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mdiehl -> (2/28/2002 5:50:00 AM)

TIMJOT - I know you said major. I thre in the minors to show how often the US public was led to start a war w/o a major incident to inspire the general wroth. I'm not sure we can discount the Plains wars. They involved a lot of money, alot of cavalry, most of the US army in-being, and covered alot of ground. The Spanish American war is very interesting because of the parallels with WW2. The Maine incident, although unintentional, became a cause celebre in the press. I guess we agree that a similar incident... the loss of a major US capitol ship (not the Panay) with major casualties would have been enough to pull the trigger in the public's mind. Roosevelt would not have been above letting such an incident happen. The Revolution. The British did not necessarily fire the first shot. It's not clear who did. At Lexington Green the militia and a British company were at an armed standoff. The British orders were to disperse the crowd and sieze an arms cache. The crown's investigators found no one who claimed giving an order to fire, nor could they find any British soldier who remembered receiving such an order until the shots were already in the air. The British co then withdrew, but was attacked en route by more American militia firing from ambush circumstances. A rather minor mole hill as incidents go, that later became a mountain. Hardly on the scale of Pearl Harbor but in the end it did not matter. The tension was there. All that was wanting was an excuse, real or otherwise. But you can't lay the blame for the start of the actual combat on the Brits. From their point of view their job that day was to march to a couple of towns and secure the royal powder supply. They weren't supposed to engage or be engaged. Let's see. Oh yeah. Gulf of Tonkin. Used as an excuse to escalate a war in which the US was already engaged. Largely viewed as another suspicious circumstance. Gulf War. No attack on the US. Public sentiment whipped up just the same. There was no *prior* defense agreement with Kuwait. At the time Hussein thought he had GW's permission to invade Kuwait, since April Glaspie had given an ambiguous reply to Iraq's suggestion that it might attack Kuwait. Not even remotely construable as a major attack against the US. I'm not sure we're disagreeing about much. In all of the cases even minor incidents were used to justify a subsequent war. Would such a thing have happened in 1942 had the Japanese not attacked PH? I suspect so. [ February 27, 2002: Message edited by: mdiehl ]



TIMJOT -> (2/28/2002 6:08:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by mdiehl:
"Your P-40 statement is incorrect. The P-40 did not hold its own in the early pacific stages. It suffered badly in the PI, DIE, and NG precisely due to poor and incorrect tactics. US pilots initially tried to turn and dogfight with the much nimbler zeros and suffered the consequences. Only the AVG, where Chenault had trained his pilots in the dive and climb tactics. Which maximized the P-40s strengths in dive speed and firepower did the P-40 make a good account of itself early in the war." I may have mistaken your post for another. All in good intent. Regarding the PI, NEI and NG. The P40 series performed pretty credibly in New Guinea in many engagements (see "Fire in the Sky" ... by, uh, Eric Bergerud IIRC). The P40 had a couple of other strengths including that it was faster (max speed, level flight) and had a higher roll rate. The problem with the early engagements in NG (through April) was Port Moresby itself. The A/F there were in a very primitive state. Moreover, in the radar shadow of the major mtn range that separated it from the Japanese airbases, the lead time for getting aloft and in a position to use those a/c strengths against the Zekes was pretty short. The result was that the Japanese could attack in circumstances that gave the P40 drivers the choice between duking it out at slow speed in a turning duel (the Zeke's forte) or running away. They *ought* to have run away... at least initially, long enough to gain an altitude and speed advantage. So in a sense I'm not disputing you about learning from combat experience, but there were circumstances that (as in any air to air combat situtation) mitigated against success in early 1942 in New Guinea. Supply was another problem at the time. The PI is a different circumstance, I hope you might agree, because the logistical rope was completely broken, the USAAFFE were completely outnumbered, and many of their a/c were destroyed in the initial Japanese raids. Not because of poor combat tactics, but because on 8 December many of them were caught on the ground refueling after a protracted CAP patrol initiated by a false warning of an incoming raid. When you're outnumbered 5:1 or more, you're going to eventually get bounced or just ground down. You can call that bad strategy or poor communication or whatever, but it was much less an issue of pilot training than an issue of upper level management. Very few P40s saw combat in the NEI. IIRC, Langley was sunk ferrying crated P40s because the local colonial AF had so few first line a/c. Fokkers, F2s, and early US twin engined export bombers. I don't recall the models. If you search the web there are a couple of sites that give OOBs for the Netherland East Indies a/f in Dec 1941. Pretty shocking. IIRC there were a few brief engagements in the island barrier. In some of those circumstances the P40s dealt out considerably more punishment than they received and in others they were on the losing side. A whole lot seems to have depended on initial conditions in combat, and the pilots ability to recognize that the initial conditions were bad, and his willingness or ability to exit stage left under such circumstances. I think this is the area where Allied pilot wisdom and experience improved the most throughout the war. The ever increasing supply of better a/c, better radar, and better logistics increasingly put them in circumstances where they could control the initial conditions. Or they could run away and "reset" the conditions to be more favorable. Bear in mind that the USAAF was already heavily invested in the analysis of the results of A/A combat in the ETO by the end of 1940. The quality of US pilot training was very very good in 1941 and 1942. As the veterans were rotated into training duties (the forerunner to the USN Top Gun
school was started in 1942), US pilots increasingly came to have the training that made them perform like veterans. Good training can and does compensate for lack of *hot* combat experience. And there in a nutshell is the problem, incidently, with the old Grigsby Pacific War. A pilot with 1000 hours of experience is not 500 hours "better" than a pilot with 500 hours experience. If the guy with 500 hours experience or even no combat experience is well-enough trained to fly his a/c to its strengths, and if his plane is a better plane than the one flown by the fellow with 1000 hours experience, the rookie is going to tend (statistically) to win. As to "Everything short of war" uh, yeah, I agree. But increased lend-lease, increased fortification and buildup in the PI, increased A/F development would, I suspect, have led to a very rapid conflict. I suppose in a perfect world the Japanese might have prevented all units from ever attacking any American units, even though the US would have probably violated every "rule of war" regarding the conduct of neutrals (as we did in the Atlantic), but I don't believe it. Can you imagine how ticked the Japanese would have been if the US had declared a "mid-Pacific line" or an "Australian line" along which British or Australian merchantment would be guarded by the Pacific Fleet, as we did in the Atlantic? Can you imagine their reactino to a 20 mile neutrality zone aroyund the PI? Or "Dutch Lend Lease" with the US occupying the southern Indonisian barrier islands like Timor, Celebes or even Balikpapan? [ February 27, 2002: Message edited by: mdiehl ]
Mdiehl, I do agree with most your points. However the fact even if limited in number, there were head to head engagements with the P-40 and zero in both the PI and DEI. In fact there was one particular engagement over Java pittng over 50 p-40s and Hurricans against a like number of zeros. The P-40s and Hurricans were routed trying to dogfight with the zeros. By the time of NG the US had 6 months of combat expirence and had finally realized that trying to engage the zero without an altitude advantage was suicide.



TIMJOT -> (2/28/2002 10:34:00 AM)

mdiehl[QUOTEI'm not sure we're disagreeing about much. In all of the cases even minor incidents were used to justify a subsequent war. Would such a thing have happened in 1942 had the Japanese not attacked PH? I suspect so. ] [/QUOTE] No we dont disagree about much. All I said that an attack on the Brits and or Dutch in itself would not in all probablity automatically cause a declaration of war by the USA. As long as the Japanese refused to be baited they could forstall or at least delay direct conflict with the US. Personally I think after they had conquered Malaya and DIE they would not be able to resist attacking the PI which undoubtly would trigger war with the US.



mdiehl -> (2/28/2002 10:09:00 PM)

"Mdiehl, I do agree with most your points. However the fact even if limited in number, there were head to head engagements with the P-40 and zero in both the PI and DEI. In fact there was one particular engagement over Java pittng over 50 p-40s and Hurricans against a like number of zeros. The P-40s and Hurricans were routed trying to dogfight with the zeros." I'd really appreciate a reference to that because it sounds a little incredible. Not saying you're making it up. I'm sure you are recalling it from something read. I'm a little skeptical about it because I doubt that there were 50 operational P40s and Hurricanes at any time in Java. Also, the P40 and the Hurricane were *very* different cats and I have avoided discussing UK/Commonwealth pilots. The Hurricane was both slower and less maneuverable than the A6M. The P40 had the advantage of being a faster plane.



Ranger-75 -> (3/1/2002 2:58:00 AM)

You guys are pushin' all my buttons again From Timjot:
"Mdiehl, I do agree with most your points. However the fact even if limited in number, there were head to head engagements with the P-40 and zero in both the PI and DEI. In fact there was one particular engagement over Java pittng over 50 p-40s and Hurricanes against a like number of zeros. The P-40s and Hurricans were routed trying to dogfight with the zeros." These were not US or RAF pilots. You may recall that when Nagumo went foraying against Ceylon, that his strike was intercepted on its way back by RAF Hurricanes and sufferred severe losses. I agree that pilots need to use the strengths of their aircraft against the weaknesses of the enemy's aircraft, but when this was done, the Japanese air air ended up getting the short end of the stick, because of the fragility of their planes. As to the "highly experienced Japanese pilots". They were well trained, but the Imperial HQ refused to make accomodations in the pilot training program, so that even before Midway, the IJNAF had lost almost one year's worth of pilots. I'm tired of hearing of the "inexperienced US Navy" I'm an Army man and hate the Navy as much as anybody else, but the US Navy was far from inexperienced in 1939-1942. Except for new polits coming out of schools the pilots were well trained. The American commanders like Leslie, McKlusky, Massey, etc., were all long time veterans and were highly skilled in their professions. You didn't make Lt Commander in the prewar USN in a couple of years, these men all had 15 or more years of experience behind them. You also couldn't make Admiral in 5 years (except for Mountbatten, but that's another story). The real problem was not enough ships to make 3 or 4 carrier groups like the IJN used. Even the Japanese were never able to get their 6 CV first air fleet back together after PH, there was too much to do and not enough to do it with.



mdiehl -> (3/1/2002 5:33:00 AM)

Look, there's no doubting that pilots can make mistakes, even the best trained ones. Regarding the performance of the USN aviators and their training there's not much disputing that they gave as good as they got (Lundstrom has a book on this) in early 1942. There are a couple notable exceptions, Midway F2As being the most obvious one. Why F2As were sent rather than P40s or even P400s (they'd have been allright at low altitude) I'd be interested in finding out. My take on the notion of fantastic Japanese aerial supremacy is that "superior training" is being invoked when in most cases the initial conditions (bounced, destroyed on ground, or badly outnumbered) greatly favored the Japanese anyhow. But after a couple of inquiries on the web I can't find any accounts of large furballs between Hurricanes+P40s vs Zekes or even Oscars, TIMJOT. I'd still like to hear a references. More typical is the following disposition of 24 Hurricanes, sans oxygen systems, shipped to Batavia in December 1941: Uncrated and ready to fly, assigned to NEI (Dutch pilots) and combat ready on 16 February 1942. - 2 lost operationally in training
- 8 bounced by Oscars during their landing pattern in a redeployment to Kalidjati. Of these 1 otherwise undamaged struck a crater. 2 fled and escaped. 5 destroyed landing or on the ground. - 1 damaged and written off when its prop struck an IJN boat during a strafing run on the IJN landings at Bantam, pilot landed plane okay. Now *thats* pod racing! - 1 lost operationally the following day. - 6 burned to prevent capture. The NEI pilots are credited with 30 IJN a/c "destroyed or damaged." Given the fragility of IJN a/c, more likely the former in my unsubstantiated opinion, assuming that the 30 figure is not the usual inflated number. (In which case, probably should read 10 destroyed or probables). I've also found some stuff on the P40s waxed at Darwin in the first Darwin raid. Again it was, apparently, a bounce situation. 5 a/c flying cap bounced by Japanese fighters coming in high from Kendari, and a whole bunch more of P40s shot down over the runway as they were taking off. 1 shot down trying to dogfight with the Japanese in order to draw their attention away from an allied pilot who had bailed out and was still descending. The P40 was a write off but the pilot survived, and probably his action prevented the Japanese fighters from shooting up the guy in the parachute.



Ranger-75 -> (3/12/2002 12:05:08 PM)

mdiehl,

The reason that there were F2As (and SBU "vibrators" on Midway, is that these were Marine squadrons, not Army squadrons, The USN was "upgrading" the VMF and VMSB squadrons, but they hadn't finished yet. That's why there were both Buffaloes and Wildcats and both Dauntlesses and Vindicators (vibrators or wind indicators to their detractors). Up to this time, the USN, of which the USMC is part, didn't have a lot of combat references to draw upon as far as the older planes were concerned. They found out the hard way. After action reports made it clear that the F2A and SBU (and TBD) had to be IMMEDIATELY removed from front line service. This decision was actually taken during the last stages of the battle, when the 3 remainind Devastators of VT6 went along in the attacks against the mikuma and mogami. The standing orders were if even a peep of AA fire was encountered, the devastators were NOT to go into an attack. The AA guns on the two cruisers were still working and VT6 did not participate in the attack (this saving the pilots).

Wildcats gave better than they got throught their service carrer in the Pacific as did the Hurricane and P40 (when flown by RAF, RAAF or USAAF pilots).



TIMJOT -> (3/15/2002 4:42:39 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Look, there's no doubting that pilots can make mistakes, even the best trained ones. Regarding the performance of the USN aviators and their training there's not much disputing that they gave as good as they got (Lundstrom has a book on this) in early 1942. There are a couple notable exceptions, Midway F2As being the most obvious one. Why F2As were sent rather than P40s or even P400s (they'd have been allright at low altitude) I'd be interested in finding out. My take on the notion of fantastic Japanese aerial supremacy is that "superior training" is being invoked when in most cases the initial conditions (bounced, destroyed on ground, or badly outnumbered) greatly favored the Japanese anyhow.

But after a couple of inquiries on the web I can't find any accounts of large furballs between Hurricanes+P40s vs Zekes or even Oscars, TIMJOT. I'd still like to hear a references.

More typical is the following disposition of 24 Hurricanes, sans oxygen systems, shipped to Batavia in December 1941:

Uncrated and ready to fly, assigned to NEI (Dutch pilots) and combat ready on 16 February 1942.

- 2 lost operationally in training
- 8 bounced by Oscars during their landing pattern in a redeployment to Kalidjati. Of these 1 otherwise undamaged struck a crater. 2 fled and escaped. 5 destroyed landing or on the ground.

- 1 damaged and written off when its prop struck an IJN boat during a strafing run on the IJN landings at Bantam, pilot landed plane okay. Now *thats* pod racing!

- 1 lost operationally the following day.

- 6 burned to prevent capture.

The NEI pilots are credited with 30 IJN a/c "destroyed or damaged." Given the fragility of IJN a/c, more likely the former in my unsubstantiated opinion, assuming that the 30 figure is not the usual inflated number. (In which case, probably should read 10 destroyed or probables).

I've also found some stuff on the P40s waxed at Darwin in the first Darwin raid. Again it was, apparently, a bounce situation. 5 a/c flying cap bounced by Japanese fighters coming in high from Kendari, and a whole bunch more of P40s shot down over the runway as they were taking off. 1 shot down trying to dogfight with the Japanese in order to draw their attention away from an allied pilot who had bailed out and was still descending. The P40 was a write off but the pilot survived, and probably his action prevented the Japanese fighters from shooting up the guy in the parachute. [/B][/QUOTE]

Mdiehl

Sorry for not getting back to you sooner. My primary source regarding the air battle over Java is Saburo Sakai's book "Samurai". Now you may or may not consider it a reliable source, but I can tell you I found the book generally even handed and he was indignant that there has been little or no mention of the air battle he describes in Allied accounts of the campaign.

For the record; the British flew 50 Hurricans off the HMS Indomitable in early Febuary. They were originally based on Sumatra and about 25 made it to Java when Sumatra fell. The US flew 4 flights of P-40s to Java via the Darwin, Timor, Bali route; in an attempt to reform the old US 17th Pursuit Grp. from the PI there. The first flight of 13 made it without incident. The other three suffered losses either by being bounced, mechanical problems or attacks while on the ground. Consequently only about 25 US P-40s were operational on Java. There were also a small number of Dutch Hurricans and P-40s and a lager number of Dutch Buffalos operational on Java. Theoretically therefore such a large air battle was possible. I have to admit though; the only other cooberating source I had was an artical I read on a Briitish Armed Forces Web page that makes mention of a wild malee Between Hurricans flown by BOB vetrans and Zeros over the DEI. Unfortunately that Website no longer seems to be in existance.



TIMJOT -> (3/15/2002 5:12:22 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ranger-75
[B]You guys are pushin' all my buttons again

From Timjot:
"Mdiehl, I do agree with most your points. However the fact even if limited in number, there were head to head engagements with the P-40 and zero in both the PI and DEI. In fact there was one particular engagement over Java pittng over 50 p-40s and Hurricanes against a like number of zeros. The P-40s and Hurricans were routed trying to dogfight with the zeros."

These were not US or RAF pilots. You may recall that when Nagumo went foraying against Ceylon, that his strike was intercepted on its way back by RAF Hurricanes and sufferred severe losses. I agree that pilots need to use the strengths of their aircraft against the weaknesses of the enemy's aircraft, but when this was done, the Japanese air air ended up getting the short end of the stick, because of the fragility of their planes.

As to the "highly experienced Japanese pilots". They were well trained, but the Imperial HQ refused to make accomodations in the pilot training program, so that even before Midway, the IJNAF had lost almost one year's worth of pilots.

I'm tired of hearing of the "inexperienced US Navy" I'm an Army man and hate the Navy as much as anybody else, but the US Navy was far from inexperienced in 1939-1942. Except for new polits coming out of schools the pilots were well trained. The American commanders like Leslie, McKlusky, Massey, etc., were all long time veterans and were highly skilled in their professions. You didn't make Lt Commander in the prewar USN in a couple of years, these men all had 15 or more years of experience behind them. You also couldn't make Admiral in 5 years (except for Mountbatten, but that's another story). The real problem was not enough ships to make 3 or 4 carrier groups like the IJN used. Even the Japanese were never able to get their 6 CV first air fleet back together after PH, there was too much to do and not enough to do it with. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Ranger 75,

These were RAF and US pilots. I am speaking of air battles over Java not Ceylon.

Regarding US training. I agree US pilots were well trained and proffesional, but my only point is that no amount of training can make up for actual compat expirence. The fact is that US pilots were trained and operating under flawed outmoded pre-war techniques. This put them at a disadvantage early on. Once these expirenced proffessionals figured out their planes strengths and weakness in combat they were able to more than hold there own. You cant expect them to start the war in 43 with the same expirence they had after a year of combat.

Another example of flawed pre-war tactical doctrine proven wrong in combat, was the Navys pre-war insistance that a Compliment of 16 fighters for there carriers was sufficient to handle both CAP and escort duties.

Regarding Carrier TF size. It was Navy tactical doctorine. Pre-war the USN never operated carriers in TF's larger than two carriers because USN doctorine dictated that the carriers primary purpose was to scout ahead of the Battle Fleet, inflict attrition attacks when possible and then withdraw and let the big guns finish the job.



mdiehl -> (3/15/2002 10:54:34 PM)

The problem with your line of reasoning TIMJOT is that it may not be correct to claim that "No amount of training" can compensate for differences in the amount of combat experience. If I am to agree with you I have to adopt a trivial definition of "training" --- one that excludes non-lethal flying in which pilots engage in combat maneuvers etc against their friends, and one that excludes theoretical discussions and training vis a vis "what one does in general when condition X happens" and "what one specifically does one one is flying an aircraft with characteristics Y and Z."

Obviously, the Top Gun school assumes as its premise that training can make up for lack of combat experience. The precursors to Top Gun were implemented in 1942 in the USN/USMC. But, *all* the combatants engaged in (to varying degrees) extensive aerial training and exercises. In some ways, the 1941 USAF and USN pilots available on 7 December 1941 were among the most extensively trained pilots in the world. (There had been more competition for fewer pilot positions than among nations that began to mobilize earlier than the US). And so, even today, there is extensive theoretical training in all the flying services, that cover such topics as how a energy a/c conducts combat with a non-energy but highly maneuverable a/c. It would be a mistake to think that such topics had not been studied prior to Pearl Harbor in the US. Thach studied these in 1941 *before* PH.

The deal is, IMO, that training needs to be adequate enough to get a pilot to fly his a/c to its strengths. A million combat hours flying a Zeke are not going to give the Zeke pilot an advantage against a rookie flying a P51 (or a P40 or P38 or P47 or F6F or F4U), if the rookie says "I'm going to keep my airspeed up and use energy to engage the enemy on my terms." In that event, the P51 (or whatever) has all the advantages. He can engage and disengage at will. The poor Zeke pilot can at best hope that the P51 pilot's attacks will be thwarted by maneuver, and that eventually the P51 pilot will get bored or run out of ordnance and leave.

Now, I've mentioned the P51, but if you look at what USAAF pilots engaged in New Guinea in 1942 say, they say that the P40 gave them the ability to control the fight and engage on their own terms. The USAAF pilots mention how happy they were that their speed advantage allowed them to exit a bad situation and either (a) go home or (b) develop an advantaged position and return to the fight (assuming that the fight was still going on.. they often ended right quickly). They also specifically mentioned their concern with the intr0duction of the Tony because the Tony's maximum airspeed and diving abaility basically matched that of the P40 (which is why they were pleased to receive faster a/c as new US models were introducted).

There is also no real good comparison between the US pilots and teh Japanese in 1941-1942 and the comparison in late 1944-1945. "Inexperienced" does not do justice to the lack of training of the late war Japanese pilots. "Untrained" seems more accurate.

As to outmoded doctrine. Both the USN and IJN maintained inadequate CAP over their carriers. This reflects not pilot training or even combat experience (the IJN CVs certainly had not been threatened by the KMT AF in 1939) but experience with CV vs. CV operations.

In many other ways, Japanes tactical doctrine in air-to-air combat was inferior. The 3 plane section. The tendency for Japanese sections to lose all cohesion in combat. The poor maintenance of radios in land-based a/c (that contributed in part to their lack of cohesion, and also to the high visibility of incoming Japanese strikes).



TIMJOT -> (3/16/2002 9:49:28 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]The problem with your line of reasoning TIMJOT is that it may not be correct to claim that "No amount of training" can compensate for differences in the amount of combat experience. If I am to agree with you I have to adopt a trivial definition of "training" --- one that excludes non-lethal flying in which pilots engage in combat maneuvers etc against their friends, and one that excludes theoretical discussions and training vis a vis "what one does in general when condition X happens" and "what one specifically does one one is flying an aircraft with characteristics Y and Z."

Obviously, the Top Gun school assumes as its premise that training can make up for lack of combat experience. The precursors to Top Gun were implemented in 1942 in the USN/USMC. But, *all* the combatants engaged in (to varying degrees) extensive aerial training and exercises. In some ways, the 1941 USAF and USN pilots available on 7 December 1941 were among the most extensively trained pilots in the world. (There had been more competition for fewer pilot positions than among nations that began to mobilize earlier than the US). And so, even today, there is extensive theoretical training in all the flying services, that cover such topics as how a energy a/c conducts combat with a non-energy but highly maneuverable a/c. It would be a mistake to think that such topics had not been studied prior to Pearl Harbor in the US. Thach studied these in 1941 *before* PH.

The deal is, IMO, that training needs to be adequate enough to get a pilot to fly his a/c to its strengths. A million combat hours flying a Zeke are not going to give the Zeke pilot an advantage against a rookie flying a P51 (or a P40 or P38 or P47 or F6F or F4U), if the rookie says "I'm going to keep my airspeed up and use energy to engage the enemy on my terms." In that event, the P51 (or whatever) has all the advantages. He can engage and disengage at will. The poor Zeke pilot can at best hope that the P51 pilot's attacks will be thwarted by maneuver, and that eventually the P51 pilot will get bored or run out of ordnance and leave.

Now, I've mentioned the P51, but if you look at what USAAF pilots engaged in New Guinea in 1942 say, they say that the P40 gave them the ability to control the fight and engage on their own terms. The USAAF pilots mention how happy they were that their speed advantage allowed them to exit a bad situation and either (a) go home or (b) develop an advantaged position and return to the fight (assuming that the fight was still going on.. they often ended right quickly). They also specifically mentioned their concern with the intr0duction of the Tony because the Tony's maximum airspeed and diving abaility basically matched that of the P40 (which is why they were pleased to receive faster a/c as new US models were introducted).

There is also no real good comparison between the US pilots and teh Japanese in 1941-1942 and the comparison in late 1944-1945. "Inexperienced" does not do justice to the lack of training of the late war Japanese pilots. "Untrained" seems more accurate.

As to outmoded doctrine. Both the USN and IJN maintained inadequate CAP over their carriers. This reflects not pilot training or even combat experience (the IJN CVs certainly had not been threatened by the KMT AF in 1939) but experience with CV vs. CV operations.

In many other ways, Japanes tactical doctrine in air-to-air combat was inferior. The 3 plane section. The tendency for Japanese sections to lose all cohesion in combat. The poor maintenance of radios in land-based a/c (that contributed in part to their lack of cohesion, and also to the high visibility of incoming Japanese strikes). [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Mdiehl

The problem with your line of reasoning is that "Top Gun" type training usaully rely on combat vetrans for instructors. The US was very good at rotating there vetrans back to the states for training purposes. Without war, where do you get these vetrans and their knowlegde base? I dought reports of Japanese pilots besting RAF and Dutch Hurricanes and Buffalos would have been enough to convince the complacent US Army and Navy their pilots traing and planes were superior.

Even Thatch ran into considerable opposition, trying to implement his thereories. The higher ups didnt take to kindly, the implication that the approved tactical doctorine was flawed. The USN pioneered useing independent carrier TFs to strike at enemy Fleets and shore installations in Fleet excercises in the 30s. but the Big gun lobby entrenched at the higher levels of the Navy effectively quashed further development.

True even a Eric Hartman in a 109 might be in trouble with an inexpirence but competant pilot in a P-51. But you are talking years of technicalogical advancement. I was speaking of months, maybe a year. Wasnt the Hellcat specifically designed as a Zero killer? Wasnt first hand combat insight of the plane and knowlegde garnered from a captured zero; utilized in its design?

The fact is; the US army did not train its pilots in the dive and climb tactics that proved effective against the zero; prior to the war. Even with Chenault shouting for it from China. US Army and Navy trained there pilots to dogfight! It was the US pilots attempts to dogfight with the zero early in the war; with the resulting losses, that fostered the invincible Zero myth.

My only point is that when discussing alternate history scenerios people tend to rely too much on actual history to make there points. You cant simply extrapulate that the USN would have been the same well oiled killing machine that it had become in the historical 1943; without the war in 42. Many of the tactical and technological breakthroughs may or may not have happened without the impedence of war.

By the way, Mdeihl. Im curious on your thoughts regarding Saburo Sakai as a credible source.



mdiehl -> (3/18/2002 12:23:49 AM)

Timjot says:

"True even a Eric Hartman in a 109 might be in trouble with an inexpirence but competant pilot in a P-51. But you are talking years of technicalogical advancement. I was speaking of months, maybe a year. Wasnt the Hellcat specifically designed as a Zero killer? Wasnt first hand combat insight of the plane and knowlegde garnered from a captured zero; utilized in its design?

The fact is; the US army did not train its pilots in the dive and climb tactics that proved effective against the zero; prior to the war. Even with Chenault shouting for it from China. US Army and Navy trained there pilots to dogfight! It was the US pilots attempts to dogfight with the zero early in the war; with the resulting losses, that fostered the invincible Zero myth."

Well, the US Army did train its pilots in climb and dive tactics. They'd been studying the results of the BOB for about 18 months with much advise and consultation from the UK. The P40s that were not destroyed on the ground at PH managed to make a decent account of themselves, IIRC. My point about the P51 applies to the P40 as well. The plane as available in service in December 1941 was faster in level flight than the Zero, faster in a dive, and more maneuverable at speeds in the mid-300s mph. This is a point that most of the successful P40 pilots who flew against Japan emphasize. Much of the P40s reputation as a dog comes from its service in the BOB and N. Africa.

Naval planes are another matter entirely. The F4F was about 12 mph slower than the Zero in level flight, but could out dive and (diving and therefore at high speed, out maneuver but only at high speed) the A6M. Most F4F pilots did not routinely engage in slow-speed turning duels with Zero pilots. Ever. That is why the attrition for F4Fs vs. Zeros, including Coral Sea, Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign, was about 1:1 through the end of 1942.

Yes the F6F was specifically designed to exceed the capabilities of the Zero. The problem was that there is good theory and good training, then there's the actuality. Even good pilots can lose their focus, and let their airspeed drop such that highly maneuverable, slow planes like the Zeke become more dangerous than usual. The F6F was designed to out-acelerate the Zeke so that in a pinch it could get up the necessary airspeed. It did not really succeed in that effort. The Zeke was just too light with a very high thrust to weight ratio. The F6F was much more powerfully driven, but still was a Grumman product (with all the armor, self-sealing tanks and strcutural overdesign that such implies). What the F6F got for its better layout was: more stability when landing, longer range, improved acceleration, and improved climb and to speed rates vis a vis the F4F. The result was a plane that at slow speeds was inferior to the Zero in a turning engagement, but that was even better at engaging the Japanese planes in *initial* conditions (high speed at contact) on terms that favored the allies.

The F4U was in-design prior to the capture of any zeros. It turned out to be, arguably, the best single-engined piston motored fighter of the war. So, we're not talking "years" of technical development. The P40 as of December 1941 was a better plane that the Zero. The other a/c that followed in the USAAF roster were far better than most planes the Japanese could field (even when one does not discount late Japanese planes for their crappy engines). The "arms race" that drove the contest was the race between the Allies and Germany. That arms race was already in progress when Japan attacked the US.

Saburo Sakai is a credible resource on what he thought he could do with a Zero. He's not a particularly credible resource about the numbers of Allied a/c involved in any given dogfight, who were flying theAllied planes, or the results of action. He was as subject as all pilots were to overstating casualties inflicted on opponents. If he says there was a fur ball involving 50 P40's and Hurricanes in Java and that the Allies were "routed" I'm willing to accept that there was a combat with more planes (both friendly and hostile) than he could count and that after a few minutes there were no more Allied planes in the area. Did they disengage? Shot down? Were they outnumbered 3:1 from the start? He wouldn't know.

If on the other hand someone presents me with a reference to unit log for a RAAF, USAAF or Dutch squadron in Java that says, on such and such a day, pilots Bamgaard, Hawk, and Smith were lost in action in an aerial dogfight over Batavia, that is a credible source. A second best source is an allied pilot who stated, from memory, that he fought in an action where some number of his buddies were shot down. At the bottom of my credibilty list about allied pilot losses you find "Japanese claims." That's no slur against the Japanese. At the bottom of my credibility list about Japanese losses you'll find "Allied pilot claims that were not verified by wing camera footage."



TIMJOT -> (3/18/2002 10:07:13 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Timjot says:

"True even a Eric Hartman in a 109 might be in trouble with an inexpirence but competant pilot in a P-51. But you are talking years of technicalogical advancement. I was speaking of months, maybe a year. Wasnt the Hellcat specifically designed as a Zero killer? Wasnt first hand combat insight of the plane and knowlegde garnered from a captured zero; utilized in its design?

The fact is; the US army did not train its pilots in the dive and climb tactics that proved effective against the zero; prior to the war. Even with Chenault shouting for it from China. US Army and Navy trained there pilots to dogfight! It was the US pilots attempts to dogfight with the zero early in the war; with the resulting losses, that fostered the invincible Zero myth."

Well, the US Army did train its pilots in climb and dive tactics. They'd been studying the results of the BOB for about 18 months with much advise and consultation from the UK. The P40s that were not destroyed on the ground at PH managed to make a decent account of themselves, IIRC. My point about the P51 applies to the P40 as well. The plane as available in service in December 1941 was faster in level flight than the Zero, faster in a dive, and more maneuverable at speeds in the mid-300s mph. This is a point that most of the successful P40 pilots who flew against Japan emphasize. Much of the P40s reputation as a dog comes from its service in the BOB and N. Africa.

Naval planes are another matter entirely. The F4F was about 12 mph slower than the Zero in level flight, but could out dive and (diving and therefore at high speed, out maneuver but only at high speed) the A6M. Most F4F pilots did not routinely engage in slow-speed turning duels with Zero pilots. Ever. That is why the attrition for F4Fs vs. Zeros, including Coral Sea, Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign, was about 1:1 through the end of 1942.

Yes the F6F was specifically designed to exceed the capabilities of the Zero. The problem was that there is good theory and good training, then there's the actuality. Even good pilots can lose their focus, and let their airspeed drop such that highly maneuverable, slow planes like the Zeke become more dangerous than usual. The F6F was designed to out-acelerate the Zeke so that in a pinch it could get up the necessary airspeed. It did not really succeed in that effort. The Zeke was just too light with a very high thrust to weight ratio. The F6F was much more powerfully driven, but still was a Grumman product (with all the armor, self-sealing tanks and strcutural overdesign that such implies). What the F6F got for its better layout was: more stability when landing, longer range, improved acceleration, and improved climb and to speed rates vis a vis the F4F. The result was a plane that at slow speeds was inferior to the Zero in a turning engagement, but that was even better at engaging the Japanese planes in *initial* conditions (high speed at contact) on terms that favored the allies.

The F4U was in-design prior to the capture of any zeros. It turned out to be, arguably, the best single-engined piston motored fighter of the war. So, we're not talking "years" of technical development. The P40 as of December 1941 was a better plane that the Zero. The other a/c that followed in the USAAF roster were far better than most planes the Japanese could field (even when one does not discount late Japanese planes for their crappy engines). The "arms race" that drove the contest was the race between the Allies and Germany. That arms race was already in progress when Japan attacked the US.

Saburo Sakai is a credible resource on what he thought he could do with a Zero. He's not a particularly credible resource about the numbers of Allied a/c involved in any given dogfight, who were flying theAllied planes, or the results of action. He was as subject as all pilots were to overstating casualties inflicted on opponents. If he says there was a fur ball involving 50 P40's and Hurricanes in Java and that the Allies were "routed" I'm willing to accept that there was a combat with more planes (both friendly and hostile) than he could count and that after a few minutes there were no more Allied planes in the area. Did they disengage? Shot down? Were they outnumbered 3:1 from the start? He wouldn't know.

If on the other hand someone presents me with a reference to unit log for a RAAF, USAAF or Dutch squadron in Java that says, on such and such a day, pilots Bamgaard, Hawk, and Smith were lost in action in an aerial dogfight over Batavia, that is a credible source. A second best source is an allied pilot who stated, from memory, that he fought in an action where some number of his buddies were shot down. At the bottom of my credibilty list about allied pilot losses you find "Japanese claims." That's no slur against the Japanese. At the bottom of my credibility list about Japanese losses you'll find "Allied pilot claims that were not verified by wing camera footage." [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Mdiehl

Off course the Hellcat and Cosair were better than the zero. I dont want to get into a technical/performance debate with you, because as I said before I will gladly defer to your expertise on that subject.

I will however, take exception to your statement that US pilots were taught to dive and climb and not to dogfight in pre-war training. The Flying Tigers were made up mostly senor carreer military pilots. Some were even flight instructors. Yet Chenault had to convince them to forget there training and instead to rely on the dive and climb technique when fighting the more manuverable Japanese fighters. In the Philipines the USAFFE lost 49 out 104 P-40s on the ground that first raid. Most of the remaining 55 were lost in combat, becuase the pre-war trained US army pilots tried to turn and dogfight with the zero. There inability to dogfight with the zero on equal terms fostered the belief that their P-40s were greatly inferior to the zero. When in reality they were just useing them in the wrong way. Many of these pilots made there way to Australia and NG where eventually through experience and word of mouth were able to figure out the best way to use the P-40s against the zero. This was a learning process and I dont really understand how you can argue that.

If the US army studied the results of the BOB then they would have learn the only way to defeat a 109 was to get into a turning fight with it because any spitfire or hurrican trying to dive and climb with a 109 would have been toast.

Are you saying the US army and navy were training their pilots to defeat an enemy aircraft they had little if any idea existed? It sounds like you are saying that US pilots were completely prepared and trained to fight the zero, knew exactly how best use their aircraft to take advantage of the enemies weaknesses, from the get go. You mentioned PH. How many of those planes shot down in airiel combat fighters? Its not suprising the US pilots could get some licks in on planes making there attack runs. If I recolect even a couple of P-36 pilots got some kills.



mdiehl -> (3/19/2002 11:30:19 PM)

"The Flying Tigers were made up mostly senor carreer military pilots. Some were even flight instructors."

Mmm. Not sure what you mean by "senior." Not high rank I'm guessing. Most USAAF squadrons were, in late 1941, heavily staffed with pilots with lots of experience. The AVG guys pretty much new how to fly boom and zoom without Chenault telling them the same. Chenault's constant harangue was more along the lines of telling pilots to keep their heads and work as teams. A chronic problem among all combatant powers.

"In the Philipines the USAFFE lost 49 out 104 P-40s on the ground that first raid. Most of the remaining 55 were lost in combat, becuase the pre-war trained US army pilots tried to turn and dogfight with the zero."

Most of the remainder were lost, not in combat, but rather operationally because the PI were at the end of a nonexistant logistical rope. A heavily damaged P40 in the PI became an immediate source of spare parts because no new supplies were forthcoming. Since battle damage is fairly common even among aircraft that aren't flamed out and crashed, it does not take long for a good unit to get used up. Many of the prewar trained pilots did not try to turn with the Zero. Some did. Japanese accounts recall the latter fondly. Along the way the Japanese lost a lot of good planes and pilots in the PI campaign.

"There inability to dogfight with the zero on equal terms fostered the belief that their P-40s were greatly inferior to the zero."

P40 pilots diverged in their opinion on the P40. Some reviled it. Some loved it. It gets to your point about "inability to dogfight on equal terms." For an A6M the superiority was at really low airspeeds... 90-250 mph or thereabouts. Above 250 and the Zero loses its acceleration and climb advantage. Above 300 and the P40 is rolling (and initiating a change in direction) faster. Above 325-350 and the Zeke loses its ability to turn, so the P40 is actually completing, for example, a 180 change of direction *faster* than a Zero. At 350 mph the Zero became a brick. At 375 or so the control surfaces began to shred. Meanwhile at 325 a P40 is feeling like a really great fighter plane.

"When in reality they were just useing them in the wrong way."

Some. My point being that some did not. This had more to do with maintaining one's concentration and alertness in the engagement, rather than training. Again, this is something that all the combatants had trouble with in pilots who were first experiencing live ammo combat.

"If the US army studied the results of the BOB then they would have learn the only way to defeat a 109 was to get into a turning fight with it because any spitfire or hurrican trying to dive and climb with a 109 would have been toast."

True for the Hurricrate. Not true for the Spitfire vis top speed. Diving was a separate problem. The ME109 could dive better because it had a fuel-injected engine. The Crates and Spits had to roll prior to diving because the early variants lacked fuel injection. It's very difficult to build up optimal dive speed when inverted. Fuel injection solved the problem for the Spit. The crate was still, well, a crate.

"Are you saying the US army and navy were training their pilots to defeat an enemy aircraft they had little if any idea existed?"

I'm saying several things:

1. In the Spanish Civil war, it became apparent that speed beats maneuverability. In the BOB, it became apparent that 2-plane elements in 4 plane sections were better than a 6 plane line abreast formation. The USAAF learned both, and the US (and UK and Germany and the French and even the poor Italians) all designed new models to achive speed. Maneuverability was a secondary consideration. The Japanese, for a combination of very good economic reasons and probably for some cultural ones as well, designed fighters to be cheap, fuel efficient and maneuverable. They were behind the 8-ball from the get go and never came close to catching up.

2. There *are* such things as optimal designs and good theory. One does not need to have fought a Zero (or any other plane) to know what the best qualities of a p40 (or any other plane) are. I think maybe here is where you and I are differing philosophically. You seem to think that a person only knows air combat well if he knows both his plane own plane and his opponent's. I do not agree.

3. Regarding the Zero *specifically.* Thach knew about the Zeke's maneuverability and was designing tactics to compensate for it in 1941. We seem to agree on that. He employed those tactics from the get go with two carrier groups. Chennault knew about the Zero long before the AVG/23rd PG saw combat. Other allied nations knew about the Zeke and were evaluating its general characteristics (they did not have an actual one to test, of course) and the implications for their units. Beyond that, both USAAF and P40 pilots had studied the energy vs. maneuver problem because they routinely held interservice simulations. The P40s were manifestly more maneuverable than the F4Fs and faster too. So there was fertile ground for working out the problem without any need for direct knowledge of the Zekes

"It sounds like you are saying that US pilots were completely prepared and trained to fight the zero, knew exactly how best use their aircraft to take advantage of the enemies weaknesses, from the get go."

No. What I'm saying is that failing to fly a P40 to its strengths more or less means that the plane is being flown at speeds that are friendly to the Zero. Not because you know that's what the Zero likes but rather because the best performance from the P40 comes in the higher energy ranges, and combat of any kind bleeds energy. The tendency for air combat with piston egined a/c is to slow aircraft down. A USAAF pilot who loses situational awareness and lets the natural tendency of combat maneuvers take him below 250 mph will find himself in trouble when a Zeke is in position to take advantage. ** He's also vulnerable to any other plane that has much more energy, regardless of the plane's mfr. ** On the other hand, a pilot who sees his airspeed indicator sitting at 220 mph puts the nose down and opens the throttle will likely escape a Zeke if he has the time.

You make it sound like my argument is that folks knew all about the Zeke. That's not it. Folks did know all about the P40. The experience gained by the early P40 squadrons heavily reinforced the need for situational awareness and to fly the P40 to its strengths. I wonder how many Zekes were shot down trying to turn with a P40 at 325 mph? Probably there was a situational awareness learning curve *there* as well. This had nothing to do with training or tactics. It had to do, statistically, with the fact that in every aerial engagement, regardless of teh fact that you train pilots like mad to avoid losing siutaional awareness, some are going to do it anyhow. They're the ones that go first and fastest, and make up the examples in the basic tactics manuals.

"You mentioned PH. How many of those planes shot down in airiel combat fighters?"

Don't know offhand. Does it matter? I find it important that Zekes were present and heavily outnumbered the USAAF in the air. The P40s got their licks in without losing a pilot. IIRC one plane was forced to land from battle damage. To me that shows that the Zeke was inadequate to the basic reason why they were thrown into the fight at all. Whatever advantages the Zekes allegedly had by plane or by training, the P40s performed better that day.



Jeremy Pritchard -> (3/20/2002 3:00:04 AM)

Botht he P-40 and A6M had their strengths and faults.

P-40 strengths were Speed, Durability and Firepower

A6M strengths were Manuverability, Range and Firepower

The A6M was EXTREMELY long ranged, which was EXTREMELY good for Pacific Warfare, something that is rarely mentioned. It could escort bombers where their opponents could not.

However, in order to achieve this range, the A6M sacrificed durability. Even a P-36 could easily kill an A6M when it is in its gun sights.

Firepower was good on the A6M, but there was an inherent problem in IJNAF tactics based on supply. The IJNAF pilot was accountable for bullets spent, and reprimanded for bullets spent without kills! Guns tended to have less ammunition then their Allied counter parts, but since most action was decisive in 3 seconds, and not many pilots scored more than 1 kill per flight, it does not really affect the strength of the aircraft.

The P-40, obsolete by european standards was still able to fight in the Pacific. It lacked the range of the A6M, which severely hampered it. However, its 6 50 calubur MG's could easily tear a new one in the A6M. HOWEVER, the A6M rarely fought the P-40. Most A6M's were quickly removed from the Philppine theatre to fight in the East Indies. The P-40's in the Philippines mainly went up against Ki-27's. I would say that the P-40 was AN equivalent to the A6M, as each had strengths that worked against the other's weakness. All that mattered was who could manipulate the strengths against the other's weakness better.

HOWEVER, the Hurricane IIB fighters which saw service at Singapore late in the war did appear in numbers, and did have success (and even gained local air superiority back), but due to attrition and lack of supply they were whittled down. Palembang also was another area of Hurricane I and IIB victory. And one could say that the Hurricanes in Java were also sucessful.


When the Ki-61 Hein appeared, all hope for the P-40 was lost. In the Ki-61, there was an aircraft with better Firepower, Speed and equivalent Durability and Range.

The Japanese did not always have massive overwhelming numbers, especially during air combat in the South Pacific, and even with the A6M vs. F4F's and P-40's in relatively similar numbers, losses were just about equal, when all factors were taken into account. If you look at the IJNAF history in the region you will see that the Japanese never sent high numbers of aircraft to the region at one time, and most were fed in, wore down, then replaced.


Had the Allies positioned sufficient numbers of Hurricanes and P-40's in the Pacific in 1941 the war would probably have been much different. The A6M was NOT generations beyond USAAF and RAF designs in the Pacific, and DID have numerical superiority. However, Allied designs in the Pacific were equal to their opponents in different aspects. The Japanese were a little slower to catch up to the Allied designs, but when they did they did surpass the main combat aircraft the Allies fielded.


The A6M was an equivalent to the P-40/Hurricane

The Ki-61 could easily outmatch the P-40 and Hurricane

The P-38/Spitfire could easily outmatch the Ki-61

The Ki-84 could easily outmatch the P-38/Spitfire, and even gave the P-51/F6F a run


If you notice the modifications done to the A6M throughout its history, you will see it being perpetually increased in speed, durability and firepower. Indeed, the Japanese stopped making manuverable aircraft at the Ki-43 and A6M lines, and switched to the J2M, N1K, Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84 which were much more faster aircraft. So, manuverability was seen as a dying tactic when the Japanese noticed the Allied avoiding all such combat, and compensated with their own speedy aircraft.

I would not say that the P-40 was leaps and bounds better than the A6M, since it was poorer than it in many areas, but better in others. I say they are generally 'equal' when all points are put together, but since relaity NEVER allows for equal opportunities to judge aircraft, it is difficult to say which one was better, if one at all.



mdiehl -> (3/20/2002 3:49:04 AM)

"P-40 strengths were Speed, Durability and Firepower
A6M strengths were Manuverability, Range and Firepower"

Both statements agreed to again with the qualification that maneuverability is affected by current speeds. At high speeds the P40 was more maneuverable than the Zeke.

"The A6M was EXTREMELY long ranged, which was EXTREMELY good for Pacific Warfare, something that is rarely mentioned. It could escort bombers where their opponents could not. However, in order to achieve this range, the A6M sacrificed durability. Even a P-36 could easily kill an A6M when it is in its gun sights."

I agree with the caveat that I do not think the fragility was sacrificed merely to obtain range. The problem is the thrust to weight to airframe optimization problem. A high speed a/c requires a more robust airframe. That in turn demands more HP from the power plant. In the Japanese case that means more cylinder heads (because the Japanese could not build a good high-pressure engine and did not have 100 octane fuel), which in turn increases weight and cuts back speed. You see the problem.

"Firepower was good on the A6M, but there was an inherent problem in IJNAF tactics based on supply. The IJNAF pilot was accountable for bullets spent, and reprimanded for bullets spent without kills!"

Add to that the fact that the Japanese 20mm short cowl-mounted cannon was a low velocity, short range POS prone to malfing.

"Guns tended to have less ammunition then their Allied counter parts, but since most action was decisive in 3 seconds, and not many pilots scored more than 1 kill per flight, it does not really affect the strength of the aircraft."

Can't agree with that. Many US pilots achieved multiple kills per engagement. The "decisive in 3 seconds" really only accounts those three seconds where an effective hit is scored. I'd argue that the initial conditions in any engagement were teh decisive part. IN any case, there are a few very good examples of Japanese fighters emptying their ammunition trays into Allied a/c only to see them fly away. Later war USMC/USN pilots demanded the FM2 have 4x.50 cal rather than 6x.50 because they wanted more gun *time* rather than more guns.

"When the Ki-61 Hein appeared, all hope for the P-40 was lost. "

When the Ki-61 appeared the P40 fund its match. It was still marginally faster in level flight (by the time the Ki-61 appears in numbers you're looking at late model P40s, not P40Es.. the theater is New Guinea of course). It can't outdive the Tony or out-turn it. Fortunately for many Allied pilots, the Ki-61 in-line was a piece of crap, being both unreliable and difficult to service in the field. So often a P40 could escape and evade a bad situation because the Ki-61 was not up to theoretical specs. I, however, would not want to be a P40 driver in a bad situation hoping that the Ki-61 had such a problem.

"In the Ki-61, there was an aircraft with better Firepower, Speed and equivalent Durability and Range."

Worse firepower. Somewhat worse durability (but better than the A6M series). Equivalent speed or slower. Equivalent range. A truly mediocre plane but a 1-for-1 competitor with the P40.

"The Japanese did not always have massive overwhelming numbers, especially during air combat in the South Pacific, and even with the A6M vs. F4F's and P-40's in relatively similar numbers, losses were just about equal, when all factors were taken into account."

Well, they did have numerical advantage in the PI and Indonesia, and of course at PH. But overall losses through 1942 in fighter a/c were equal. That tells me that the early war allied plane-pilot combination was as good as the early war Japanese plane-pilot combination, despite all the hype about Japanese training and experience or the exceptional maneuverability of teh Zero. Unfortunately for Japan, being "equal" was not good enough, because they could not field replacements at the pace that the Allies could.

"Had the Allies positioned sufficient numbers of Hurricanes and P-40's in the Pacific in 1941 the war would probably have been much different."

I agree, because in most circumstances the deciding factor was not the planes or pilots, but rather the initial conditions. The PI and Java could not have fielded more P40s in any case because the logistical rope was too long.

"The Japanese were a little slower to catch up to the Allied designs, but when they did they did surpass the main combat aircraft the Allies fielded."

The Japanese never came close. They had some a/c that, produced in very limited numbers, could achieve top speeds in the high 300s low- 400s. These could not be produced in quantity, sustained in the field, nor comonly achieve their design specs in combat situations primarily because the Japanese never managed to get consistently good performance out of their high-horsepower engines.

"The A6M was an equivalent to the P-40/Hurricane"

Yes to the Hurricane, no for the A6M2 vs. P40E. Not even close on the P40N.

"The Ki-61 could easily outmatch the P-40 and Hurricane."

Yes to the Hurricane. A dead draw, IMO, against the P40s.

"The P-38/Spitfire could easily outmatch the Ki-61"

No to the early Spits. Yes to the later variants. Yes in all circumstances for the P38 with the usual caveat: keep the airspeed up. The 38 could outrun a Ki-61 but not out-turn.

"The Ki-84 could easily outmatch the P-38/Spitfire, and even gave the P-51/F6F a run."

No to the Spitfire IX series and beyond. Yes to the P38, prior to the J series, no after that. Not even remotely close on a P51. The best a Ki-84 could hope for against a P51 group was to be miles away and running for home. The P51 and F6F were hugely different a/c. The F6F was actually slower than a properly operating Ki-84. IMO the F6F was mediocre. The P51 on the other hand had a top speed that exceeded the Ki-84 by 20-50 mph depending on the source you read.

"Indeed, the Japanese stopped making manuverable aircraft at the Ki-43 and A6M lines, and switched to the J2M, N1K, Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84 which were much more faster aircraft."

Faster than previous Japanese a/c. Slower than the fastest Allied a/c by quite a bit.

"I would not say that the P-40 was leaps and bounds better than the A6M, since it was poorer than it in many areas, but better in others. I say they are generally 'equal' when all points are put together, but since relaity NEVER allows for equal opportunities to judge aircraft, it is difficult to say which one was better, if one at all."

I'd agree with "equal."



Ranger-75 -> (3/20/2002 10:02:33 AM)

Hi guys, I changed my email on the matrix register page and got my account disabled for trying to be cooperative.

Someone mentioned the Japanese lack of 100 octane fuel. That was only half the answer. The Japanese also lacked the ability to design and manufacture engines that could match the increasingly more powerful engines coming out of US and British plants. Look at the tub known as the P47. That thing shouldn't have been allowed to fly it was so heavy, but thanks to its very powerful engine, not only could it fly, but its size gave it a high durability. The allies just kept on ramming more powerful engines in their planes and the Japanese couldn't hope to keep up.

Regarding that pilot who's credibility was questioned. I have read some excerpts from Japanese pilots and find them far too "ideologized" to be credibly escept as mentioned, with regard to friendly losses on a given day.

Grumman "cats" still rule the air over the sea...



CynicAl -> F6F history (3/20/2002 10:08:37 AM)

The F6F WAS NOT designed as a Zero killer, as it was actually on the drawing boards at Grumman before Pearl Harbor. Indeed, the Navy ordered two prototypes in June 1941! The F6F was designed as a Bf 109 killer, if anything - Grumman received combat reports from British units flying the Martlet against the Luftwaffe in North Africa, and that input DID figure into the design. The Wildcat needed more power, so Grumman started trying to figure out how to cram a 1500-hp R-2600 (later changed to the 2000-hp R-2800) into a Wildcat airframe. They soon realized that what was needed was an entirely new aircraft, but on the other hand they also wanted to retain as many as possible of the Wildcat's good qualities; unsurprisingly, the F6F ended up looking a lot like a scaled-up version of its predecessor. When the Pacific War started, combat reports from that theater came back to Grumman as well; but by then the basic design was already finished, and short of starting over from scratch, the most that could be done was to tweak the design a little.

Give it just a little thought - the captured Zero crashed in June 1942, the Hellcat made its combat debut in late 1943. That would be less than 18 months to find, recover, repair, and evaluate the Zero, then design, test, and mass-produce a new aircraft from scratch to be a "Zero Killer." The Grumman design team were good, but puh-leeze!



Ranger-75 -> (3/20/2002 10:23:58 AM)

Al's statement about the engine for the Hellcat only reinforces the earlier notion that the allies made better planes by developing more powerful engines. That's what kept the Spitfire a front line aircraft for the entire war. Only the Spitfire and P38 Lightning were in front line service for the entire war. engine upgrades...

North American built the first P51 in only 120 days, but i think they had preliminary design work already completed. That was another example. The first mustangs with allison engines had terrible high altitude performance, but once the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine was fitted (from the Spitfire) performance shot up. There's Britain showing the way again...

Same "problem" with the P39 Aircobra. The designers refused to put a supercharger in it and it had no high altitude performance. The soviets loved it though, they used it as a tank buster.



Jeremy Pritchard -> (3/20/2002 10:37:19 AM)

I see the development of the F6F like that of the Tiger I. It was developed before experience of enemy tanks, but was well suited to fight them. The F6F reinforced the qualities of the F4F, which was durability, speed and firepower. However, there was time to learn the lessons experiences from December 1941 till the production of the F6F. I am sure that developers did not ignore lessons learned durign the war in the Pacific.



CynicAl -> (3/20/2002 12:19:14 PM)

RE: the P-51 - Exactly. NA already had the preliminary design. And even with the near-miraculous 120 days from paper to prototype, how long did it take to get the things into front-line squadrons on the opposite side of the planet? By the time the crashed Zero was found, recovered, repaired, and evaluated, Grumman would have had little more than 120 days to go from paper to combat.

RE: Lessons learned - I never said Grumman didn't incorporate "lessons learned" from the Pacific. I believe my exact words were "tweak the design a little." I'm just saying that the often-repeated story that the F6F was a purpose-designed Zero Killer is pure myth. What the captured Zero did help with was in developing tactics, and in demonstrating that the new generation of US fighters could beat the Zero handily - a terrific morale booster for new US pilots going into combat.



Ranger-75 -> (3/20/2002 1:46:19 PM)

Think we can get the A-1 SkyRaider (Originally called the AD1 SkyRaider) into the mix, in place of a superflous aircraft? It was beilg built in late '44


That was a wild plane, 4 hours endurance over the target area, it was used up until the 1970. It woulld have been the ultimate killer of IJN ships.



mdiehl -> long post (3/20/2002 11:20:35 PM)

I hope this will be the last thing I have to say about a/c technical specs for a while. ;) My point, which I will repeat at the end of the post, is that mid/late war Allied a/c were much more dangerous, when properly used, than mid/late war Japanese a/c, when properly used. This post covers the top models produced by the US and Japan, including the mediocre Ki-84. No disrespect to GB who also had some outstanding entries, particularly the Tempest and Typhoon, and late model Spitfires.

The F6F was ordered in 1941. The first prototype was delivered 26 June 1942. Its design was indeed tweaked to combat the A6M, although when designed it was intended as a competitor for
both the A6M and the ME 109. Both the A6M and the ME109 were known in June 1941, by general flying characteristics (the A6M) and from captured/rebuilt a/c (ME109s.. recovered in Great Britain). With a top speed of 380 mph at 23000 feet, it was amply equipped to deal with those and, in addition, the Ki-61. Top speeds: A6M2:331 @ 15000; A6M5 (the fastest Zeke):351 @ 20,000. ME109E:348 @ 15000. ME109G (here the a/c become closely matched): 386 mph @ 23000 feet. Note I’ve rounded off the elevations. I’ve not talked about climb rates (where the A6M series and the ME109 series had the F6F beat) or dive rates (where the F6F smoked the Axis) or durability (where the F6F was better because the A6M series were flimsy and the ME109 had a water-cooled in-line engine). Now the Tony (Kawasaki Ki-61-1: 368 mph @ 16000.

Other fabulous Japanese wannabees:

Kawasaki Ki-100-1, arguably the best Japanese fighter of WW2. Initially designed with an unservicable engine (the Kawasaki HA140 V12 in-line), it was given a Ha112 radial that worked decently, giving the a/c 360 mph @ 20,000 feet. The “best fighter” addresses the addition of a good turbosupercharger in two protoypes in mid 1945, with deliveries scheduled for late 1945. A tcs would have upped the max airpseed to around 400 mph and increased its high-altitude performance (which was horrible, otherwise, 332 mph @ 33,000 feet). It was arguably the only plane that could reliably climb to the altitudes of very high B29s, had the latter chosen to stay there.

Mitsubishi J2M2/3: 363 mph@18,000. Initiated in 1938 as a high altitude interceptor, anticipating its need against B17s apparently. First prototype delivered 20 March 1942 because of production priorities given to the A6M series. The first engine was the 1430 hp Kasai 13, which was a bust. The second engine was a water-methanol boosted Kasai 23a radial, installed in late 1942, also a failed engine. By March 1943 only 11 aircraft had been delivered, of 141 airframes built, because of design and production problems involving high power engines. Later engines included the Kasai 23c and the Kasai 16a (a 3-stage supercharged radial used in the J2M5). Problems with the later radials virtually shut down production, with only 34 J2M5s delivered. Roughly 479 air frames built from start to finish.
Nakajima Ki-84-1a. 392 mph @ 20,000 feet. The other “best Japanese fighter” candidate, IMO. As usual, there were performance and design problems with the high power engine, in this case the direct injection (a very advanced concept) Ha-45 radial. I will let a typical author’s comments handle the rest (from Aircraft of WW2 ed by Stewart Wilson, Aerospace Publications, Fyshwick, Australia, 1998): “.. the Hayate sufferd from the use of poor-quality materials and progressively deteriorating quality control levels, accidents and underserviceabilities from these being quite common. The engine also required extensive and skilled maintenance, but this was often not available during the last year of the war.”

Now, a few Allied star performers, in brief:

P51-D: 437 @ 25,000. P51H, a stunning 487 mph @ 25,000, 463 @ 15000, giving this plane the best all-altitude speed of any piston engined fighter in the war. Vought-Sikorski F4U-1: 417 @ 20,000. F4U4: 446 @ 26,000. My nominee for best fighter (all combatants, all theaters) because it was more durable than the P51 and carried a much wider armament platform, including subvariants of the F4U-4 that carried 4x20mm and plenty of ammo for same. P38D: 389 @ 20,000 feet. P38H: 402 @ 25,000 feet. All variants of the P38 suffered a bit from low top speed at ltitudes less than 10,000 feet, which is why I in a previous post gave the Tony credit for being the equal of the P38D. The P38J solved this problem and was generally superior to all Japanese fighters. I will rescind my earlier comment about the Tony being the equal of the F6F. It wasn’t.

So that, in a nutshell, is that. The best Japanese a/c fall 20-90 mph short of the best Allied a/c, even on their best days. Of course, initial conditions of combat, climb rate and acceleration and maneuverability affect the outcome, so all military a/c were very dangerous when properly used. In general, acceleration and climb are a function of horsepower, weight, and propeller pitch. The late war Allied a/c generally had better acceleration and better climb at all altitudes than the Japanese a/c, and better maneuverability at high speeds. On the whole, however, late-war Allied a/c were far more dangerous, when properly used, than late-war Japanese a/c, when properly used.



TIMJOT -> (3/21/2002 12:12:46 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"The Flying Tigers were made up mostly senor carreer military pilots. Some were even flight instructors."

Mmm. Not sure what you mean by "senior." Not high rank I'm guessing. Most USAAF squadrons were, in late 1941, heavily staffed with pilots with lots of experience. The AVG guys pretty much new how to fly boom and zoom without Chenault telling them the same. Chenault's constant harangue was more along the lines of telling pilots to keep their heads and work as teams. A chronic problem among all combatant powers.

"In the Philipines the USAFFE lost 49 out 104 P-40s on the ground that first raid. Most of the remaining 55 were lost in combat, becuase the pre-war trained US army pilots tried to turn and dogfight with the zero."

Most of the remainder were lost, not in combat, but rather operationally because the PI were at the end of a nonexistant logistical rope. A heavily damaged P40 in the PI became an immediate source of spare parts because no new supplies were forthcoming. Since battle damage is fairly common even among aircraft that aren't flamed out and crashed, it does not take long for a good unit to get used up. Many of the prewar trained pilots did not try to turn with the Zero. Some did. Japanese accounts recall the latter fondly. Along the way the Japanese lost a lot of good planes and pilots in the PI campaign.

"There inability to dogfight with the zero on equal terms fostered the belief that their P-40s were greatly inferior to the zero."

P40 pilots diverged in their opinion on the P40. Some reviled it. Some loved it. It gets to your point about "inability to dogfight on equal terms." For an A6M the superiority was at really low airspeeds... 90-250 mph or thereabouts. Above 250 and the Zero loses its acceleration and climb advantage. Above 300 and the P40 is rolling (and initiating a change in direction) faster. Above 325-350 and the Zeke loses its ability to turn, so the P40 is actually completing, for example, a 180 change of direction *faster* than a Zero. At 350 mph the Zero became a brick. At 375 or so the control surfaces began to shred. Meanwhile at 325 a P40 is feeling like a really great fighter plane.

"When in reality they were just useing them in the wrong way."

Some. My point being that some did not. This had more to do with maintaining one's concentration and alertness in the engagement, rather than training. Again, this is something that all the combatants had trouble with in pilots who were first experiencing live ammo combat.

"If the US army studied the results of the BOB then they would have learn the only way to defeat a 109 was to get into a turning fight with it because any spitfire or hurrican trying to dive and climb with a 109 would have been toast."

True for the Hurricrate. Not true for the Spitfire vis top speed. Diving was a separate problem. The ME109 could dive better because it had a fuel-injected engine. The Crates and Spits had to roll prior to diving because the early variants lacked fuel injection. It's very difficult to build up optimal dive speed when inverted. Fuel injection solved the problem for the Spit. The crate was still, well, a crate.

"Are you saying the US army and navy were training their pilots to defeat an enemy aircraft they had little if any idea existed?"

I'm saying several things:

1. In the Spanish Civil war, it became apparent that speed beats maneuverability. In the BOB, it became apparent that 2-plane elements in 4 plane sections were better than a 6 plane line abreast formation. The USAAF learned both, and the US (and UK and Germany and the French and even the poor Italians) all designed new models to achive speed. Maneuverability was a secondary consideration. The Japanese, for a combination of very good economic reasons and probably for some cultural ones as well, designed fighters to be cheap, fuel efficient and maneuverable. They were behind the 8-ball from the get go and never came close to catching up.

2. There *are* such things as optimal designs and good theory. One does not need to have fought a Zero (or any other plane) to know what the best qualities of a p40 (or any other plane) are. I think maybe here is where you and I are differing philosophically. You seem to think that a person only knows air combat well if he knows both his plane own plane and his opponent's. I do not agree.

3. Regarding the Zero *specifically.* Thach knew about the Zeke's maneuverability and was designing tactics to compensate for it in 1941. We seem to agree on that. He employed those tactics from the get go with two carrier groups. Chennault knew about the Zero long before the AVG/23rd PG saw combat. Other allied nations knew about the Zeke and were evaluating its general characteristics (they did not have an actual one to test, of course) and the implications for their units. Beyond that, both USAAF and P40 pilots had studied the energy vs. maneuver problem because they routinely held interservice simulations. The P40s were manifestly more maneuverable than the F4Fs and faster too. So there was fertile ground for working out the problem without any need for direct knowledge of the Zekes

"It sounds like you are saying that US pilots were completely prepared and trained to fight the zero, knew exactly how best use their aircraft to take advantage of the enemies weaknesses, from the get go."

No. What I'm saying is that failing to fly a P40 to its strengths more or less means that the plane is being flown at speeds that are friendly to the Zero. Not because you know that's what the Zero likes but rather because the best performance from the P40 comes in the higher energy ranges, and combat of any kind bleeds energy. The tendency for air combat with piston egined a/c is to slow aircraft down. A USAAF pilot who loses situational awareness and lets the natural tendency of combat maneuvers take him below 250 mph will find himself in trouble when a Zeke is in position to take advantage. ** He's also vulnerable to any other plane that has much more energy, regardless of the plane's mfr. ** On the other hand, a pilot who sees his airspeed indicator sitting at 220 mph puts the nose down and opens the throttle will likely escape a Zeke if he has the time.

You make it sound like my argument is that folks knew all about the Zeke. That's not it. Folks did know all about the P40. The experience gained by the early P40 squadrons heavily reinforced the need for situational awareness and to fly the P40 to its strengths. I wonder how many Zekes were shot down trying to turn with a P40 at 325 mph? Probably there was a situational awareness learning curve *there* as well. This had nothing to do with training or tactics. It had to do, statistically, with the fact that in every aerial engagement, regardless of teh fact that you train pilots like mad to avoid losing siutaional awareness, some are going to do it anyhow. They're the ones that go first and fastest, and make up the examples in the basic tactics manuals.

"You mentioned PH. How many of those planes shot down in airiel combat fighters?"

Don't know offhand. Does it matter? I find it important that Zekes were present and heavily outnumbered the USAAF in the air. The P40s got their licks in without losing a pilot. IIRC one plane was forced to land from battle damage. To me that shows that the Zeke was inadequate to the basic reason why they were thrown into the fight at all. Whatever advantages the Zekes allegedly had by plane or by training, the P40s performed better that day.
[/B][/QUOTE]


Mdeihl,

Uhhggg!!!.................Enough with the performance stats already, no one is debating them, so please; I beg you stop reciteing the "Encyclopidia of WWII Fighter Aircaft".

The debat was the significance of combat expirence and the resulting learning curve gleened from it early in the war.

You really have been quite hypocritical on this point. On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training.

Wasnt it the Luftwaffes combat expirence in Spain that led to the adoption of the 4 plane rotte formation?

Wasnt it the RAF combat expirence in France 40 that led to droping the 3 plane Vic formation?

Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?

You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts.

You say pilots knew how to use their P-40s against zeros in the PI and that it was "situational awarness" that was blame.
Where are your sources for such a claim?I have read several sources on the subject;
Including:

"The Bataan Airforce"
"Samurai"
"The Fall of the Philipines"
"Philipine War Diary"

That categorically state otherwise.

You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique. In all my readings; Chenault is giving credit for this. Even "Pappy" Boyington; who was no fan of Chenault, credits Chenault for training the AVG in these tactics. Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?

You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" ie; the performance capabilities of your opponent. The US pilots initially did not know the zero's; max speed, its climb rate, its dive rate, its turn rate. Cosequently the US P-40 pilots comming up against the zero for the first time didnt know they could always out dive them, but couldnt out climb them. They didnt know they couldnt turn with them, but could out run them. This is where first hand combat expirence comes in or at least information learned from other's experience comes in.

Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality.

Finally RE: PH attack, its important to know how many air cobat losses were zekes, because Kates and Vals are cosiderably easier targets. The fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time.



Ranger-75 -> (3/21/2002 12:14:16 AM)

mehiel,

My vote goes to the P-51 Mustang, because it could do all its great stuff with a range of over 1,000 miles longer than the F4U. The F4U was a great plane though, despite the initial difficulties in getting it into full production.



mdiehl -> (3/21/2002 1:19:10 AM)

Timjot -

The a/c stats are necessary because other posters have suggested that the Japanese fielded a/c that were comparable or better in performance than allied a/c. Those stats were not directed at you in particular, as I am sure you are somewhat aware of them. I'll post a/c performance stats whenever someone makes a claim that I can verify is false. I'm sure it is commonly the case that such folks are working from memory, or from one source. I typically use 4 a/c sources as general references, the one I cited above being the most portable.

As to the rest of your post.

"You really have been quite hypocritical on this point."

Let's not get "personal," shall we.

"On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training."

I think we have a failure to communicate. "Experience" in the broadest sense has consistently driven the design *goals* of aircraft designers. Experience has shown repeatedly that, all other things being equal, speed wins. Increasing aircraft speed was the principle design goal of designers in WW1, and again starting in the mid 1930s. It was the design goal of the major post WW2 superpowers, and it remains a desirable advantage today, although there are some problematic structural limitations to the maximum sustainable airspeed for a/c currently in production. The advent of the a-a missile also has changed combat towards a more balanced equation of speed and maneuverability, IMO, because a-a missiles are generally faster than the targets at which they get launched.

Over the years, even in the 1930s, some a/c tactics were consistently worked on to give pilots with speedy a/c the advantage. So, when I say "boom and zoom" was a premium starting in the late 1930s, I'm saying that pilots knew (and were trained to know) where the main strengths of their a/c lay. These points were debated beginning about the time of teh Spanish Civil War, when it became apparent that high speed interceptors were catching up to the speeds of mulit-engined bombers. Some other tactical considerations were worked out in combat, and fairly quickly I might add, for example the change from the 3-plane Vic resulting from the BOB that you and I agree occurred.

USAAF guys studied the BOB with the advise and consent of the UK. That's why the USAAF and USN were flying 4-plane two element sections prior to US entry. Other tactics that specifically gave the F4F a distinct advantage over the A6M, specifically the weave that came to be called the "Thach Weave" were developed situationally. But weaves in general and weaves in support of wingmen were generally known from WW1. (*A note on the Thach Weave. First really implemented in a widespread fashion at Santa Cruz, the F4Fs ate veteran A6M pilots for lunch. Prior to that tactic, the F4F+pilot was the Zeke's equal. Afterwards, Japanese attrition rates soared, and the F4F+pilot became a better instrument of aerial warfare than the A6M+pilot).

"Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?"

No it was not. The AVG did not see combat until 1942. Chennault and other army instructors were talking about mutually supporting wingmen and boom and zoom tactics in 1941, long before the first engagement between any Allied and Japanese pilot happened.

"You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts. "

See: Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud that includes brief discussions of the relative merits of the early war a/c, and also includes "personal accounts" of P40 drivers that support almost everything I've said in this forum. See also Frank's Guadalcanal, and look at a/c losses. I posted an analysis of the losses a long long time ago in the GGPW forum and it has probably been archived. At Guadalcanal, USMC/USN pilots achieved the following: 1.6:1 Japanese losses to US losses, all a/c, all types, all missions. 1.2:1 American losses to Japanese losses including only fighters (reasonably, since bombers were apt to be shot down in surface attack). 1.1:1 Japanese losses to American losses when only F4Fs are counted (because there are *no* accounts of a P39 shooting down a Zeke over the canal in 1942 and because P39s were used primarily in ground support mode and because I would never argue that the P39+pilot combination was a better *fighter* than the A6M+pilot. It's a technical specs thing.)

"You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique."

Mmm. You seem to be saying that a person does not train to fly their a/c to its strengths until after they've seen some of their friends shot down in combat as a result of not flying their a/c to their strengths. Until they've been in combat, they tend to fly their a/c according to what rules, then? Either I'm not following your argument (probably), or your argument is, uh, reducible to the statement that 'pilots train to fly their a/c to maximize their opponent's abilities.' This can't be what you mean.

"Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?"

The circumstances and odds were not remotely comparable. The vast majority of AVG fighter opponents were Oscars, and planes that were even less airworthy, and the vast majority of AVG kills were bombers, who were on many occasions unescorted. The PI pilots in late '41 and early '42 had no logistical support, very little early warning, and faced an opponent that had more airbases and more aircraft in easy range of their airfield than they had. As to the NEI groups, I'm still waiting for your OOB listing the P40 a/c groups stationed tehre, and a detailed breakdown of their losses. Like I said, Sakai's recollection on the matter is pretty worthless to me with respect to allied losses.

"You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" "

It comes down to this. From a P40 driver's perspective in 1941, the best tactic is to keep the airspeed up. Period. Whether your opponent is an ME109, an A6M2, an F4F in interservice wargames, a Hurricane, a P36, or a rumoured aircraft with high maneuverability and low speed, the answer is the same. Speed and safety and the ability to control an air combat go hand in hand. Less speed means less safety and less ability to control the combat. Period.

Since air to air combat bleeds energy, it is easy for a fellow in the heat of battle to lose situational awareness. One aspect of the latter is airspeed. If a P40 pilot, or any other pilot of a speed-maximized plane (like the ME109, or even a lowly Crate) lets his airspeed drop, he cedes control of the battle to any opponent who has not let his airspeed drop. It tended to happen to all combatants in all theaters that new pilots were more likely to lose airspeed in this way and to neglect it, often, to unfortunate ends. Vis the A6M *specifically* this was very bad, because losing airspeed played to the A6Ms strengths to a greater degree than say, losing airspeed in combat with a slowly turning ME109.

The point in all cases remains the same. Against any opponent it is always better to have a speed advantage if you can get it. US pilots did not need to be trained specifically to fight the Zero and they did not have to have fought Zeros to know what the right thing to do with a P40 was. The Zeros simply made the same lessons that were instilled in training "more real" if you will.

The Zeke guys had the same relatinoship between doctrine and combat experience. Their plane was *not* a speed demon. They were trained to fly to its strengths, principally low-speed maneuverability. The Zeke pilots learned that it was unwise to try to turn with a fast moving P40, or a diving F4F, and that in a face-to-face head on approach run, the enemy planes were better. Unfortunately for the Japanese, knowing not to try to keep pace with a P40 does not solve the immediate problem of winning (or even escaping) an air to air combat. If you let the P40 outrun you, the P40 can return at will in circumstances that favor the P40. It happened all the time. (See, again, Fire in the Sky for some of those pilot accounts). The faster plane controls the fight. Period.

"Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality."

Japanese pilot quality dropped because Japan could not train pilots fast enough. Even if it could have done so, it could not build capable a/c fast enough. That the Japanese failed to rotate their veterans contributed to the decline, both by failing to move front line "wisdom" to rear areas, as you suggest, and because all pilots needed to be rotated or their flying skills deteriorated.

"he fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time."

IIRC. Welsh was credited with 1 Zeke and two bombers confirmed at PH. You can do your own web poking (I don't mean that negatively) to verify. The P40s fought with Zekes and around Zekes at PH. It's hard to see how much more detail you want, or how much effort is really justified in dismissing results because circumstances were momentarily exceptional. In most a/a combat, circumstances are momentarily exceptional.



Adnan Meshuggi -> (3/21/2002 7:23:24 PM)

Hm, now we knew it.... the american planes were superior, followed by the brits.

The trainig of the american pilots was superior too (even in 1940-41) and normaly a amercan shot down 3 enemy planes in only one mission.

Wait


wait

something sounds strange for me....

If this is so, why had the axis the successfuller pilots (by great numbers) with the inferior planes ?

Okay, lets look a little bit deeper....

Hartman, 361 kills ...mostly russians, but in one mission, (his last combat mission) he killed out of 25 2 or 3 Mustangs and escaped easily... in a ME109G-14, a inferior plane... why ? because in that time you will find no other pilot with his combat experience and combat knowledge.... and you can train your p51 pilot as long as you want, the experience in combat rules.... sure the new german pilots (for that), nearly loosing their planes by flying straight on, are a different thing.

But without a war , the americans allways would be inferior against the military harded japs....

Lets talk about american aces.... (well, i think below 50 kills it is baby ace, but that is maybe a different opinion) wich planes flew they and in witch time (after starting their war career) they had their kills...?

So i think, forget the reviosinistic phrases, and be honest. The american airforces had not the quality of the japs, but they worked hard, had later the much better planes and a good advantage in numbers, like 10:1 or better....

But you are right in one point.... even Hartmann could have been killed by the pilot of a Mig 1 or a Rata, with a pilot with 10 hours knowledge, because of the factor LUCK..... think about it...


And if you think Hartmann dosen´t count (well it is unfair), we take the Star of Africa, Marsillies, he had only brits.

Or we take one other of the more then 500 germans, wich had better war records then your best aces..... but they were so inferior



TIMJOT -> (3/21/2002 10:28:05 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Timjot -

The a/c stats are necessary because other posters have suggested that the Japanese fielded a/c that were comparable or better in performance than allied a/c. Those stats were not directed at you in particular, as I am sure you are somewhat aware of them. I'll post a/c performance stats whenever someone makes a claim that I can verify is false. I'm sure it is commonly the case that such folks are working from memory, or from one source. I typically use 4 a/c sources as general references, the one I cited above being the most portable.

As to the rest of your post.

"You really have been quite hypocritical on this point."

Let's not get "personal," shall we.

"On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training."

I think we have a failure to communicate. "Experience" in the broadest sense has consistently driven the design *goals* of aircraft designers. Experience has shown repeatedly that, all other things being equal, speed wins. Increasing aircraft speed was the principle design goal of designers in WW1, and again starting in the mid 1930s. It was the design goal of the major post WW2 superpowers, and it remains a desirable advantage today, although there are some problematic structural limitations to the maximum sustainable airspeed for a/c currently in production. The advent of the a-a missile also has changed combat towards a more balanced equation of speed and maneuverability, IMO, because a-a missiles are generally faster than the targets at which they get launched.

Over the years, even in the 1930s, some a/c tactics were consistently worked on to give pilots with speedy a/c the advantage. So, when I say "boom and zoom" was a premium starting in the late 1930s, I'm saying that pilots knew (and were trained to know) where the main strengths of their a/c lay. These points were debated beginning about the time of teh Spanish Civil War, when it became apparent that high speed interceptors were catching up to the speeds of mulit-engined bombers. Some other tactical considerations were worked out in combat, and fairly quickly I might add, for example the change from the 3-plane Vic resulting from the BOB that you and I agree occurred.

USAAF guys studied the BOB with the advise and consent of the UK. That's why the USAAF and USN were flying 4-plane two element sections prior to US entry. Other tactics that specifically gave the F4F a distinct advantage over the A6M, specifically the weave that came to be called the "Thach Weave" were developed situationally. But weaves in general and weaves in support of wingmen were generally known from WW1. (*A note on the Thach Weave. First really implemented in a widespread fashion at Santa Cruz, the F4Fs ate veteran A6M pilots for lunch. Prior to that tactic, the F4F+pilot was the Zeke's equal. Afterwards, Japanese attrition rates soared, and the F4F+pilot became a better instrument of aerial warfare than the A6M+pilot).

"Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?"

No it was not. The AVG did not see combat until 1942. Chennault and other army instructors were talking about mutually supporting wingmen and boom and zoom tactics in 1941, long before the first engagement between any Allied and Japanese pilot happened.

"You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts. "

See: Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud that includes brief discussions of the relative merits of the early war a/c, and also includes "personal accounts" of P40 drivers that support almost everything I've said in this forum. See also Frank's Guadalcanal, and look at a/c losses. I posted an analysis of the losses a long long time ago in the GGPW forum and it has probably been archived. At Guadalcanal, USMC/USN pilots achieved the following: 1.6:1 Japanese losses to US losses, all a/c, all types, all missions. 1.2:1 American losses to Japanese losses including only fighters (reasonably, since bombers were apt to be shot down in surface attack). 1.1:1 Japanese losses to American losses when only F4Fs are counted (because there are *no* accounts of a P39 shooting down a Zeke over the canal in 1942 and because P39s were used primarily in ground support mode and because I would never argue that the P39+pilot combination was a better *fighter* than the A6M+pilot. It's a technical specs thing.)

"You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique."

Mmm. You seem to be saying that a person does not train to fly their a/c to its strengths until after they've seen some of their friends shot down in combat as a result of not flying their a/c to their strengths. Until they've been in combat, they tend to fly their a/c according to what rules, then? Either I'm not following your argument (probably), or your argument is, uh, reducible to the statement that 'pilots train to fly their a/c to maximize their opponent's abilities.' This can't be what you mean.

"Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?"

The circumstances and odds were not remotely comparable. The vast majority of AVG fighter opponents were Oscars, and planes that were even less airworthy, and the vast majority of AVG kills were bombers, who were on many occasions unescorted. The PI pilots in late '41 and early '42 had no logistical support, very little early warning, and faced an opponent that had more airbases and more aircraft in easy range of their airfield than they had. As to the NEI groups, I'm still waiting for your OOB listing the P40 a/c groups stationed tehre, and a detailed breakdown of their losses. Like I said, Sakai's recollection on the matter is pretty worthless to me with respect to allied losses.

"You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" "

It comes down to this. From a P40 driver's perspective in 1941, the best tactic is to keep the airspeed up. Period. Whether your opponent is an ME109, an A6M2, an F4F in interservice wargames, a Hurricane, a P36, or a rumoured aircraft with high maneuverability and low speed, the answer is the same. Speed and safety and the ability to control an air combat go hand in hand. Less speed means less safety and less ability to control the combat. Period.

Since air to air combat bleeds energy, it is easy for a fellow in the heat of battle to lose situational awareness. One aspect of the latter is airspeed. If a P40 pilot, or any other pilot of a speed-maximized plane (like the ME109, or even a lowly Crate) lets his airspeed drop, he cedes control of the battle to any opponent who has not let his airspeed drop. It tended to happen to all combatants in all theaters that new pilots were more likely to lose airspeed in this way and to neglect it, often, to unfortunate ends. Vis the A6M *specifically* this was very bad, because losing airspeed played to the A6Ms strengths to a greater degree than say, losing airspeed in combat with a slowly turning ME109.

The point in all cases remains the same. Against any opponent it is always better to have a speed advantage if you can get it. US pilots did not need to be trained specifically to fight the Zero and they did not have to have fought Zeros to know what the right thing to do with a P40 was. The Zeros simply made the same lessons that were instilled in training "more real" if you will.

The Zeke guys had the same relatinoship between doctrine and combat experience. Their plane was *not* a speed demon. They were trained to fly to its strengths, principally low-speed maneuverability. The Zeke pilots learned that it was unwise to try to turn with a fast moving P40, or a diving F4F, and that in a face-to-face head on approach run, the enemy planes were better. Unfortunately for the Japanese, knowing not to try to keep pace with a P40 does not solve the immediate problem of winning (or even escaping) an air to air combat. If you let the P40 outrun you, the P40 can return at will in circumstances that favor the P40. It happened all the time. (See, again, Fire in the Sky for some of those pilot accounts). The faster plane controls the fight. Period.

"Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality."

Japanese pilot quality dropped because Japan could not train pilots fast enough. Even if it could have done so, it could not build capable a/c fast enough. That the Japanese failed to rotate their veterans contributed to the decline, both by failing to move front line "wisdom" to rear areas, as you suggest, and because all pilots needed to be rotated or their flying skills deteriorated.

"he fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time."

IIRC. Welsh was credited with 1 Zeke and two bombers confirmed at PH. You can do your own web poking (I don't mean that negatively) to verify. The P40s fought with Zekes and around Zekes at PH. It's hard to see how much more detail you want, or how much effort is really justified in dismissing results because circumstances were momentarily exceptional. In most a/a combat, circumstances are momentarily exceptional. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Mdiehl

Sorry about the "hypocrite" remark. Nothing personal intended. Maybe "contridictory" would be a better word.

On the one hand you state that

A)The Germans gained invaluable combat experience in Spain, which helped them to develope superior tactical doctorine.

B)The British learned from their expiernces in France 40 and early BOB, that their tactical doctorine was flawed.

C)The US learned from studying both the Luftwaffe and RAF in the BOB.

All of which I agree with, but on the other hand you
Totally discount the value of combat expirence in the pacifiic theater. In regards to developing effective tactics and pilot efficiency.

Now down to business....

Mdeihl says: "All things being equal speed wins" ;

True but all things were not equal in 41 and would not be equal in 43 either if there is no war in 42. The Japanese army and navy rotated their pilots into the china theater to get combat expirence. So most of their pilots had at least some compat expirence in 41/42. Not to mention the combat expirence they would gain from their attack south in 42.


Mdeihl says: Hmm...you seem to saying that a pilot doesnt fly his a/c to its strengths until he flies in combat.......ect :

No Im saying that strengths are all relative to what your opponents strengths are. A p-40s strength against a zero wouldnt neccessarily be a strength against a 109. The US pilots didnt know what there strengths were relative to the zero initially. They had been told that their a/c were superior to anything the Japs had.

Mdeihl: "No it was not, the AVG didnt see combat until 1942"

Yes, Mdiehl, but Chenault had been in China as an intructor and observer for the Chinese Nationist AF, since 1937. He was responsible for the first combat reports on the zero and oscars and proceeded in developing combat tactics to fight them.

Qutoe: "Flying Tigers"pg76; "Chenault instructed us to forget what we had learned from the US services. He told us not to engaged the enemy unless you have altitude avangtage. Never try to turn with the Jap fighters or climb from it. Use your superior dive speed to make a pass then climb away to regain altitude and to make another pass. Most impotantly keep your air speed up at all times"

Mheihl says: "The circumstances were not even remotely similar"

Actually they were pretty similar. The AVG at least initially had little if any logistical support, Their only warning system were a bunch of chinese peasants looking in the sky. Where as the USAFFE had radar in the PI. They faced an oponent with more airbases and aircraft, in easy striking distance to there airfields; just like in the PI. True they faced mainly Oscars, but the truth is so did USAFFE in PI. The only Zeros were with the IJN 11th Air Flottila, which was withdrawn in January.

RE: allied OOB in Java; I posted it earlier, you must of missed it. Basically 48 RAF Hurricans Flown of HMS Indomitable. The US flew 4 flights of P-40s via Darwin,Timor,Bali,Java air route. The first flight of 13 made it without incident. The following 3 flights all suffered losses in transit. The numbers are a bit scetchy, but at the most an estimated 25-30 US P-40s were operational in Java at one point. Plus 3 squadrons of Dutch Buffalos, 12 Dutch Curtiss 75s(P-36s) and a small number of Dutch P-40s and Hurricans.

Mdiehl: "Read Fire in the Sky"

I did. First "Fire in the sky" covers the NG-Solomons campaign, roughtly July 42 and on, 8 months after the start of the war. But if you insist.
Quote: "Fire in the Sky" Pg.167; pp;US pilots PI tried to dogfight with the Zero with tragic results

Quote "Fire in the Sky"pp;cp5; "By July,allied pilots had pretty much thrown away the book on tactical doctorine and had developed tactics to deal with the circumstances that faced them".

Quote:"Fire in the Sky" The zero in capable hands remaind dangerous...... (example)pp. "The RAF sent a Spitfire wing to Australia,These were BOB vets and didnt want to listen to the advice of there American and Australain counter parts. Unfortuanely they tried to use the tactics that were effective for them in the BOB; they suffered heavy losses. Gradually they learned how best to fight the zero and the losses declined."

What ya know; Your own source kinda refutes your assertion that the US learned the tactics neccessary to combat the zero by studying the BOB.

Mdiehl: "See Also Franks Guadacanal losses"

Guadacanal was fully 10 months after the start of hostilities, Maybe thats where we differ. When I say early in the war I mean roughly the first 6 months of initial combat. During and after of which, it stands to reason that allied pilots through experence would have figured out how best to combat their enemy.

Mdiehl: "Welsh was credited with 1 zeke and 2 bombers."

One zeke hardly constitutes proof that the US knew how to combat the zero on equal terms. It just proves there are always aberations in the realm of combat.

Mdiehl: I respect your body of knowledge on this subject, particularly on the combat performance of WWII aircraft. However I dont really understand how you can continue to argue the insignificance of combat experence; when even your own sources and statements suggest otherwise.



byron13 -> (3/22/2002 1:58:44 AM)

Pardon the interruption, gentlemen. Good debate, though all of you are wrong.

This admittedly has no relevance to the discussion here, but many of you are well-read. There is a book that was published that focused on American armored operations in Western Europe during World War II and in particular on the Hedgerow campaign. It basically talked about how inferior the Sherman was, how the tankers were told they had the best tank in the world, and how we got our butts handed to us. I think the title was something like "Steel Coffins" or "Burning Coffins." I can't find it on Amazon. Anyone have a good title?

What reminded me of this book was the statements about U.S. pilots knowing that the P-40 had a speed advantage over the Zero and were trained to use it. I cannot debate the subject with those more knowledgeable here, but I am suspicious of that statement. I know for a fact that U.S. pilots in 1941 believed they were better than Japanese pilots - including those of the IJN. I would bet that they believed their aircraft were superior. Every account I can remember reading of the early war was the "shock" pilots had when they realized how maneuverable the Zero was. My unsubstantiated guess would be that U.S. pilots were trained in classic knife fight style dogfighting and felt they could win in a turning fight with whatever the Japanese had. This would have been the result of poor intelligence, ego, and a feeling of racial/national superiority. You have to remember that, back in the day, all nations were much more naive and ignorant. We honestly believed that Japanese couldn't see well because of their slanted eyes. And none of the European air forces to that time had used boom 'n zoom tactics; rather, air combat picked up where WWI left off: with classical maneuver. So why would the naive Americans train or believe differently? So I don't find it hard to believe that our guys were itching to turn with the Japanese and were not trained to boom 'n zoom. The tallies from the early months of the war would seem to bear that out. And, similarly, our tankers (god bless all tankers!) were itching to go nose to nose with Mark IV's and V's as late as Normandy despite the experiences of North Africa and Italy. The aggressiveness and cockiness that every soldier and pilot needs has an inertia of its own that is often fatal until tempered by experience.

Let's face it: fighter pilots are not trained to make a high speed run on a formation, shoot down one plane, and exit the fight. They are trained, perhaps because it is more difficult to master and therefore training in this is more critical, to maneuver with the enemy. If nothing else, fighter pilot ego alone almost dictates that each pilot believes he can outfly the opponent. Even in the 1960's when we were supposedly so much smarter and knew that our Crusaders and Phantoms could not turn with Vietnamese Migs, our guys were still trying. Surely there is not better place for boom 'n zoom than in Vietnam where you had better long range weapons and much faster but much less maneuverable aircraft, but we still tried to turn. The results were 1) high loss rates and 2) the topgun school.

With that, I depart to watch the scrap from a distance. Long live the Philippine Empire!



Raverdave -> (3/22/2002 4:40:50 AM)

I think that it was Chuck Yeager who said something along the lines of " Its not the plane that counts but the pliot in it" or words to that effect. Just my 2 cents worth.



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