quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

FYI. Found web surfing. It's ballpark correct. Not sure extent to which the specific .50bmg round makes a difference. The horizontal scale is yards I think.

[image]local://upfiles/1631/3027D19F85C94AA7975346DA03D0368E.jpg[/image]

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Thus deriving "long haul" to mean 1100 mile round trip would be an act of putting words in Richard Frank's text that do not actually appear in said text.

quote:

Recovering an almost intact A6M in the Aleutians was a major intelligence coup for the Americans. But the task of repairing Petty Officer Tadayoshi Koga's crashed Zero was by no means simple - American engineers had no technical
data to consult, Fortunately, major repair work only needed to be done to the nose, canopy and tail unit, and the broken
Sumitomo propeller was; replaced by a Hamilton Standard, the two being virtually identical. The repair task was
completed by October 1942, and the Zero was sent to San Diego so that it could be evaluated against the various types of US fighters in first- line service at the time. After the Zero was pitted against the Grumman F4F Wildcat in simulated combat, the subsequent report concluded that:
'The'Zeke (Zero) is superior to the F4F-4 in speed and climb at all altitudes above 1000 feet and is superior in service ceiling and range, close to sea level, with the Wildcat in neutral blower, the two aircraft are equal in level speed. During dives the two aircraft are also equal with the exception that the Zeke's engine cuts out in pushovers, There is no comparison between the turning circles of the two aircraft (due to the relative wing loading and low stalling speed of the Zeke.
'In view of the foregoing, the F4F type in combat with the Zeke is basically dependent on, mutual support, internal protection, and pullouts or turns at high speed where minimum radius is limited by structural or physiological effects of acceleration (assuming that the allowable acceleration on the F4F is greater than that of the Zero). However, advantage should be taken, where possible, of the superiority of the F4F Wildcat in pushovers and rolls at high speed, or in any combination of the two.’

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

Thought I'd post this to throw some more fuel on the fire:

From:

Mitsubishi Zero, Robert Jackson, 2003, Crowood Press

quote:

Recovering an almost intact A6M in the Aleutians was a major intelligence coup for the Americans. But the task of repairing Petty Officer Tadayoshi Koga's crashed Zero was by no means simple - American engineers had no technical
data to consult, Fortunately, major repair work only needed to be done to the nose, canopy and tail unit, and the broken
Sumitomo propeller was; replaced by a Hamilton Standard, the two being virtually identical. The repair task was
completed by October 1942, and the Zero was sent to San Diego so that it could be evaluated against the various types of US fighters in first- line service at the time. After the Zero was pitted against the Grumman F4F Wildcat in simulated combat, the subsequent report concluded that:
'The'Zeke (Zero) is superior to the F4F-4 in speed and climb at all altitudes above 1000 feet and is superior in service ceiling and range, close to sea level, with the Wildcat in neutral blower, the two aircraft are equal in level speed. During dives the two aircraft are also equal with the exception that the Zeke's engine cuts out in pushovers, There is no comparison between the turning circles of the two aircraft (due to the relative wing loading and low stalling speed of the Zeke.
'In view of the foregoing, the F4F type in combat with the Zeke is basically dependent on, mutual support, internal protection, and pullouts or turns at high speed where minimum radius is limited by structural or physiological effects of acceleration (assuming that the allowable acceleration on the F4F is greater than that of the Zero). However, advantage should be taken, where possible, of the superiority of the F4F Wildcat in pushovers and rolls at high speed, or in any combination of the two.’

He also provides results of comparisons with the P-38, P-39, P-51, F4U-1 if you would like to see them...

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

Thought I'd post this to throw some more fuel on the fire:

From:

Mitsubishi Zero, Robert Jackson, 2003, Crowood Press

quote:

Recovering an almost intact A6M in the Aleutians was a major intelligence coup for the Americans. But the task of repairing Petty Officer Tadayoshi Koga's crashed Zero was by no means simple - American engineers had no technical
data to consult, Fortunately, major repair work only needed to be done to the nose, canopy and tail unit, and the broken
Sumitomo propeller was; replaced by a Hamilton Standard, the two being virtually identical. The repair task was
completed by October 1942, and the Zero was sent to San Diego so that it could be evaluated against the various types of US fighters in first- line service at the time. After the Zero was pitted against the Grumman F4F Wildcat in simulated combat, the subsequent report concluded that:
'The'Zeke (Zero) is superior to the F4F-4 in speed and climb at all altitudes above 1000 feet and is superior in service ceiling and range, close to sea level, with the Wildcat in neutral blower, the two aircraft are equal in level speed. During dives the two aircraft are also equal with the exception that the Zeke's engine cuts out in pushovers, There is no comparison between the turning circles of the two aircraft (due to the relative wing loading and low stalling speed of the Zeke.
'In view of the foregoing, the F4F type in combat with the Zeke is basically dependent on, mutual support, internal protection, and pullouts or turns at high speed where minimum radius is limited by structural or physiological effects of acceleration (assuming that the allowable acceleration on the F4F is greater than that of the Zero). However, advantage should be taken, where possible, of the superiority of the F4F Wildcat in pushovers and rolls at high speed, or in any combination of the two.’

He also provides results of comparisons with the P-38, P-39, P-51, F4U-1 if you would like to see them...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I heard the bit about the P-39, too. Was never really clear on exactly WHY it was so much better than the Zero below 12K feet.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

Too good to be true!
Here it is folks!
Proof that it's the Pilot and not the plane
...notice that even giving the Japs the tough Gruman Hellcat and the Americans the flimsy Zero - It's still the Jap plane that's shot up and crashed![:D]

B

quote:

ORIGINAL: Charles_22

quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

Too good to be true!
Here it is folks!
Proof that it's the Pilot and not the plane
...notice that even giving the Japs the tough Gruman Hellcat and the Americans the flimsy Zero - It's still the Jap plane that's shot up and crashed![:D]

B

Nah, that's just an ancient wargamer's trick to make that point. You get a Cat and paint it with IJ colors everytime you lose a plane. That way the commander doesn't blame you for getting shot down or shot up on the ground, but promotes the flak crew instead.

quote:

Thus deriving "long haul" to mean 1100 mile round trip would be an act of putting words in Richard Frank's text that do not actually appear in said text.

quote:

The flames of war erupted in both New Guinea and the Solomon islands in early 1942, with the Japanese invading Rabaul and Kavieng in the Solomon Islands on 14 January 1942, Wewak and Lae/Salamaua in New Guinea on March 9, 1942.

Land troops were provided by the Japanese Army, the South Seas Detachment under General Hori. Air cover for both operations was provided by the JNAF, the JAAF being caught up in the invasions of Malaya, Singapore and Burma. In fact up to December 1942 the JNAF had to provide fighter and strike aircraft to cover both area's, as it was not until then that the JAAF moved into New Guinea in force with the advent of the 11th Sentai, JAAF, on 18 December 1942. So during the critical phase of the Guadalcanal battles from August to November 1942, the JNAF had to not only attack Guadalcanal and the American Support fleet but also mount offensive fighter and bomber sweeps over New Guinea to support Hori's troops fighting on the Kokoda Trail, and at the end of the year, at Milne Bay and Buna. Which proved too much for the small number of Kokutai based at Rabaul.

Opposing the Japanese on New Guinea in early 1942 was a motly collection of RAAF aircraft. Fortunately for them the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal burst on the scene before the Japanese could build up their forces in New Guinea, otherwise they would have taken Port Moresby by storm. This gave the newly arrived General Kenney time to organise his forces, the Fifth Air Force being offically created on the 7th August 1942. For the remainder of the New Guinea campaign the Fifth Air Force and the RAAF first fought the JNAF, then the JAAF.

quote:

Lakunai was Rabaul's primary fighter strip. It was heavily defended with AA guns, and searchlight units were detached at Raluana Point, near the Matupi causeway on the nearby beach, and on the hills in the Sulphur Creek area. The airfield itself was Y-shaped with both runways exceeding 4,500 feet. Despite volcanic dust which pervaded everywhere, the runways' coral surfaces were smooth and all-weather. At the Northeast end of both runways was a volcanic hill which constituted a formidable obstacle. Square protective revetments were placed alongside the runways, with most of the complex' buildings and barracks located at the southern field's end. Japanese maps and documents of the era refer to the field (in Kana) as 'Rabinjikku' - or 'Rabaul lower'. Vunakanau was known as 'Rabaul upper'. Lakunai was mostly used for smaller aircraft as the volcano, which so dominated the landscape, was considered dangerous for fully-loaded bombers to avoid.... Volcanic dust at Lakunai played havoc with the engine's air filter which had to be regularly removed and cleaned.

quote:

Thursday, 1 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-17s and P-400s pound forces and communications in the Owen Stanley Range, hitting Menari, Kagi, Myola Lake, the Kokoda area, Wairopi bridge, and the Buna-Wairopi trail; and the 71st Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 38th Bombardment Group (Medium), moves from Bredden Field, Australia to Port Moresby with B-25s.

Friday, 2 October, 1942
In the Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea, A-20s bomb and strafe Japanese campsites around Myola and hit several trails in the area, while P-400s strafe bridges at Sirorata and Wairopi and a village Northeast of Wairopi. B-17s bomb shipping and airfield at Rabaul on New Britain Island, Bismarck Archipelago.


Saturday, 3 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s bomb and strafe Efogi and Myola Lake, P-40s strafe the Efogi-Buna trail, B-25's hit a bridge at Wairopi, and a lone B-17 bombs a camp on the Kumusi River.


Sunday, 4 October, 1942
In New Guinea, P-40s strafe forces and occupied areas at Myola Lake, Kokoda, Wairopi, Yodda, and Buna; a US reconnaissance party from the 126th Infantry Regiment, 32d Infantry Division reaches Jauri, completing a reconnaissance of the Kapa Kapa-Jauri trail, which is found to be difficult but practicable for use as a route in a contemplated offensive against the Buna-Gona area.


Monday, 5 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-25s attack a convoy off Buna; A-20s hit AA positions at Sanananda Point and bomb the village of Sanananda; B-17s bomb airfields at Buna and also hit airfields at Rabaul on New Britain Island.


Tuesday, 6 October, 1942
In New Guinea, Fifth AF aircraft complete the movement of the reinforced Australian 18 Brigade to Wanigela on the peninsula between Dyke Acland and Collingwood Bays on the East coast of Papua; this is part of the move aimed at capture of the Buna-Gona area.


Thursday, 8 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-25s bomb the Buna area while A-20s pound the Buna-Kokoda trail; the Japanese withdrawal Northeast across the Owen Stanley Range slows as they prepare to make a stand at Templeton's Crossing North of Myola.


Friday, 9 October, 1942
30 B-17s pound numerous targets at Rabaul, New Britain Island. In New Guinea, 14 B-25s hit the airfield at Lae; and HQ 49th Fighter Group moves from Darwin, Australia to Port Moresby


Saturday, 10 October, 1942
B-17s pound Rabaul and nearby Lakunai airfield on New Britain Island. In New Guinea, A-20s hit targets along the Buna-Kokoda trail and, with P-400s, strike villages in the area of Asisi and Sanananda; and the 9th Fighter Squadron moves from Darwin, Australia to Port Moresby with P-40s


Sunday, 11 October, 1942
The 22d Troop Carrier Squadron, Air Carrier Service, Air Service Command, Fifth Air Force, moves from Essendon Airdrome to Garbutt Field, Australia with C-47s.


Monday, 12 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s hit the village of Isivita and targets on the trail near Wairopi; B-25s bomb Buna, Wairopi bridge, and targets along the Buna-Kokoda trail. The 64th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 43d Bombardment Group (Heavy), arrives at Fenton Field from Iron Range, Australia with B-17s.


Tuesday, 13 October, 1942
B-17s again pound Rabaul, New Britain Island, concentrating on Vunakanau and Lakunai Airfields. In New Guinea, a B-17 bombs Buna; and the 6th Troop Carrier Squadron, 63d Troop Carrier Group, arrives at Port Moresby from the US with C-47s. The 65th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 43d Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Torrens Creek to Iron Range, Australia with B-17s.


Wednesday, 14 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-25s attack Lae, a bridge 40 miles (64 km) N of Port Moresby, and the area of the Wairopi bridge; on the Kokoda trail Japanese offer fierce resistance to Australians pushing NE in the vicinity of Templeton's Crossing; and Fifth AF aircraft begin flying a force of Australians and Americans to Wanigela.


Thursday, 15 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s and P-40s pound forces South of Templeton's Crossing and at Popondetta; B-25s bomb Salamaua and hit targets in the Owen Stanley Range and in the area around the bridge at Wairopi. A single B-17 attacks shipping near Treasury Islands, Solomon Islands.


Friday, 16 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s and B-25s hit the village of Pawaia, trails in the Kokoda area, the Buna-Kokoda trail, and villages at the mouth and along the Mambare River; and B-25s also bomb the Mubo-Salamaua trail. B-17s bomb airfield at Rabaul, New Britain Island and attack targets in the Solomon Islands, including the airfield at Buin on Bougainville Island, and shipping off Moila Point and the Shortland Islands.


Saturday, 17 October, 1942
The 403d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 43d Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Torrens Creek to Iron Range, Australia with B-17s


Sunday, 18 October, 1942
B-17s attack shipping and aircraft in the Faisi area in the Shortland Islands, Solomon Islands, schooners and buildings at Lorengau on Manus Island, Admiralty Islands, Kahili Airfield, and shipping off Kahili, Pupukuna Point, and Buin on Bougainville Island. In New Guinea, B-25s hit Wairopi bridge in the Owen Stanley Range, the village of Mubo, and the dock and occupied area on Pilelo Island; the Fifth AF completes the air movement of most of the 128th Infantry Regiment, 32d Infantry Division, to Wanigela; and the 39th Fighter Squadron, 35th Fighter Group, moves from Townsville, Australia to Port Moresby with P-38s.


Wednesday, 21 October, 1942
B-25s hit Luscan Harbor on the South coast of New Britain Island


Friday, 23 October, 1942
A-20s bomb and strafe Deniki and Deniki-Kokoda trail in New Guinea. B-17s thoroughly pound shipping at Rabaul on New Britain Island. HQ 19th Bombardment Group (Heavy), which has been fighting since 8 December 1941, begins a movement from Mareeba, Australia to the US


Saturday, 24 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-25s hit Lae Airfield; and organized Japanese resistance on Goodenough Island ceases.


Sunday, 25 October, 1942
13 B-17s bomb shipping at Rabaul, New Britain Island. In New Guinea, A-20s bomb and strafe the Isurava-Kokoda trail, the W bank of the Kumusi River, and the area North of Asisi as Australian ground forces push toward Kokoda in the Owen Stanley Range; and HQ 38th Bombardment Group (Medium) and the 405th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) move from Townsville, Australia to Port Moresby with B-25s. The 93d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 19th Bombardment Group (Heavy), begins a movement from Mareeba, Australia to the US.


Monday, 26 October, 1942
In New Guinea, B-25s hit Salamaua and the airfield at Lae; A-20's, escorted by P-40s, bomb and strafe trails in the Missima-Kaile-Deniki area.


Tuesday, 27 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s hit trails in Southeast Papua around Alola, Isurava, and Abuari; P-39s escort Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hudsons in strike against small craft at Ferguson Island in the D'Entrecasteaux Islands.


Wednesday, 28 October, 1942
B-17s pound shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, New Britain Island, while B-25s bomb the airfield on Gasmata Island off the South coast of New Britain Island.


Thursday, 29 October, 1942
A-20s hit the Isurava-Deniki and Abuari-Kaile trails, New Guinea; B-17s attack shipping in BougainvilleStrait between Buin, Bougainville Island and Faisi Island, Shortland Islands. The 71st Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 38th Bombardment Group (Medium), moves from Townsville, Australia to Port Moresby with B-25s.


Friday, 30 October, 1942
B-17s bomb harbor and shipping at Buin, Bougainville Island.


Saturday, 31 October, 1942
In New Guinea, A-20s bomb and strafe Nauro and the area to N; B-25s strafe supply trucks Southeast of Gona. B-17s bomb shipping at Rabaul, New Britain Island, and in Buin, Bougainville-Faisi Island-Tonolai, Bougainville Island area.

quote:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I have that book on my shelf too...the comparison between Zero and the P-39 is also quite an eye opener. Above 12,000 to 15,000 feet the Zero excels in all departments.
However below 12,000 feet the tables are COMPLETELY turned and the P-39 does everything better by a huge margin.[;)]

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An obvious arguement for rating the A/C in WITP for altitudes. Try running a "sweep" with P-39's in the game at 1000 feet and see how quickly Zero's eat your lunch......

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Unless your suggesting that aircraft and crews only suffer wear on the way in.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

..... Indeed, much of the Japanese apparent success in the first six months of the war in aerial combat is largely attributable to the lousy logistical circumstances experienced by Allied pilots and the fact that absent "average" early warning systems the attacker is usually going to have strategic and even tactical advantage.

quote:

Halsay said after the battle of midway in his report that the 4f3/4f4 must be replaced as the zero was a better fighter!!

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

Any military commander who is interested in a wartime "fair fight" ought to be courtmartialed.
Halsey just wanted a plane that was faster, more manueverable, better protected and carrying heavier firepower than the Zero. Seems like a reasonable sort of comment for any Allied commander to make. The fact it was after the Battle of Midway was probably coincidental.[:D]

quote:

Halsay said after the battle of midway in his report that the 4f3/4f4 must be replaced as the zero was a better fighter!!

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

Any military commander who is interested in a wartime "fair fight" ought to be courtmartialed.
Halsey just wanted a plane that was faster, more manueverable, better protected and carrying heavier firepower than the Zero. Seems like a reasonable sort of comment for any Allied commander to make. The fact it was after the Battle of Midway was probably coincidental.[:D]

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

Huh?

B

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Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip

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ORIGINAL: treespider

quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

Huh?

B

Just thought I'd stoke the fire...but I would suggest the kill ratio would have been substantially different if the Japanese didn't have to make a 565 mile return trip...

quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip

Some aircraft may have been lost that way it is true. Maybe even as much as 5%. The point is that one can cherry pick the conditions they want. Frank specifically was writing in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Japanese." Notably the assesment did not include the equivalent of "and I'd have gotten away with it were it not for you meddling kids!" ... that is, Frank does not say with a shorter round trip the Japanese certainly would have won the air campaign. He wasn't writing that summary chapter in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Allies" ... like having sufficient warning via the radar and coastwatcher net that the F4Fs could typically obtain positional advantage. When it worked, the warnings turned one sided "attacker has initiative and positional advantage" affairs into, essentially, meeting engagements.

Give the F4F pilots decent rest, good maintenance facilities, and good food, and the Japanese pilots would probably have lost regardless of the distance they had to fly to engage. Their plane wasn't up to battle damage nor were their training and tactics the right sort of training and tactics to deal with opponents who would not fight to the strengths of the Japanese planes.