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TIMJOT -> (3/28/2002 12:36:11 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"A) Japan would still hold a combat learning curve advantage"
1. My point was that they never had a "combat learning curve advantage." The Japanese had no more experience combating aircraft that were speed maximized than the Allies had combating a/c that were maneuver maximized.
2. Despite more air-time in training, the majority of IJN pilots had little combat experience. (The China Expeditionary Force army pilots are a different matter.) Despite having in general more air-time in training than most USAAF and USMC pilots, the casualty ratios were pretty close in 1941-e1942, *against US made aircraft that were slightly superior (the P40), and markedly inferior (the F4F, F2A, P39/400).* So, when I project 1941-e1942 type combat scenarios onto mid 1942 and beyond, I see the Japanese losing any edge they may have had in training and getting mauled, with early combat losses more like 1.3:1 favoring the Allies.
3. At the risk of sounding like I'm stating the obvious, there are some compelling reasons why many Allied pilots survived their initial encounters with Zekes, and these have to do primarily with lessons learned in training. That was why I pointed out that the "right" solution for the Zeke was the right solution in general facing any other aircraft. This was known because it was known that air to air combat bleed energy and that an energy a/c has teh advantage over a non-energy a/c. It's true *even if the opponents fly the exact same kind of plane.* IN a P40 vs P40 duel, the pilot who keeps his energy up beats the pilot who does not.
4. I do not think you are safe in assuming that the US pilots in mid-1942, sans a shooting war, would have been substantially similar in their, uh, mindfulness of the utility of airspeed, to the way they were in December 1941.
4a. In time, through collaboration with Britain and studies of the war in Europe and N. Africa the US would have simply outpaced Japan. The longer you wait, the worse the situation becomes both with respect to doctrine and aircraft performance.
4b. When you start talking about 1943 you're talking about *much* better Allied a/c. Some of these aircraft were *obviously* stronger at higher speeds, and no amount of combat vis A6Ms would have been required to emphasize that point. Consider the P38: at low speeds it was so mushy that pilots would already have been even mroe averse to air speed reduction in combat. And it was known from the get go that a twin-engined out-board motored a/c was inherently less maneuverable than a single-engined in-board motored a/c. So the temptation to even try maneuvering with a Zeke was going to be pretty weak in your alternate-start-date scenario.
4c. Also, with 6 months more of studying the European situation, listening to Chenault carry on (I'm assuming here that one way or the other the AVG is in combat in February 1942 since that was the plan regardless), and the army-navy maneuver excercises started by Thach in 1941 carried through mid 1942, you might find the USN/USAAF pilots being superior on all fronts. Six months of delayed warfare gives the time to reinforce lessons that were already being learned from the ETO and taught in flight school. Historically, the USN was thrust rather quickly into combat in 1942, so there was scarcely time for Thach to work out the doctrine with a bunch of CV air wings anyhow. Given an additional 6 months, the Japanese might find the USN, USMC and USAAF uniformly flying their a/c to minimize the Zeke's advantage, rather than the rather dispersed Allied situational awareness/performance curve that one observes historically.
"B)Japan would not have suffered the historical qualitative and quantative attrition that drastically reduced their combat efficiency in 43."
That is something with which I agree. However, the initial attrition rate would have been much worse for the Japanese than the initial attrition rate that they experienced in the early going of the historic event. So instead of inflicting, say, 1.2-1.5:1 combat loss ratios (favoring the Japanese) in the PI and Java, you'd see ratios more like 1.3:1 in favor of the Allies if the war *starts* in, say, June 1942. This does not solve the Allies' problem with the logistical isolation and lack of sufficient airbases in the PI, but it does deplete the Japanese pilot pool at a faster rate.
"Sure the US would be more prepared in late 42/43 than they would be in 41/42 and the advent of new a/c would eventually take its toll."
The toll and effect of advanced US a/c, and improved (relative to historic performance) pilot abilities would have been *immediate.*
"But you would probably not going to have a Mariana's style turkey shoot in an alternate history 43 becuase the IJN pilots would be better and the USN pilots would not be as good."
If the war starts as late as 1943, Japan loses a/c and pilots from the get go at a 2:1 rate. Not the Marianas Turkey Shoot by a long shot, but a pretty horrible situation all around. You'd probably still have the Turkey Shoot and probably still some time in 1944. WIth a 1943 start, the battle for the skies is already lost for Japan. The battle then has to be won either on the seas or through the successful implementation of a strategy that baits a numerically and qualitatively superior foe into a series of small encounters that give a local advantage to Japan. For that to work you have to count on US operational planners to make a lot of mistakes.
"Of course this is in context of the game. Historically Japan cant win a war with the US no matter when it starts, but thats no fun."
Well, I'd say you choose between a good historical simulation or fantasy. If I want something that pretends to be a simulation then I set the victory conditions to balance out the numerous advantages held by the Allies.
Personally, I do not want a simulation that is "balanced" by virtue of pretending that one side or the other had capabilities that diverge in extreme and implausible ways from historical conditions (like using the GGPW model for air-air combat). You can have Axis Fantasy or you can have WW2. The whole fun of the thing for me is to try to do better than the historic performance (for either side). When I want perfect play balance and am willing to tolerate fantasy in a strategic game, I'll take Stellar Conquest any day over, say, Empire of the Rising Sun or GGPW. [/B][/QUOTE]
Hi Mdiehl
First the the Historical, and then back to the game
I agree with your assessment by mid 42 (say from July 42 and on) the combat ratio was basically 1:1. I cant agree however with your claim that the combat ratio was 1:1 early in the war
(Dec.41-June42). To what you do you base this claim? Certainly you dont mean total Allied a/c. Malaya for example, the fighters
were not caught on the ground and most the losses can be attributed to combat attrion. Even as late as April 42; the attack on Colombo Ceylon, resulted in 14 Hurricanes shot down to 1 zero. The follow up raid on Tricomolee resulted in 9 Hurricanes shot down to 3 zeros. I've already alluded to the fact that the DEI losses were much greater than 1:1 and wont repeat myself.
However, if you are just talking about US combat vs the zero, then I still take exception to your claim. Admittedly exact numbers are hard to come by for these early encounters, but you can make some general assumptions with the stats that are available
First in the PI, as I mention before various sources put losses on the ground on the 8th Dec between 35-40 P-40s out of 104 deployed. After that I can find no other reference of P-40s being destroyed on the ground. So that leaves you with between 64-69 P-40s. deployed after the 8th. Now according to official army records Gen.Brereton reports that on Dec 13th USFEAF had 26 operational P-40s with 6 more repairable P-40s available. That would mean a loss of 32-37 a/c in a 5 day period. Now even US confirmed claims of zeros, were 3 zeros by Cpt Wagner, 3 more by 3 other p-40 pilots and 1 by a P-35 pilot. For a total of 7 zeros shot down in arial combat. Japanese sources claimed 9 zero losses in total for all reasons in the PI campaign. That would indicate a 4:1 ratio in favor of the zero. Even taken into account the possibility of non combat losses of say 1/4 of that number, you still have a ratio of 3:1.
Now for Java, the numbers are even harder to come by, but what we do know that 5 flights of p-40s were sent to Java via the "Brereton Route" (Darwin-Timor-Bali-Java) The first flight of 13 made it without incident. The following 4 all suffered high losses in route, by a combination of combat, mechanical, and accidents. Now records show that eventually 25 p-40s were operational in Java. That means; that excluding that first flight, 12 additional P-40s made it from those other flights. Now even say 2/3rds of the losses in route were from accidents/breakdowns, That would leave at least 13 were probable combat losses in route. Now actual hard numbers of losses in Java are even harder to attribute. What is known, that the last 14 US P-40s were destroyed on the ground in an attack on Malang Airfield Java in March. That would indicate that 11 P-40s had been lost prior to that. For a probable total of 24 P-40s lost in air compat in the DEI.
RE: The "Big Java Air Battle". I have confirmed there was indeed a large airbattle fought over Surabaja Java on Feb.13,1942. Of course accounts and loss claims vary greatly. Both sides agree though that it was a wild malee and that the Allies for a change where flying above the port awaiting the attack. The aircraft including P-40s, Buffalos, Curtiss.75 Hawks, CW-13 and Hurricanes. The Japanese attacked with 54 zeros; 27 each from the 3rd and Tinian Kokutai's. The Japanese had claimed 39 planes of all types shot down, which is no dought an exageration, but we do know the losses must have been high, becuase they have been given as the reason why that no Air cover was available for the ABDA Fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea. Japanese losses of 3 Zeros can be confirmed from official Japanese records.
In the first attack on Darwin, 12 RAAF P-40s were reported shot down vs IJN records reporting 3 zero lost.
Approximate(albeit rough) total allied air losses first 4 months
PI
104 P-40s
18 P-35s
DEI
65 US P-40s
72 Dutch Fighters (Buffs, 75 hawks, CW-13, Hurricanes)
48 RAF Hurricanes
Singapore/Malaya
64 RAF/RAAF Buffalos
50 RAF Hurricanes
Burma
16 RAF Buffalos
? AVG P-40s
Ceylon
23 RAF Hurricanes
Darwin
12 RAAF P-40s
--------------------------
472 Total fighter losses
Of this number at least
181 were in your opinion superior P-40s
121 were somewhate equal Hurricanes
174 were clearly inferior.
I dont have the Total Japanese losses for those first 4 months, but do know they were anywhere near 400.
Another point has to made. You have made alluded to the fact that Japanses combat claims are dubious at best. To which I agree. However it must also be pointed out that Allied claims were just as exagerated, particularly early in the war.
For example: The US 24th pursuit grp. in the DEI claimed 38 zeros shot down and 16 probable. Saburo Sakai points out that ther where never more than 54 zeros operational over Java in the entire campaign.
Another point is that Allied claims of overwelming numerical superiorty is also greatly exagerated.
For example: The Japanese had only 108 zeros for the PI campaign 54 each in the 3rd and Tininain Kokutai's, There were only a total of 30 zeros attached to the IJA forces for the Malaya Campaign. There were 0 zero's in Burma. Many of the a/c claimed to be zeros were in fact greatly inferior Oscars, Nates and Clauds.
Thats all I have time for now. I will get back to you regarding your game comments.
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