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TIMJOT -> (4/8/2002 1:39:10 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Well, TIMJOT, I'm gonna drop it because you now have me thoroughly confused. Must be lack of coffee or something. I've not *intentionally* done any "selective reading" but I agree that I do not understand the premises of your scenario *at all.*
Somewhere in this there was the idea that Japan makes DBS work by having a war but not invading anywhere in ways that puts the Japanese navy in close proximity to land bases that might have tactical a/c. Then it was Japan attacks everywhere except US assets. Then Japan attacks everywhere simultaneously including the PI. Three different scenarios as far as I can tell or I've just not figured out where you're starting. Note that the latter is WW2 writ early. The second one still puts Japan's navy in and around Island bases. The first.. god knows. But if you do *not* wipe out the Pac Fleet in a PH style airstrike, then your odds of successfully invading simulataneously throughout the Malay barrier and PI are dramatically reduced. That was, after all, exactly why the Japanese attacked PH on 7 December in the first place... to buy time to make the necessary conquests elsewhere. I'll let it go though.
"Now tell me Mdeihl what exactly does Wash-London allude too? Please dont say "Atlantic charter" or "arcadia conference"
The Washington-London Naval Conference that determined the 5:5:3 ratio of the period's equivalent of the H-Bomb: heavy dreadnaughts. Japan was allowed 3 BBs per UK/US 5 because it was assumed that they only needed 3 to secure their interests in the Pacific. The US and UK 5 because they were 2-Ocean powers. But the 5 comes from the obvious (to everyone at the time) need to keep a wary eye on the Empire of Japan. Otherwise, if the Allies were so darned complacent about Japanese naval power, they might have set the ratio at 5:5:"whatever." Meaning that Japan could be ignored because, according to your premise, the western powers were so dumbfounded by bigotry that they could not recognize a threat when it was staring them in the face.
I'll give you three ways, for the sake of ideas that could make a computer game with your "Japan gets to choose when and where and how the war starts" scenario:
1. An American yacht crewed by a naval skipper and a PI crew noses around in the S.China Sea, pushing the Japanese buttons so to speak, getting sunk, and resulting in an opening of hostilities before Japan manages ot invade anywhere.
2. Lend Lease. The US negotiates rapidly an agreement with the NEI leasing the Celebes, Timor, and Southern Borneo, Dutch NG to the US for 99 years, giving the NEI much needed capital to purchasse American weapons for the defense of that chunk of territory for which they are primarily now responsible: Java and Indonesia. In return, NEI are lent a dozen or so pig boats, some PT boats, all of Asiatic Fleet's 4-stackers, all of the P36s in the PI, a recon squadron (PW10's Catalinas), and Marblehead (which is a 2nd class CL by contemporary USN standards anyhow).
3. "Naval Excercises." The president, who happens to be a former Navy Secretary, sorties Asiatic fleet as soon as the Japanese start moving. Houston, Boise, Marblehead, and auxiliaries dog the heels of a major Japanese invasion convoy, pushing Japan's buttons all over again, and forcing Japan to deploy naval assets taht they had not planned on using (or had planned to use elsewhere) to keep an eye on the American threat.
In all three cases, if Japan does not *immediately* attack the PI, the latter receives within 3 months 2 real army divisions, an armored battalion, 20 more airstrips, several first line squadrons of P40s and strike aircraft The PI, which now bristles like a porcupine, requires 10 Japanese divisions to subdue.. an effort that they can't sustain because they don't have the merchant capacity to do that without starving their troops elsewhere, and because they loose a good chunk of the required "light/medium" torpedo-armed elements of their fleet to a network of airbases so vast that Kido Butai can't suppress them without sustaining massive and immediately irreplacable losse to aircrew. Why does the PI bristle so? Because Japan has tipped its hand as to the direction it's going (Southern Resource Area), an area that the US historically worked hard to keep international, and because Japan is obviously on a major military expansionist drive, and because the PI is obviously the next target.
'nuff said. If your model of the state of world alertness and tension is one in which Japan is all knowing about where, when, and how the allies will respond, and that the Allies are so ignorant as ot have no idea what their own strategic interests are in an area that has been very much on their minds for 60 years (US) and 270 years (UK), then so be it. [/B][/QUOTE]
Mdeihl
You are getting confused. The progression of this debate was as follows
1) Cynacal and I were discussing what would happen "IF" the IJN and USN had "HYPOTHETICALLY" clashed in a single early decisive battle. We were NOT dicussing "HOW" or ' WHEN" or "WHY" or "IF" such a battle could take place. Thats when, for arguement sake we discounted other possible USN/IJN commitments.
2)You chimed in when I suggested that the "LL Torp Article" did not accurately represent the IJN DBS. For one, the 3/4 of the examples the IJN primary goals were other than pressing the attack. By definition a DBS would be the combineing of the Fleet for the express purpose of destroying the enemy Fleet.(ie Midway) . BBs being loaded with HE shells, DDs being cramed with troops and supplies. Results in battles like Vella Gulf and Kolombagara where the IJN DDs blindly launched torpedo spreads to cover withdrawls do not accurately model a DDs pressing a concerted attack.
For two the author made critical assumptions in 12 out of 21 examples, regarding the number of torpedos launched. He quantifies "Probable" with vague terms like "Apears to have been" and "doctorine being influx". How do you accurately quantify that? The fact is, the author is making assumptions on launches that "COULD" be as much as 50% off.
For three. The IJN calculations were based on the effect of longrange fire on a Battleline. This is "CRITICAL" because calculations based on firing a torp at "X" distance; at "Y" rate of speed; at a "Large" target traveling at a speed no greater than 21 knots, would not give you the same percentage hit rate when firing at substantially smaller , more manuverable and faster targets. Do we know that the IJN calcutions for attacking light forces was not the same as the authors 6% ?
That being the case only two examples demonstrate torp attacks on capital ships. 2nd Guadacanal and Suriagao Straight. In 2nd Guad. the USS Washington was a fast modern BB capable of 28 knots and equipted with the lastest radar. It was not subject to an coordinated Long range torp attack. Regarding Surieagao Straight, the author was completely off the mark. For one Nishamura force never launched a torp attack long or short range, against the BB line. Shima's follow up force never came in sight of the BB line and only launched a single attack in the general direction of two unidentified radar blips to cover his retreat. What the Author missed was that USN Desron 52 launched a ranged torp attack of 25 torps at the IJN battleline, recording 2 hits on the BB Fuso, 1 hit on BB Yamishiro, and 1 hit each on 2 IJN DDs. For a total of 5 hits with a hit rate of 20%. Since american torps were no better than the type 93, this american action best models the IJN DBS on the effect of ranged torp attacks at night by light forces on a Battline. Regardless two examples are not sufficient to accurately gauge the effectiveness of the IJN DBS, pro or con.
3)The debate shifted to possible scenerios, however remote, where an early decisive surface battle might have taken place. Thats when the different circumstances to which the US would find themselves at war was discussed.
4)Finally it shifted to theorizing what the US response would or could have been, without the attack on PH. Where you accuse me of making unsupportable generalizations and then proceed to make your own unsupportable generalizations.
So there you have it a natural progression of an ongoing debate. Nothing contridictory about it at all.
Regarding "Prove it" I do not have the time or the inclination to go back and site souces and specific quotes everytime I make an "informed" statement. I do stand by my statements regarding Americas pre- war perception of the Japanese both in regards to the military and the public. I would suggest to you that contempory newspaper reports, magizine articles, newsreels and polls are an accurate guage of the perceptions held by the public. That first person accounts such as Col. Melniks "Philipine War Diary" are an accurate reflection of the US military's rank and file perception of the Japanese military. I would also suggest you read US and UK pre-war intellegence reports regarding Japan. Particularly ones regarding the capabilities of their navy and airforce and then tell me that they were not racially biased. Finally I would suggest you read about the Pearl Harbor Investigation and the Kimmel Hearings to get a better understanding on the reasons of US unprepardness.
My statements and opinions are more often than not. based on the analysis and writtings of noted authors/sholars such as; Wilmont, Prange, Costello, and Vander Vat. You on the otherhand never site sources to support your opinions. With the one exception of "Fire in the Sky" which by the way ended up contradicting your statement not supporting it.
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