the chateau.

Thirteen German tanks, which may have. debouched from the road before the air attack, reached the woods southwest of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored artillery observer in a cub plane spotted them and dropped a message to Company B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt. John A. Kingsley, the company commander, who had six Sherman tanks and a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed an ambush near a slight ridge that provided his own tanks with hull defilade and waited. The leading German company (or platoon), which had six panzers, happened to see Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in that direction. The first shot from Kingsley's covert put away the German commander's tank and the other tanks milled about until all had been knocked out. Six more German tanks came along and all were destroyed or disabled. In the meantime the American tank destroyers took on some accompanying assault guns, shot up three of them, and dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.

At the close of day the enemy had taken Lutrebois and Villers-la-BonneEau plus the bag of three American rifle companies, but the eastern counter-attack, like that in the west, had failed. Any future attempts to break through to Assenois and Hompre in this sector would face an alert and coordinated American defense.




I thought we were done with the Ardennes.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:41:05 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

More Information Regarding Third Army's use of Combined Arms in the Ardennes


From the Official History:

The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its wounds after the disastrous fight as advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, when Model ordered the division to move south, beginning 26 December. Most of its tanks were in the repair shops, fuel was short, and some units did not leave for Bastogne until the afternoon of the 29th. This march was across the grain of the German communications net and became badly snarled in the streets of Houffalize, where Allied air attacks had caused a major traffic jam, that forced tank units to move only in small groups. It is probable that fewer than fifty tanks reached the Bastogne area in time to take part in the 30 December attack.

The appearance of this SS unit was greeted by something less than popular acclaim. The regular Army troops disliked the publicity Goebbels had lavished on the feats of the SS divisions and the old line commanders considered them insubordinate. Worse still, the 1st SS Panzer Division came into the sector next to the 14th Parachute Regiment: the SS regarded themselves-or at least were regarded-as Himmler's troops, whereas the parachute divisions were the personal creation of Goering. (It is not surprising that after the attack on the 30th the 1st SS Panzer tried to bring the officers of the 14th before a Nazi field court.) [14]

The 167th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker), ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer in the attack, was looked upon by Manteuffel and others with more favor. This was a veteran division which had distinguished itself on the Soviet front. The 167th had been refitting and training replacements from the 17th Luftwaffe Feld Division when orders reached its Hungarian casernes to entrain for the west. On 24 December the division arrived at Gerolstein on the Rhine; though some units had to detrain east of the river, Hoecker's command was at full strength when it began the march to Bastogne. A third of the division were veterans of the Russian battles, and in addition there were two hundred picked men who had been officer candidates before the December comb-out. Hoecker had no mechanized heavy weapons, however, and the division transport consisted of worn-out Italian trucks for which there were no spare parts.

The 167th and the kampfgruppe from the 1st SS Panzer (be it remembered the entire division was not present on the 30th) were supposed to be reinforced by the 14th Parachute Regiment and the 901st of the Panzer Lehr. Both of these regiments were already in the line southeast of Bastogne, but were fought-out and woefully understrength. The first plan of attack had been based on a concerted effort to drive straight through the American lines and cut the corridor between Assenois and Hompre. Just before the attack this plan was modified to make the MartelangeBastogne highway the initial objective. The line of contact on the 30th extended from Neffe south into the woods east of Marvie, then followed the forest line and the Lutrebois-Lutremange road south to Villers-laBonne-Eau. The boundary between the 167th and the 1st SS Panzer ran through Lutrebois. The 167th, lined up in the north along the BrasBastogne road, would

[14] See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).

Page 624

aim its assault at the Remonfosse sector of the highway. The 1st SS Panzer, supported on the left by the 14th Parachute Regiment, intended to sally out of Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Lutrebois, however, was captured late in the evening of the 29th by the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry. A map picked up there by the Americans showed the boundaries and dispositions of the German assault forces, but either the map legend was unspecific or the word failed to get back to higher authority for the German blow on the morning of 30 December did achieve a marked measure of tactical surprise.

The 35th Infantry Division stood directly in the path of the German attack, having gradually turned from a column of regiments to face northeast. The northernmost regiment, the 134th Infantry, had come in from reserve to capture Lutrebois at the request of CCA, 4th Armored, but it had only two battalions in the line. The 137th Infantry was deployed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and on the night of the 29th Companies K and L forced their way into the village, radioing back that they needed bazooka ammunition. (It seems likely that the Americans shared Villers with a company of German Pioneers.) In the south the 320th Infantry had become involved in a bitter fight around a farmstead out-

Page 625

side of Harlange-the German attack would pass obliquely across its front but without impact.

During the night of 29 December the tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved up along the road linking Tarchamps and Lutremange. The usable road net was very sparse in this sector. Once through Lutremange, however, the German column could deploy in two armored assault forces, one moving through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other angling northwest through Lutrebois. Before dawn the leading tank companies rumbled toward these two villages. At Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by seven tanks heavily supported by infantry. The panzers moved in close, blasting the stone houses and setting the village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message reached the command post of the 137th asking for the artillery to lay down a barrage of smoke and high explosive, but before the gunners could get a sensing the radio went dead. Only one of the 169 men inside the village got out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier had run through the rifle fire to warn the reserve company of the battalion west of Villers.

The battle in and around Lutrebois was then and remains to this day jumbled and confused. There is no coherent account from the German side and it is quite possible that the formations involved in the fight did not, for the reasons discussed earlier, cooperate as planned. The American troops who were drawn into the action found themselves in a melee which defied exact description and in which platoons and companies engaged enemy units without being aware that other American soldiers and weapons had taken the same German unit under fire. It is not surprising, then, that two or three units would claim to have destroyed what on later examination proves to have been the same enemy tank detachment and that a cumulative listing of these claims-some fifty-odd German tanks destroyed-probably gives more panzers put out of action than the 1st SS Panzer brought into the field.

It is unfortunate that the historical reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in the von Rankian sense ("exactly as it was") is impossible, for the American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit careful analysis by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division artillery, for example, simultaneously engaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west. Weyland's fighter-bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command intervened at precisely the right time to blunt the main German armored thrust and set up better targets for engagement by the ground forces. American tanks and tank destroyers cooperated to whipsaw the enemy assault units. The infantry action, as will be seen, had a decisive effect at numerous points in the battle. Two circumstances in particular would color the events of 30 December: because of CCA's earlier interest in Lutrebois, radio and wire communications between the 4th Armored and the 35th Division were unusually good in this sector; although the 35th had started the drive north without the normal attachment of a separate tank battalion, the close proximity of the veteran 4th Armored more than compensated for this lack of an organic tank-killing capability.

Page 626

Lutrebois, two and a half miles east of the German objective at Assenois, had most of its houses built along a 1,000-yard stretch of road which runs more or less east and west across an open plain and is bordered at either end by an extensive wooded rise. On the morning of the 30th the 3d Battalion of the 134th Infantry (Lt. Col. W. C. Wood) was deployed in and around the village: Company L was inside Lutrebois; Companies I and K had dug in during the previous evening along the road east of the village; the battalion heavy machine guns covered the road west of the village. To the right, disposed in a thin line fronting on the valley, was the d Battalion (Maj. C. F. McDannel).

About 0445-the hour is uncertain-the enemy started his move toward Lutrebois with tanks and infantry, and at the same time more infantry crossed the valley and slipped through the lines of the 2d Battalion. As the first assault force crossed the opening east of Lutrebois, the American cannoneers went into action with such effect as to stop this detachment in its tracks. The next German sortie came in a hook around the north side of Lutrebois. Company L used up all of its bazooka rounds, then was engulfed. The German grenadiers moved on along the western road but were checked there for at least an hour by the heavy machine guns. During this midmorning phase seven enemy tanks were spotted north of Lutrebois. A platoon of the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion accounted for four, two were put out of action by artillery high explosive, and one was immobilized by a mine.

News of the attack reached CCA of the 4th Armored at 0635, and General Earnest promptly turned his command

Page 627

to face east in support of the 35th Division. By 1000 General Dager was reshuffling CCB to take over the CCA positions. The first reinforcement dispatched by CCA was the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, which hurried in its half-tracks to back up the thin line of the 2d Battalion. Here the combination of fog and woods resulted in a very confused fight, but the 2d Battalion continued to hold in its position while the enemy panzer grenadiers, probably from the 2d Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer, seeped into the woods to its rear. The headquarters and heavy weapons crews of the 3d Battalion had meanwhile fallen back to the battalion command post in the Losange chateau southwest of Lutrebois. There the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion gave a hand, fighting from half-tracks and spraying the clearing around the chateau with .50-caliber slugs. After a little of this treatment the German infantry gave up and retired into the woods.

During the morning the advance guard of the 167th Volks Grenadiers, attacking in a column of battalions because of the constricted road net, crossed the Martelange-Bastogne road and reached the edge of the woods southeast of Assenois. Here the grenadiers encountered the 51st. Each German attempt to break into the open was stopped with heavy losses. General Hoecker says the lead battalion was "cut to pieces" and that the attack by the 167th was brought to nought by the Jabos and the "tree smasher" shells crashing in from the American batteries. (Hoecker could not know that the 35th Division artillery was trying out the new POZIT fuze and that his division was providing the target for one of the most

Page 627

lethal of World War II weapons.)

The main body of the 1st SS Panzer kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so before noon moving along the Lutremange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five tanks were counted in all. It took two hours to bring the fighterbombers into the fray, but they arrived just in time to cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn back the bulk of the panzers. Companies I and K still were in their foxholes along the road during the air bombing and would recall that, lacking bazookas, the green soldiers "popped off" at the tanks with their rifles and that some of the German tanks turned aside into the woods. Later the two companies came back across the valley, on orders, and jointed the defense line forming near the chateau.

Thirteen German tanks, which may have. debouched from the road before the air attack, reached the woods southwest of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored artillery observer in a cub plane spotted them and dropped a message to Company B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt. John A. Kingsley, the company commander, who had six Sherman tanks and a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed an ambush near a slight ridge that provided his own tanks with hull defilade and waited. The leading German company (or platoon), which had six panzers, happened to see Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in that direction. The first shot from Kingsley's covert put away the German commander's tank and the other tanks milled about until all had been knocked out. Six more German tanks came along and all were destroyed or disabled. In the meantime the American tank destroyers took on some accompanying assault guns, shot up three of them, and dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.

At the close of day the enemy had taken Lutrebois and Villers-la-BonneEau plus the bag of three American rifle companies, but the eastern counter-attack, like that in the west, had failed. Any future attempts to break through to Assenois and Hompre in this sector would face an alert and coordinated American defense.




I thought we were done with the Ardennes.



Read the title: It is referring to Patton's mastery of Combined Arms. Using the Bulge is just another example.



Kevinugly -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 4:43:42 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:00:04 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.


Have fun [;)]

Unlike you and Ironduke, the posting of articles gives the reader an "unfiltered" view of Patton. People can read about him and his mastery of warfare without comment from me, you, or anyone else.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:01:20 PM)

MILITARY SCIENCES: Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


General George S. Patton, Jr: Master of Operational Battle Command. What Lasting Battle Command Lessons Can We Learn From Him?

Authors: Sanderson, Jeffrey R.; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Abstract: This monograph discusses General George S. Patton, Jr. and Operational Battle Command. Six primary elements Leadership, Decision Making, Information Assimilation, Visualization, Conceptualization, and Communication make up the dynamics of Battle Command. General Patton mastered the application of these dynamics. This monograph defines and provides examples of the dynamics of Battle Command as used by General Patton while he commanded the Third Army.

The monograph first discusses Command and Control of Third Army, as well as General Patton's relationship with his primary staff The monograph then defines and provides examples of each of the dynamics of Battle Command using General Patton and his staff as the example. In conclusion the monograph provides three relevant lessons for future operational commanders concerning operational Battle Command based upon a historical study of General Patton. The lessons learned from the study include the training and retention of a competent staff, the commander personally focusing the intelligence effort, and the commander issuing clear intent and guidance especially regarding endstates



Kevinugly -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:18:45 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.


Have fun [;)]

Unlike you and Ironduke, the posting of articles gives the reader an "unfiltered" view of Patton. They can read about him and his mastery of warfare without comment from me, you, or anyone else.



Now I know you're just winding us up. At least we know you don't actually have any opinions of your own, which is a relief I suppose since it means I can ignore your posts[:D]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:30:50 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.


Have fun [;)]

Unlike you and Ironduke, the posting of articles gives the reader an "unfiltered" view of Patton. They can read about him and his mastery of warfare without comment from me, you, or anyone else.



Now I know you're just winding us up. At least we know you don't actually have any opinions of your own, which is a relief I suppose since it means I can ignore your posts[:D]


Au contre, mon frere. . .

I haven't even used my best stuff, yet [;)]

If you don't read the articles, then you will never learn. . .

And if you don't learn, then that means I have to keep repeating the same thing over and over again. . .

The articles I present are well researched, unlike some of your gratuitous opinions. And opinions are the lowest form of knowledge. . .

And if you are ignoring the articles, then that only confirms that you have absolutely no real desire to learn anything about Patton, except to hold onto many of your own erroneous conceptions of the man.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 5:33:37 PM)

Concepts of Information Warfare in Practice: General George S. Patton and the Third Army Information Service, August-December, 1944

Authors: Nowowiejski, Dean A.; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES

Abstract: This monograph looks for historical examples of information warfare in order to gain insight into its current practice. It first describes key elements of the concept of information operations, particularly as they relate to battle command. It then explores how George S. Patton and his Third Army Information Service demonstrated those ideas, and how their example offers direction for current developments in information warfare.

Key sources used in research included emerging doctrinal literature on information warfare, biographical information on the professional development and command qualities of Patton, and after action reports of the Third Army and 6th Cavalry Group, the unit that constituted the Army Information Service.

This monograph found that Patton aggressively sought information advantage as a battle commander, and that he demonstrated the key qualities of vision and intuition. The Third Army Information Service developed a relevant common picture of the battlefield by the expanding the instrument of directed liaison. What needs emphasis in current concept of information warfare is the improving the ability of commanders and staffs to process information. We must reemphasize the human dimensions of information operations through refined professional development.

http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5511/A551103.html



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:01:17 PM)

[image]local://upfiles/279/Jh149594098.jpg[/image]


AMERICAN BLITZKRIEG?


Lt. General George S. Patton Jr., has never been properly recognized for his contribution to military strategy, although he executed the fastest advance ever in history, far faster than Guderian’s famous blitzkrieg into Poland.

In this article I will show some incredible examples of Patton’s victories, as well as examine why and how Patton’s strategy works. To do this, let’s look at an example of Patton’s military strategy in action:

It was March, 1945, and Patton’s XX Corps’ was rapidly advancing towards the Rhine, threatening General Balck’s entire forces. General Balck, commander of German Army Group G, needed to delay Patton’s crossing of the Rhine. So he formed a defensive line consisting of 10 divisions in the Hunsruck Mountains to protect his north flank. But Patton now used his most effective method against a solidly-held German area. He split his army’s advance in two. In addition to the XX Corps’ advance in the north which Balck was worried about, he also ordered the 4th Armored to cross the Moselle in the south and dash through the enemy’s rear. The XII Corps’ Infantry followed closely behind the armored division, wiping up any resistance. The XII Corps in the south, far in the enemy’s rear, circled around and linked up in the north with the XX Corps, which had plunged through the West Wall and was rapidly advancing towards the Rhine. Because Patton had split the Third Army in two and encircled the Hunsruck Mountains, the Americans captured ten entire German divisions there. This was Patton’s masterpiece; it shows the true genius of his strategy.

Continuing his campaign in the Palatinate, Patton’s 4th Armored cut off the Germans’ bridges across the Rhine. Mainz and Mannheim quickly fell to the onslaught of Patton’s slashing armor. Patton’s armored divisions were attacking the German Army Group on three sides. Trapped in France, surrounded and cut off from their Rhine bridgeheads, the Germans began surrendering in the tens of thousands.

The Third Army’s campaign in the Palatinate was rolling onwards, more brilliant by the hour. “We are the eighth wonder of the world,” Patton wrote to his wife, “…I hope things keep smooth. It seems to be too good to be true.” On March 21st 1945, the Palatinate Campaign officially came to an end with Third Army having annihilated every German contingent in the Moselle triangle. “I really believe this operation is one of the outstanding operations in the history of war,” Patton wrote in his diary. German Major General Schimpf of the 3rd Paratroop Division would call Patton’s campaign in the Palatinate “phenomenal.”

Patton’s strategy, to encircle and cut-off the enemy, rather than annihilating him in a direct assault, was the key to his success. He used his armored divisions and the air force for these behind-the-lines encirclements because they were fast enough to surprise the enemy. He then had the infantry follow behind the armored divisions, wiping up. Patton’s strategy was perfect blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, some military historians claim that Patton was merely “chasing a retreating enemy” and that his army fell apart under real resistance, or that he was capturing and defeating inferior, under-supplied German troops.

There are several problems with these arguments. The purpose of Patton’s strategy, and the purpose of blitzkrieg, is to avoid direct frontal attacks and to bypass resistance. The idea is to cut the enemy off from his supplies and force him to surrender. This strategy saves thousands of lives, but it requires the armies to move very quickly, giving rise to the accusation that they are “chasing” the enemy. The other accusation, that the Germans were under-supplied and not as well equipped as the Americans, is silly. The first blitzkrieg, executed by Guderian in Poland, consisted of German tanks and planes against Polish cavalry. The inequality of these forces in no way diminished Guderian’s victory.

There were occasions where the Third Army actually had far less supplies than the Germans, yet still managed to win the battle. One of these occurred at dawn on September 8th, 1944. Because the Third Army was now on the defense, an SS Panzer Brigade attacked them. The SS brigade at first had a minor success. They fired at General McLain’s headquarters, broke in and captured classified files, then withdrew to join the main force. This would have been the first German victory of the campaign; but then Third Army asserted itself, counterattacked, and almost completely annihilated the German contingent. The Germans lost 30 tanks, 60 half-tracks, and 900 men.

Patton was just as brilliant at defense as he was during the attack and pursuit. When Eisenhower ordered the Third Army onto the defense in September, 1944, Patton told his two corps commanders that they were to make “limited attacks” so that the Germans would not know that the Third had been ordered onto the defense. He prohibited the stringing of barbed wire and would not allow his men to mine the army’s frontier. This would only be a temporary halt, and he did not want them to do anything which would make future advances difficult. So here is how Patton defended the Third Army’s border: he ordered his men to make small outposts which could be easily assisted by the Third’s powerful tanks in case of a German attack. Artillery was placed wherever German tanks were likely to strike. Then Patton alerted the men in Weyland’s air force to be ready at a moment’s notice to fly in and strafe enemy soldiers. If the Germans attacked, commanders were to call in the tanks and infantry at once. This is the essence of blitzkrieg: constant mobility at a moment’s notice; and contrary to the revisionist theory, here Patton was exercising it under defense.

One of Patton’s most ingenious and little known plans was for his Rhine crossing. Several months before he crossed the Rhine, while he was still planning in England, he selected a spot along the Rhine River where he would cross with his Army. He chose this area “because the terrain on my side dominated that on the other side, as the former was far enough away from the Frankfurt hills to prevent direct fire on the bridges, and because, above everything else, there was a barge harbor there from which we could launch the boats unseen.” Less than ten men died in Patton’s military crossing of the Rhine! That is unprecedented in the history of war. That Patton could plan this from simply looking at a terrain map in London is incredible, and shows Patton’s genius not just in swift exploitation, but also in planning.

Patton’s crossing of the Rhine was typical of his operations; the 5th Infantry Division had simply ferried across the Rhine in rafts and small engineer assault boats early in the morning. The operation was launched with nothing special in the way of supplies or equipment. He was very proud of this and had his messenger tell Bradley that, “Without benefit of aerial bombing, ground smoke, artillery preparation, and airborne assistance, the Third Army at 2200 hours, Thursday evening, March 22, crossed the Rhine River.” The man who had the aerial bombing, ground smoke, artillery, airborne divisions, Field Marshal Montgomery, had been beaten across the Rhine by the genius of Lt. Gen. Patton’s strategy.

“We did not wait,” Patton wrote, “and caught most of the 15th Panzer division in bed.” Patton’s strategy had triumphed again. Patton’s strategy was constant advance: he needed to be unrelenting if he was to surprise the enemy. The Germans respected Patton’s strategy and admired its genius, calling him our “most modern” commander. Rommel wrote that, “We had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.” Von Rundstedt simply called Patton our “best.”

The Americans, however, have been unwilling to give Patton credit for his remarkable achievements. I think it’s time we reevaluate what makes a great strategy. If we value winning a war quickly with a minimum of casualties, we should look to the commander who captured ten Germans to one American; we should look to the inventor of American blitzkrieg, General Patton.



Copyright June 29, 2002

This website is maintained by Barbara E. Boland

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/strategy.html



VicKevlar -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:14:49 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Yes, Kev leave it. Even Ironduke sees the pointless nature of your postings, especially when they are about totally useless and wasted German operations such as "Baseplate". Even Ironduke can't put a positive spin on that operation.

Ironduke:

You should be providing more support to your shadow, "Kevinugly".

The only time you seem to value sources for Patton is when they criticize him. Then you are as giddy as a little school girl.


This is exactly the type of post I mentioned I didn't wish to see anymore.........in short, stop it.



VicKevlar -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:16:35 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


Please, please, give us the wisdom of all this info you have gathered from reading "quite a few books on the subject".

I'm dying to hear it. . .



Alright....you're truly treading on thin ice here. Do you need a full out warning to cease?



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:27:14 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: VicKevlar

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


Please, please, give us the wisdom of all this info you have gathered from reading "quite a few books on the subject".

I'm dying to hear it. . .



Alright....you're truly treading on thin ice here. Do you need a full out warning to cease?



[&:]

I have been called a liar at least a dozen times in this thread, among many other names. . .

And you call me out over this???

[8|]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 6:29:51 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: VicKevlar

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Yes, Kev leave it. Even Ironduke sees the pointless nature of your postings, especially when they are about totally useless and wasted German operations such as "Baseplate". Even Ironduke can't put a positive spin on that operation.

Ironduke:

You should be providing more support to your shadow, "Kevinugly".

The only time you seem to value sources for Patton is when they criticize him. Then you are as giddy as a little school girl.


This is exactly the type of post I mentioned I didn't wish to see anymore.........in short, stop it.


Well Vic - you are being quite selective, aren't you.

Obviously those who can't win this debate by posting information, have contacted you over those harmless posts. They were made in good, clean fun. A little jesting never hurt anyone.

How about looking at all the insults that were hurled at me throughout this thread? [;)]

But I took the abuse from others like a man, and I didn't whine to you about attacks against me.



VicKevlar -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 7:48:04 PM)

Reporting dozens of posts before my inital page 13 admonishment isn't winning you any points.

Tell ya all what...........if this thread doesn't get on track without all the personal insults, whining, etc; It's simply going to be locked.



Jane Doe -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 7:55:42 PM)

GUIDE - how to debate - a revelation[sm=00000959.gif]



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 9:37:48 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.


Have fun [;)]

Unlike you and Ironduke, the posting of articles gives the reader an "unfiltered" view of Patton. People can read about him and his mastery of warfare without comment from me, you, or anyone else.


[:D][:D][:D][&o][&o][:D][:D][:D]

PattonHQ; Pattonhomepage; Pattonuncovered; Pattonmuseuempage Patton Society. Unfiltered! How can you say this?
This is not unfiltered, it is partisan as you or I, I keep copying quotes from serious history books, and get nowhere, you feel free to post in lengthy excerps from Patton fan sites and call it unfiltered????

Ultiomately, we're going round in circles because we do not share an opinion of what are and aren't good sources. I prefer D'Este et al to webpages. It is your prerogative to post these webpages verbatim, but if we don't agree on the relevant merits of history books versus webpages then we're lost, and we should call it a day before Vic locks it up. I'm happy with my books. You're happy with your webpages, lets agree to disagree.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 9:44:56 PM)

quote:

The scientific method is based upon evidence rather than belief. However, Ironduke believes Patton to be bad regardless of the evidence. And when evidence is shown him to the contrary, he just simply twists it the way he wishes it.


This is not true, Von Rom. I do not know why you posted it.

quote:

Ironduke has made it very clear from the outset of this thread, that he simply wants to destroy Patton's reputation. Therefore, the very basis for his argument rests on a false premise: namely, Patton wasn't very good and Ironduke will prove it.


And you have made it clear you believe the opposite, yet my argument (despite being backed by a legion of reputable historians) is apparently twisted. Your lack of knowledge about the historical method is showing here. No premise is false, no argument is based on a false premise. The debate and argument demonstrates whether the premise is false. This is nonsense.

quote:

If I don't respond to some of Ironduke's posts, it is NOT because he is right; it is only because Ironduke does not care about hearing the truth or about sources, etc.


I may not be right, but you do not respond because you are unable to prove me wrong, and wisely resist the temptation to try. You've posted tens of thousands of words, and your own analysis is only a couple of hundred. The rest if from partisan websites.

quote:

This is NOT the Scientific Method, you speak of.

Ironduke has already decided on the conclusion and he won't let any other views get in his way. That is why discussing the issue with him is pointless. . .


Anyone reading this thread would see I have praised Patton several times, and you have not even indicated he had any faults. They would also conclude your mind is made up as well, and incapable of being changed by even overwhelming evidence. Your scientific method is based upon copying large sections of partisan website into the thread word for word, and hoping someone is impressed. Most of the time, I do not believe there is much in what you copy to trouble serious historians, and all this serves to do is highlight the paucity of what you are attempting to show. You hide your lack of argument and evidence and analysis behind huge chunks of information of limited value. I don't point this out lightly, it is a shame, and one of the reasons the thread has stopped being fun. Instead of a point by point breakdown and rebuttal, I have to wade through an essay from Patton unconvered. This justs hardens attitudes, and is one of the reasons we should call it a day.

I want your analysis, not someone elses. If these webmasters (PATTONHQ, PATTONSOCIETY, PATTONUNCOVERED - is there a theme here?)want to post in the forum, they can get a user name and start, but in the interim, I'm after your thoughts. If I want to debate with these people, I'll go and see if they have a forum.

Please please analyse. Huge chunks of test with a bit highlighted in bold is not analysis. Writing your own thoughts, and quoting the bold bits into your argument is analysis.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 9:55:56 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: VicKevlar

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Yes, Kev leave it. Even Ironduke sees the pointless nature of your postings, especially when they are about totally useless and wasted German operations such as "Baseplate". Even Ironduke can't put a positive spin on that operation.

Ironduke:

You should be providing more support to your shadow, "Kevinugly".

The only time you seem to value sources for Patton is when they criticize him. Then you are as giddy as a little school girl.


This is exactly the type of post I mentioned I didn't wish to see anymore.........in short, stop it.


Vic,
I do not fear forum moderation, but I do fear all it's forum moderators. [;)] I'm sorry if anything I have said was over the mark, I won't trouble you anymore. Like I said, I'll post once more with my OWN thoughts on this issue, which will stand for the record. I would have thought having to step in has done you some good, hasn't it? You can't have had too much to do around here since AOW was relocated? [;)]

Regards (and if necessary, apologies)
Ironduke



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 10:09:52 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

This has been an interestiing thread to read.. and while I do not share Iron Dukes disdain for Paton, I would like less general and more specifics.. for instance ID, ironduke, states Paton incorrectly turned into Britany, why? Third army was held up in France on orders from above, why is this seen at Avranches and later in not allowing paton to race to Luxemburg as a strategic error? Does anyone really believe Patons forces could not have easily defeated a remnant army in france, with the overwelming supplies and air power, before these same two assets where squandered in pushing slowly up the coast?

Ok Paton was criticised in Sicaly, he pushed his troops to get forward faster... again help me out here.. do not see the problem.. and in North Africa he took over a pretty directionless command and seemingly overnight had the situation righted...
I do conceed legends are always bigger than the actual men .. but is he not at least a good, competent aggressive corp commander?

Iron duke, I never saw your response, to why Monty who was slow but won... request.. feel fre to toss it in...
I finally mean no disrespect for those who disagree, I actually consider myself better educated than most History profs I knew in the Ivy league scxhool I went to, in terms of modern military histroy and weapons, and still consider myself a student not a Historian!
please help me understand youe point of view...


Freeboy,
I apologise, I did promise, I did start it and have a wordpad doc somewhere (You might regret asking for this) however, it will make for a good discussion. I'm just off to type Monty into Google and start looking for evidence [;)].

Regards (and apologies)
Ironduke



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 11:33:41 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

I'll be looking forward to seeing a complete, full assessment of your thoughts about Patton and Third Army at Metz. Please include full details and sources you use.


It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.


Have fun [;)]

Unlike you and Ironduke, the posting of articles gives the reader an "unfiltered" view of Patton. People can read about him and his mastery of warfare without comment from me, you, or anyone else.


[:D][:D][:D][&o][&o][:D][:D][:D]

PattonHQ; Pattonhomepage; Pattonuncovered; Pattonmuseuempage Patton Society. Unfiltered! How can you say this?
This is not unfiltered, it is partisan as you or I, I keep copying quotes from serious history books, and get nowhere, you feel free to post in lengthy excerps from Patton fan sites and call it unfiltered????

Ultiomately, we're going round in circles because we do not share an opinion of what are and aren't good sources. I prefer D'Este et al to webpages. It is your prerogative to post these webpages verbatim, but if we don't agree on the relevant merits of history books versus webpages then we're lost, and we should call it a day before Vic locks it up. I'm happy with my books. You're happy with your webpages, lets agree to disagree.


Well, truth is truth; and history is history, no matter where it comes from.

The fellow who narrates on the DVD of Patton is one of the fellas who owns one of those websites. He also goes on public speaking across the country. I think his opinion carries some weight.

Even so, I have provided articles from dozens of sources and I haven't even touched my best stuff yet [;)]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/22/2004 11:41:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

The scientific method is based upon evidence rather than belief. However, Ironduke believes Patton to be bad regardless of the evidence. And when evidence is shown him to the contrary, he just simply twists it the way he wishes it.


This is not true, Von Rom. I do not know why you posted it.

quote:

Ironduke has made it very clear from the outset of this thread, that he simply wants to destroy Patton's reputation. Therefore, the very basis for his argument rests on a false premise: namely, Patton wasn't very good and Ironduke will prove it.


And you have made it clear you believe the opposite, yet my argument (despite being backed by a legion of reputable historians) is apparently twisted. Your lack of knowledge about the historical method is showing here. No premise is false, no argument is based on a false premise. The debate and argument demonstrates whether the premise is false. This is nonsense.

quote:

If I don't respond to some of Ironduke's posts, it is NOT because he is right; it is only because Ironduke does not care about hearing the truth or about sources, etc.


I may not be right, but you do not respond because you are unable to prove me wrong, and wisely resist the temptation to try. You've posted tens of thousands of words, and your own analysis is only a couple of hundred. The rest if from partisan websites.

quote:

This is NOT the Scientific Method, you speak of.

Ironduke has already decided on the conclusion and he won't let any other views get in his way. That is why discussing the issue with him is pointless. . .


Anyone reading this thread would see I have praised Patton several times, and you have not even indicated he had any faults. They would also conclude your mind is made up as well, and incapable of being changed by even overwhelming evidence. Your scientific method is based upon copying large sections of partisan website into the thread word for word, and hoping someone is impressed. Most of the time, I do not believe there is much in what you copy to trouble serious historians, and all this serves to do is highlight the paucity of what you are attempting to show. You hide your lack of argument and evidence and analysis behind huge chunks of information of limited value. I don't point this out lightly, it is a shame, and one of the reasons the thread has stopped being fun. Instead of a point by point breakdown and rebuttal, I have to wade through an essay from Patton unconvered. This justs hardens attitudes, and is one of the reasons we should call it a day.

I want your analysis, not someone elses. If these webmasters (PATTONHQ, PATTONSOCIETY, PATTONUNCOVERED - is there a theme here?)want to post in the forum, they can get a user name and start, but in the interim, I'm after your thoughts. If I want to debate with these people, I'll go and see if they have a forum.

Please please analyse. Huge chunks of test with a bit highlighted in bold is not analysis. Writing your own thoughts, and quoting the bold bits into your argument is analysis.


I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

These well researched articles come from dozens of sources, including the prestigious Command and General Staff College (where all the great military leaders of the 20th Century have been educated). Many of these people have written about Patton's great use of Combined Arms. Have you even bothered to read them?

My opinion is just that - my opinion. What I have presented in these articles are well researched studies about particular facets of Patton's military career. They deal with facts.

You don't like them simply because they don't agree with your point of view about Patton.

They contain a great deal of scholarship, which is more than I can say about plain opinion that has been expressed in this thread.

These generals and professors share my opinion about Patton. If they write scholarly articles about Patton then I will use them.

This way the reader of this thread can read for themselves what well-informed people have written about Patton over the years.



Jane Doe -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 12:20:43 AM)

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 12:22:47 AM)

The Following is Taken From the Book "War As I knew It" by General George Patton

Below, in Patton's own words, you will find Patton's thoughts on a wide variety of subjects (which are arranged in alphabetical order).




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR POWER
The trouble with the Airborne Army is that it is too ponderous in its methods. At the present stage in airborne development, it is my belief that one airborne regiment per army, available on twelve hours notice, would be more useful than several airborne divisions which usually take several weeks to get moving. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMERICA
Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity is untrue to himself and to American tradition. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMERICANS
The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics in the world. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of our ability, particularly in view of the fact that the two races left which we may have to fight are both poor mechanics but have ample manpower. While we have ample manpower, it is to valuable to be thrown away. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARMIES
When the American Army had once put its hand once put its hand to the plow, it should not let go. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

No one man can conduct an army... the success of any army depends on the harmonious working of its staff and the magnificent fighting ability of the combat officers and enlisted men. Without this teamwork, war cannot be successfully fought. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARMOUR
The primary mission of armoured units is the attacking of infantry and artillery. The enemy’s rear is the happy hunting ground for armour. Use every means to get it there. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARTILLERY
Our mortars and our artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent they are junk — see that they keep firing! - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

When caught under fire, particularly of artillery, advance out of it; never retreat from it. Artillery very seldom shortens it’s range. - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.

When soldiers are caught in a barrage, either from mortars, rockets, or artillery, the surest way to get out of it is to go forward fast, because it is almost the invariable practice of the enemy to increase rather than decrease his range. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACK
Grab 'em by the nose and kick 'em in the pants! - General George S. Patton.

The larger the force and the more violence you use in the attack, whether it be men, tanks, or ammunition, the smaller will be your proportional losses. - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April 1944.

Hit hard soon. - General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April 1944.

Take plenty of time to set up an attack. It takes at least two hours to prepare an infantry battalion to execute a properly coordinated attack. Shoving them in too soon produces useless losses.- General George S. Patton. Letter of Instruction. 3 April 1944.

Never attack where the enemy expects you to come. It is much better to go over difficult ground where you are not expected than it is over good ground where you are expected. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

When we are attacking, the enemy has to parry, while, when we are defending or preparing to attack, he can attack us. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

Throughout history, many campaigns have been lost by stopping on the wrong side of a river. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

The moral effect of discontinuing an attack is very bad for the troops. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.

If in a unit the size of a division, the attack is not going well four hours after it starts, it is necessary to make a careful personal reconnaissance and see if it may not be necessary to change the emphasis; because four hours of fighting should produce substantial effects. This does not mean that a man should be wobbly about continuing in the face of uncertain victory, but it does mean that, after four hours, one should know whether the thing is going to be a go or not, and if it is not, he should slow up his attack on the old line while implementing it in a new direction. - General George S. Patton. War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BATTLES & BATTLEFIELDS
Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously hearken to us soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen. - O’Niel, 3rd Army chaplain. When asked to write a prayer by General Patton, O’Niel replied, “May I say, General, that it usually isn’t a customary thing among men of my profession to pray for clear weather to kill fellow men.” The next day the weather cleared.

In forty hours I shall be in battle, with little information, and on the spur of the moment will have to make most momentous decisions, but I believe that one’s spirit enlarges with responsibility and that, with God’s help, I shall make them and make them right. It seems my whole life has been leading up to this moment. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary entry, November 6, 1942.

In battle, small forces — platoons, companies, and even battalions — can do one of three things; go forward, halt, or run. If they halt or run, they will be an even easier target. Therefore, they must go forward. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Battles are won by frightening the enemy. Fear is induced by inflicting death and wounds. Death and wounds are produced by fire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The acid test of battle brings out the pure metal. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

I think, if we should say “Fire is the Queen of Battle,” we should avoid arm arguments and come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

There can never be too many projectiles in a battle. Whether they are thrown by cannon, rockets, or recoilless devices is immaterial. The purpose of all these instruments is identical — namely, to deluge the enemy with fire, nor is it necessary that these projectiles be discharged on the ground. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAVERY & COURAGE
Courage is fear holding on a minute longer. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

Untutored courage [is] useless in the face of educated bullets. - George S. Patton, Jr.

If we take the generally accepted definition of bravery as a quality which knows not fear, I have never seen a brave man. All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory are attributed which make a man courageous even when he is afraid. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CASUALTIES
In battle, casualties vary directly with the time you are exposed to effective fire. Your own fire reduces the effectiveness and volume of the enemy’s fire, while rapidity of attack shortens the time of exposure. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, April 3, 1944.

Every soldier should realize that casualties in battle are the result of two factors: first, effective enemy fire, and, second, the time during which the soldier is exposed to that fire. The enemy’s effectiveness in fire is reduced by your fire or by night attack. The time you are exposed is reduced by the rapidity of your advance. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

During battle, it is very important to visit frequently hospitals containing newly wounded men. Before starting such an inspection, the officer in charge of the hospital should inform the inspecting general which wards contain men whose conduct does not merit compliments. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The greatest weapon against the so-called “battle fatigue” is ridicule. If soldiers would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic. Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Montsec was a huge monument to our dead [in WWI]. I could not help but think that our delay in pushing forward would probably result, after due course of time, in the erection of many other such monuments for men who, had we gone faster, would not have died. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER
The Grand Vizier ended up by saying that it was necessary to converse with a great man fully to realize his greatness, and that there was an Arabic saying to the effect that those said all men were equal were either fools or liars, and that he and the Sultan were neither. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary, December 8, 1942.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMBAT
If during combat communication breaks down, each commander can and must so act as to obtain the general objective. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMBINED ARMS
Whenever armor and air can work together... the results are sure to be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the roads, and so long as he stays on the roads the fighter-bomber is one of his most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork two things are necessary: first, intimate confidence and friendship between air and ground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of the ground commander. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMAND
In my experience, all very successful commanders are prima donnas, and must be so treated. Some officers require urging, others require suggestions, very few have to be restrained. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

The more senior the officer, the more time he has. Therefore, the senior should go forward to visit the junior rather than call the junior back to see him. The exception to this is when it is necessary to collect several commanders for the formulation of a coordinated plan. In that case, the junior should report to the superior headquarters. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

In the old Navy of sail there was a custom that the new Officer of the Deck did not call for any change in the setting of the sails for one half hour — that is, for one bell after he took over. The same thing might well apply to commanders and staff officers who take over new jobs in war. They should wait at least a week before they make any radical changes, unless and except they are put in to correct a situation which is in a bad way. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

This habit of commanding too far down, I believe, is inculcated at schools and at maneuvers. Actually, a General should command one echelon down and know the position of units two echelons down. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order, or the devising of a plan, is only about five percent of the responsibility of command. The other ninety-five percent is to insure, by personal observation, or through the interposing of staff officers, that the order is carried out. Orders must be issued early enough to permit time to disseminate them. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

It is a very difficult thing to order two officers in whom you have great confidence to carry out an operation which neither of them thinks is possible. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

A general who had been relieved came in at his own request and tried to explain why he was no good. I offered him a lesser command in another division, but he told me he needed 48 hours to consider it. I did not tell him so, but I realized that any man who could not make up his mind in less than forty-eight hours was not fit to command troops in battle. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMUNICATION
Use every means before and after combats to tell the troops what they are going to do and what they have done. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONQUEST
We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, September 25, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COORDINATION
It is my opinion that coordination is a very much-misused word and its accomplishment is difficult. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COWARDICE
Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Cowardice is a disease and must be checked before it becomes epidemic. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting it. If soldiers would make fun of those who begin to show battle fatigue, they would prevent its spread, and also save the man who allows himself to malinger by this means from an afterlife of humiliation and regret. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
In such a close fight a soldier has not time to change his mind. - General George S. Patton, Jr. November 22, 1942.

A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction, 3 April, 1944.

I always had a very funny feeling at such times. The plans, when they came into my mind, seemed simple, but after I had issued the orders and everything was moving and I knew that I had no reserve, I had a feeling of worry and, as usual had to say to myself, "do not take counsel of your fears." The sensation is very much like that I used to have steeplechasing. I was always very anxious to ride the race, but when the saddling bell rang I felt scared. When the flag dropped and the race was on, my fear left me. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFENSE
Wars are not won by defensive tactics. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The utter futility of fixed defenses. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Pacifists would do well to study the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, remembering that these defenses were forced; that Troy fell; that the walls of Hadrian succumbed; that the Great Wall of China was futile; and that, by the same token, the mighty seas which are alleged to defend us can also be circumvented by a resolute and ingenious opponent. In war, the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of offense depends on the warlike souls of those conducting it. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCIPLINE
There is only one kind of discipline — PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential muderers. You must set the example. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

One of the primary purposes of discipline is to produce alertness. A man who is so lethargic that he fails to salute will fall an easy victim to the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Discipline can only be obtained when all officers are so imbued with the sense of their awful obligation to their men and to their country that they cannot tolerate negligence. Officers who fail to correct errors or to praise excellence are valueless in peace and dangerous misfits in war. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Men cannot have good battle discipline and poor administrative discipline. Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details, and on mutual respect and confidence. Discipline must be a habit so engrained that it is stronger than the excitement of battle or the fear of death. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline. An experienced officer can tell, by a very cursory administrative inspection of any unit, the caliber of its commanding officer. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious. Where would an undisciplined football team get? The players react subconsciously to the signals. They must, because the split second required for thought would give the enemy the jump. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

No man is unafraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline. The Army saying, “who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?” is largely true. Pride, in turn, stems from self-respect and from the knowledge that the soldier is an American. The sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and superiors comes from a knowledge of reciprocal obligation, and from the sharing of the same way of life. Self-confidence, the greatest military virtue, results from the demonstrated ability derived from the acquisition of all the preceding qualities and from the expert use of weapons. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DUTY
Any commander who fails to obtain his objective, and who is not dead or severely wounded, has not done his full duty. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

Battle is the most magnificent competition in which a human being can indulge. It brings out all that is best; it removes all that is base. All men are afraid in battle. The coward is the one that lets fear overcome his sense of duty. Duty is the essence of manhood. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary, November 6, 1942.

It is rather sad to me to think that my last opportunity for earning my pay has passed. At least, I have done my best as God gave me the chance. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ENEMIES
The Nazis are the enemy. Wade into them. Spill their blood. Shoot them in the belly. When you put your hand into a bunch of goo that a moment before was your best friend's face, you'll know what to do. - George C. Scott, as General George Patton in "PATTON."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FATIGUE
Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Staff personnel, commissioned and enlisted, who do not rest, do not last.... When the need arises, everyone must work all the time, but these emergencies are not frequent: unfatigued men last longer and work better at high pressure. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEAR
All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. - General George S. Patton Jr.

Do not take counsel of your fears. - General George S. Patton Jr., Letter of Instruction, March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORTIFICATIONS
The German is the champion digger. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. April 3, 1944.

The trick expression, “Dig or die,” is much overused and much misunderstood. Wars are not won by defensive tactics. Digging is primarily defensives. The only time it is proper for a soldier to dig is when he has reached his final objective in an attack, or when he is bivouacing under circumstances where he thinks he may be straffed from the air or is within artillery range of the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Do not dig slit trenches under trees if you can avoid it, because a shell passing overhead and striking the tree acts as an airburst and the fragments come straight down, so that your slit trench is useless to you, although it may be of some assistance to the Graves Registration people. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERALS
In my opinion, generals — or at least the commanding general — should answer their own telephones in the daytime. This is not particularly wearisome because few people call a general, except in emergencies, and then they like to get him at once. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.

There are more tired division commanders than there are tired divisions. Tired officers are always pessimists. Remember this when evaluating reports. Generals must never show doubt, discouragement or fatigue. Generals should adhere to one type of dress so that soldiers will recognize them. They must always be neat. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFANTRY
Infantry troops can attack continuously for sixty hours. Frequently much time and suffering are saved if they will do so. Beyond sixty hours, it is rather a waste of time, as the men become fatigued from lack of sleep. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

In a modern infantry division, if every available vehicle — tanks, armored cars, gun carriages, AA guns and trucks — is utilized, no soldier need, or should, walk until he actually enters battle. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

When a unit has been alerted for inspection, do not fail to inspect it thoroughly. Further, do not keep it waiting. When soldiers have gone to the trouble of getting ready to be inspected, they deserve the compliment of a visit. be sure to tell the unit commander publicly that his unit was good, if such was the case. If it is bad, tell him privately in no uncertain terms. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area occupied by the enemy. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFORMATION
Information is like eggs: the fresher the better. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KILLING
Christmas dawned clear and cold; lovely weather for killing Germans, though the thought seemed somewhat at variance with the spirit of the day. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LEADERS
The lions in their dens tremble on hearing his approach. - From a citation from the Moroccan govt. to General George S. Patton.

In spite of my reputation as a head-cutter, I really am very long-suffering. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LEADERSHIP
All very successful commanders are Prima Donnas and must be so treated. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

In the first actions, new troops must receive aggressive leadership by all grades, including general officers, who must be seen in the front line during action. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

In cold weather, General Officers must be careful not to appear to dress more warmly than the men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

All officers, and particularly General Officers, must be vitally interested in everything that interests the soldier. Usually you will gain a great deal of knowledge by being interested, but, even if you do not, the fact that you appear interested has a very high morale influence on the soldier. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

When speaking to a junior about the enemy confronting him, always understate their strength. You do this because the person in contact with the enemy invariably overestimates their strength to himself, so if you understate it, you probably hit the approximate fact, and also enhance your junior's self-confidence. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Each, in his appropriate sphere, will lead in person. Any commanders who fails to obtain his objective, and is not dead or severely wounded, has not done his full duty. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOGISTICS
The DESPERATE DETERMINATION to succeed is just as vital to supply as it is to the firing line. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

Replacements are spare parts — supplies.... A company without riflemen is just as useless as a tank without gasoline. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.

Always remember that it is much better to waste ammunition than lives. It takes at least eighteen years to produce a soldier, and only a few months to produce ammunition. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The chief purpose of the General and Special Staffs is to insure that the troops get what they want in time. In battle, troops get temperamental, and ask for things they really do not need. However, where humanly possible, their requests, no matter how unreasonable, should be answered. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The fighting soldiers should carry nothing into battle except what he wears, his ammunition, his rations, and his toilet articles. When he goes back, he should get new uniforms, new underclothes, new everything. The two-bag system ("A" and "B") with which we began this war is utterly foolish, because by the time the "B" bags get up, many of their owners have become casualties. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

The American soldier is absolutely incapable of enforcing the rule that civilians stay off the roads during active operations. His goodness of heart is a credit to him, but I am sure it has cost us many casualties. In war, time is vital, and bull-carts cause waste of time and therefor death.
If I were to fight another war, I would make it an inflexible rule that no civilian vehicle, horse, cow, or motor drawn, appear on any axial road, and I would enforce this by shooting the animals and destroying the vehicles. I did this in Sicily and was criticized by an ignorant press, who considered it very brutal to kick a few donkeys off bridges, and ignored the fact that by so doing we took Palermo in one day and at a very low cost. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

If "the greatest study of mankind is man," surely the greatest study of war is the road net. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.

Railroad trains, carrying rations, or fuel, or other articles with a sales value on the black market, must be guarded, and any person attempting pillage must be shot and the fact published. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOYALTY
There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARKSMANSHIP
Shoot short. Richochets make nastier sounds and wounds. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEDALS
It is vital to good morale that decorations get out promptly and on an equitable basis. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

When a unit leaves your command, if its performance at all justifies it, a letter of farewell and commendation to the unit should be sent. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
In war nothing is ever as bad, or as good, as it is reported to Higher Headquarters. Any reports which emanate from a unit after dark — that is, where the knowledge has been obtained after dark — should be viewed with skepticism by the next higher unit. Reports by wounded men are always exaggerated and favor the enemy. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

The report of no incident that happens after dark should be treated too seriously. They are always overstated. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARY JUSTICE
One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrative rather than legal.As thefrench say, sentences are for the purpose of encouraging others. I am convinced that, in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk battle, should be executed.... It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MORALE
War may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory. - General George Patton.

Supply and administrative units and installations are frequently negected by combat commanders. It is very necessary to their morale and efficiency that each one be inspected by the senior general of the unit with which they are operating. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

An army commander does what is necessary to accompish his mission, and that nearly eighty percent of his mission is to arouse morale in his men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

It is an unfortunate fact that few commanders, and no poiticians, realize the individuality of units and the necessity of playing on human emotion.... [General] Paul once told me, with perfect sincerity, that the greatest moment of his life had been at the Battle of The Bulge when I put my arm around him and said, "How is my little fighting son-of-a-bitch today?" he said that this remark inspired not only him, but every man in the division. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The more senior the officer who appears with a very small unit at the front, the better the effect on the troopos. If some danger is involvved in the visit, it's value is enhanced. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFFICERS
Officers must posses self-confidence and the confidence of their men. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers are always on duty and their duty extends to every individual, junior to themselves, in the U.S. Army — not only to members of their own organization. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers are responsible, not only for the conduct of their men in battle, but also for their health and contentment when not fighting. An officer must be the last man to take shelter from fire, and the first to move forward. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The officers must constantly interest himself in the rations of the men. He should know his men so well that any sign of sickness or nervous strain will be apparent to him, and he can can take such action as may be necessary. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

Officers must assert themselves byb example and by voice. They must be pre-eminent in courage, deportment, and dress. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.

The responsibilities of an officer are quite analogous to those of a policeman or a fireman. The better he performs his daily tasks, the less frequently does he have to take direct action. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDERS
Avoid as you would perdition issuing cover-up orders, orders for the record. This simply shows lack of intestinal fortitude on the part of the officer signing the orders, and everyone who reads them recognizes it at once. - General George S. Patton, Jr. War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PACIFISM
While flying over France, I was continually struck with the amount of human effort that had been spent in the construction of trenches and other lethal agents during both this and WWI. A pacifist could get a splendid text for a sermon on human frailty from such monuments to the evil of war. But he could get even better arguments against himself by looking at the cemeteries, where each little white cross attests to the human folly which has invariably resulted in more wars. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Pacifists would do well to study the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, remembering that these defenses were forced; that Troy fell; that the walls of Hadrian succumbed; that the Great Wall of China was futile; and that, by the same token, the mighty seas which are alleged to defend us can also be circumvented by a resolute and ingenious opponent. In war, the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of offense depends on the warlike souls of those conducting it. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEASANTS
In the fields the plowing is done with the most peculiar combination of animals. The peasants either use a horse and camel, a burro and a camel, a bull and a camel, or a bull and a horse. I am informed that they cannot use two camels because they fight each other. Any animal hooked up with a camel becomes disgusted and loses interest in life. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Diary. November 22, 1942.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANNING
Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually they only serve as a datum plane from which you build as necessity directs or as opportunity offers. They should be made by the people who are going to have to execute them. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 6 March, 1944.

successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

One does not plan and then try to make circumstance fit those plans fit the circumstances. I think the difference between success and failure in high command depends upon the ability, or lack of it, to do just that. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.

In planning any operation, it is vital to remember, and constantly repeat to oneself, things: "In war nothing is impossible, provided you use audacity," and "Do not take counsel of your fears." If these two principles are adhered to, with American troops victory is certain. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POLITICS
I have yet to find where politic language produces successful government. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRAISE
Remember that praise is more valuable than blame. - General George Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1792.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRISONERS OF WAR
Prisoner of war guard companies, or an equivalent organization, should be as far forward as possible in action to take over prisoners of war, because troops heated with battle are not safe custodians. Any attempt to rob or loot prisoners of war by escorts must be strictly dealt with. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECONNAISSANCE
Your primary mission as a leader is to see with your own eyes and be seen by your troops while engaged in personal reconnaissance. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1944.

You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive.... Information is like eggs: the fresher the better. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction, March 6, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESPONSIBILITY
In 40 hours I shall be in battle, with little information, and on the spur of the moment will have to make the most momentous decisions. But I believe that one's spirit enlarges with responsibility and that, with God's help, I shall make them and make them right. - General George Patton.

I believe that one's spirit enlarges with responsibility. - General George S. Patton, diary. November 6, 1942.

A General Officer who will invariably assume the responsibility for failure, whether he deserves it or not, and invariably gives the credit for success to others, whether they deserve it or not, will achieve outstanding success. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RETREAT
Never yield ground. It is cheaper to hold what you have than to retake what you have lost. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, April 3, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELF-RESPECT
No man is unafraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline. The Army saying, “who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?” is largely true. Pride, in turn, stems from self-respect and from the knowledge that the soldier is an American. The sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and superiors comes from a knowledge of reciprocal obligation, and from the sharing of the same way of life. Self-confidence, the greatest military virtue, results from the demonstrated ability derived from the acquisition of all the preceding qualities and from the expert use of weapons. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOLDIERS & SAILORS
Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains victory. - General George S. Patton, Jr.

The American soldier is willing to die but not to kill. - General George S. Patton, Jr. Concerning the statistic that only one rifleman in four could bring himself to fire his weapon.

In spite of their magnificent appearance, our men do not put up a good show in reviews. I think that we still lack pride in being soldiers, and must develope it. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. may 20, 1943.

The successful soldier wins his batte cheaply so far as his own casuaties are concerned, but he must remember that violent attacks, although costly at the time, save live in the end. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

The history of our invariablly victorious armies demonstrates that we are the best soldiers in the world. This should make your men proud. This should make you proud. This should imbue your units with unconquerable self-confidence and pride in demonstrated ability. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

There is a great difference between an old division, irrespective of the individuals composing it, and a new division. War develops a soul in a fighting unit, and while there may not be many of the old men left, it takes a very little yeast to leaven a lump of dough. I suppose I might be funny and say it takes very few veterans to leaven a division of doughboys. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The fact that the Allies made a successful landing [in Normandy] demostrates that good troops can land anywhere. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

Soldiers like to play on a winning team. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The professiona soldier is certainly conservative. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that, in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

The soldier is the army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one's country. Hence it is a proud priviege to be a soldier — a good soldier.... To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and in his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated ability. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.

American soldiers are most ingenious. When they could not capture a town to sleep in, they would roll three large snowballs or snow rolls, place one on each side and the third on the windward end , and, lining them with pine-tree branches, they slept in groups of three or four. How human beings could endure this continuous fighting at sub-zero temperatures is still beyond my comprehension. - General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATEGY
Have been giving everyone a simplified directive of war. Use steamroller strategy; that is, make up your mind on a course and direction of action, and then stick to it. But in tactics, do not steamroller. Attack weakness. Hold them by the nose and kick them in the pants. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. November 2, 1942.

If I had worried about flanks, I could nevver ahve fought the war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

Study the map, because, if you find a large number of big roads leading through a place, that is the place to go regardless of enemy resistance. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRENGTH
You can never be too strong. Get every man and gun you can secure, provided it does not unduly delay your attack. - General George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction. 3 April, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURPRISE
It is better to attack with a small force at once, and attain surprise, than it is to wait and lose it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TACTICS
Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire placed through movement. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

There is only one tactical principal which is not subject to change. It is: “To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time.” - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

There is no approved solution to any tactical situation. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front, but to get fire behind the enemy, you must hold him by frontal fire and move rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided if possible. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, 3 April, 1944.

The policy of holding the enemy by the nose with fire and kicking him in the pants with movement is just as true as when I wrote it, some twenty years ago, and at that time it had been true since the beginning of war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

All the historical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted that, between Bingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was impossible. Here again we took advantage of a theory of our own, that the impossible place is usually the least well defended. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Whether these tactical thoughts of mine are the result of inspiration or insomnia, I have never been able to determine, but nearly every tactical idea I have ever had has come into my head full-born, much after the manner of Minerva from the head of Jupiter. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never attack along the bottom of a valley unless you have the heights on both sides in your possession. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Any operation, reduced to its primary characteristics, consists in moving down the road until you bump into the enemy.... When you have bumped, hold him at the point of contact with fire and about a third of your command. Move the rest in a wide envelopment so that you can attack him from his rear flank. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Vertical or horizontal envelopment for tactical effect should not go too deep or be too large. The best results are attained when the envelopment arrives in or just back of the enemy’s artillery positions. Here you disprupt his supply and signal communications and his guns, and are close enough to the troops advancing along the axis to be sure of making contact in a reasonable time. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Never halt on the near side of a river or a mountain range. Secure a bridgehead in both cases, because even if you do not intend to exploit the crossing, the possession of a bridgehead on the far side cramps the enemy’s style. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

always capture the highest terrain feature in your vicinity at once, and stay on it. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

Owing to the pernicious traditions of our known distance rifle markesmanship, we are prone to hold our fire until we see targets. In battle these are seldom visible. When any group of soldiers is under small-arms fire, it is evident that the enemy can see them; therefore, men should be able to see the enemy, but seldom are. When this situation arises, they must fire at the portions of hostile terrain which probably conceal enemy small-arms weapons. I know for a fact that such a proceedure invariably produces an effect and generally stops hostile fire. All the historical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted that, between Bingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was impossible. Here again we took advantage of a theory of our own, that the impossible place is usually the least well defended. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TERRAIN
It is always well to remember that the country is just as hard on the enemy as it is on you. - General George S. Patton, Jr., diary. December 9, 1943.

Throughout history, wars have been lost by not crossing rivers. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.

It is my opinion that, in the High Command, small-scale maps are best because from that level one has to decide on general policies and determine the places, usually road centers or river lines, the capture of which will hurt the enemy most. How these places are to be captured is a matter for the lower echelons to determine from the study of large-scale maps or, better still, from the ground. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRAINING
High physical condition is vital to victory. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. March 6, 1944.

Fatigue makes cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire. - General George S. Patton, Jr., Letter of Instruction. March 6, 1944.

Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close-order drill. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Officers and men must know their equipment. They must train with the equipment they intend to use in battle. Equipment must be in the best operational condition when taken to the Theater of Operations. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

Combat experienc has proven that ceremonies, such as formal guard mounts, formal retreat formations, and regular and supervised reveille formations, are a great help, and, in some cases, essential, to prepare men and officers for battle, to give them that perfect discipline, that smartness, that alertness without which battles cannot be won. - General George S. Patton, letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

A pint of sweat saves a gallon of blood. - General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It, 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VICTORY
Soldiers of the Seventh Army: Born at sea, baptized in bood, and crowned with victory, in the course of thirty-eight days of incessant battle and unceasing labor, you have added a glorious chapter to the history of war. - General George S. Patton, Jr., General Order #18, August 22, 1943.

We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction, September 25, 1944.

From the bloody corridor at avranches, to brest, thence across France to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany, and now onto Bastogne, your record has been one of continuous victory. Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthless enemy, but also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitude every aspect of terrain and weather. Neither heat not dust nor floods nor snow have stayed your progress. The speed and brilliance of your achievements are unsurpassed in military history. - General George S. Patton, Jr., commendation issued to the troops of the 3rd Army XIX Tactical Air Command, January 1, 1945.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WAR
War is an ancient subject and I, an ancient man. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

One continues to learn about war by practicing war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

It was a risky operation, but so is war. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his. - General George S. Patton.

War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WAR & PEACE
I love war and responsibility and excitement. Peace is going to be hell on me. - General George Patton.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WEAPONS
Few men are killed by the bayonet; many are scared by it. Bayonets should be fixed when the fire-fight starts. Bayonets must be sharpened by the individual soldier. The German hates the bayonet and is inferior to our men with it. Our men should know this. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.

The M-1 rifle is the most deadly rifle in the world. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be. - General George S. Patton, Jr., letter of instruction. April 3, 1944.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WORLD WAR II
All the historical studies we had ever read on the crossing asserted that, between Bingen and Coblentz, the Rhine was impossible. Here again we took advantage of a theory of our own, that the impossible place is usually the least well defended. - General George S. Patton, jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.

During this operation [the Battle of The Bulge] the Third Army moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States — possibly in the history of the world. The results attained were made possible only by the superlative quality of American officers, American men, and American equipment. No country can stand against such an army. - General George S. Patton, Jr.,War As I Knew It. 1947.



FreeRepublic, LLC, PO BOX 9771, FRESNO, CA 93794
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2003 Robinson-DeFehr Consulting, LLC.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 12:35:41 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."


Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 2:48:32 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."


Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.


Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...[X(]) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 3:46:05 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."


Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.


Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...[X(]) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke



Oh, I feel bored. . .

BTW, Ironduke, aren't you going to give us that in-depth analysis of early German Blitkrieg victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, like you promised?



Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 3:47:48 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33
How does a battle in which Patton had no command input, illustrate his skill at battlefield command, as opposed to his skill at training?

Regards
33



How does an Olympic event in which the coach has no input illustrate the coach's grasp of technique, training, discipline, and skill, when it is the athlete who performs the event?

Exactly, excellent analogy. An olympic coach may have an excellent grasp of all the required elements of preparation - but may be totally unable to perform the athletic task. You don't see too many tubby old gymnastics coaches flailing about on the rings.

In exactly the same way, a battle in which Patton's subordinates do all the work indicates that he has prepared them exceedingly well - which is to his credit - but does not directly indicate anything about Patton's ability to command in battle.

Regards
33



Golf33 -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 3:50:06 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

And the beauty about diaries is - they can't be changed later (unlike books which can be changed and/or rewritten, which is what Bradley did between his two books).


Since I have allowed myself to be sidetracked, I will restate the question.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.


This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/23/2004 3:54:52 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33
How does a battle in which Patton had no command input, illustrate his skill at battlefield command, as opposed to his skill at training?

Regards
33



How does an Olympic event in which the coach has no input illustrate the coach's grasp of technique, training, discipline, and skill, when it is the athlete who performs the event?

Exactly, excellent analogy. An olympic coach may have an excellent grasp of all the required elements of preparation - but may be totally unable to perform the athletic task. You don't see too many tubby old gymnastics coaches flailing about on the rings.

In exactly the same way, a battle in which Patton's subordinates do all the work indicates that he has prepared them exceedingly well - which is to his credit - but does not directly indicate anything about Patton's ability to command in battle.

Regards
33


Whatever you say. . .

Patton knew nothing about battle; he didn't study military history; he didn't devote his life to his country; he and Third Army didn't capture more territory than any other army; he didn't train, inspire and lead his troops; Third Army got all its leadership and training tips from cards it found in Cracker Jack boxes. . .

Why, Patton was just a couch potato. . .

Now back to your regularly scheduled program. . .



Page: <<   < prev  16 17 [18] 19 20   next >   >>

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
1.28125