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TIMJOT -> (3/30/2002 8:53:07 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ranger-75
[B]You folks are underestimating the non-combat plane losses in your discussions.

Non-combat losses far exceeded combat losses, especially on unimproved airfields (like what was all over the Pacific) and on Carriers.

As an example (all references are to Dunnigan's Victory at Sea):

The F4U Corsair. Corsairs shot down 2,140 enemy aircraft (of course not all of them enemy fighters) while losing 189. That's over 10:1 but by mid 1943-45, the USN and USMC had the better training and aircraft. Still, 10:1.

But, other losses,
340 to enemy AA
164 in landing accidents
900 (approx) in other "operational mishaps"

Even lumping the the AA losses with the air combat losses meant that non-combat losses were about twice as high as combat losses.

And this was later in the war when the US had made improvements in all areas or operations. Earlier in the war, both sides would likely have experienced greater non combat losses.

Other Kill Ratios:
The F4F Wildcat:
Dunnigan quotes a 5.9:1 air combat kill ration for the wildcat in air combat (again, not all enemy fighters), half the Corsair, but still very good for a "inferior" plane. It wasn't really inferior.

The F6F Hellcat:
Hellcats shot down 6,477 enemy aircraft losing 270 to enemy air action. That's almost 24:1
:eek:

The SBD Daultless:
Even the SBD Daultless gave better than it got versus enemy fighters (the Zero was the only fighter it usually ran up against). SBDs shot down 138 Japanese aircraft while losing only 80 to emeny fighters, over the course of the entire war. [/B][/QUOTE]

Ranger

The Wildcat was "inferior", but the USN nullified this with "superior" tactics ( two plane formation, Thatch weave and such)

Are you sure SBDs shot down 139 zeros? I can believe they shot down vals and kates and other such planes, but ZEROS??? :confused:



Jeremy Pritchard -> (3/30/2002 10:53:12 PM)

The IJAAF and IJNAF were notorious for sending out bomber raids without fighter cover, especially during the I-Go offensives and Kamikaze raids.

When calculating air-to-air kills, especially against the Japanese, you will realize that a vast majority of kills by the F6F and F4U from 1944 onward were Kamikaze kills. These kamikaze offered virtually no resistance and put up only pitiful fights. Hundreds were expended in individual raids, the vast majority got nailed by CAP, and most of the remaining by AA, with only a small percentege ever getting through. Also, many planes expended on Kamikaze missions were horrobily obsolete (Ki-30, Ki-27, etc..)

Here is a blurb from a Weapons and Warfare book on the Ki-100 "The 244th Sentai commanded by Major Teruhiko Koyabashi claimed the destruction of seven Chance Vought F4U Corsairs on June 3, 1945, and claimed 12 Hellcat Kills on July 25 without losses." Judging by this statement and ratio, the unexperienced 244th Sentai (spent most of the war at the homeland) managed to take on and easily defeat USN fighters with the Ki-100. In fact, many claims and losses are enflated or deflated by both sides. Many accepted kills were actually claimed by two or more different pilots.

However, when you look at the A6M you might see it being a positive kill ratio as well, when you take into account ALL kills. Stating just the USN side will not give the clear picture. Maybe the A6M had a 4:1 kill ratio, which compares very favourably with the F4F. Possibly the Ki-84 and Ki-100 had 14:1 kill ratios, which makes the F4U and F6F look like trainers!

There is no doubt that the US were able to shoot down more Japanese planes then they lost, but it may not be due specifically to better aircraft. Tactics can result in the poor use of aircraft. Sending carrier planes to be used on land based missions without sufficient support or direction (operation I-Go) resulted in the destruction of the well trained 2nd Generation of IJNAF.

During the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe had the better experienced, larger, and probably better equipped air force, yet had losses much higher then their enemy. This was primarily due to the fact that the attacker (the Luftwaffe, and in the early part of the war the IJNAF) could not rescue their downed pilots, plus had the added points against them by having to battle after hours of flying time (which are exhausting) while your enemy engages minutes after leaving the ground. The Allies had radar much earlier in the war (in the Pacific and Europe), which meant that their fighters were intercepting more enemy aircraft then their opponents.

Looking at straight numbers cannot tell the exact circumstances, espcecially when these numbers span over a long period, and under ever changing circumstances.



TIMJOT -> (3/31/2002 9:39:40 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
[B]Regarding the Battleship fleets...

The IJN was outnumbered, however, its battleships were "better".

The Nagatos were better then the Colorados in speed and durability.

The Fuso/Ise classes were better then the contemporary USN 14" Battleships because of their speed (25-26 kts vs. 21 kts), as well as their firepower (2 more guns then the Nevada/Texas class) even though they had an equal number of guns as the Pennsylvania and Tennessee class, the Japanese mounted theirs on 6 turrets of 2 guns, while the USN had theirs on 4 turrets of 3 guns. This is better because if a turret is knocked out (happens a lot in battle), then the Japanese lose less guns then if an American battleship was hit.

The Kongo class, even though under armoured, faired VERY well. the Kirishima was able to battle both the Washington and South Dakota (I believe) and survive fairly long (and battered up the South Dakota fairly well!). They were GREAT carrier escorts, and superb Battle Cruisers (they could easily deal with USN Cruisers).

Before the arrival of the North Carolinas, the USN battlefleet suffered from being slow and poorly equipped. They had NO large vessel to escort their carriers until the new battleships arrived. The Japanese ships also out sped US ships by 4-5 kts, which really counts when engaging in battle. Had the USN and IJN actually fought a real surface engagement with their battlefleets, the IJN would have had superior ships to the USN. Both sides had ancient battleships, but the Japanese were much better at making them capable of fighting very well 20 years after they were built. The US never used their Pre-War battleships as much other then bombardment vessels, not because of an abundance of new battleships, but because theirs were too slow, and in need of years of refitting to reach the levels of the IJN battleships. By early 1942 the USN had around 6 Pre-War battleships in the Pacific, but were all left on the West Coast. [/B][/QUOTE]

Jeremy

The Nagoto's were better in speed, slightly better in armor,but according the "Fleets of WWII", were somewhat less mechanically reliable. So I would clasify them as only slightly better than the Colorodos.

The Fuso's ands Ise's were not better than the US contempories Pensyvania's Missippi, Tennessee's. They had a slightly better speed of 24-25 knots compared to 21.5 knots of the US ships. However they were considerably less well protected. 12" belt, 2.25" deck adn 12" turret. As compared to 13.3"belt, 3.5"deck and 18" turret of the US BBs. The US BBs were also more seaworthy and more stable gun platforms. Contrary to your statement, The 6 turret layout was in fact "inferior". 6-2gun turrets are heaveir than 4-3gun turrets. The Midship turrets have a limited arch of fire. The layout requires more amor to cover the vital areas. Thats why all navies including the IJN went to the 4 and 3 turtet layout for all their new BBs.

The Kongos, were very under armored, having only an 8" belt, 2.75 deck and 8" turret. The Hei was so severly damaged by only 8" and 5" shells; US aircraft were able to later sink it. The Kirshima as litterally blown apart by the Washington. The Kongo was sunk by only 2 torpedo hits. They were very good carrier escort ships however. Just really cant be considered BBs.

All in all the 3-4 knot advantage enjoyed by the IJN BBs is nulified with the USN BBs better protection. The Kongos were BCs and history has proven that speed was no supstitute for amor when came to surface combat. 3 British BCs were litterally blown out of the water at Jutland. Likewise the Hood against the Bismark. the kirshima against the Washington.

Conclusion: the Nagatos were slightly better than the Colordos. The Ise and Fuso were equal to the Pensyvania and slightly infferior to the Missippis's and Tennessee's



CynicAl -> (3/31/2002 12:01:10 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
[B]Regarding the Battleship fleets...

The IJN was outnumbered, however, its battleships were "better".

The Nagatos were better then the Colorados in speed and durability.

The Fuso/Ise classes were better then the contemporary USN 14" Battleships because of their speed (25-26 kts vs. 21 kts), as well as their firepower (2 more guns then the Nevada/Texas class) even though they had an equal number of guns as the Pennsylvania and Tennessee class, the Japanese mounted theirs on 6 turrets of 2 guns, while the USN had theirs on 4 turrets of 3 guns. This is b etter because if a turret is knocked out (happens a lot in battle), then the Japanese lose less guns then if an American battleship was hit.

The Kongo class, even though under armoured, faired VERY well. the Kirishima was able to battle both the Washington and South Dakota (I believe) and survive fairly long (and battered up the South Dakota fairly well!). They were GREAT carrier escorts, and superb Battle Cruisers (they could easily deal with USN Cruisers).

Before the arrival of the North Carolinas, the USN battlefleet suffered from being slow and poorly equipped. They had NO large vessel to escort their carriers until the new battleships arrived. The Japanese ships also out sped US ships by 4-5 kts, which really counts when engaging in battle. Had the USN and IJN actually fought a real surface engagement with their battlefleets, the IJN would have had superior ships to the USN. Both sides had ancient battleships, but the Japanese were much better at making them capable of fighting very well 20 years after they were built. The US never used their Pre-War battleships as much other then bombardment vessels, not because of an abundance of new battleships, but because theirs were too slow, and in need of years of refitting to reach the levels of the IJN battleships. By early 1942 the USN had around 6 Pre-War battleships in the Pacific, but were all left on the West Coast. [/B][/QUOTE]

The Nagatos, as all IJN BBs in this period, were handicapped by their "diving" shells, which were actually designed to splash short of the target and then continue underwater in the hopes of scoring hits below the waterline (and, it was hoped, below the armored belt). Unfortunately, optimizing the shell design for this feature (which proved to be completely useless in practice, as NO such hits were EVER recorded with the special shells) seriously impeded AP performance. The Colorados, though never upgraded to handle the "superheavy" Mk8 16" shells, still had a much better gun/shell combination than Nagato. The US ships also sported thicker armor on the belt, conning tower, turrets, and barbettes; and as the war wore on, increasingly better fire control as well.

Fuso had two more guns and was noticeably faster than its US contemporary, Nevada, but was less well protected. The Fuso also shared with the rest of the IJN battle line the handicap of inferior AP shell performance, and increasingly inferior fire control as the war progressed. The Ise class basically repeated the Fusos, but their contemporaries were the US New Mexico class, which had a more modern armor scheme.

I must also strongly disagree with your statement that distributing the main battery across six turrets was a good thing. Yes, it allows you to preserve a greater portion of your firepower in the event of disabling turret hits, but by increasing the number of turrets you simultaneously increase the target area and therefore the likelihood of such hits. In that sense, it's a wash. In another sense, though, it's very much NOT a wash. Spreading the main battery over six turrets greatly increases the length of the ship's vitals, and thus greatly increases the weight of armor needed to protect them to a given standard. Concentration allows superior protection to be afforded at a reduced weight penalty.

The Kongo class managed to be the most useful elements of the Japanese battlefleet in WW2, serving in capacities for which their newer stablemates were judged too slow, too uneconomical, or too valuable. But they were seriously underarmored, barely able to withstand cruiser fire; with only 8 14" rifles, they were also seriously underarmed by the standards of the 1940s. Despite their speed advantage, they'd be meat on the table for any USN BB from at least New York on. Indeed, a couple of cruisers managed to bite off Hiei (so much for "easily able to deal with..."); and Kirishima only did as well as she did because South Dakota suffered a (self-inflicted) casualty in engineering that knocked out all electrical power in the ship at the start of the battle. When Washington managed to get an unobstructed shot, Kirishima got clobbered fast.

Before the arrival of the North Carolinas in the PTO, the USN battlefleet suffered from being attacked where they swung at anchor in peacetime, putting most of the BBs out of commission for varying lengths of time. The lack of BBs suitable for CV escort wasn't perceived as a problem, because CVs were supposed to support the BBs, not vice versa - cruisers were supposed to fill the escorting roles. In practice, it turned out that BBs made great AA escorts; but that wasn't what anyone, including the IJN, originally intended.

The speed advantage of the IJN battlefleet over the old Standards is of relatively little consequence once the decision has been made to give battle - fast or slow, similar gun ranges mean that bringing the enemy under fire requires exposing yourself to his fire in turn. Once the fleets start trading blows, the firepower, protection, FC, and sheer numbers advantages of the US ships make the outcome nearly certain. Prewar IJN planners knew that - that's the reasoning behind the heavy Japanese emphasis on "super" weapons, such as the Long Lance torpedos, the "diving" shells, and the Yamato class BBs. That's also the reason why Japanese plans for the "Decisive Battle" grew increasingly (and overly) complex, and ever more dependant on freakishly good luck, impossibly good C4I, and a totally cooperative opponent acting exactly as their script decreed. If the pre-war battlefleets of Japan and the US had met in a Tsushima-style engagement, the US would have been hurt. But the IJN would have been annihilated.



CynicAl -> (3/31/2002 12:10:08 PM)

Heh. I need to type faster. And perhaps not take dinner breaks in the middle of posting. When I started typing the above, Tim's reply wasn't up yet...

Sorry for the repetition.



TIMJOT -> (4/1/2002 6:14:24 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by CynicAl
[B]Heh. I need to type faster. And perhaps not take dinner breaks in the middle of posting. When I started typing the above, Tim's reply wasn't up yet...

Sorry for the repetition. [/B][/QUOTE]

No apologies needed:) I didnt know about those diving shells. Were all IJN AP shells this type? Or did they have normal APs also? I also concur, that pre-war dotorine dictated that the carries support (ie scout) for the BBs. So amor protection not speed was paramount in USN planners eyes.

Not so sure that pre-war USN wins a Tshima style Battle though. The Japanese plans to use the Long lance Torps would have been devasting to the battleline. Even their BBs had Torps.



CynicAl -> (4/1/2002 10:36:58 AM)

Re: Diving shells. As far as I know, all Japanese AP shells in service from @ the mid-30's on were this type. Stocks of the older shells (at least the 16" ones) were converted to 800kg bombs for the B5Ns.

Ironically, the IJN would probably have had a better chance in a straight-up brawl ala Tsushima than if they actually tried to put their ghastly "Decisive Battle" scenario into effect. The thing was an abomination, plain and simple. It's almost hard to pick out the worst feature, there are so many to choose from - divided forces, overcomplication; in short, all the usual suspects of wartime IJN planning - but I think it's probably the assumption that the USN would blithely play along with their script, steaming fat, dumb, and happy (and oddly unescorted), full speed ahead right into the jaws of their trap, without reacting at all.

The most likely result of implementing this deeply flawed plan would be the destruction in detail of all IJN "light" forces (everything up to and including the Kongos) as the dozen-plus penny-packet groupings were shot to pieces in the preliminary Night Battle phase, which would savage the US escorts (mostly by gunfire, rather than the Long Lances*) but leave the BBs largely unmolested. The next morning, the IJN battle line would be ravaged by a much-less-damaged-than-expected US battle fleet, while the Japanese CO stood scratched his head and wondered why none of his escorts had rejoined.

*The Long Lance was a ship-killer, no mistake: fast, long-ranged, and powerful. But IJN doctrine for their use was less impressive. There's an interesting analysis of this at http://www.warships1.com/W-Tech/tech-067.htm



CynicAl -> (4/1/2002 11:32:51 AM)

Made a mistake earlier: The IJN recorded exactly ONE underwater hit with the Type 91 "diving" shell in the course of the entire war. It penetrated to the forward magazine of USS Boise before exploding, but Boise survived to fight another day (and served until 1979 in Argentina).



TIMJOT -> (4/1/2002 9:28:51 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by CynicAl
[B]Re: Diving shells. As far as I know, all Japanese AP shells in service from @ the mid-30's on were this type. Stocks of the older shells (at least the 16" ones) were converted to 800kg bombs for the B5Ns.

Ironically, the IJN would probably have had a better chance in a straight-up brawl ala Tsushima than if they actually tried to put their ghastly "Decisive Battle" scenario into effect. The thing was an abomination, plain and simple. It's almost hard to pick out the worst feature, there are so many to choose from - divided forces, overcomplication; in short, all the usual suspects of wartime IJN planning - but I think it's probably the assumption that the USN would blithely play along with their script, steaming fat, dumb, and happy (and oddly unescorted), full speed ahead right into the jaws of their trap, without reacting at all.

The most likely result of implementing this deeply flawed plan would be the destruction in detail of all IJN "light" forces (everything up to and including the Kongos) as the dozen-plus penny-packet groupings were shot to pieces in the preliminary Night Battle phase, which would savage the US escorts (mostly by gunfire, rather than the Long Lances*) but leave the BBs largely unmolested. The next morning, the IJN battle line would be ravaged by a much-less-damaged-than-expected US battle fleet, while the Japanese CO stood scratched his head and wondered why none of his escorts had rejoined.

*The Long Lance was a ship-killer, no mistake: fast, long-ranged, and powerful. But IJN doctrine for their use was less impressive. There's an interesting analysis of this at http://www.warships1.com/W-Tech/tech-067.htm [/B][/QUOTE]


I dont know. The IJN light forces performed pretty **** well in the solomons. There plans to attack the US Fleet at night with wave after wave of torp attacks could have been devasting. Thats why they armed the DDs CLs and CAs to the teeth with torps. The LL torp was extremely accurate and had over twice the range of the US torp. Again the Solomons demonstrated that the IJN was very proficient at useing this weapon and skilled at night fighting. While US night fighting efficiency was suspect to say the least. I assume this scenerio takes place early in the war, so radar use would have been very limited. Certainly t he BBs would would not have had radar. IJN night optics much better than US optics, so I think the IJN performs better than you think in the preliminary attrition actions. They should have no trouble driving off US DD escorts. The shear number disparity in Torps. US DDs carried 4-6 torps no-reloads. IJN DDs carried 8 torps with reloads for a total of 16 torps per DD.

I agree in a theoritical vacume demonstrateing a toe to toe daylight battleline fight the USN would probably prevail. Better AP shells + better armor protection + more concentrated big gun fire power. However that type of pure battleline battle would have been very unlikely. The IJN was fully prepared to sacrifice there light forces in order to break up the US Battleline. Once broken up all bets are off. At this point the IJN speed advantage might be decisive.

I agree IJN plans were flawed, aways too complicated and needless division of force. However pre-war USN planing aslo had its drawbacks. For one the USN planed to use their carriers in widlely dispersed 1 carrier TF groups. To act as scouts for the Battleline. Im afraid this penny packet dispersion of the carrier strength would have been unlikely to be able to stand up to the combined striking power of the Kido Butai.



mdiehl -> (4/1/2002 10:29:43 PM)

Ranger 75 - TIMJOT and I were discussing the early war combat loss ratios, not the whole war ratios. Much of the radically favorable US ratio that you cite is a result of combat after 1942. Interesting nonetheless, and indicative of the ways in which advanced doctrine made the F4F/FM2 a much more lethal a/c in the PTO than it ever would ahev been in the ETO.

To All: My mistake on the IJN BBs. They're not my forte. I'll leave it to others to retrodict the event that never happened. FWIW the [url]www.combinedleet.com[/url] guns and armor page illustrates how and why the SODaks and Iowas were the best in BB design.

Jeremy Pritchard - What can I say. Japanese pilots claimed lots of kills flying everything from Ki100s to A6Ms. Under the *best* circumstances you should *assume* that pilots exaggerated their victory claims by a factor of 3. It also would not surprise me to learn that SBDs claimed in excess of 100 A6Ms and that they actually shot down a score or slightly more. Not owing to any of the lovely characteristics of the SBD, just the tail gunner trying to do his usual thing. If you look at B17 gunners claims in Germany you'd think each Fort shot down took five Germans fighters down with her.

"Possibly the Ki-84 and Ki-100 had 14:1 kill ratios, which makes the F4U and F6F look like trainers!"

LOL! *yeaah, riiiiight*

TIMJOT, why would you assume that the Pacific fleet would not be more fit with radar and no more likely to use the radar sets well? Without an active shooting war for the 1st 6 months of 1942 the naval assets are not committed in the Atlantic or Pacific. That basically puts most of the navy in port getting refit with the newest equipment and then in excercises, training at its proper use. Add that to the fact that all US DD skippers understood proper torpedo doctrine prior to the start of the war (see the Balikpapan sngagement for a good example of this in January 1942) and, IMO, you have a formula whereby the USN is much more prepared for all surface engagement conditions in mid 1942 than it historically was.


*** To All. Please deselect "Email Notification" when posting to the forums. The deluge of trivial notifications is a pain in the axx. ***



mdiehl -> (4/1/2002 10:41:33 PM)

TIMJOT says:

"There plans to attack the US Fleet at night with wave after wave of torp attacks could have been devasting. Thats why they armed the DDs CLs and CAs to the teeth with torps. The LL torp was extremely accurate and had over twice the range of the US torp."

The aforementinoed Warships1 post shows why that claim is just wrong. Numbers mean something. A "modal hit rate of zero" means that in 51% or more of the instances where Japanese ships fired torpedos, they scored zero hits. A "mean hit rate of 5.8%" means that in all engagements (including the good ones like Tassafaronga), about one in every 20 IJN torpedos launched could be expected to hit a target. A "median hit rate of 3.1%" shows that the middle of the distribution is around 3%" and the whole ball of string means that the Japanese hit distribution histogram is not normally distributed. The Warships1 analysis is dead-on accurate in claiming that the common element in successful surface torpedo attacks by Japan (and, I will add, the USN) is the combination of night and close range.

"Again the Solomons demonstrated that the IJN was very proficient at useing this weapon and skilled at night fighting. While US night fighting efficiency was suspect to say the least."

This is incorrect. The USN beat the Japanese at Balikpapn (a night engagement in which the vaunted IJN night optics failed to spot the USN DDs that were torpedoing them). Savo Island and Tassafaronga were lopsided IJN victories. Cape Esperance, 2nd Guadalcanal were USN victories. 1st Guadalcanal was a draw.

I'd call Sunda Strait a Japanese victory except that:
- Perth and Houston were both virtually out of ammo and had both suffered prior damage in air attacks. - Perth and Houston were grossly outnumbered and sandwiched between 3 converging enemy groups and an impassable obstacle (an island). - The IJN fired 87 torpedoes, missing with 81 or 82 of them, and scoring one of the hits on Perth after she had lost way. - In the process they sank 27000 long tons of their own ships.

A flotilla of well armed bathtub duckies could have taken out a CA and CL under those circumstances. The only reason why the battle was not an embarressing IJN defeat is because the Allied ships had no path to escape. Not by virtue of any plan or doctrine on the IJN's part. Just dumb luck.

Washington had good radar at 2nd G'canal. IMO the other BBs, including the older ones, would have been substantially fit with these in the absence of a shooting war for teh first 6 months of 1942.

One last thing on optics. Japanese superior night optics was with a spotting instrument, not with fire control systems. When you look at optical ranging systems the *night* capabilities of the IJN, KM, RN and USN were pretty similar. So the Japanese advantage was in spotting an enemy TF not in shooting at an enemy TF.. until radar became widely distributed that is. After that it was advantage - Allies.

In my view, the Guadalcanal campaign represents the best the IJN could expect from tehir doctrine. The shallow water, restricted (by islands, bars, and reefs) quarters, and the radar-masking effects of land masses gave the Japanese the circumstances that they needed to have a prayer of making the Japanese pre-war plans work. YOu would not find these conditions if the engagements had been fought near, say, Midway, Saipan, or in the Phillippine Sea.



TIMJOT -> (4/1/2002 11:05:34 PM)

Cynacle

I have just read the URL article. IMHO its a good effort but fundementally flawed. The author is making apple and oranges comparisons to prove a bias view.

First over half the surface actions he uses do not fit the profile of the IJN Decisive naval battle. First in foremost qualifying factor is the use of radar. In almost all the examples of IJN failure radar played the critical role. In these later battles the USN radar advantage, almost always gave the US initiative as the "attacker" and put the IJN in the role of "defender" This does not fit the IJN Descisive battle scenerio (DBS).

In all earlier battles where radar played little or no role and the IJN were in the role of the attacker. the IJN achieved a hit rate of 12-13%. Which fits the IJN DBS.

The one lone exeption the Java sea battle Is not a fair assesment. The opposing forces CAs, CLs, DDs had no speed advantage. This demonstrates that two forces with equal speeds can basically fight a stalement battle of position. The IJN was force to fire at extreme rangers because the ABDA would not close and give battle. In the IJN DBS the US screening force would not have that luxury of keeping safe distance becuase that would leave the much slower battleline open to attack. Even with the low percentage of Torp hits the IJN still decisively defefeated the ABDA in that action.

The majortiy of the surface actions anaylised are flawed becuase the IJN's paramount objectives were shore bombardment or convoy escort. Not the destruction of enemy ships. Many of the engagements were in fact broken off becuase the comming of daylite would bring the Cactus AF. The IJN DBS would not have taken place in range of US land base aircraft. In fact the IJN superior carrier force would most likely give air superioty to the Japanese or at the very least cancel out US airpower in the battle.

The authors Surigo straight anology further undermines his analysis. An USN battline fully equiped with radar, laying in wait, with overwelming force, in cross T formation. Against a greatly inferior force blundering blindly into the trap. Hardly demonstrates acurately; the IJN DBS of an attacking force being able to penetrate the defences of a battleline.



CynicAl -> Back to Dream Features (4/1/2002 11:14:53 PM)

This may already be in the game, but one very nice feature would be separate penetration and warhead ratings, especially for the big guns. US AP shells tended to have very good penetration capabilities - the best in the world, even - but very small warheads. British AP shells (and Japanese, who initally followed the British model) tended to have much larger bursters but didn't penetrate as well. US shells were a little better against hard targets (BBs), British-type shells were a little better against softer targets (everything else). Modeling variations in penetration at various ranges would be nice, as well - point-blank, nothing could match the sheer brute force of the IJN 18.1"; but the US 16"/50s were better penetrators at medium to long range, and at extreme range the US 16"/45s were better still.

Another Dream Feature: is it possible to set the forum to default to no email notification? I'm with mdiehl on this, it's just a pain - but half the time I forget to click the cussed box.



mdiehl -> (4/1/2002 11:26:55 PM)

"I have just read the URL article. IMHO its a good effort but fundementally flawed. The author is making apple and oranges comparisons to prove a bias view."

What's this? You don't like the conclusions so you say the analysis is biased from the start? Puh-leeaase. Let's not go there.

"First over half the surface actions he uses do not fit the profile of the IJN Decisive naval battle."

Well, then what sort of test fits your requirements. Count only the battles in which a set-peace enagement on terms and conditions favorable to the Japanese and in accordance with their incredibly cumbersome plans actually occurs? Look man, you either get the data that you've got or you get nothing.

"First in foremost qualifying factor is the use of radar. In almost all the examples of IJN failure radar played the critical role."

Well, since most IJN ships lacked radar, your point is.... ? That any IJN engagement on the high seas prior to 1944 is doomed to result in a Japanese defeat because until 1944 most IJN ships lacked radar of any kind.

"In all earlier battles where radar played little or no role and the IJN were in the role of the attacker. the IJN achieved a hit rate of 12-13%. Which fits the IJN DBS."

Houston and Perth lacked radar. The hit rate at Sunda Strait was somewhere between 8/87 and 5/87 or 9.2% to 5.7%.

Your logic seems to trivially define "DBS" as "an egagement that Japan wins in accordance with plan." I'll agree that any enemy victory does not accord with Japanese plans and is not part of their "DBS." I will not concur that the data from such cases should be trivially dismissed. The fact that DBS results were achieved so infrequently merely proves that the DBS doctrinal conditions could rarely be met. Otherwise the discussion is trivial.

"The one lone exeption the Java sea battle Is not a fair assesment. The opposing forces CAs, CLs, DDs had no speed advantage."

Non sequitur. The Japanese had what the had. If the results do not conform to expectations under DBS then the IJN should have formulated a more realistic battle plan.

"The IJN was force to fire at extreme rangers because the ABDA would not close and give battle."

In effect, Allied Big-Gun doctrine meets Japanese DBS doctrine. The result, between an disorganized, outnumbered Allied group in a hodge-podge command led by an Admiral that could not speak the languag of teh majority of his subordinates was indecisive. Hmmm. Makes you wonder how things would have turned out had HMS Exter been the flagship that day.

"In the IJN DBS the US screening force would not have that luxury of keeping safe distance becuase that would leave the much slower battleline open to attack."

Why? Because the allied ships magically get run down? The Japanese don't get to pick the ships that oppose them.

"Even with the low percentage of Torp hits the IJN still decisively defefeated the ABDA in that action."

Because of the absence of Allied spotter a/c. On such nails are engagements won and lost. IIRC a flight of Dutch F2As passed over the engagement at a crucial point. Would that the F2As had bounced the IJN spotter a/c. But they had a mission elsewhere.

"The majortiy of the surface actions anaylised are flawed becuase the IJN's paramount objectives were shore bombardment or convoy escort."

Well, in that case Savo Island should be dismissed for similar reasons.

"Many of the engagements were in fact broken off becuase the comming of daylite would bring the Cactus AF. The IJN DBS would not have taken place in range of US land base aircraft."

Which just means that the DBS would not have taken place.

"In fact the IJN superior carrier force would most likely give air superioty to the Japanese or at the very least cancel out US airpower in the battle. "

Cancel out probably. The USN and IJN pretty much emasculated each other's airpower at Coral Sea. Change a bomb hit here or a vapor explosion there and Coral Sea could have ended with no US CVs sunk and 2 IJN CVs and 1 CVL sunk.

"The authors Surigo straight anology further undermines his analysis. An USN battline fully equiped with radar, laying in wait, with overwelming force, in cross T formation. Against a greatly inferior force blundering blindly into the trap."

About what the Japanese could expect as a result of any head-to-head engagement on the high seas in 1943 or thereafter.

"Hardly demonstrates acurately; the IJN DBS of an attacking force being able to penetrate the defences of a battleline."

The IJN DBS idea was not going to happen, and the data that you dismiss show why. The DBS only works if the Japanese get to choose the timing, circumstances, and OOBs of the engagement. Funny how warfare rarely works that way.



CynicAl -> (4/1/2002 11:39:53 PM)

quote:

TIMJOT posted:
The IJN was force to fire at extreme ranges because the ABDA would not close and give battle. In the IJN DBS the US screening force would not have that luxury of keeping safe distance because that would leave the much slower battleline open to attack.


But that's the thing - The Japanese planned to fire at maximum range in the DB, especially against the light forces. Maximum range engagements ("outranging the enemy") were central to IJN doctrine. That was the reason why they wanted a torpedo with such a very long range. (This was also the thinking behind the over(?)-emphasis on range in IJN aircraft.) But long-range engagements, even with the excellent Long Lance, generally yielded poor hit rates - the ocean is just too big, and even the largest ship (or fleet) is too small. The LLs did much better when circumstances constrained the Japanese to engage at much shorter ranges than called for in IJN doctrine, as in the Solomons campaign.



mdiehl -> (4/2/2002 12:17:34 AM)

Exactly. And the problem gets worse, in terms of the "what if" scenario that started this discussion, the longer the Japanese wait to involve the US. The problem is that US fire control gets much better with time, whereas Japanese fire control remains more or less static. In the posited long-range engagement, eventually US ranging becomes accurate enough that it becomes possible to hit Japanese ships reasonably well at long range, while retaining the maneuverability to avoid being hit.

Again, see combinedfleet.com. Look at the footnotes on US fire control radar on the SoDak/Iowas. The same system was installed on the Old Slowpokes like USS Pennsylvania and the other radar-equipped vessels at Surigao Strait. The slow speed of the PA gives it a less extreme advantage, but it is still nice to have been able to both shoot accurately and maneuver radically (the USN), rather than one and not the other (the IJN, KM and RM. The RN too?).

By the way, Jeremy, the US Old Slowpokes were used at Surigao Strait. They were the ones that crossed the T and ripped the IJN formation to shreds and patches. So they were not simply intended to be used in bombardment. They were in fact armed with the latest fir control devices and anti-ship ordnance, and used it very well.



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 1:14:44 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Ranger 75 - TIMJOT and I were discussing the early war combat loss ratios, not the whole war ratios. Much of the radically favorable US ratio that you cite is a result of combat after 1942. Interesting nonetheless, and indicative of the ways in which advanced doctrine made the F4F/FM2 a much more lethal a/c in the PTO than it ever would ahev been in the ETO.

To All: My mistake on the IJN BBs. They're not my forte. I'll leave it to others to retrodict the event that never happened. FWIW the [url]www.combinedleet.com[/url] guns and armor page illustrates how and why the SODaks and Iowas were the best in BB design.

Jeremy Pritchard - What can I say. Japanese pilots claimed lots of kills flying everything from Ki100s to A6Ms. Under the *best* circumstances you should *assume* that pilots exaggerated their victory claims by a factor of 3. It also would not surprise me to learn that SBDs claimed in excess of 100 A6Ms and that they actually shot down a score or slightly more. Not owing to any of the lovely characteristics of the SBD, just the tail gunner trying to do his usual thing. If you look at B17 gunners claims in Germany you'd think each Fort shot down took five Germans fighters down with her.

"Possibly the Ki-84 and Ki-100 had 14:1 kill ratios, which makes the F4U and F6F look like trainers!"

LOL! *yeaah, riiiiight*

TIMJOT, why would you assume that the Pacific fleet would not be more fit with radar and no more likely to use the radar sets well? Without an active shooting war for the 1st 6 months of 1942 the naval assets are not committed in the Atlantic or Pacific. That basically puts most of the navy in port getting refit with the newest equipment and then in excercises, training at its proper use. Add that to the fact that all US DD skippers understood proper torpedo doctrine prior to the start of the war (see the Balikpapan sngagement for a good example of this in January 1942) and, IMO, you have a formula whereby the USN is much more prepared for all surface engagement conditions in mid 1942 than it historically was.


*** To All. Please deselect "Email Notification" when posting to the forums. The deluge of trivial notifications is a pain in the axx. *** [/B][/QUOTE]

Well that would assume that there were more radar sets available at the time. Something I am not sure of. Radar at least naval radar was still expiremental at this stage. But if the availablity of radar sets are not an issue, then I will agree the lack of fighting would allow more ships to be fitted and trained in radar. Even so you couldnt just start installing sets on the entire fleet. The uncertanty of the situation would seem to dictate keeping substantial part of the fleet ready to sorte at a moments notice.

Also without the real world combat expierence I still think the USN suffers from that learning curve thing. By 1943 the USN had become petty **** proficient with radar due to no small reason all those night surface actions in the solomons (IMHO)



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 4:15:17 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"I have just read the URL article. IMHO its a good effort but fundementally flawed. The author is making apple and oranges comparisons to prove a bias view."

What's this? You don't like the conclusions so you say the analysis is biased from the start? Puh-leeaase. Let's not go there.

"First over half the surface actions he uses do not fit the profile of the IJN Decisive naval battle."

Well, then what sort of test fits your requirements. Count only the battles in which a set-peace enagement on terms and conditions favorable to the Japanese and in accordance with their incredibly cumbersome plans actually occurs? Look man, you either get the data that you've got or you get nothing.

"First in foremost qualifying factor is the use of radar. In almost all the examples of IJN failure radar played the critical role."

Well, since most IJN ships lacked radar, your point is.... ? That any IJN engagement on the high seas prior to 1944 is doomed to result in a Japanese defeat because until 1944 most IJN ships lacked radar of any kind.

"In all earlier battles where radar played little or no role and the IJN were in the role of the attacker. the IJN achieved a hit rate of 12-13%. Which fits the IJN DBS."

Houston and Perth lacked radar. The hit rate at Sunda Strait was somewhere between 8/87 and 5/87 or 9.2% to 5.7%.

Your logic seems to trivially define "DBS" as "an egagement that Japan wins in accordance with plan." I'll agree that any enemy victory does not accord with Japanese plans and is not part of their "DBS." I will not concur that the data from such cases should be trivially dismissed. The fact that DBS results were achieved so infrequently merely proves that the DBS doctrinal conditions could rarely be met. Otherwise the discussion is trivial.

"The one lone exeption the Java sea battle Is not a fair assesment. The opposing forces CAs, CLs, DDs had no speed advantage."

Non sequitur. The Japanese had what the had. If the results do not conform to expectations under DBS then the IJN should have formulated a more realistic battle plan.

"The IJN was force to fire at extreme rangers because the ABDA would not close and give battle."

In effect, Allied Big-Gun doctrine meets Japanese DBS doctrine. The result, between an disorganized, outnumbered Allied group in a hodge-podge command led by an Admiral that could not speak the languag of teh majority of his subordinates was indecisive. Hmmm. Makes you wonder how things would have turned out had HMS Exter been the flagship that day.

"In the IJN DBS the US screening force would not have that luxury of keeping safe distance becuase that would leave the much slower battleline open to attack."

Why? Because the allied ships magically get run down? The Japanese don't get to pick the ships that oppose them.

"Even with the low percentage of Torp hits the IJN still decisively defefeated the ABDA in that action."

Because of the absence of Allied spotter a/c. On such nails are engagements won and lost. IIRC a flight of Dutch F2As passed over the engagement at a crucial point. Would that the F2As had bounced the IJN spotter a/c. But they had a mission elsewhere.

"The majortiy of the surface actions anaylised are flawed becuase the IJN's paramount objectives were shore bombardment or convoy escort."

Well, in that case Savo Island should be dismissed for similar reasons.

"Many of the engagements were in fact broken off becuase the comming of daylite would bring the Cactus AF. The IJN DBS would not have taken place in range of US land base aircraft."

Which just means that the DBS would not have taken place.

"In fact the IJN superior carrier force would most likely give air superioty to the Japanese or at the very least cancel out US airpower in the battle. "

Cancel out probably. The USN and IJN pretty much emasculated each other's airpower at Coral Sea. Change a bomb hit here or a vapor explosion there and Coral Sea could have ended with no US CVs sunk and 2 IJN CVs and 1 CVL sunk.

"The authors Surigo straight anology further undermines his analysis. An USN battline fully equiped with radar, laying in wait, with overwelming force, in cross T formation. Against a greatly inferior force blundering blindly into the trap."

About what the Japanese could expect as a result of any head-to-head engagement on the high seas in 1943 or thereafter.

"Hardly demonstrates acurately; the IJN DBS of an attacking force being able to penetrate the defences of a battleline."

The IJN DBS idea was not going to happen, and the data that you dismiss show why. The DBS only works if the Japanese get to choose the timing, circumstances, and OOBs of the engagement. Funny how warfare rarely works that way. [/B][/QUOTE]


Mdiehl

Not at all. Its just IMHO that the author first had a theory and then went about an analysis to support this theory. Rather than anaylisng data to come up with a theory. Again just my take.

Regarding fitting the Scenerio. Cynacal and I were discussing the the hypothetical engagement of the decisive naval battle envisioned by both sides in their pre-war plans useing pre-war ships.

Of course the advent of airpower and radar made such a set piece surface engagement impossible after say mid 42 and on. To debate the merit of the plans you have analyse them in the context of the realities at the time they were envisioned.

To answer your question regarding radar; No it wasnt the lack of radar prior to 44 that doomed IJN it was the presence of radar in USN ships that doomed the IJN in an open seas surface action. There were some execeptions early on becuase as you point out the geographic difficulties of the Solomons and even more importantly due to inadequate training or understanding of the proper use of early radar.

RE; "Sunda Strait." First this wasnt an "engagement" it was a running retreat and attempted "disengagement". True the Houston and Perth mangage to lob a few shells at some transports as they passed a convoy, but the battle demonstrates the difficulty of engageing an enemy that has equal speed and is trying to disengage. Its not surprising that the long range torp attack failed. Whats surprising is that one mangage to hit. The main reason the attack was launched was a desperate attempt to slow down the escaping cruisers so that the IJN CAs could close range and engage. In this they were ultimately successful not to any small part due to the evasive manuvers the allied cruisers had to employ to avoid all those torps.

Re: "Balikapan" The US DDs attacked a virtually defenceless conoy at anchor. The transports where perfectly silouetted by Burning oil wells and protected by only 3 patrol craft. Each mounting only 2 x 4.7" guns and no Torps. Never the less the US DDs first attack of 10 torps at close range all missed. In the second attack they mangage to hit and sink 3 transports and on patrol craft. Hardly the resounding aclimation of USN night tactics that you claimed it to be.

Re:Java Sea not being applicable; My point is the the USN light forces would not have the luxury of keeping their distance becuase they would eventually end up leaving the much slower 21knot battle line behind. (This would not be the case with the new fast US BBs, but again that is out of the context of the discussion.) This means in order to protect the battleline they would have to close with the enemy. The effect of close range LL torp attack as demostrated in the solomons is undeniable.

Re: Savo; It can be dismissed on similar grounds becuse they were not escorting ships and the were not going to bombard. Hence they were not loaded up with HE shells instead of AP shells like the Hie and Kirshima were. The mission was to break through the screen to destroy the shipping.

Re: USN and IJN emasulating themselves at Coral Sea; That was two equal strength TFs fighting head to head. USN pre-war doctorine called for the carriers to be dispersed into single carrier TFs for maximum scouting potential. IJN pre-war doctorine called for the concentration of the Kido Buhtai into single overpowering strike force. Cant say for sure, but it seems the USN plan would leave each of its dispersed TF open to being overwelmed individually in turn. At the very least lets just say both carrier forces end up cancelling each other out because niether side had envisioned them to be the main implement of destruction anyway.

Re "Suriago Staight anology" Yes I agree, but I wasnt discussing 43 and on , I was discussing mid 30s up to mid 42.

Again in the context of the discussion most of the examples do not demostrate accurately the circumstances in which the proposed scenerio could take place. Im not saying everything has to go as plan. Im saying that in the DBS the IJN mission would be solely to press the attack against the opposing surface force. That was not the case in most of the examples.



mdiehl -> (4/2/2002 4:40:04 AM)

"Not at all. Its just IMHO that the author first had a theory and then went about an analysis to support this theory. Rather than anaylisng data to come up with a theory."

Well. Science is a recursive thing. Testing a theory with data is part of the process, and usually regarded (by scientists, at any rate) as a better way to approach a problem than to look for patterns in data and come up with an explanation. But both approaches are in fact used and complementary. What he did not do was "come up with an analysis to prove his theory." The question he asked was, given the historical performance of IJN torpedoes in real engagements, was the DBS ever likely to succeed, given that the Japanese DBS rested heavily on the assumption that torpedoes would achive hit rates of 16-20%.

"Regarding fitting the Scenerio. Cynacal and I were discussing the the hypothetical engagement of the decisive naval battle envisioned by both sides in their pre-war plans useing pre-war ships. "

Ah. I missed that. So if the battles happen in 1940-1941, radar is not a big phenom.

"RE. "Sunda Strait."

I agree that it is surprising that the IJn scored any hits. Less so, however, when you consider that Perth and Houston were boxed in. IMO the biggest tactical mistake, given Perth/Houston's objective (run away) was when Perth challenged the shadowing Japanese DD. The Allies should have played mum and seen how far they could get. But then, inaggressive skippers aren't necessarily the best guys to have running your bridges. Still, a crappy hit rate for the IJN torpedoes coupled with some really wild-axxed lousy gunnery on both sides.

"Re: "Balikapan"

My point wasn't about the torpedoes. It was about the doctrine. US DD skippers knew that if one could get the enemy in torpedo water, especially if one was undetected, then the best tactic was to volley torpedoes until you had all the hits you could claim. US DD skippers knew this as a matter of routine. Now, if you're talking the pre-1941 war, it is unclear whether the USN skippers would have been given license to operate without being tethered to the battle line. If you're talking a start after June 1942 it is more likely, IMO, that DD flotillas are given greater flexibility on when and how to engage.

"The US DDs attacked a virtually defenceless conoy at anchor. The transports where perfectly silouetted by Burning oil wells and protected by only 3 patrol craft."

And an they were also protected by an IJN CL-DD group, at least until it went roaring into the darkness looking for submarines. Again: "So much for superior night optics."

"Hardly the resounding aclimation of USN night tactics that you claimed it to be."

Not a resounding acclaimation. Just an observation that the right doctrine was in place as a result of training prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Hence, no need to invoke the mystique of "learning curve."

"The effect of close range LL torp attack as demostrated in the Solomons is undeniable."

It's completely deniable, or at least disputable. Type 93a was demonstrably quite effective at Savo and Tassafaronga. Virtually absent at 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, particularly wherein at the latter engagement the best weapon at teh IJN's disposal for use against USN fast battleships (the Type 93a) was completely ineffective.

"Re "Suriago Staight anology" Yes I agree, but I wasnt discussing 43 and on , I was discussing mid 30s up to mid 42."

Bueno. I missed that earlier. But if you get much prior to 1941 then you have no real Kido Butai, and the a/c in use are fixed-gear biplanes or something, not Zeros. I'd take an F2 or even an F3 (retractable carriage biplane version of the F4) against one of the Japanese stringbags any day. In those circumstances, you also have the TBD, Wind-indicator, and the first "Helldiver" (also a biplane) looking like pretty good tactical bombers because the IJN opposition to them would have been far less effective than Zekes.

"I'm saying that in the DBS the IJN mission would be solely to press the attack against the opposing surface force. That was not the case in most of the examples."

You're entitled to your opinion, of course. Still seems to me like a lot of rationalizations aimed at dismissing key data points. Unless, of course, your DBS-pre-1941 scenario doesn't actually involve the IJN *invading* anywhere.



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 4:52:46 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by CynicAl
[B]

But that's the thing - The Japanese planned to fire at maximum range in the DB, especially against the light forces. Maximum range engagements ("outranging the enemy") were central to IJN doctrine. That was the reason why they wanted a torpedo with such a very long range. (This was also the thinking behind the over(?)-emphasis on range in IJN aircraft.) But long-range engagements, even with the excellent Long Lance, generally yielded poor hit rates - the ocean is just too big, and even the largest ship (or fleet) is too small. The LLs did much better when circumstances constrained the Japanese to engage at much shorter ranges than called for in IJN doctrine, as in the Solomons campaign. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Cynaical

I will agree that the extreme long range torp. aspect of the plan was probalbly not get the results envisioned. Particularly against the light forces. Might have had a better chance against the slow pre-war BBs though. In any case IJN planed to follow up the Longrange attack with to quote your source "suicidal" close in engagement. Again the IJN were perfectly willing to sacrifice the light forces in order to widdle down the USN Battle line. I think you are right in that the Long range attacked probabley wouldnt score many hits but I think it would have at least disrupted the the battleline. Its hard to keep in formation while avoiding even long range torp attacks. The US BBs in disarray the IJN BBs would be able to get the superior position and get in the all important first salvos.



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 6:07:32 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"Not at all. Its just IMHO that the author first had a theory and then went about an analysis to support this theory. Rather than anaylisng data to come up with a theory."

Well. Science is a recursive thing. Testing a theory with data is part of the process, and usually regarded (by scientists, at any rate) as a better way to approach a problem than to look for patterns in data and come up with an explanation. But both approaches are in fact used and complementary.

"Regarding fitting the Scenerio. Cynacal and I were discussing the the hypothetical engagement of the decisive naval battle envisioned by both sides in their pre-war plans useing pre-war ships. "

Ah. I missed that. So if the battles happen in 1940-1941, radar is not a big phenom.

"RE. "Sunda Strait."

I agree that it is surprising that the IJn scored any hits. Less so, however, when you consider that Perth and Houston were boxed in. IMO the biggest tactical mistake, given Perth/Houston's objective (run away) was when Perth challenged the shadowing Japanese DD. The Allies should have played mum and seen how far they could get. But then, inaggressive skippers aren't necessarily the best guys to have running your bridges. Still, a crappy hit rate for the IJN torpedoes coupled with some really wild-axxed lousy gunnery on both sides.

"Re: "Balikapan"

My point wasn't about the torpedoes. It was about the doctrine. US DD skippers knew that if one could get the enemy in torpedo water, especially if one was undetected, then the best tactic was to volley torpedoes until you had all the hits you could claim. US DD skippers knew this as a matter of routine. Now, if you're talking the pre-1941 war, it is unclear whether the USN skippers would have been given license to operate without being tethered to the battle line. If you're talking a start after June 1942 it is more likely, IMO, that DD flotillas are given greater flexibility on when and how to engage.

"The US DDs attacked a virtually defenceless conoy at anchor. The transports where perfectly silouetted by Burning oil wells and protected by only 3 patrol craft."

And an they were also protected by an IJN CL-DD group, at least until it went roaring into the darkness looking for submarines. Again: "So much for superior night optics."

"Hardly the resounding aclimation of USN night tactics that you claimed it to be."

Not a resounding acclaimation. Just an observation that the right doctrine was in place as a result of training prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Hence, no need to invoke the mystique of "learning curve."

"The effect of close range LL torp attack as demostrated in the Solomons is undeniable."

It's completely deniable, or at least disputable. Type 93a was demonstrably quite effective at Savo and Tassafaronga. Virtually absent at 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, particularly wherein at the latter engagement the best weapon at teh IJN's disposal for use against USN fast battleships (the Type 93a) was completely ineffective.

"Re "Suriago Staight anology" Yes I agree, but I wasnt discussing 43 and on , I was discussing mid 30s up to mid 42."

Bueno. I missed that earlier. But if you get much prior to 1941 then you have no real Kido Butai, and the a/c in use are fixed-gear biplanes or something, not Zeros. I'd take an F2 or even an F3 (retractable carriage biplane version of the F4) against one of the Japanese stringbags any day. In those circumstances, you also have the TBD, Wind-indicator, and the first "Helldiver" (also a biplane) looking like pretty good tactical bombers because the IJN opposition to them would have been far less effective than Zekes.

"I'm saying that in the DBS the IJN mission would be solely to press the attack against the opposing surface force. That was not the case in most of the examples."

You're entitled to your opinion, of course. Still seems to me like a lot of rationalizations aimed at dismissing key data points. Unless, of course, your DBS-pre-1941 scenario doesn't actually involve the IJN *invading* anywhere. [/B][/QUOTE]


I never said the USN skippers didnt know how to use torps. They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps fireings. The reason the first volly of ten torps all missed was becuase they made ther run at too high speed. That will happen with enexpirence. You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. It wasnt a factor at Balikapan becuase of those oil fires. All in all under the circumstances though I think those old US four stackers did a bang up job throughout the DEI campaign. They certainly outperformed ther RN and Dutch Navy counterparts and stood up credibly to more modern IJN counterparts.

Re: IJN screening force: You can blame the Japanese commander for sending off the whole screen to chase after a sub, but you cant blame the optics. Their optics were good, but they couldnt see into the futrue!

Re"Long Lance deneabiltly". I guess we can agree to disagree, In 1st Guadacanal the artical states that IJN scored 6 hits. Damaging the Atlanta, Portand and Junea and sinkin 2 US DDs Vs. no IJN ships being hit by torps. A 12.5% success rate. Whcih supports the IJN DBS.

Re:Aircraft; I dont think Wildcats were deployed on carriers until 41 either. F2s were never fully deployed on carriers. Just a few transitional squadtons I think. So pre 40 USN basically got biplane fighters too. They do have TBDs and "Vibrators" though. Not sure when vals and kates joined the Kido Bhutai. Basically I agree that pre 1941 niether carrier force would be decisive.

No my DBS doesnt entail the IJN to be in the process of invading anywhere. The decisive engagement was to be a Jutland clash of fleets not some a series of disconnected peicemeal sorties trying to dislogde or resupply ground forces. This is a debate of the outcome of the two combined fleets meeting in a single battle.



CynicAl -> Clarifications, in no particular order (4/2/2002 2:34:21 PM)

Correct, F4Fs were not deployed to CVs before 1941, nor were F2As. A 1940 war would have seen USN VF squadrons flying F3F biplanes against the IJN's A5M monoplanes. Sounds like a mismatch at first, but it turns out that it's not so much. The US plane had an enclosed cockpit and retractable undercarriage, both of which the A5M lacked. The A5M was only just faster than the F3F in level flight (a difference of <10 kts, IIRC), and had a higher wing loading, a lower power-to-weight ratio, and considerably less range than the Grumman. Both are lightly armed by WW2 standards, and neither would have armor plating or self-sealing tanks, at least not for a while. The A5Ms only advantages are a marginal level speed advantage, and maybe an advantage in diving speed. The two sides are pretty evenly matched, at least until the A6M reaches the fleet. As for attack aircraft... The IJN will have the B5N (a 1937 type) and the D3A (a 1939 type) in service for a 1940 war, though the D3A in particular may be in short supply at first. Intercepting these types will probably be a headache for the F3Fs; the good news for the US is that the A5M lacks the range of the A6M, so they're likely to be unescorted. The USN will be relying on SB2Us and TBDs; less capable than the SBDs and TBFs of 1942, certainly, but they won't be going up against A6Ms, either. The A5M will have its own problems trying to intercept these types, especially since the F3F does have the range for the escort mission.

It's also worth noting that the massed-CV formation known as the First Air Fleet wasn't formed until April, 1941; prior to that date, IJN CV doctrine was much more like that of the US. The number of flight decks available to each side was also a little closer in 1940 than it was in December 1941; the IJN had 4 fleet and 2 light CVs (one of which was Hosho, hardly even worth counting;)), while the USN had four fleet CVs, plus Ranger; with Wasp coming on-line mid-year. Some of these would be detailed to the Atlantic, but in the event of a shooting war with Japan it's likely that both Lexingtons and both Yorktowns would be made available for Pacific service, making the odds pretty even in the CV department. The CVs, prior to 1941, probably will cancel each other out - a net win for the US in terms of the DBS.

Neither the Japanese nor the Americans envisaged the DBS occurring in response to a Japanese invasion of anywhere. On the contrary, both sides expected that it would take place in the course of a US attack on Japanese-held territory. Over time, planners on both sides looked at scenarios focused around the Bonins, Ryukus, Marianas, and Marshalls. By 1940, US planners had long accepted that the Japanese, being on the defensive, would choose the time and place for the DB. And yes, the US did know about the IJN's DB fixation. Not all the details - the LLs would have (and indeed did) come as a bit of a shock in their first engagements, for example - but enough to have a pretty good idea of how the Japanese meant the scenario to play out.



CynicAl -> (4/2/2002 3:30:25 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]

Hi Cynaical

I will agree that the extreme long range torp. aspect of the plan was probalbly not get the results envisioned. Particularly against the light forces. Might have had a better chance against the slow pre-war BBs though. In any case IJN planed to follow up the Longrange attack with to quote your source "suicidal" close in engagement. Again the IJN were perfectly willing to sacrifice the light forces in order to widdle down the USN Battle line. I think you are right in that the Long range attacked probabley wouldnt score many hits but I think it would have at least disrupted the the battleline. Its hard to keep in formation while avoiding even long range torp attacks. The US BBs in disarray the IJN BBs would be able to get the superior position and get in the all important first salvos. [/B][/QUOTE]

This is where the IJN DBS really comes off the rails, though. The extreme-range LL shots at the USN light forces were supposed to clear the path to the US main force, but they're not going to succeed in that. The IJN light forces would salvo their LLs, draw off and reload their tubes, then press in expecting the way to be mostly clear all the way in to the BBs; they'd hit the largely undamaged US screen and chaos would ensue. Now the Japanese would have had three options: fire off more LLs at the screen from long range; close the range and then fire off more LLs at the screen; or try to get by the screen on guns and guts, saving the remaining LLs for the US battle line. The third is the doctrinally correct choice, and at least some skippers would undoubtedly have tried to do just that; but just as certainly some of the precious LLs (probably many, possibly most) would be expended in the tangle with the US screen. Odds are that relatively few torpedos will actually be launched at the US main force during the night battle. As for disrupting the formation, the Japanese night attack forces were also supposed to take part in the daylight phase of the DBS. If they have time to extract themselves, get organized, and rejoin Combined Fleet after making their attacks, then it's probably safe to assume that the surviving USN ships would have time to resume formation. The Night Battle phase was supposed to attrite the US main force, not disrupt it.

Edited for clarity.



mdiehl -> (4/2/2002 10:21:09 PM)

"They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps firings. .... [and] .... You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. "

Agreed. Of course, the thing about *alternate* history is that it's *alternate.* ;) Meaning that I'm game to try the alt history that you propose but expect that such a game gives the Allies the option of fiddling with the initial conditions.

"Even so the US DD was sunk and a US CA was hit by torps. No IJN ship was hit by torps."

None was sunk. There were IIRC three non-detonating hits fired by one US DD that passed within a few hundred yards of a Japanese CB (Kirishima was it?). The run was too short from the launching DD to the target. Did not matter though. The big guns fired at night by USN ships crushed the opposition that night. Point to allies. Failure of DBS noted.

Let me ask a rhetorical question. How many of the actions listed on that web site do you dismiss as invalid data points because they do not meet the assumptions of the DBS? What does that tell you about the fragility of the DBS doctrine in the face of real world operating conditions? What does it say about the DBS if the only circumstances in which its assumptions apply are circumstances where there is a set-piece engagement, where the Allied ships are known as to number and type, and where every Japanese weapon system works to expectations rather than to their actual historical reliability and accuracy?

Since you have to have a war for the attempted implementation of DBS, how does Japan get that war without invading somewhere? Once the war starts, what stops the US from leveraging an oil embargo and just resting for about 8 months while Japan's economy tanks? IMO the DBS was flawed at the strategic level because no matter how the war starts, it automatically becomes about places rather than ships.

Re:Aircraft.

Agreed about generally indecisive. But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 10:44:19 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by CynicAl
[B]

This is where the IJN DBS really comes off the rails, though. The extreme-range LL shots at the USN light forces were supposed to clear the path to the US main force, but they're not going to succeed in that. The IJN light forces would salvo their LLs, draw off and reload their tubes, then press in expecting the way to be mostly clear all the way in to the BBs; they'd hit the largely undamaged US screen and chaos would ensue. Now the Japanese would have had three options: fire off more LLs at the screen from long range; close the range and then fire off more LLs at the screen; or try to get by the screen on guns and guts, saving the remaining LLs for the US battle line. The third is the doctrinally correct choice, and at least some skippers would undoubtedly have tried to do just that; but just as certainly some of the precious LLs (probably many, possibly most) would be expended in the tangle with the US screen. Odds are that relatively few torpedos will actually be launched at the US main force during the night battle. As for disrupting the formation, the Japanese night attack forces were also supposed to take part in the daylight phase of the DBS. If they have time to extract themselves, get organized, and rejoin Combined Fleet after making their attacks, then it's probably safe to assume that the surviving USN ships would have time to resume formation. The Night Battle phase was supposed to attrite the US main force, not disrupt it.

Edited for clarity. [/B][/QUOTE]

Yes, in retrospect the IJN would have been better off scrapping the daylight action all together. They would be better off captializing on the confusion on the night action. Come to think of it. Do you know if the artical represents the lastest final version of the IJN DBS? I seem to remember reading somewhere I think it was "Yamamoto, the Reluctant Admiral" that the IJN DBS had evolved into being an all night action. Thats why they put so much enfences in developing night fighting tactics, night optics, and flashless powder. Not totally positive though.

I think the plan to use the Kongos to break through would also be foolhardy. history shows that they lacked the armor to withstand even 5" and 8" shells never mind 14" and 16" shells. They would be better off and more useful sticking with the main battle fleet. Keeping the USN light forces at bay while the BBs slugged it out.

One problem I have with the articals examples is that none of them demonstrate the effect of a long range Torp attack on a Slow BB battline. All the examples save one, involve relatively fast manueverable light forces. Which as demonstrated had little trouble avoiding long range torp attacks. The one example against BBs were against two of the USN fast modern BBs under circumstances where the IJN was the defender not the attacker.

Where I see the IJN plan working (albeit unexpectedly) is that even if the Long range LL attack doesnt score the hits envisioned. It would have undoubtly disrupted the Battleline. The slow USN BB line would have a choice of keeping formation and takeing some hits or breaking formation to avoid hits. If its the former than the IJN starts getting the attrition it needs. If its the latter then the IJN battline can start pounding the dispersed USN BBs. It is unlikely that the USN could similarly disrupt the IJN battleline due the relatively short range and unreliabilty of the US torps.



TIMJOT -> (4/2/2002 11:51:34 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps firings. .... [and] .... You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. "

Agreed. Of course, the thing about *alternate* history is that it's *alternate.* ;) Meaning that I'm game to try the alt history that you propose but expect that such a game gives the Allies the option of fiddling with the initial conditions.

"Even so the US DD was sunk and a US CA was hit by torps. No IJN ship was hit by torps."

None was sunk. There were IIRC three non-detonating hits fired by one US DD that passed within a few hundred yards of a Japanese CB (Kirishima was it?). The run was too short from the launching DD to the target. Did not matter though. The big guns fired at night by USN ships crushed the opposition that night. Point to allies. Failure of DBS noted.

Let me ask a rhetorical question. How many of the actions listed on that web site do you dismiss as invalid data points because they do not meet the assumptions of the DBS? What does that tell you about the fragility of the DBS doctrine in the face of real world operating conditions? What does it say about the DBS if the only circumstances in which its assumptions apply are circumstances where there is a set-piece engagement, where the Allied ships are known as to number and type, and where every Japanese weapon system works to expectations rather than to their actual historical reliability and accuracy?

Since you have to have a war for the attempted implementation of DBS, how does Japan get that war without invading somewhere? Once the war starts, what stops the US from leveraging an oil embargo and just resting for about 8 months while Japan's economy tanks? IMO the DBS was flawed at the strategic level because no matter how the war starts, it automatically becomes about places rather than ships.

Re:Aircraft.

Agreed about generally indecisive. But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Mdiehl

Well Re: Alternate history. This particular alternate history simply entails a earlier starting time for the war and no Pearl harbor. Two completely plausible Alternate history parameters. When you start going back and start to fiddle around with things such as unhistorical bugetary retraints; ship building capacities and priorities; tactical doctrines and training. The scenerio starts to loose pluasibility and hence credibility. It may be fun but it would not be realistic. IMHO

I hardly think the 1st Guadacanal was a crushing victory for the allies. It has been historically considered an allied tactical defeat. Putting the entire US cruiser force out of action. Hence the need to dispatch the carrier TF BBs for 2nd Guadacanal. Admittedly it is considered a strategic victory because it stop the bombardment of Henderson field. I think the IJN lost only one DD that night. The Hie was damaged, but it took the cactus airforce to actually sink her.

RE; "Your rhetorical question" I dont dismiss any on those grounds. But is it too much to ask that you exclude scenerios that have IJN BBs loaded with HE shells on their decks? Or the ones were the IJN ships are either escorting or carrying troops? Or the fact that the very definition of the DBS means the IJN would choose where its fought. ( Read Cynacals post for clarificaion)

The F2s were rejected because their landing gear were too weak for carrier operations. The need to add more armor and self sealing fuel tanks severely dimished their performance. And like you said the inability of Brewter to fufill orders. Only the Saratoga and Lexingtons temporarily deployed F2s. The Enterprise and Yorktown went straight from F3s to F4s. No matter what similarities of the F3s and F4s, you still are not going to magically have F4s deployed on carriers 40/41.



mdiehl -> (4/2/2002 11:59:49 PM)

"It is unlikely that the USN could similarly disrupt the IJN battleline due the relatively short range and unreliabilty of the US torps."

The disruption and significant damage to the IJN battleline is quite likely and results directly from the lopsided (in favor of the US) number of heavy shells falling on the IJN battle line at long range.

Japan's chances improve if the action can be made to occur at close range and at night, but the DBS still requires that the USN play by the IJN's script. If the USN refuses to commit the main battle line at night (which they'd be reluctant to do, because visual ranging is much easier in daylight and the USN has the advantage by virtue of the number of heavy guns -- so why would they throw away such an obvious advantage for the much riskier and less controllable prospect of a night engagement), then DBS does not have a prayer of working.

If the Japanese CA battle line attempts to close at night I see them running into the USN DD/CA battle line while the USN BBs refuse. If the combat is a meeting engagement with prepared, alerted forces, something like 1st Guadalcanal results (lots of badly damaged ships all around) with neither side's CA/DD elements in a strong position to carry on the fight the next day.

Hey, here's a better way maybe to make the DBS work. Let the main battle lines slug it out in a meeting engagement at daylight. The IJN BB line gets crushed, the USN BB battle line gets badly hurt. *Then* the IJN rushes in with the CA-DD elements and mops up what it can.

"Putting the entire US cruiser force out of action. [at 1st Guadalcanal]"

Yeah. Both of them [damaged.] In exchange for a CB [sunk]. I'd call that an Allied strategic victory and a tactical victory since the Japanese mission was thwarted and they lost alot of tonnage in the process.

And yes. I do think that discounting battles that do not meet the assumptions of the DBS is a trivial reduction of the historical evidence. It reduces to the statement that "Japan successfully implements the DBS if they successfully implement the DBS." Discounting these battles allows one to pretend that the Japanese assumption that the US will engage when, where and how the Japanese want them to, and that IJN equipment will work as hoped-for, are correct. It's similar to the Japanese war-games before Midway. We'll pretend that the USN carries won't ambush us at Midway because that's not what we want or expect them to do.

"When you start going back and start to fiddle around with things such as unhistorical bugetary retraints; ship building capacities and priorities; tactical doctrines and training. The scenerio starts to loose pluasibility and hence credibility. It may be fun but it would not be realistic. IMHO"

I haven't posited anything ahistorical or incredible. The F4 was in design in 1939. The US production capacity was available. US Industry was way over capacity and underused. Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war. Or the fulfillment of the Japanese desire for a series of set piece engagements all occur under conditions favorable to Japan with results that favor Japan. Or the assumption that Japan gets a war without attacking anything (your non-invasion scenario). Or the USN rushing willy-nilly into a set of engagements when the historical oil-embargo can simply be allowed to radically deteriorate Japan's war making potential while US potential simultaneously grows. Embargoeing Japan and letting their economy collapse is, after all, just the old "Anaconda Strategy" resurrected for a new place and time.



CynicAl -> (4/3/2002 2:32:07 AM)

MDiehl:
But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.

Brewster Aircraft was fundamentally mismanaged, with a horribly inefficient plant layout and serious quality control problems. There was basically no chance that they could ever supply the USN with enough fighters; they were over-committed and over-extended and "as fast as they could" wasn't nearly fast enough to meet their contractual obligations to their various customers. Perhaps some of the foreign-ordered aircraft could be impressed into US service in a PacWar 1940 scenario, in fact that's likely; but it's still never going to be enough. Also, as has been pointed out, weight growth caused by fitting the kit needed to make the F2A combat-worthy fatally reduced the F2A-3s flight performance and overstressed the landing gear. So even if you could get F2As, you wouldn't want them.

As for the F4F: The F3F biplane was developed into the XF4F-1 biplane, which was rejected. After a major redesign, resulting in essentially a completely different aircraft, Grumman produced the XF4F-2 monoplane. That also was rejected, but the Navy encouraged Grumman to keep trying because they wanted a fallback position in case Brewster turned out not to be able to deliver as promised (very wise, as it turned out). After yet another significant revision of the design, Grumman submitted the XF4F-3 for the Navy's approval - the first version of the F4F to offer a performance advantage over the Buffalo. But there were still several more and less serious teething issues to be worked out, especially in the areas of stability and engine cooling. The earliest the Navy could have taken delivery would have been late July or August of 1940, assuming that they appropriated the aircraft originally ordered by France. Even so, they wouldn't likely have F4Fs in frontline service until early 1941.

Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war.

No and yes. The development of the F4F-3 was not as smooth as you seem to think; it was actually fairly torturous for that time. By the time all necessary modifications were in place and you actually set up the assembly line(s) to start mass-producing the things, you can't get these aircraft out to the fleet much faster than was done historically, no matter how much money you throw at the problem. The big US production advantage didn't start kicking in until 6 months or more into the war; the first stage of the war was spent geraring up - and this despite the extended "short of war" period available for preparation historically, a period which our AH is curtailing or even eliminating. Eventually, the US production advantage is going to become overwhelming. But it 's not going to happen in the first six months of war, and probably not in the first year.

TimJO'T:
Yes, in retrospect the IJN would have been better off scrapping the daylight action all together. They would be better off captializing on the confusion on the night action. Come to think of it. Do you know if the artical represents the lastest final version of the IJN DBS? I seem to remember reading somewhere I think it was "Yamamoto, the Reluctant Admiral" that the IJN DBS had evolved into being an all night action. Thats why they put so much enfences in developing night fighting tactics, night optics, and flashless powder. Not totally positive though.


I can't be certain of course, but I believe the main event - the cataclysmic clash of the opposing battle lines - was still set to occur during daylight the morning after the Night Battle Phase. I haven't read Reluctant Admiral, though - I'm going (as I believe the author of the article was) mostly from the plans discussed in Evans and Peattie's Kaigun. (A terrific book, btw, and I highly recommend it to anyone with an interest in the subject of pre- and early-war IJN planning.)

Where I see the IJN plan working (albeit unexpectedly) is that even if the Long range LL attack doesnt score the hits envisioned. It would have undoubtly disrupted the Battleline. The slow USN BB line would have a choice of keeping formation and takeing some hits or breaking formation to avoid hits. If its the former than the IJN starts getting the attrition it needs. If its the latter then the IJN battline can start pounding the dispersed USN BBs.

The Japanese envisaged the battle line acton and the NBP as two entirely separate events, with sufficient time in between for their light forces to disengage and rejoin the main body before the main action could begin. So any disruption to the US formation during the NBP is not terribly relevant to the BB-vs-BB slugfest that would follow, because there would be plenty of time to regroup.



Jeremy Pritchard -> (4/3/2002 3:29:26 AM)

Production of the Wildcat would not be as fast to get into as the current game but not as slow as you think. A lot of F4F production went to England in 1941. If the US had gone to war in, say June 40, they would not have sent as much to England (early) if they experienced shortages. However, in 1941 the Marine Air Wings experienced a MAJOR spurt of growth. Before then they only really existed on paper (the 1st MAW was established, but the 2nd MAW was still forming). The men were there, but the equipment was not. VMF-211 was equipped with the most early version of the F4F (3) to see production, so early that it did not have folding wings.

Here is a quote from an F4F website, wich corresponds to others...

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ac-usn22/f-types/f4f.htm

"Testing of the XF4F-3 led to an order for F4F-3 production models, the first of which was completed in February 1940"

"By the end of 1941 the Grumman F4F-3 (and similar F4F-3A) fighters, which had received the popular name "Wildcat" a few months earlier, had replaced the F2A in most U.S. Navy and Marine Corps fighting squadrons"

So, the F4F replaced most pre-war formations fighter aircraft by the end of 1941...

(here's another site that backs this information up)

http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/WWII/wildcat/wild_info/wild_info.htm

"Export orders for the Grumman G-36 had been placed in 1939, when France purchased 81 G-36As; this entire order was transferred to Britain in June 1940, and the first aircraft, with its British name of Martlet I, was delivered on July 27, 1940, ahead of F4F-3 deliveries to the USN. By December 1940, 22 F4F-3s had been accepted by the Navy, and initial deliveries were being made to VF-4 (USS Ranger) and VF-7 (USS Wasp) at Norfolk Naval Air Station in Virginia. During 1941, VF-42 and VF-71 were equipped with F4F-3s as well as Marine Squadrons VMF-121, 211 and 221. In addition to further contracts for the F4F-3, Grumman received a USN order for 95 F4F-3As, these being powered by R-1830-90 engines with single-stage superchargers. A prototype installation of this engine had been made in the single XF4F-6 late in 1940 when the two-stage blower was still giving trouble; production of the small batch of F4F-3A fighters was largely an insurance against failure of the newer engine. The F4F-3A was used by Navy Squadron VF-6 and Marine unit VNIF-l II."

So, by December 1940 the US had produced 100 F4F-3's (80 to the UK and 22 to the USN). The USMC VMF were not converted until 1941.

The production of the A6M was started earlier then the F4F, and reached the IJN in numbers faster then the F4F for the USN.

War with Japan was not suspected until mid 1942, and had it arrived in 1940 (most likely with the fall of France in June had the Japanese taken advantage like Italy) the USN would have been equipped with whatever fighter was available in numbers at the time, definitely not the F4F. Although the US did not go into war production until mid-late 1941 the production of the F4F could not have covered the needs of the navy for at least a few months in 1940 (and only if it cancelled the British orders).

HOWEVER, the development of the A6M lagged behind that of the F4F, but since the IJN did not have an "F2A fiasco" they were able to produce A6M's in larger numbers then the US producing F4F's.


So, had the war started in 1940 both the USN and IJN would be using aircraft at the end of their operational life (A5M for the IJN, and a few F2A's, along with some straggler F2F's). Both would start to produce modern F4F's and A6M's. The US would have a slight handicap (which would be quickly fixed) with the production of the F2A getting priority over the F4F (but due to manufacturing problems the war would have sorted this out quicky with Grumman getting the big contract). Theis would give the IJN a slight breather to produce A6M's to replace the A5M's, but eventually US production (like in 1941) would overcome.

Why would a 1940 alternate history game be overall better for the Japanese? It would be better because the Allies (Britain, India, Australia, Dutch) would be less then proportionately weaker then the Japanese. Malaya would not have a single fighter (the F2A's did not arrive until 1941!) and just some Blenheims and Vildebeest bombers, along with the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions in even poorer conditions (they were just formed in 1940).

The Dutch (which just reeled from the loss of their homeland a month earlier) would not have any F2A's (relying just on Hawk-75 and Martin 139w's), the Sumatra and Jacob Van Heemskerk would be month's from arrivng (having just escaped from Holland) and the land forces would still be alomst 100% in their colonialist form (just small formations, no Brigade or Divisions).

Burma would just have the divided Burma Division, India would have to rely on troops sent back from the Middle East.

Australian AIF divisions would start off with very little experience (having not been through 2 years of war in Africa).

The Philippines would be primarily just the Philippine Division (4th Marine Division would be trapped at Shanghai) with Philippine Units existing only on paper. P-26's would still be in the USAAFFE inventory (both Ki-27 and A5M's could have easily delat with these).


The IJN and USN would have been toe to toe in regards to Aircraft Carriers, the Essex class would appear historically (since the thing limiting their production earlier would be lack of design! This was the reason the USS Hornet was built). There would probably have been more Yorktown class carriers built in lieu of the Essex design.

The end result of the game would be the same, US production would overwhelm Japanese. Still, it would be better then just playing the 1941-45 scenario over and over, plus it would give historians some creative license!



mdiehl -> (4/3/2002 3:39:44 AM)

Thanks for the clarifications CynicAl. I knew Brewster had management problems, and that the F2 series was not desired, but it always helps to provide details.

In the AH I had in mind that the immediate need for an a/c while the F4F was in the development stage might be satisfied by giving the Brewster design and contract to another vendor as a stop-gap waiting for the F4F in quantity. Part of the presumption is that the F2 is accepted as a stop-gap, warts and all, with the absent armor and self-sealing tanks. The performance stays barely-acceptable, but your pilots and planes are at risk in the same way as Japanese pilots and planes are at risk. Then again, an F2 is a crappy plane against a Zeke, but against an A5?? The Finns seem to have done well enough with F2A3s against better a/c than the Japanese were fielding on their carrier decks.

Don't ask me who the additional vendor(s) might be. Maybe Seversky, CW or even a license agreement with Polikarpov or someone. (And the Heavens Wept. But then, that's why it's called "alternate" history.)

I did not mean to imply that the transition to the F4 was seamless. Only that if you throw enough cash at a problem you can usually expedite the attainment of a (expensive) solution. I'm assuming that under wartime conditions, the pace of development, retooling and refit would have been greatly accelerated. Both in the production and the R&D arenas, & across the board into other areas (radar, powerplants, the whole ball of string).

I don't think you can assume under the proposed AH scenario that the US preparations that started in 1940 (vis, increased pilot training, getting industry prepared for a major rev-up) are prevented by an early war start. You still have to have some premise for your war, and that in turn means IMO a period of tension-escalating episodes similar to the ones that occurred historically. Maybe starting with the Panay incident and building (rather than easing off) accretionally from that point onward.

I still can't see how the proposed AH scenario gets past the need for invasions. If Japan goes to war with the US, Japan loses access to oil. That, in turn, mandates invasions... which disperses the Japanese fleet, &c ad nauseam. It's still WW2. It's still a strategic game and it's still one where the US is going to make darned sure that it's flexing its economic muscles along with the military ones.



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