quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

You make vacuuous comments assuming what they have written is the TRUTH just because I don't respond to them?

Sur

No, I simply object to your claim that 'everyone' supports you when this is palpably untrue.

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

You make vacuuous comments assuming what they have written is the TRUTH just because I don't respond to them?

Sur

No, I simply object to your claim that 'everyone' supports you when this is palpably untrue.

Regards
33

When I say everyone, I am referring to almost all the Allied leaders, many of the high ranking German officers, and a great many writers and historians.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

Von Rom,

quote:

Guess who won at the Bulge - Patton

Probably not. Patton 3rd Army played an important role in bulge reduction but it was 1st Army that took the blow and fought the whole affair. Initial keys decisions were done by V, VIII corps commanders and divisions (sending of 7th AD to St Vith, stubborn defense of 4th and 28th ID, even taking account of 106th 'failure'). It was also Ike itself that sent 82d and 101st AB to Ardennes as early than 17th December. The last German effort around Celles by a combination of 5th PZA and 6th SS PZA was countered by 1st Army not 3rd. Patton did a remarkable work once called for by Ike, still he was planning his own offensive to avoid 3rd Army units to be sent to the north. He was upset that 10th AD was took from him to VIII Corps, finally a wise decision form either Ike or Bradley as with 7th and remnants of 9th AD, Americans force could only count on three armored division for almost first week of offensive. The British XXX Corps also played a key role guarding Meuse northwest crossings, freeing US units to be engaged in another place (especially 3rd AD and 30th ID).

LC

Heheh

I know [:)]

I was just being factitious [:D]

Cheers!

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

Von Rom,

quote:

Guess who won at the Bulge - Patton

Probably not. Patton 3rd Army played an important role in bulge reduction but it was 1st Army that took the blow and fought the whole affair. Initial keys decisions were done by V, VIII corps commanders and divisions (sending of 7th AD to St Vith, stubborn defense of 4th and 28th ID, even taking account of 106th 'failure'). It was also Ike itself that sent 82d and 101st AB to Ardennes as early than 17th December. The last German effort around Celles by a combination of 5th PZA and 6th SS PZA was countered by 1st Army not 3rd. Patton did a remarkable work once called for by Ike, still he was planning his own offensive to avoid 3rd Army units to be sent to the north. He was upset that 10th AD was took from him to VIII Corps, finally a wise decision form either Ike or Bradley as with 7th and remnants of 9th AD, Americans force could only count on three armored division for almost first week of offensive. The British XXX Corps also played a key role guarding Meuse northwest crossings, freeing US units to be engaged in another place (especially 3rd AD and 30th ID).

LC

Heheh

I know [:)]

I was just being factitious [:D]

Cheers!

Are you now saying Patton didn't actually win the battle of the bulge?

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

Here are more views by a wide variety of writers about the decision to stop Patton from closing the Falaise Gap:

The Falaise Pocket

World War II Allied Encriclement of the German Armies. Failure or Success of the Allied Leadership and Planning?

Authors: DeLauder, Braden P.; MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA

Abstract: By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west to cut off the US forces to the south. Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. bate on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.

http://www.stormingmedia.us/05/0593/A059304.html

quote:

In August 1944 Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th U.S. Army Group, abruptly halted the advance of the XV Corps of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army. He thus prevented its movement northward through Argentan toward a juncture with Canadian forces coming south from Caen toward Falaise. As a consequence, the Allies failed to close the Argentan-Falaise pocket. The virtually surrounded German forces in Normandy, escaping through the Argentan-Falaise gap, avoided complete encirclement and almost certain destruction.

Why General Bradley made his decision and whether he was correct are questions that have stirred discussion ever since World War II.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_17.htm

quote:

When Patton died, an “official history” was indeed agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part lied about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission, and thus only he was above corruption. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve the Third Army, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/chapter.html

quote:

Yet the deepest problem with A Soldier's Life is that it really is not a soldier's life. One could make the argument that on key occasions—the approach to Brest, the closing of the Falaise Gap, the crossing of the Seine River, the August race to the Siegfried Line, the initial desire to go much deeper to the rear of the Bulge, and the decision to stop before Prague—thousands of lives might have been saved had superiors ceded to Patton's judgment. Such controversial and monumental decisions affected an entire theater; yet they warrant only a few pages in Hirshson's account and are overshadowed by stories of Patton's purported liaisons, insensitive language, and blinkered class biases. In lieu of in-depth military analysis, we get a few extended quotations from Chester Wilmot, B.H. Liddell Hart, and S.L.A. Marshall—none of whom is known for consistency, fairness, or sympathy to Patton.

http://victorhanson.com/Curiosities/Patton.html

quote:

Unlike the Falaise Gap in the West, where a too-cautious Bradley again did need heed Patton's calls to allow him to drive ahead and seal the trap shut, the Soviet commanders did not make the same mistake. No one got out of the Minsk pocket. The swamps and forests of Belorussia became a huge killing zone as Red Army forces and their partisan auxiliaries took their overdue but thorough revenge.

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:MpbkUDi6pb4J:washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040604-105429-7659r.htm+patton+falaise+gap&hl=en&lr=lang_en

quote:

D'Este's portrayal of some of the other leading figures in World War II is most revealing. Contrary to his popular designation as "the GI General" (thanks to the work of Ernie Pyle), General Omar Bradley, who would later win five stars and a rank as General of the Army, is shown to be quite mercurial and a martinet. Contrary to what was shown in Patton, Bradley despised Patton, and sought to undercut him at every turn. When Bradley and Patton were allies, it was mostly out of convenience--at times when Bradley did not know Patton well enough to dislike him, or when Bradley and Patton had a mutual interest in opposing the actions of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. While Patton was feared as a tough boss, it was actually Bradley who sacked more commanders under his authority, while Patton was in favor of letting his commanders have more of a chance to prove themselves. And Bradley is severely criticized for his indecision and timidity as a commander, particularly in his performance at the Battle of the Falaise Gap--a battle where Patton's genius for warfare and boldness in command would have likely served the Allies better.

http://www.pejmanesque.com/archives/002773.html

quote:

Of course, Patton did commit some terrible and astonishing blunders as an American military commander. As D'Este points out, Patton's extensive study of military history should have alerted him to the folly of conducting siege warfare during the Lorraine campaign--when Third Army's rapid progress came to a near complete halt thanks to dreadful weather conditions, and Patton's inability to adjust to them. While the target city of Metz eventually fell to Third Army, Patton's leadership was scorned as "weak and timid," and cited as the major reason why German forces were able to hold out so long. Then there was the raid on a German POW camp in Hammelburg--a raid which cost many American lives due to poor planning and execution, and which was likely conducted because Patton learned that Lt. Col. John Knight Waters--Patton's son-in-law--was interned at the camp.

quote:

Questionable leadership and strategy were abundant during these operations, but never was the courage and bravery of the Canadian soldier questioned. Problems were not limited to the Canadians though. The German counterattack at Mortain can only be considered a monumental failure. Bradley stopping Patton at Argentan was the classic error committed in the Normandy campaign. In protecting the strong, fresh American army which could have been in Falaise a day or two after they reached Argentan, Bradley lost a chance for a quick conclusion to the campaign.

http://www.nwha.org/news_2Q2003/news_page5.html

quote:

George S. Patton was a disaster as a proconsul in postwar Bavaria. Yet Eisenhower and Bradley — nicer, steadier, and more judicious men both — failed to close the Falaise Gap, unwisely restrained Patton at the Seine River and near the German border, and employed orthodoxy, not creativity, at the Battle of the Bulge. Thank God that both of them, and not Patton, later became fixtures of American government; but weep for the thousands of GIs dead because they, and not Patton, ruled the American battlefield in Europe.

http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hansonprint011102.html

quote:

Yenne also briefly addresses the controversial decision to halt Patton’s columns at Falaise and wait for the Canadian First Army to close the encirclement of the bulk of the German Seventh Army that COBRA and the eventual British-Canadian breakout produced. Eventually, Bradley was ready to change his mind just as the Canadian forces broke through to close the gap. Ostensibly, the decision was made in order to avoid fratricide between the two converging Allied armies. Had Patton been allowed to continue, the Falaise Gap would have probably been closed in hours rather than days. As it was, tens of thousands of German troops escaped during the delay.

http://members.aol.com/TFGrantel/books/cobra.html

quote:

But by that time, what could have been a great encirclement echoing some of the pivotal battles on the Eastern Front had become something less-a victory, but one qualified by the number of German forces that had been able to flee through the gap. The fact that enemy forces did escape outraged American commanders, from the even-tempered Eisenhower and Bradley to the mercurial Patton. They saw it as yet another example of bad generalship by Montgomery, who pressured the pocket's western end, squeezing the Germans out eastward like a tube of toothpaste, rather than capping the open gap. Patton, ever aggressive, pleaded with Bradley for clearance to cut across the narrow gap, in front of retreating German forces, from Argentan north to Falaise. But Bradley wisely demurred, recognizing that the outnumbered Americans might be "trampled" by the German divisions racing for the gap. "I much preferred," Bradley recollected subsequently, "a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise."

http://www.ehistory.com/wwii/books/d-day1944/0035.cfm

quote:

Featherston, a journalist with the Durham, N.C., Herald-Sun , reviews the controversy over Gen. Omar Bradley's failure to close the gap, a measure that would have encircled large German formations in France and shortened the war. Two German armies escaped through the so-called Falaise Gap but, as the author points out, the Allies took 50,000 prisoners and counted 10,000 enemy dead.

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:aldkXZT02O0J:www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0891416625%3Fv%3Dglance+failure+to+close+the+falaise+gap&hl=en&lr=lang_en

quote:

Blumenson points out that, though Bradley created the opportunity to destroy much of the German armored force west of the Seine, he marched to the Army Group boundary and waited. In the meantime, the Canadians found the going hard and could not close the gap between themselves and the Americans. Instead of requesting a boundary change and attacking to close the gap, Bradley shifted part of XV Corps, which had reached the boundary south of Argentan, east toward the Seine. Thus, on August 17, at the moment of crisis, U.S. side forces were not positioned to close the gap, and the Canadians still had not reached the boundary. Without spelling it out, Blumenson arrays the facts and demonstrates clearly that the Allies missed an opportunity. In the end, confusion on both sides, an uncharacteristic lack of supervision by Montgomery, Bradley's movement toward the Seine and determined efforts by the Germans produced the first phase of what the Germans called the Miracle in the West.

http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/(reviews)/20014?OpenDocument

quote:

The Germans now tried to stop the allies’ advance. Against his generals’ advice, Hitler ordered 11 of his best divisions to attack the allies. Patton then went in one huge sweep behind all of the German armies, encircling them between two cities, known as Falaise and Argentan. Patton’s Third Army was at Falaise, and Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was north of Argentan.

In one of the most stupid decisions of the war, Patton was ordered to halt at Falaise and wait for Montgomery to close the gap between the two cities. It took Montgomery 2 weeks to close the gap, during which most of the German divisions escaped. Had Patton been allowed to close the gap, the war would have ended in August 1944. There would have never been an “East Germany” and a Communist dominated Eastern Europe. Thousands of Jewish lives would also have been saved.

http://www.barbaraboland.com/_wsn/page3.html

quote:

Operations Tractable and Cobra's pursuit are splendid examples of Allied armor at its operational best and strategic worst. Despite inspiring accomplishments by individual divisions and corps, the dynamic maneuver and total victory offered by Patton's U.S. Third Army were to be rejected by the conservative Bradley.

http://stonebooks.com/archives/010916.shtml

quote:

In general, Axis and Allied armies mirrored basic principles, but the Germans were considered better led

quote:

While Patton and Manton Eddy stumbled in Lorraine,

quote:

Rickard acknowledges Patton's strengths and often highlights occasions on which Patton's perception of the larger campaign -- and his plans for exploiting the situation -- made more sense than the plans of superiors. Still, in what is mostly a fair and balanced analysis, Patton receives considerable criticism for his handling of the Lorraine campaign and the costly, clumsy initial attacks against Metz in particular. Among Rickard's verdicts:


Patton failed to heed intelligence warnings of enemy capabilities
He continued to rely on failed plans after they had proved unworkable
On a number of occasions he failed to clearly state his intentions and coordinate his subordinates
He neglected to take into account his own shortages of manpower, equipment, and air support
He incorrectly maintained his focus on assaulting Metz rather than masking it
In summary:


Patton was still on probation [after the slapping incidents in Sicily] when he entered Lorraine... Eisenhower still deemed it essential that he be kept under control. Bradley was Patton's greatest restraint....
The result was caution on Patton's part....

Although he regained some of his swagger after the success of the Normandy campaign, Patton certainly never brought his full improvisational style to bear in Lorraine. But excuses cannot be made for his failure to make sound tactical decisions. His difficulties were produced by a failure to sometimes face the obvious but also due to the incompatibility of his established battle philosophy with battle conditions in Lorraine, particularly his concepts of minimal interference and utilization of speed. However, had he not abandoned his most cherished concept, that of avoiding the enemy's main strength, his operations might have been far more successful.

Rickard's is a very analytical, somewhat dry account of Patton's decision-making in Lorraine. Some readers who consider Patton a genius and a hero might feel he is unfairly tarnished here, but most students of the war will welcome this detailed re-evaluation of a less spectacular aspect of the general's career. Also features some very comprehensive order of battle information plus data on casualties, replacements, and equipment losses in the appendices.

Recommended.

quote:

Heheh

Most of the reviews about Whiting say he is a poor writer - heheh

Can't you read?

Those reviews do all the talking for me.

When some who claims to be an historian (and who you quote), writes a book criticzing Patton, and also turns out to use another name to write pulp fiction novels praising the SS, then I will take a second look at him.

You seem to be highly critical of Patton or anyone pro-Patton, but Whiting's many writing lives seems to suit you just fine.

That tells me a great deal about your critical thinking skills. Heheh

Nooo, you're not critical of Patton, whatsoever. . .


< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/13/2004 1:22:49 AM >

quote:

Here are examples from Montgomery’s life that prove that Montgomery was a bitter, vindictive man with an ambition that far outpaced his talents.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Have you coped these into the record on an earlier page? Weren't we treated to this enlightenment on page 5?

quote:

Here are more views by a wide variety of writers about the decision to stop Patton from closing the Falaise Gap:

The Falaise Pocket

World War II Allied Encriclement of the German Armies. Failure or Success of the Allied Leadership and Planning?

Authors: DeLauder, Braden P.; MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA

Abstract: By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west to cut off the US forces to the south. Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. bate on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.

http://www.stormingmedia.us/05/0593/A059304.html

No discussion of German resistance around Argentan, or the fierce firefights between first Army and German forces retreating from Mortain in the days before 3rd Army reached Argentan. No discussion of the vulnerability of Haislips troops out on a limb as they were. He does not stop to consider these items (if only to dismiss them). He also states the problems were caused by lack of communication. Bradley ordered Patton to stop, where is the communication problem there? Patton got the order and stopped. No discussion of the long versus short hook controversy either. He also seems to fall victim to this number being bandied about that 75000 Germans excaped. I'm fairly sure Blumenson, D'Este and Hastings put the numbers closer to 20000, most of who'm got out with just the shirt on their back. Many of the escapees, who Patton could not have stopped were the rear area troops. I understand about 100 tanks reached safety out of some 10 Panzer Divisons (if memory serves) whose total TOE (roughly guestimated and rounding down a little) would have been over 1500 tanks plus assault guns.

quote:

In August 1944 Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th U.S. Army Group, abruptly halted the advance of the XV Corps of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army. He thus prevented its movement northward through Argentan toward a juncture with Canadian forces coming south from Caen toward Falaise. As a consequence, the Allies failed to close the Argentan-Falaise pocket. The virtually surrounded German forces in Normandy, escaping through the Argentan-Falaise gap, avoided complete encirclement and almost certain destruction.

Why General Bradley made his decision and whether he was correct are questions that have stirred discussion ever since World War II.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_17.htm

Merely stating the obvious, the question has stirred discussion ever since. When you look at what actually happened to the German army, though, it was wasn't far short of destruction, so I feel he's making more of this than is required.

quote:

When Patton died, an “official history” was indeed agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part lied about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission, and thus only he was above corruption. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve the Third Army, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

http://www.pattonuncovered.com/html/chapter.html

This is Patton uncovered, a work discredited by D'Este in "Decision in Normandy". It strikes me as about as unbalanced a piece as it is possible to write. No competent or even incompetent writer could believe that Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed an official version of events between them after the war. Have you actually read what they said about each other after the war? As Ambrose said, Eisenhower's response to Monty's memoirs was to try and get two weeks off being President of the United States in order to write a point by point rebuttal. This is borderline paranoia and not history at all.

quote:

Yet the deepest problem with A Soldier's Life is that it really is not a soldier's life. One could make the argument that on key occasions—the approach to Brest, the closing of the Falaise Gap, the crossing of the Seine River, the August race to the Siegfried Line, the initial desire to go much deeper to the rear of the Bulge, and the decision to stop before Prague—thousands of lives might have been saved had superiors ceded to Patton's judgment. Such controversial and monumental decisions affected an entire theater; yet they warrant only a few pages in Hirshson's account and are overshadowed by stories of Patton's purported liaisons, insensitive language, and blinkered class biases. In lieu of in-depth military analysis, we get a few extended quotations from Chester Wilmot, B.H. Liddell Hart, and S.L.A. Marshall—none of whom is known for consistency, fairness, or sympathy to Patton.

http://victorhanson.com/Curiosities/Patton.html

More decent writers rubbished because they didn't like Patton. Liddell Hart is often stated (but not usually by me) as one of the Father's of modern armoured warfare. Why would his opinion of the great armoured commander not be valid?

I don't know Hanson, except his bio lists him as a professor of Classics. His review of Hirshon's work also relates that most of Hirshon's criticisms were derived from a new source, General Wood, who commanded Patton's 4th Armoured. Anyone have a precis of these criticisms, I haven't come across them.

quote:

Unlike the Falaise Gap in the West, where a too-cautious Bradley again did need heed Patton's calls to allow him to drive ahead and seal the trap shut, the Soviet commanders did not make the same mistake. No one got out of the Minsk pocket. The swamps and forests of Belorussia became a huge killing zone as Red Army forces and their partisan auxiliaries took their overdue but thorough revenge.

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:MpbkUDi6pb4J:washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040604-105429-7659r.htm+patton+falaise+gap&hl=en&lr=lang_en

I'm not sure what this article is. It lookks like journalism. The main thrust of the article is that nothing done in the west was very big at all. It suggests Patton's mad dash across France worked because there were no Germans standing in his way. Leaving aside some of the generalisations about Russian operational doctrine, it actually says very little about Patton. It also has no depth whatsoever, so it's difficult to know why the author writes what he does.

quote:

D'Este's portrayal of some of the other leading figures in World War II is most revealing. Contrary to his popular designation as "the GI General" (thanks to the work of Ernie Pyle), General Omar Bradley, who would later win five stars and a rank as General of the Army, is shown to be quite mercurial and a martinet. Contrary to what was shown in Patton, Bradley despised Patton, and sought to undercut him at every turn. When Bradley and Patton were allies, it was mostly out of convenience--at times when Bradley did not know Patton well enough to dislike him, or when Bradley and Patton had a mutual interest in opposing the actions of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. While Patton was feared as a tough boss, it was actually Bradley who sacked more commanders under his authority, while Patton was in favor of letting his commanders have more of a chance to prove themselves. And Bradley is severely criticized for his indecision and timidity as a commander, particularly in his performance at the Battle of the Falaise Gap--a battle where Patton's genius for warfare and boldness in command would have likely served the Allies better.

http://www.pejmanesque.com/archives/002773.html

I had a look at this site, you mysteriously forgot to quote this paragraph which was located just above the one you have quoted. I have kindly reproduced it below.

quote:

Of course, Patton did commit some terrible and astonishing blunders as an American military commander. As D'Este points out, Patton's extensive study of military history should have alerted him to the folly of conducting siege warfare during the Lorraine campaign--when Third Army's rapid progress came to a near complete halt thanks to dreadful weather conditions, and Patton's inability to adjust to them. While the target city of Metz eventually fell to Third Army, Patton's leadership was scorned as "weak and timid," and cited as the major reason why German forces were able to hold out so long. Then there was the raid on a German POW camp in Hammelburg--a raid which cost many American lives due to poor planning and execution, and which was likely conducted because Patton learned that Lt. Col. John Knight Waters--Patton's son-in-law--was interned at the camp.

Next:

quote:

Questionable leadership and strategy were abundant during these operations, but never was the courage and bravery of the Canadian soldier questioned. Problems were not limited to the Canadians though. The German counterattack at Mortain can only be considered a monumental failure. Bradley stopping Patton at Argentan was the classic error committed in the Normandy campaign. In protecting the strong, fresh American army which could have been in Falaise a day or two after they reached Argentan, Bradley lost a chance for a quick conclusion to the campaign.

http://www.nwha.org/news_2Q2003/news_page5.html

This one comes from a re-enactors website. The pictures are nice if you go to the next page.

quote:

George S. Patton was a disaster as a proconsul in postwar Bavaria. Yet Eisenhower and Bradley — nicer, steadier, and more judicious men both — failed to close the Falaise Gap, unwisely restrained Patton at the Seine River and near the German border, and employed orthodoxy, not creativity, at the Battle of the Bulge. Thank God that both of them, and not Patton, later became fixtures of American government; but weep for the thousands of GIs dead because they, and not Patton, ruled the American battlefield in Europe.

http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hansonprint011102.html

More from our friend Hanson. This paragraph comes from an article about the war on terror. No analysis, literally just what has been produced. It isn't evidence.

quote:

Yenne also briefly addresses the controversial decision to halt Patton’s columns at Falaise and wait for the Canadian First Army to close the encirclement of the bulk of the German Seventh Army that COBRA and the eventual British-Canadian breakout produced. Eventually, Bradley was ready to change his mind just as the Canadian forces broke through to close the gap. Ostensibly, the decision was made in order to avoid fratricide between the two converging Allied armies. Had Patton been allowed to continue, the Falaise Gap would have probably been closed in hours rather than days. As it was, tens of thousands of German troops escaped during the delay.

http://members.aol.com/TFGrantel/books/cobra.html

This is a wargamer, I think, reviewing a book that he clearly demonstrates is full of factual errors elsewhere in this short piece. I turned off where he said that the decision was made to avoid fratricide. Bradley's opinions are a matter of record as to why he did it. I'm not aware of any serious historian who believes this to be the case.

quote:

But by that time, what could have been a great encirclement echoing some of the pivotal battles on the Eastern Front had become something less-a victory, but one qualified by the number of German forces that had been able to flee through the gap. The fact that enemy forces did escape outraged American commanders, from the even-tempered Eisenhower and Bradley to the mercurial Patton. They saw it as yet another example of bad generalship by Montgomery, who pressured the pocket's western end, squeezing the Germans out eastward like a tube of toothpaste, rather than capping the open gap. Patton, ever aggressive, pleaded with Bradley for clearance to cut across the narrow gap, in front of retreating German forces, from Argentan north to Falaise. But Bradley wisely demurred, recognizing that the outnumbered Americans might be "trampled" by the German divisions racing for the gap. "I much preferred," Bradley recollected subsequently, "a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise."

http://www.ehistory.com/wwii/books/d-day1944/0035.cfm

Didn't bother to read this as it supports me. It looks more detailed than the others, though.

quote:

Featherston, a journalist with the Durham, N.C., Herald-Sun , reviews the controversy over Gen. Omar Bradley's failure to close the gap, a measure that would have encircled large German formations in France and shortened the war. Two German armies escaped through the so-called Falaise Gap but, as the author points out, the Allies took 50,000 prisoners and counted 10,000 enemy dead.

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:aldkXZT02O0J:www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0891416625%3Fv%3Dglance+failure+to+close+the+falaise+gap&hl=en&lr=lang_en

Another one that demonstrates that Falaise wasn't actually all that bad.

quote:

Blumenson points out that, though Bradley created the opportunity to destroy much of the German armored force west of the Seine, he marched to the Army Group boundary and waited. In the meantime, the Canadians found the going hard and could not close the gap between themselves and the Americans. Instead of requesting a boundary change and attacking to close the gap, Bradley shifted part of XV Corps, which had reached the boundary south of Argentan, east toward the Seine. Thus, on August 17, at the moment of crisis, U.S. side forces were not positioned to close the gap, and the Canadians still had not reached the boundary. Without spelling it out, Blumenson arrays the facts and demonstrates clearly that the Allies missed an opportunity. In the end, confusion on both sides, an uncharacteristic lack of supervision by Montgomery, Bradley's movement toward the Seine and determined efforts by the Germans produced the first phase of what the Germans called the Miracle in the West.

http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/(reviews)/20014?OpenDocument

Blumenson is a little more complicated than this, but this author doesn't suggest Patton could have closed the gap, because Bradley moved him onto the Seine. He doesn't support anyone.

quote:

The Germans now tried to stop the allies’ advance. Against his generals’ advice, Hitler ordered 11 of his best divisions to attack the allies. Patton then went in one huge sweep behind all of the German armies, encircling them between two cities, known as Falaise and Argentan. Patton’s Third Army was at Falaise, and Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was north of Argentan.

In one of the most stupid decisions of the war, Patton was ordered to halt at Falaise and wait for Montgomery to close the gap between the two cities. It took Montgomery 2 weeks to close the gap, during which most of the German divisions escaped. Had Patton been allowed to close the gap, the war would have ended in August 1944. There would have never been an “East Germany” and a Communist dominated Eastern Europe. Thousands of Jewish lives would also have been saved.

http://www.barbaraboland.com/_wsn/page3.html

Our old friend the General Patton homepage.

Also nonsense. Patton's third Army wasn't at Falaise, it was outside Argentan and then just his XV Corp was positioned outside it. His other Corp was initially miles away.

Kevinugly also makes some very relevant comments about the division of Germany and the state of the German divisions inside the Falaise pocket. This description has little basis in reality.

quote:

Operations Tractable and Cobra's pursuit are splendid examples of Allied armor at its operational best and strategic worst. Despite inspiring accomplishments by individual divisions and corps, the dynamic maneuver and total victory offered by Patton's U.S. Third Army were to be rejected by the conservative Bradley.

http://stonebooks.com/archives/010916.shtml

The one book that may be salvageable from the list, although it's a review so impossible to know what the author is saaying in it's entireity. He does say, though:

quote:

In general, Axis and Allied armies mirrored basic principles, but the Germans were considered better led

He evidently doesn't consider Patton a genius.

quote:

While Patton and Manton Eddy stumbled in Lorraine,

He also repeats the nonsense about Monty being responsible for Falaise, which rather puts me off, although since his book is essentially about the employment of armour, he might be forgiven for stumbling himself on operational matters. There is also an interesting link contained within this review to another book about Patton, this time focusing on the fighting in Lorraine. The reviewer writes:

quote:

Rickard acknowledges Patton's strengths and often highlights occasions on which Patton's perception of the larger campaign -- and his plans for exploiting the situation -- made more sense than the plans of superiors. Still, in what is mostly a fair and balanced analysis, Patton receives considerable criticism for his handling of the Lorraine campaign and the costly, clumsy initial attacks against Metz in particular. Among Rickard's verdicts:


Patton failed to heed intelligence warnings of enemy capabilities
He continued to rely on failed plans after they had proved unworkable
On a number of occasions he failed to clearly state his intentions and coordinate his subordinates
He neglected to take into account his own shortages of manpower, equipment, and air support
He incorrectly maintained his focus on assaulting Metz rather than masking it
In summary:


Patton was still on probation [after the slapping incidents in Sicily] when he entered Lorraine... Eisenhower still deemed it essential that he be kept under control. Bradley was Patton's greatest restraint....
The result was caution on Patton's part....

Although he regained some of his swagger after the success of the Normandy campaign, Patton certainly never brought his full improvisational style to bear in Lorraine. But excuses cannot be made for his failure to make sound tactical decisions. His difficulties were produced by a failure to sometimes face the obvious but also due to the incompatibility of his established battle philosophy with battle conditions in Lorraine, particularly his concepts of minimal interference and utilization of speed. However, had he not abandoned his most cherished concept, that of avoiding the enemy's main strength, his operations might have been far more successful.

Rickard's is a very analytical, somewhat dry account of Patton's decision-making in Lorraine. Some readers who consider Patton a genius and a hero might feel he is unfairly tarnished here, but most students of the war will welcome this detailed re-evaluation of a less spectacular aspect of the general's career. Also features some very comprehensive order of battle information plus data on casualties, replacements, and equipment losses in the appendices.

Recommended.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

I had a look at this site, you mysteriously forgot to quote this paragraph which was located just above the one you have quoted. I have kindly reproduced it below.

quote:

Of course, Patton did commit some terrible and astonishing blunders as an American military commander. As D'Este points out, Patton's extensive study of military history should have alerted him to the folly of conducting siege warfare during the Lorraine campaign--when Third Army's rapid progress came to a near complete halt thanks to dreadful weather conditions, and Patton's inability to adjust to them. While the target city of Metz eventually fell to Third Army, Patton's leadership was scorned as "weak and timid," and cited as the major reason why German forces were able to hold out so long. Then there was the raid on a German POW camp in Hammelburg--a raid which cost many American lives due to poor planning and execution, and which was likely conducted because Patton learned that Lt. Col. John Knight Waters--Patton's son-in-law--was interned at the camp.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Whiting is irrelevant to the argument. Bearing in mind that the Pro-Patton sources include the Patton homepage and Patton uncovered [8|] I find the criticism of him a little strange and possibly an attempt to get us away from his argument, which is the same argument used by other historians whose credentials have so far not been challenged.

As for:

quote:

As I mentioned, no one has to approach Whiting with a critical mind if they choose not too.

What is interesting is that you chose this man to approach with a critical mind (presumably because he also writes fiction and you felt you could poke fun), if that is the case, fine, I'm happy to withdraw him, (although citing customer reviews from Amazon does not class as expert review in my book) as long as you now analyse the reputations of Weigley, Hastings, D'Este, Ellis and Neillands. What do you know of these people, do they know what they are talking about, which serious historians (not websites, anyone can set one of these up and ramble on) will you cite in opposition to these men. We can then assess reputations and the various arguments.

For the record, as you seem to have brought the Atlantic into it,

quote:

But I fiind it rather odd that people from Britain have diametrically opposed views on this subject vs North Americans.

This difference seems to be due to the books we are reading.

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

I find it interesting that it is Whiting who is writing about this "new" information about the Battle of the Bulge. It is also Whiting that many from the UK are using for their information.

I am just putting this information out there for others to consider.

D'Este and Weigley are North Americans, not British. Whiting had nothing "new" to say about the Bulge, he merely had a new interpretation. The section I quoted was not about an attack he had "discovered" of Patton's, merely he agreed with what a number of distinguished historians had already said. Since I have read many of the above sources in question, and you are yet to confirm which of the standard histories you have read we cannot say with any certainty that...

quote:

This difference seems to be due to the books we are reading.

As for

quote:

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

I wholeheartedly agree with you, hence my quoting of D'Este, Weigley, Hastings and Ellis etc. If we are fair, you started by quoting extensively from the Patton homepage [8|] and Patton uncovered, a site which peddles a book by Rohmer which D'Este discredited in his "Decision in Normandy". D'Este is the historian you think fair and balanced, who wrote the Patton biography, so he isn't some Brit who can be accused of writing rubbish and publishing novels about the Waffen SS under another name.

As I've said, Whiting is a very small cog in my argument, but paying him excessive attention, you give the impression of not wanting to look at the other bigger cogs. I freely withdraw Whiting if it means you will instead move on to the others.

Respect and regards,
IronDuke

Could you make this clearer?

quote:

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

I don't assume it to be the final truth, merely the best theory and interpretation based on current evidence. I also bring these other authors up to emphasise the weight of quality scholarship that doesn't agree with the "Patton could have won a great victory at Falaise" or the "Patton won the bulge" point of view. History doesn't really provide final truths, just best guesses, and the evidence at the moment makes the above scholars say the things they have, things I have quoted in my support.

I would prefer to shift to the events themselves. Lets discuss Haislip's Corp at Argentan and whether it could have closed the gap, lets analyse Pattons drive on Bastogne and whether he should have made greater progress than he did. We can agree some basic facts (without interpretation) and then debate???
I can say why I think it was unlikely, you can tell me why you think it was likely? Easier than quoting other people extensively.

I would also ask for your comments and thoughts into other parts of his career. The slapping incidents, some of his speeches, the war crimes allegations and the episode at Hammelburg in March 45. I by no means have a negative attitude about him concerning all these incidents, but as the relative lowlights of his career, any discussion of his greatness must take them into account.

Regards,
IronDuke

So what are you trying to say?

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Whiting is irrelevant to the argument. Bearing in mind that the Pro-Patton sources include the Patton homepage and Patton uncovered [8|] I find the criticism of him a little strange and possibly an attempt to get us away from his argument, which is the same argument used by other historians whose credentials have so far not been challenged.

As for:

quote:

As I mentioned, no one has to approach Whiting with a critical mind if they choose not too.

What is interesting is that you chose this man to approach with a critical mind (presumably because he also writes fiction and you felt you could poke fun), if that is the case, fine, I'm happy to withdraw him, (although citing customer reviews from Amazon does not class as expert review in my book) as long as you now analyse the reputations of Weigley, Hastings, D'Este, Ellis and Neillands. What do you know of these people, do they know what they are talking about, which serious historians (not websites, anyone can set one of these up and ramble on) will you cite in opposition to these men. We can then assess reputations and the various arguments.

For the record, as you seem to have brought the Atlantic into it,

quote:

But I fiind it rather odd that people from Britain have diametrically opposed views on this subject vs North Americans.

This difference seems to be due to the books we are reading.

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

I find it interesting that it is Whiting who is writing about this "new" information about the Battle of the Bulge. It is also Whiting that many from the UK are using for their information.

I am just putting this information out there for others to consider.

D'Este and Weigley are North Americans, not British. Whiting had nothing "new" to say about the Bulge, he merely had a new interpretation. The section I quoted was not about an attack he had "discovered" of Patton's, merely he agreed with what a number of distinguished historians had already said. Since I have read many of the above sources in question, and you are yet to confirm which of the standard histories you have read we cannot say with any certainty that...

quote:

This difference seems to be due to the books we are reading.

As for

quote:

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

I wholeheartedly agree with you, hence my quoting of D'Este, Weigley, Hastings and Ellis etc. If we are fair, you started by quoting extensively from the Patton homepage [8|] and Patton uncovered, a site which peddles a book by Rohmer which D'Este discredited in his "Decision in Normandy". D'Este is the historian you think fair and balanced, who wrote the Patton biography, so he isn't some Brit who can be accused of writing rubbish and publishing novels about the Waffen SS under another name.

As I've said, Whiting is a very small cog in my argument, but paying him excessive attention, you give the impression of not wanting to look at the other bigger cogs. I freely withdraw Whiting if it means you will instead move on to the others.

Respect and regards,
IronDuke

Could you make this clearer?

My pleasure:

1. You have criticised the minor historian in my group, but conveniently ignored the most important ones. Why?

2. Can we discuss actual operations to sort this out?

3. You're wrong about the Atlantic. Half my eminent historians are American. People from all countries have problems with General Patton.

4. Why do you say

quote:

Therefore, the quality of the writer, and the facts they write about, are very important.

and then quote inaccuracies as fundamental as where Patton was at Falaise gap from the Patton fan sites?

5. I will freely withdraw Whiting if you will analyse the reputations of the other Historians I have mentioned.

Regards,
Ironduke

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

I don't assume it to be the final truth, merely the best theory and interpretation based on current evidence. I also bring these other authors up to emphasise the weight of quality scholarship that doesn't agree with the "Patton could have won a great victory at Falaise" or the "Patton won the bulge" point of view. History doesn't really provide final truths, just best guesses, and the evidence at the moment makes the above scholars say the things they have, things I have quoted in my support.

I would prefer to shift to the events themselves. Lets discuss Haislip's Corp at Argentan and whether it could have closed the gap, lets analyse Pattons drive on Bastogne and whether he should have made greater progress than he did. We can agree some basic facts (without interpretation) and then debate???
I can say why I think it was unlikely, you can tell me why you think it was likely? Easier than quoting other people extensively.

I would also ask for your comments and thoughts into other parts of his career. The slapping incidents, some of his speeches, the war crimes allegations and the episode at Hammelburg in March 45. I by no means have a negative attitude about him concerning all these incidents, but as the relative lowlights of his career, any discussion of his greatness must take them into account.

Regards,
IronDuke

So what are you trying to say?

1. All history is guesswork, but I have the best informed guessers on my side of the argument.

2. I challenged you to debate the operations at the centre of this argument aspect by aspect. Saying Patton broke through to Bastogne is not enough, lets discuss how he did it, what units he used etc.

3. I asked for you opinion about the slapping incidents, the Hammelburg raid, the war crimes allegations and the speeches.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank

http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASIN/1566563429/qid=1089699529/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i4_xgl14/302-5558800-4723244 : von Charles Whiting
Rezensionen

From Library Journal
These insightful new titles represent a good start to a unique travel series that attempts to re-create some of the fiercest and most critical battles of World War II through photographs, maps, eyewitness quotes, and captivating narratives. Shilleto (The Fighting Fifty-Second) and Tolhurst (The Battle of the Bulge) reconstruct the scenes and mood of the crucial battles of Normandy, France, and tell the reader where to go and how to get there, providing information on museums, monuments, cemeteries, memorials, and statues. Whiting, a distinguished military writer and historian who saw combat himself, describes battles in which the resolve of the Allies was tested and a revitalized German army emerged amidst an elaborate system of defenses, eventually loosing to a superior allied force. He captures the flow of events and sentiments as he guides the tourist through selected sites on a battlefront 400 miles long and 70 miles deep. Both guides retain a historical sensitivity that one hopes will be a hallmark of the entire series; even though they are intended for tourists, they still succeed in fully conveying the ordeal of combat. Historically enlightening, touristically informative, educational, thorough, and enjoyable, these books are recommended for all libraries.DEdward K. Owusu-Ansah, Murray State Univ. Lib., KY
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Deep Breakfast
It seems like Patton is considered one of the great US heros but I am having trouble finding anything he did tactically or strategically great. It just seems to this amateur WWII buff that if you look at Manstein, Rommel, Montgomery, or Konev they did things that were true feats and Patton just pushed back a defeated army faster than the rest out of pure gusto and agressiveness rather than military genius.

Any comments?

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke
I suspect Patton would have fared a lot worse in more even circumstances. In his favour, he was exceptionally aggressive (not a trait shared by Allied Commanders on the whole) and he had the sort of drive and push that inspires men. I think an Armoured Corp was the command he was born for, give him an objective and let him loose.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank

http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASIN/1566563429/qid=1089699529/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i4_xgl14/302-5558800-4723244 : von Charles Whiting
Rezensionen

From Library Journal
These insightful new titles represent a good start to a unique travel series that attempts to re-create some of the fiercest and most critical battles of World War II through photographs, maps, eyewitness quotes, and captivating narratives. Shilleto (The Fighting Fifty-Second) and Tolhurst (The Battle of the Bulge) reconstruct the scenes and mood of the crucial battles of Normandy, France, and tell the reader where to go and how to get there, providing information on museums, monuments, cemeteries, memorials, and statues. Whiting, a distinguished military writer and historian who saw combat himself, describes battles in which the resolve of the Allies was tested and a revitalized German army emerged amidst an elaborate system of defenses, eventually loosing to a superior allied force. He captures the flow of events and sentiments as he guides the tourist through selected sites on a battlefront 400 miles long and 70 miles deep. Both guides retain a historical sensitivity that one hopes will be a hallmark of the entire series; even though they are intended for tourists, they still succeed in fully conveying the ordeal of combat. Historically enlightening, touristically informative, educational, thorough, and enjoyable, these books are recommended for all libraries.DEdward K. Owusu-Ansah, Murray State Univ. Lib., KY
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Heheh

By the way, what is written above is NOT a review. It's just a publication press release.

I find it odd that as Leo Kessler, Whiting will write cheap pulp fiction novels praising the Waffen SS, and then don his Charles Whiting persona, and write a book critical of General George Patton. Yes, Patton, the man the German High Command feared the most. . .

And as Leo Kessler he again writes a novel called "Kill Patton!"

Isn't that odd. . .?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank

Would it have worked on the Eastern Front?